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In this dissertation, I examine the strategic evolution of the US anti-sweatshop 
movement, particularly United Students Against Sweatshops (USAS) and the Worker 
Rights Consortium (WRC). While scholars of social movements have analyzed 
individual tactics used by movements, they have only recently begun to look at the larger 
question of strategy--how movements make choices about which tactics to use when and 
how they link these tactics together into a larger plan to alter macro-level power relations 
in society. This dissertation is one of the first empirical examinations of the processes by 
which particular groups have developed their strategy. I look at how ideology and values, 
a sophisticated analysis of the structure of the apparel industry, strategic models for 
action handed down from past movements, and the movement’s decision-making 
structures interacted in the deliberations of anti-sweatshop activists to produce innovative 
strategies. I also focus on how the larger social environment, especially the structure of 
the apparel industry, has shaped the actions of the movement. In seeking to bring about 
change, the anti-sweatshop movement had to alter the policies of major apparel 
corporations, decision-making arenas typically closed to outside, grassroots influence. 
They did so by finding various points of leverage--structural vulnerabilities--that they 
could use against apparel companies. One of the most important was USAS’s successful 
campaign to get a number of colleges and universities to implement pro-labor codes of 
  
conduct for the apparel companies who had lucrative licensing contracts with these 
schools. In USAS’s campaigns to support workers at particular sweatshops fighting for 
their rights, they could then use the threat of a suspension or revocations of these 
contracts--and therefore a loss of substantial profits--as a means to pressure apparel 
companies to protect the workers’ rights. This combination of strategic innovation and 
access to points of leverage has allowed the US anti-sweatshop movement to win some 
victories against much more powerful foes. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
Glimpses of the Anti-Sweatshop Movement 
 In 1995 and 1996, there were a series of major news stories on the return of 
sweatshops in the apparel industry. These stories were fueled in part by the sensational 
nature of the cases involved. On August 3, 1995, The Los Angeles Times broke the story 
of a factory in El Monte, California where roughly seventy Thai immigrants were being 
held in conditions of virtual slavery. In 1996, Charles Kernaghan of the National Labor 
Committee (NLC) and the major US apparel union UNITE revealed that Kathy Lee 
Gifford, a talk show host who had cultivated a maternal persona, was producing her 
personal line of clothes in sweatshops employing child laborers, both in Honduras and 
New York City. The reality was that these sweatshop working conditions were nothing 
new--they had been becoming increasingly common since the 1970s, both in the US and 
abroad. The salacious nature of the scandals--modern-day slave labor in one case, a 
maternal celebrity profiting from child labor in another--however, gave these cases 
attention that more run-of-the-mill sweatshop cases did not. This was a blessing for 
groups like the NLC and UNITE who had been trying to call attention to the resurgence 
of sweatshops for some time, with relatively little success (Ross 2004). 
Although conditions certainly vary from one factory to another, it is still possible 
to broadly describe the conditions that prevail in sweatshops. The workforce consists 
predominantly of young women, whom employers--seeing them through patriarchal eyes-
-view as more dexterous and docile, both more skilled as sewing and less likely to rebel 
than men. A typical workweek is six days a week, twelve or more hours a day. Pay is 
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minimal, sometimes not even meeting the legal minimum wage of the country where the 
factory is located, let alone a living wage. Overtime is usually mandatory--again 
regardless of what the actual law says. At times, when workers must complete large 
orders, they are forced to get only a few hours asleep underneath their sewing machines. 
Factories are generally unsafe and unsanitary. Sexual harassment is typically pervasive. 
Women may be fired for being pregnant, so that their employers do not have to pay for 
maternity leave. Where racial differences exist, as with East Asian factory owners in 
Central America, there may be racial harassment as well. Armed guards may be present 
to keep workers in line, with the police available to back them up when the guards alone 
cannot bring sufficient force to bear to repress workers (Bonacich et al. 1994; Brooks 
2007; Klein 1999; Pangsapa 2007; Ross 2004). 
 While the El Monte and Gifford scandals called some attention to these facts, 
media coverage soon petered out. It was enough, however, to spark an interest in anti-
sweatshop activism in some sectors, including among college students. Independently, 
over the course of the 1995-1996 school year, anti-sweatshop groups sprang up on a 
number of college campuses, fueled by concern that their schools were doing business 
with companies who profited from sweatshop labor. Eric Dirnbach (interview, 2007), 
then a graduate student at the University of Michigan, told me, 
There was really nothing going on around campus about that [issue] and 
there was some news coming out, the Kathie Lee scandal and some other 
things about some Nike problems with sweatshop factories in Indonesia 
and other Asian countries, so we decided we were going to try to do 
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something about that. […] We protested at football games, and had some 
meetings with the administration, etc. Our demands were a little 
incoherent at that point--it basically was drop the Nike contract or get 
them to do the right thing. It was not quite clear to us at the time exactly 
what the right thing would be. 
This lack of coherence appears to have been common among student anti-sweatshop 
activists at the time. In addition to being unsure of their exact demands, in many cases, 
they did not have a clear plan for pressuring the administrators of their school. They 
might organize a piece of street theater on campus to raise awareness of the issue of 
sweatshops, but they did not necessarily have a clear idea about how that might translate 
into a long-term plan for changing college policy. 
 Roughly ten years later, over the summer of 2005, a national student anti-
sweatshop group, United Students Against Sweatshops (USAS) convened a meeting, 
which included people not only from other US anti-sweatshop groups, but anti-sweatshop 
activists from across the globe. Their goal was to come up with a plan that would allow 
them to force major apparel companies to change their business practices, particularly the 
fashion in which they outsourced their manufacturing, something that lies at the root of 
the problem of sweatshops. Their goal, in other words, was to devise a plan that would 
bring about major structural changes in the industry. The product of this meeting was the 
Designated Suppliers Program (DSP), in which companies doing business with 
participating schools would be required to source a certain percentage of their clothing 
for those schools--initially 25%, but eventually 75%--to particular factories, which had 
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been certified by the Worker Rights Consortium (WRC), an independent monitoring 
organization, as being generally respectful of workers’ rights. While this was certainly 
ambitious, there was no reason for USAS and its allies to think it was totally unrealistic. 
They had already pressured over 150 colleges and universities into adopting codes of 
conduct meant to guarantee labor rights and then persuading those schools to join the 
WRC, which would act as the enforcer of these codes. Indeed, USAS and its allies had 
founded the WRC for this very purpose. 
 Clearly, the US student anti-sweatshop movement had evolved significantly over 
ten years. They had gone from being a network of somewhat only loosely connected 
groups on various campuses to a national organization that many considered to be at the 
cutting edge of the US anti-sweatshop movement as a whole. They had also gone from 
being unclear on how to effectively pressure the administrators of their own colleges to 
designing a detailed plan to alter some of the basic business practices of the major firms 
of the apparel industry, behemoths of the corporate world such as Nike and Reebok. 
In seeking to understand how this dramatic development happened, current 
scholarly theories of social movements offer us little guidance. Quite simply, they have 
relatively little to say about the ways in which social movements strategize and therefore 
little to say about how a group’s strategy might evolve so much over the course of ten 
years. Instead, at least until recently, movement scholars have focused on the individual 
tactics movements have used--such actions as street theater, rallies, petitions, sit-ins, etc. 
Much of this work has produced valuable insights into how groups select their tactics and 
the effects these tactics have. This research has, however, largely neglected the larger 
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question of strategy, not looking, for instance, at how different activists link different 
tactics into a larger plan and what the effects of those tactics in interaction with each 
other are. Without this, it is hard to get a grip on how the student wing of the anti-
sweatshop movement evolved from using scatter-shot protests and guerilla theater to 
devising an ambitious plan on the scale of the DSP. Over the course of this dissertation, I 
will look at the strategic evolution of the US anti-sweatshop movement, with a particular 
focus on USAS and the WRC. 
Understanding how they developed a coherent strategic plan and how their 
strategy evolved over time will give us a deeper understanding of not only this movement 
in particular, but of how movements in general create their strategies. I will also consider 
why looking at strategy as an integrated set of practices is important--what dynamics it 
brings to light that considering tactics and other actions by social movements, such as 
organizing and framing messages, in isolation does not illuminate. The anti-sweatshop 
movement has been successful in part because they have looked at all these issues in an 
interconnected fashion--unlike some activist groups (including some activists I 
interviewed before they connected with the larger movement) who think only tactically, 
coming up with ideas for creative actions, but not thinking about how they form part of a 
larger, organized line of attack against those power-holders responsible for the injustices 
they oppose. Understanding how movements can think strategically is important, for both 
scholars and activists, since doing so seems likely to dramatically increase their odds of 
success. 
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“Tactics” and “strategy” are two terms commonly used in one breath, as if they 
were largely synonymous. I would argue, however, distinguishing between the two calls 
our attention to an important aspect of how movements operate. In particular, it can 
highlight the ways in which activists draw on the diverse range of actions with which 
they are familiar to craft a larger campaign or plan. A tactic, as I define it here, is a 
discrete action that a social movement organization (SMO) can take that is modular (that 
is, standardized and repeatable)--something such as a rally, a sit-in, street theater, or 
strike. I define strategy, on the other hand, as the process by which SMOs and networks 
of allied SMOs seek, in the context of unequal power relationships, to develop sets of 
interlinked practices that will allow them to alter the larger social system, in particular 
seeking to alter the balance of power in their own favor and in those of the social groups 
they represent. These interlinked practices include assessing the opportunities and 
constraints in their larger social environment (Alimi 2007; Koopmans 2005; McAdam 
1999; Tarrow 1998), mobilizing people through movement organizations (Morris 1984), 
forming alliances with other groups (Bandy and Smith 2005; Bystydzienski and Schacht 
2001), framing their ideas for a larger audience (Ferree et al. 2002; Ryan 1991; Snow and 
Benford 1988), and selecting a particular set of tactics to use to pressure authorities 
(McAdam 1983; McCammon et al. 2008; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1978). In other words, 
strategy covers the range of actions, including the individual tactics scholars have long 
studied, a movement consciously takes to reach its goals--and the process by which 
movement activists select those particular actions and combine them into a larger whole. 
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Methods and Data 
My analysis draws on two major sources of data. The first is thirty in-depth 
interviews with activists in the US anti-sweatshop movement, conducted between June 
and October 2007. Because the people I wished to speak with were scattered across the 
US, I conducted the majority of interviews by phone, though I was able to do some face-
to-face; I noticed no difference in the quality of the interviews--i.e., the interviewees’ 
willingness to speak freely, etc.--whether they were by phone or in person. My selection 
of interviewees was guided by the need to create what Robert Weiss (1994) calls a panel 
of knowledgeable informants--people who have participated in the events I am interested 
in and have otherwise difficult to obtain knowledge. The intent was also ethnographic, 
since I wanted to understand not only what happened, but how the interviewees 
understood the social forces they were up against and the strategic reasons for their 
actions. I interviewed people from a broad range of organizations, though the focus was 
on current and former members/ staff of United Students Against Sweatshops and the 
Worker Rights Consortium. My second major source of data was historical research 
using newspaper articles, various groups’ reports and websites, and other such material to 
help me reconstruct some events in detail. 
For practical reasons of time, finances and linguistic ability, I confined this study 
to US-based organizations, not attempting to study the entire global network of the anti-
sweatshop movement. As should be clear from my analysis though, most of the activists I 
spoke with had spent a considerably amount of time abroad working with allies in the 
Global South and many of the actions of the US anti-sweatshop movement were 
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influenced by feedback from these allies. The activists I spoke with all gave me 
permission to quote them using their real names; given the small size of the anti-
sweatshop movement, trying to protect people’s confidentiality through pseudonyms 
probably would have been fruitless in any case. In a few cases, however, I have used 
pseudonyms for particular quotes or citations of interviews because the interviewees are 
currently in positions where it would be problematic for them to be publicly associated 
with certain positions they took in their interviews. I have marked such pseudonyms with 
an asterisk (*) the first time they appear in each chapter. 
In doing the interviews, analyzing them afterward and writing this dissertation, I 
have treated my interviewees as experts on the topic of anti-sweatshop activism. While as 
a trained sociologist, I bring a particular sort of expertise to these questions my 
interviewees don’t have, as experienced activists who have often thought a good deal 
about the causes of sweatshops and the strategy of their movement, they have a practical 
expertise I lack. In analyzing how the anti-sweatshop movement has strategized and 
particularly what makes for successful strategy in the social contexts in which they work, 
I have found their insights invaluable. The theory of social movement strategy and 
political opportunity I develop here is my own, but it builds upon the practical insights 
my interviewees shared with me. 
 
The Current State of Social Movement Theory 
 Part of the reason that scholars of social movements in sociology and political 
science have not closely analyzed strategy until recently is that the field itself is relatively 
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young, only really taking shape in the 1970s, whereas many other central topics in the 
social sciences took shape as subfields in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. This is not to say that scholars did not study social movements before the 70s, 
but, at least in the US, they did so through the lens of collective behavior theory, a 
perspective that current scholars (despite the disagreements among themselves that we 
will look at below) have largely rejected. Although there were a number of important 
variations of the theory, collective behavior theorists generally took a dim view of social 
movements, seeing them as irrational, their participants as emotionally disturbed and 
socially isolated, and movements themselves as a threat to democracy. US scholars 
developed this perspective largely in response to movements they disliked and which 
were actually anti-democratic--fascism and Marxist-Leninism. This model did not fit well 
with the movements that emerged in the 1960s and 70s, however, which clearly played a 
role in deepening democracy in the United States. A new generation of scholars who 
were either participants in these movements or broadly sympathetic to them arose and 
began developing new theories (Buechler 2000). 
 Since this time, two distinct camps of thought have developed among US scholars 
of social movements--political process theory and cultural constructionism. Political 
process theorists have largely emphasized structural and organizational factors in 
understanding the dynamics of social movements, while cultural constructionists 
emphasize, as one might guess from their name, cultural factors. Despite some broad 
areas of agreement between the two camps, there are also many points of difference, 
leading to some at times highly contentious debates (e.g., Goodwin and Jasper 2004b). I 
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will briefly review the main claims of the two schools, before turning to look in depth at 
those areas of both theories most relevant for understanding social movement strategy. 
 
Political Process Theory 
 Political process theory is the easier of the two schools to provide a clear 
overview of because the scholars belonging to this camp have produced at least two 
major volumes that clearly define the central concepts of the theory, synthesizing the 
work of a large number of scholars--Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements, 
edited by Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, and Meyer Zald (1996b) and Power in 
Movement by Sidney Tarrow (1998). In their introduction to Comparative Perspectives 
on Social Movements, McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (1996a) lay out the concepts of 
political opportunity structure, mobilizing structures, and framing as they key concepts in 
political process theory; in Power in Movement, Tarrow adds a fourth key concept, 
tactical repertoires. I will explain these concepts briefly here, then explore them in more 
depth as appropriate later in this chapter and throughout the dissertation. 
 The concept of political opportunity structure can be broadly understood as the 
idea that larger social conditions, many of which movements have little or no control 
over, help shape the chances for success or failure of a movement. More specifically, 
political process theorists have tended to focus on the structure of the state and in what 
instances that structure creates openings for social movements. These can include factors 
like how open a state is to dissent--something usually connected with the degree of 
democracy--and the existence of factions among the elite who might be potential allies 
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for movements. Despite this emphasis on wider structures, political process theory is not 
guilty of structural determinism. The actions of movements as they interact with these 
structures matter. If they wish to accomplish anything at all, movements must have 
mobilizing structures--that is, they must be organized in such a way as to able to recruit 
people and then motivate them to take action, action that may put them directly at odds 
with authorities. Most movements’ mobilizing structures involve networks that join 
together a broad array of groups, which may be organized in a variety of ways (McAdam 
et al. 1996b; Tarrow 1998). The anti-sweatshop movement, for instance, includes 
mainstream labor unions, with their highly hierarchical structure, and United Students 
Against Sweatshops, which is much more decentralized and makes decisions by 
consensus, as well as a number of non-profits and churches. Despite these differences and 
occasional tensions, they work closely together, sharing ideas, planning strategy together, 
and mobilizing their membership to support each others’ campaigns. 
 Political process theorists analyze what movements do when they take action 
through two main concepts--tactical repertoires and framing. A movement’s tactical 
repertoire includes that range of actions with which activists within the movement are 
familiar with and will use (McAdam et al. 1996b; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1978). The anti-
sweatshop movement, for instance, has done everything from gathered signatures on 
petitions to doing sit-ins. Despite their willingness to take such highly confrontational, 
disruptive actions as sit-ins though, they do not do things such as burning effigies or 
suicide bombing--these actions are outside their tactical repertoire. Framing refers to the 
cultural work a movement does, in trying to promote their message in wider social 
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forums, particularly the mass media. Movements use frames to interpret events in the 
world around them, highlighting issues they see as unjust, identifying social actors who 
are responsible for this injustice (usually some group in power), and articulating a way 
that people can collectively work to right this injustice. If frames do not do these things, it 
is unlikely they will mobilize people--if there is no obvious target for activism, no one to 
blame, or if there is to clear way to pressure that target, people have little incentive to 
take action (Gamson 1992; McAdam et al. 1996b; Ryan 1991; Tarrow 1998). 
 
Cultural Constructionism 
 The cultural constructionist school of thought arose out of the concern that 
political process theorists were giving short shrift to culture in their analyses. Although 
political process theorists accept the importance of framing, they have tended not to treat 
culture as particularly important in understanding political opportunity structures, 
mobilizing structures, or tactical repertoires. Anthony Oberschall’s (1996) analysis of the 
pro-democracy movements that lead to the collapse of the Marxist-Leninist regimes of 
Eastern Europe in 1989 stands out as one of the few analyses in the political process 
tradition to emphasize the importance of legitimacy (or the lack thereof) in understanding 
the political opportunities a movement faces. This important cultural dimension of 
politics is otherwise conspicuous by its absence from most work done by political process 
theorists. The concept of framing certainly emphasizes the role of culture in social 
movements, but many political process theorists tend to shoehorn in anything cultural 
into this concept, rendering it overly broad (Goodwin and Jasper 2004a). In Power in 
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Movement, for instance, Tarrow (1998) discusses the role of collective identity in 
movements only briefly and then as a variant upon the theme of framing. Cultural 
constructionists give far more weight to this concept, treating it as something distinct 
from attempts to strategically convey a message to a wider audience (that is, framing in 
the strictest sense of the term) and analyzing it in depth. 
 It is a bit harder to give an overview of the work of cultural constructionists, as 
they, unlike political process theorists, have not produced any works that have the 
ambition of providing a broad overview of the field. The closest to a programmatic 
statement that this camp has produced is James Jasper’s (1997) The Art of Moral Protest; 
this book, however, is more an overview of Jasper’s own ideas, rather than an attempt to 
synthesize the work of a large number of scholars, as Comparative Perspectives 
(McAdam et al. 1996b) and Power in Movement (Tarrow 1998) were. Nonetheless, a few 
themes stand out from cultural constructionists’ work. They agree with political process 
theorists that it is important to look at the ways in which movements interact with their 
larger social and political environment, but find the concept of political opportunity 
structure overly narrow in their attempts to do so (Goodwin and Jasper 2004b). Jasper 
(1997) in particular emphasizes the role movements play in reshaping the larger culture, 
arguing that their greatest impact comes from their ability to force new issues, such as 
animal rights, into the wider public discourse, thus changing public consciousness and the 
terms of the debate. He is rather skeptical, however, of movements’ ability to have a 
direct impact of state policy. (See also Polletta (2006).) 
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 Much of the work of cultural constructionists has been focused on the inner life of 
movements, moving beyond political process theorists’ focus on the effectiveness of 
mobilizing structures. A key concept for many cultural constructionists is collective 
identity, the way in which movements forge a common sense among their members of 
belonging to a larger collectivity, with which they identify and care deeply about (della 
Porta 2005; Jasper 1997; Kurtz 2002; Taylor and Whittier 1999). Both Winifred Breines 
(1989) and Francesca Polletta (2002) has done extensive work on participatory 
democracy in social movement organizations, while both Jasper (1997) and Paul 
Lichterman (1995, 1996) have examined in depth the ways in which activists create a 
sense of community. These concepts all overlap in important ways--participatory 
democracy may be an important element of a group’s collective identity and a sense of 
community certainly reinforces any collective identity that exists. All these things can 
play an important role in terms of mobilizing people, but cultural constructionist theorists 
emphasize that activists do not simply create collective identities or communities for 
strategic reasons. Instead, they value community or participatory democracy in and of 
themselves, seeing them as much a part of their movement’s raison d’être as achieving 
external goals. Cultural constructionists have also showed a greater sensitivity to the roles 
race, class and gender play in the internal dynamics of a movement than political process 
theorists have (Breines 2006; Kurtz 2002; Lichterman 1995, 1996; Polletta 2005). 
Finally, cultural constructionists have emphasized the role emotions play in social 
movements, both in the internal dynamics of the movement and in their interaction with 
their foes (Goodwin et al. 2001; Jasper 1997). 
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New Developments 
 Recently, prominent theorists from both camps have attempted to break with their 
own past work, crafting new paradigms, ones in which the concepts they spent much of 
their careers developing apparently do not play a central role. Doug McAdam, Sidney 
Tarrow, and Charles Tilly (2001)--three of the most important political process theorists--
produced the book, The Dynamics of Contention. Here political opportunity structure, 
mobilizing structures, tactical repertoires and framing disappear from the picture. Instead, 
they attempt to build a theory of movements using Robert Merton’s concepts of 
mechanisms and processes, two key terms they never successfully define in a clear way. 
In doing so, they state that their purpose is to create a more dynamic and relational 
approach to the analysis of social movements. From the cultural constructionist camp, 
James Jasper (2006) wrote Getting Your Way, the central concern of which is strategy as 
a social process. Here Jasper makes his central concept a series of strategic dilemmas that 
not only social movements but a broad range of social actors must address as they take 
action in the wider social world. 
While these books both introduce some useful new concepts, their authors’ 
attempt to break with their previous work and create completely new paradigms, more or 
less from scratch, is in my mind an odd choice. Whatever the problems with both the 
political process and cultural constructionist paradigms, they both offer invaluable 
insights into understanding the dynamics of social movements. In this dissertation, I 
attempt to build on the work of theorists in both schools of thought. My work can 
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probably best be seen as within the political process tradition, but reformulating it in a 
way that takes into account and synthesizes in many of the issues raised by cultural 
constructionist theorists. 
 
Tactics and Strategy 
The Current Literature 
In analyzing the tactics and strategy of the anti-sweatshop movement, the obvious 
starting point in the current literature is the concept of tactical repertoires, the collection 
of actions with which a movement is familiar and will use. What makes is possible for a 
movement to have a repertoire of tactics which they can deploy in similar ways in 
different circumstances is that each particular tactic takes a certain modular, standardized 
form. This means that not only can the same tactics be used in different situations, but 
that they can be passed from one movement to another, sometimes even to a movement’s 
adversaries, since the standardized form eases the process of learning (McAdam et al. 
1996b; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1978). One classic example of a tactic being learned and 
adopted by one’s enemies is the use by the anti-abortion movement of civil disobedience, 
long a tactic exclusively of the left, in order to blockade clinics where abortions are 
performed. 
In addition to learning elements of other movement’s repertoires, movements may 
also innovate and create new tactics for their own repertoire. McAdam (1983) documents 
this at work in the civil rights movement. Each time activists would deploy a new tactic--
the bus boycotts, the sit-ins at lunch counters, the Freedom Rides, the city-wide 
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campaigns of the sort held in Albany, Birmingham, and Selma--they would temporarily 
baffle authorities, frustrating their attempts to maintain their social control. Eventually, 
however, the police and government officials would find effective ways to defuse the 
power of the tactic in question, leading to a downturn in civil rights activism until 
activists came up with a new tactic that the authorities were once again unfamiliar with. 
Part of the reason for the civil rights movement’s eventual long-term decline was that its 
leaders were eventually unable to come up with new, innovative ways to frustrate the 
authorities. It seems likely that every movement will reach such a point at some time, if 
for no other reason that the authorities have far more in the way of resources and the 
entire weight of the social structure and normal social routines to bring to bear against 
activists. Over the longer run as well, according to Tarrow (1998), movements’ tactical 
repertoires can change dramatically as they adapt to larger social conditions. The rise of 
the modern nation-state is the most important example, radically changing the nature of 
collective action, leading from a situation where brief, isolated local uprisings were the 
norm to the contemporary social movement, with its long-term goals and national--or 
increasingly transnational--orientation. As with the sharing of tactical repertoires, this 
involves a gradual, historical learning process as activists try new tactics under new 
conditions and one movement learns from the successes and failures of another. 
Implicit in much of the political process theorists’ analysis of tactical repertoires 
is that the development and deployment of tactics is largely an instrumental matter. 
Jasper (1997), however, emphasizes that movements do not use purely instrumental 
grounds to evaluate which tactics they use in any specific case from among the range 
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they are familiar with. Different groups have distinct “tastes” in tactics--what tactics a 
group uses is in part determined by the culture of the group. Tactics have a symbolic as 
well as strategic value, saying something about the collective identity of the group. 
Within the same broad movement, some individual groups may gravitate towards direct 
action and away from lobbying or vice versa; doing so helps define them respectively as 
radicals and moderates. Jasper doesn’t deny that the effectiveness of any given tactic does 
play a role in determining whether a group will adopt it, but insists that the group’s 
values and collective identity are equally if not more important. 
Some theorists (e.g., Downey 1986; Ferree 1992) have tried to take into account 
both the more instrumentalist approach of political process theorists and the cultural 
approach emphasizing collective identity by arguing that when movements strategize, 
they take into account both instrumental and ideological or value-rational concerns, 
engaging in a trade-off between the two. Polletta (2005), however, argues that this is a 
false dichotomy. Rather, what activists see as instrumentally effective involves a value-
laden process of cultural interpretation. Rather than there being a trade-off between 
ideological and instrumental concerns, they are two sides of one and the same process, as 
activists use their beliefs to make sense of what impact their tactics will have on the 
world--and therefore what will be effective. 
Among social movement theorists, there is a fair amount of consensus about what 
makes a movement’s choice of tactics effective--that they generate large-scale social 
disruption, which puts pressure on authorities to resolve the crisis in order to restore 
business as usual. The risk is that these authorities may respond with repression, but in 
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the right circumstances (that is, given the right political opportunities), they may instead 
make concessions to activists in order to restore social peace (Flacks 1988; Gamson 
1990; McAdam 1983; Piven and Cloward 1977; Tarrow 1998). Jasper (1997), however, 
argues that social movements have their primary impact not through the pressure they put 
on authorities by means of the disruption they generate, but through the changes they 
bring about in the wider public discourse, putting on to the agenda previously neglected 
issues, such as animal rights. 
As already noted, it is only recently that some scholars have begun to shift away 
from the exclusive focus on tactics to broader questions of strategy. Eitan Alimi (2007) 
has shown that some Palestinian nationalist groups actively analyze their political 
environment, particularly the political alignments in the occupying power of Israel, 
looking at the opportunities and constraints, to decide when it is appropriate to mobilize 
and which tactics they should use. In their study of groups advocating women’s inclusion 
in juries during the early twentieth century, Holly McCammon and her colleagues (2008) 
found those SMOs that were most successful were those that took the time to stop and 
reflect on their strategy, assessing the causes of their failures and reading “signals” from 
their social environment, then modifying their tactics and framing in light of this. In other 
words, both emphasize that a movement that is strategically savvy does not just deploy 
tactics from a repertoire in a rote manner, but analyzes what tactics will have the greatest 
impact, given the political opportunity structure. 
While both Alimi and McCammon et al. emphasize the importance of the 
decisions movements make about strategy, they do not analyze the process of making 
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decisions. In his study of the United Farm Workers, Marshall Ganz (2000, 2009) sheds 
some light on this, specifically what types of organization and leadership give rise to 
good strategy. He emphasizes the importance of an organization that promotes 
deliberative decision-making and in which the leadership is accountable to the members; 
and leadership drawn from a range of backgrounds, thus bringing a range of social 
networks and activist knowledge to the process of strategizing. 
 
A New Approach to Strategy 
While the work of Alimi (2007), McCammon et al. (2008), and Ganz (2000, 
2009) provides an important starting point in the analysis of strategy, they still leave 
much unexplored. In particular, they do not look into the process of how social 
movement organizations and networks formulate strategy. Both Alimi and McCammon et 
al. stress the importance of a movement taking the time to analyze the social 
environment--but they do not explore the interpretive process by which movements do 
so. This is not a simple matter, however, and there are no guarantees that a movement’s 
analysis of its environment will be either terribly accurate or useful. Ganz, on the other 
hand, presents us with a model of a social movement organization that can successfully 
strategize--but, while he recounts the events of meetings where activists debated strategy, 
he does not explore this process theoretically. In this dissertation, I wish to begin 
exploring the process behind formulating strategy in more depth. Below, I present a 
model of how movements strategize, one which I will apply to the anti-sweatshop 
movement in the rest of this dissertation. 
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To understand how a movement organization or network thinks about strategy, we 
must start with the systems of ideas through which they make sense of the world around 
them. Despite its centrality to the anti-sweatshop movement and other movements, 
ideology has been a largely neglected topic in the study of movements. Somewhat 
recently, however, a few respected social movement scholars (Ferree and Merrill 2004; 
Oliver and Johnston 2000; Zald 2000) have suggested reviving the concept of ideology in 
the study of movements, emphasizing the need to distinguish it from the more commonly 
used--and, as already discussed, overextended--concept of frames. While movements 
deploy frames for strategic purposes--to persuade people to support them and counter 
their foes’ claims (Ferree and Merrill 2004; Ryan 1991; Snow and Benford 1988)--
ideology is what guides a movement’s actions (Zald 2000). Here, I wish to follow Pamela 
Oliver and Hank Johnston’s (2000) definition of ideology--a core set of values, a set of 
theories (not necessarily coherent) about how the social world works, and norms for 
taking action in the world in the light of those values and theories. (A frame, on the other 
hand, focuses in on an issue, defining it in a specific way, with the hope of appealing to 
people who do not necessarily share the movement’s larger ideology, in order to build 
broader public support (Ferree and Merrill 2004).) Of the three elements of ideology, the 
most important, according to Oliver and Johnston, are the movement’s values. While 
movements may change their values, this is relatively rare and a long, difficult process, 
involving much reflection and discussion. Although also an involved process, movements 
are more likely to change their theories and norms, doing so in light of their successes 
and failures, but also in ways consistent with their values; theories and norms change as 
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movements seek to better understand how to see their values realized in the larger social 
world. 
While values, social theories, and norms may broadly guide a movement’s 
actions, if a movement is to act strategically, they must think through their actions at a 
more specified level, relevant to whatever campaign they are undertaking. In designing 
their strategy, the anti-sweatshop movement has drawn on the lessons of past campaigns 
and movements. Just as individual tactics are modular and can be passed on, so are 
strategies. Movements link together tactics, frames, mobilizing structures, etc. in 
relatively standardized (though not necessarily dogmatic or static) ways--models of 
strategic activity that can be passed from one movement to the next and one generation of 
activists to the next. Activists do not blindly cling to or apply these principles and models 
though. As they encounter obstacles, they learn from experience and innovate, adapting 
their social theories and strategic models. In this dissertation, I will explore in depth the 
strategic models of the anti-sweatshop movement and how they have evolved over time. 
In particular, I will look at the models USAS has developed to wage campaigns on 
campus to get college administrators to give into their demands; and that the US anti-
sweatshop movement as a whole has used to organize successful solidarity campaigns in 
support of workers on the ground in sweatshops across the world. 
This process of innovation involves a continuous dialectic between action and 
reflection (Ryan and Jeffreys forthcoming; Ryan et al. forthcoming), experience and 
ideology. When developing an initial strategy, activists will reflect on the world about 
them, using their ideology as a means to interpret that world and understand it. Based on 
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this understanding, they develop a strategic model, which they then put into action. No 
strategic model will be perfect, however, and even the most successful one will run into 
limits, as authorities figure out how to respond to it and blunt its impact. When members 
of a movement realize that this is occurring, they will then start a new cycle of reflection, 
including an examination of their experiences in taking action. Indeed, even a movement 
just getting started will draw on the experience of other movements in the past, 
particularly their strategic models, reflecting on the successes and failures of the past to 
better understand how to best achieve success in the present. In this dissertation, we will 
see the anti-sweatshop movement do this repeatedly, both in small ways as they 
formulate strategies on different college campuses, and in large ways, as they develop 
major innovations like the Worker Rights Consortium and the Designated Suppliers 
Program, both meant to fundamentally alter the landscape of anti-sweatshop activism. 
The articulation of ideology, the learning and adaptation of strategic models are 
not things that happen spontaneously. The process of interpreting the social environment 
and taking action occurs in the context of SMOS and the networks between them. Social 
movement organizations and networks play two critical roles in strategizing--creating a 
system of institutional memory, whereby the knowledge of strategic models is passed 
onto new generations of activists; and facilitating a process of deliberative decision-
making, in which activists actively interpret their social environment, decide how to 
apply their existing models and what innovations to adopt. Over the course of this 
dissertation, I will look at how USAS has drawn on the strategic knowledge of older 
SMOs, such as UNITE HERE (the major US apparel union) and the United States 
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Student Association (USSA), a student organizing group. I will also look at how USAS 
has passed on its knowledge to new members through annual conferences, something 
especially important for student groups like USAS, which, by their very nature, have 
extremely high turn-over rates as more experienced members graduate and new students 
join. I will also look at how activists made decisions at various key points in the 
evolution of the movement’s strategic models, as well as somewhat more routinely in 
campus-based and international solidarity campaigns, and how these decision-making 
processes shaped the resulting strategies. 
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Political Opportunity Systems 
 It would be mistake, however, to analyze the anti-sweatshop movement’s strategy 
in isolation. The movement’s strategy was born out of both activists’ analysis of their 
social environment and their attempts to alter that social environment--particularly, the 
conflicts they had with powerful foes, ranging from college administrators to 
transnational apparel corporations. Given this, to understand how the anti-sweatshop 
movement has strategized, we must understand how their interaction with their social, 
political and economic environment influenced their choices--how it constrained them, 
where they found opportunities, what their analysis of the social forces they were up 
against was. In other words, we need to understand what political process theorists would 
refer to as the political opportunity structure of the anti-sweatshop movement. 
 
The Current Literature 
The main obstacle to the anti-sweatshop movement achieving its goals has been 
the structure of the international apparel industry. Given the way USAS has sought to use 
the licensing programs of colleges and universities as a way to exert influence on the 
apparel industry, the power structure of higher education also played an important role in 
defining their political opportunities. In seeking to understand how these structures have 
affected the anti-sweatshop movement, we find surprisingly little guidance in political 
process theory and the concept of political opportunity structure. As not only cultural 
constructionist critics of the political process model (Goodwin and Jasper 2004a), but 
even some of its major proponents (Gamson and Meyer 1996; McAdam 1996), have 
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admitted, the concept of POS remains vague, more of a sensitizing concept that anything 
else. William Gamson and David Meyer (1996), for instance, argue that it is often 
“defined exclusively ad hoc and after the fact” (p. 276) and that “[i]t threatens to become 
an all-encompassing fudge factor” (p. 275). One telling sign of this vagueness is that 
Richard Healey and Sandra Hinson (personal communication, 2008) of the Grassroots 
Policy Project, two activists with an extensive knowledge of academic theories of social 
movements, which they seek to use to help movement organizations develop more 
effective strategy, have said that they have found it impossible to operationalize the 
concept of political opportunity structure in a way that is useful to activists. Instead of 
developing a coherent definition of POS, too many scholars have simply identified what 
aspects of the social environment are most relevant to the success or failure of the 
movement they are studying and labeled those the political opportunity structure, leading 
to a bewildering variation of definitions from one scholar to the next (Meyer 2004).  
Several leading political process theorists have, however, attempted to synthesize 
those definitions to capture the most commonly cited--and presumably therefore most 
important--factors. McAdam (1996) names the following four factors as the crucial ones: 
“1. The relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political 
system[;] 
“2. The stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that 
typically undergird a polity[;] 
“3. The presence or absence of elite allies[; and] 
“4. The state’s capacity and propensity for repression” (p. 27). 
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Tarrow (1998) divides the POS into the stable, institutionalized aspects of the political 
system and those that are more likely to change in the short-term. In the stable category 
he includes state strength, the state’s prevailing strategy for dealing with movements, and 
typical modes of repression; in the less stable category, the degree of access movements 
have to the political system, shifting political alignments, divisions among the elite, the 
existence of elite allies, and whether elites choose to repress movements or facilitate 
them. Gamson and Meyer (1996) place elements of the POS along two axes--stability vs. 
volatility and institutional vs. cultural--then proceed to place a wide range of social 
phenomena, including many identified by McAdam and Tarrow, as well as other 
scholars, at various points along these two axes. 
 I would argue that, while all these definitions highlight important factors, they all 
remain somewhat ad hoc and not easy to operationalize. Where, for instance, does one 
look for “openness [in] the institutionalized political system”? One could look for 
whether a system is democratic or not, but in the experience of anti-sweatshop activists, 
this does not necessarily correlate with openness. Indeed, most anti-sweatshop activists, 
while hoping to change government policy at some future date, have concluded that, for 
the time being, governments are so committed to neoliberal policies that they are, for all 
intents and purposes, largely closed to movement influence. Instead, they have found 
effective ways to pressure major transnational corporations, among the least democratic 
organizations on the planet; while even authoritarian governments may hold sham 
elections in the hopes of shoring up their legitimacy, the bodies that run the world 
economy do not feel the need even for such pretense. Yet, this is where the anti-
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sweatshop movement has been able to pry open some opportunities and begin to alter 
policy. 
 Two major cultural constructionist theorists, Jeff Goodwin and James Jasper 
(2004a) (see also Jasper (1997)), while agreeing that it is important to look at the social 
environment movements operate in, would have us dispose of the concept of POS 
entirely. They argue that when we speak of a political opportunity structure, the 
metaphor of structure can sometimes obscure as much as it reveals. Though social 
scientists are, in principle, all perfectly well aware that social structures change over time, 
the metaphor of structure tends to make us focus on what is fixed in the social 
environment, not what is undergoing transformation. This tends to obscure the fact that 
movements can, by their actions, change the political opportunities and constraints they 
face--a rather odd thing to obscure when one considers the fact that the very goal of 
movements is to transform their social environment. The metaphor of structure also tends 
to obscure the fact that the structures with which movements interact are not passive--
they consist of elite social actors (Jasper and Poulsen 1993; McAdam 2004), such as 
corporations and governments, that respond to movements, sometimes in ways that harm 
movements (repression or countering their messages), sometimes in ways that help 
(whether through concessions or strategic blunders). The definitions of POS we have 
reviewed try to take into account elite actors and changes in structure, but Goodwin and 
Jasper (2004a) argue that in all too many analyses, they are not evident and POS is 
treated in a static--as well as ad hoc--fashion. 
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One notable attempt to give the concept of political opportunity more definition is 
Myra Marx Ferree, William Gamson, Jürgen Gerhards, and Dieter Rucht’s (2002) 
analysis, which focuses on movements’ interactions with the with the mass media. As 
such, they focus on developing the concept of a discursive opportunity structure (DOS), 
which they succeed in defining with more precision than anyone up till now has defined 
political opportunity structure. They argue that in public life, there are any number of 
arenas where social movements and other groups fight frame battles (Ryan, 1991)--that 
is, they come into conflict over the proper framing of the issues, each side struggling to 
ensure that their frame will prevail as the one through which a particular issue is 
generally understood. The most important such arena in contemporary society is the 
mainstream mass media--which frame prevails in the mass media has consequences far 
beyond it, helping to define the larger public agenda. As Steven Lukes (2005) argues, the 
ability to get issues on the public agenda--or keep them off--and help define the terms in 
which they are understood is as critical to exercising social power as actual control over 
political decision-making processes. 
Unlike a real arena, the terrain in the mass media is uneven, with some groups 
having a structural advantage over others, features that help define the DOS. Journalists 
and editors do not act as neutral referees, but are themselves active participants in the 
conflict. They in turn are guided by journalist practices and norms, which can shape 
which actors and frames can gain access to the arena--and how much access to it they can 
get. Related to this, is what Ferree et al. (2002) call standing--essentially a form of status 
(in Max Weber’s (1946) sense), defining whether or not a social actor can expect to be 
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quoted in the media and how likely this is to happen. Standing is shaped by not only 
different journalist practices, but by political structures and the “characteristics of the 
actors who compete for standing including their goals, resources, and professionalism” 
(p. 87). (See also Ryan (1991).) Social actors must also contend with the various themes 
and counter-themes that exist in any society--what values and ideas are typically 
emphasized in public discourse (themes) and those that, while not dominant, may still 
sometimes be emphasized as a countering set of values. Those whose frames resonate 
with the dominant themes are much more likely to be taken seriously by mainstream 
journalists; and will have a much easier time conveying their meaning to a larger 
audience. In other words, they face a more open discursive opportunity structure (Ferree 
et al. 2002; Gamson 1992). 
 
A New Approach to Political Opportunity 
 In this dissertation I will build a more fleshed out model of political opportunity, 
that builds on the work already done by political process theorists, but takes into account 
the critiques raised both within that camp and by cultural constructionists. Taking into 
account Goodwin and Jasper’s (2004a) criticisms of the limitation of the metaphor of 
structure, I choose to speak not of a political opportunity structure, but of a political 
opportunity system (POS). This system includes both stable and dynamic elements, 
structural and cultural factors, and elite social actors--that is social agents, as well as 
social structures. Following Ferree et al. (2002), I wish to speak of arenas--but not only of 
the discursive arenas that they focus on, but decision-making arenas as well. I propose 
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that we think of the POS as made up of a series of interlocking, sometimes hierarchically 
arranged arenas, both discursive and decision-making. These arenas are social structures-
-they are certain durable patterns to the macro-level social relations that make them up, 
rules which social actors are expected to follow as they press their case in these arenas. 
(Social movements, of course, have a tendency to break these rules, especially when they 
rules stack the deck against weaker social actors.) 
It is important to note that these arenas are not just structures, but also social 
actors. For instance, an apparel corporation is a social structure, with its own relatively 
stable patterns of macro-social relationships, based on hierarchical chains of command, 
oriented towards maximizing profits; a decision-making arena, in which the leaders must 
decide on which actions they wish to take in the wider world--including in response to 
pressures from social movements; and a social actor, as the leaders oversee their 
subordinates carrying out the decisions they have made. This three-fold character is true 
not only for major corporations, but for many other social phenomenon--a college 
administration or a national government is also simultaneously a social structure, a 
decision-making arena, and a social actor. 
While it is useful to analytically distinguish between discursive and decision-
making arenas--and most arenas are principally discursive or decision-making--all arenas 
have both discursive and decision-making elements. In the mass media, the social actors 
fighting the frame battles must deal with the decisions made by journalists and editors in 
terms of what to cover and how; they may even lobby these decision-makers to cover 
certain stories in certain ways. In decision-making arenas, social actors must make their 
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case, framing their arguments in ways that will persuade others--even if they are also 
bringing other pressures to bear, such as the threat of a strike or sit-in. 
 In conceptualizing the POS, we need to think about how different social 
movement actors are related to these arenas. Differences in social location give social 
movement actors access to different social institutions--i.e. different discursive and 
decision-making arenas--and thus widely varying political opportunities (Piven and 
Cloward 1977). Sweatshop workers and student anti-sweatshop activists, despite 
belonging to a common transnational movement, have very different relationships to 
apparel companies. The workers are at the bottom of this social structure, interacting with 
their employers, contractors to whom the major apparel firms have outsourced production 
and who consequently have relatively little power in the larger picture. Students, on the 
other hand, are consumers--and a particularly valued set of consumers at that, at which a 
great deal of marketing is targeted. The profits of the brand-name corporations depend on 
their reputation with consumers such as college students. Given this, the brands worry far 
more about the attitudes and actions of students than they do workers, giving students 
openings that workers do not have, a point we will explore in more depth throughout the 
dissertation. Therefore, we must conceive of the POS always in relation to particular 
social actors, never simply in generic form (although, in some cases, it is certainly 
possible to make generalizations). 
This structure in turn has consequences for both workers’ and students’ ability to 
form independent organizations. There is a broad consensus among social movement 
theorists that, for movements to effectively exercise power they must be able to organize 
  33 
(McAdam 1999; McAdam et al. 1996b; Morris 1984; Tarrow 1998).1 With the exception 
of Meyer (2004), there has been less attention to the fact that different social conditions 
create different opportunities and constraints on movements’ ability to actually form such 
organizations, what I am referring to as organizing space. Workers in third-world 
sweatshops typically have very little space to organize, facing repression--ranging from 
firing of leaders to death squads--when they try to do so (Armbruster-Sandoval 2005). US 
activists working on college campuses, by contrast, are far freer to organize without fear 
of unpleasant consequences. They may be arrested, even threatened with expulsion 
(though this is rare), but they do not need to fear for their lives or livelihoods. 
 Just as workers and students must deal with different degrees of organizing space, 
they have different degrees and types of leverage. By leverage, I mean those points in the 
social structure that activists, with the proper tactical skill, can manipulate to their 
advantage to bring pressure to bear on those with more power than them. While the 
power of elites rests on the normal routines of social institutions, because movements 
almost by definition lack large degrees of institutionalized power, they must exert 
leverage through the opposite means--finding ways to disrupt the normal functioning of 
social institutions (Flacks 1988; Piven and Cloward 1977; Tarrow 1998). When such 
disruption is sufficient that elites feel their interests are threatened, they will respond--
hopefully with concessions, but also possibly with repression and counter-mobilization 
(see below). The anti-sweatshop movement has attempted to exert leverage both in the 
factory, with the workers striking at individual sites of production, and in sites of 
consumption, such as college campuses. 
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Unfortunately, corporations have not simply responded to pressure from social 
movements by giving into their demands. Instead, they respond to movement pressures 
by developing counter-measures against movements. In the case of the anti-sweatshop 
movement, their first line of defense has been repression--firing and attacking workers 
when they attempt to unionize. As the anti-sweatshop movement has successfully 
exposed these labor rights violations and forced companies to recognize unions, the 
companies have responded by engaging in a counter-mobilization effort (Jasper and 
Poulsen 1993), developing their own counter-frames and organizations that ostensibly 
foster corporate social responsibility. These counter-mobilization efforts have been as 
much an obstacle to the success of the anti-sweatshop movement as the brute repression 
of workers. 
 
The rest of this dissertation will analyze these matters in more depth. In the next 
chapter, we will take a look at the structure of the global apparel industry and how this 
structure is responsible for the pervasiveness of sweatshops. We will then move on to 
look at the origins of the anti-sweatshop movement, looking at the historical roots of 
some important elements of their strategic models. From there, we will turn out attention 
to the movement itself. We will start with an examination of USAS and the political 
opportunity system it faces on college campuses. Then we will look at the origins and 
operations of the WRC. After this examination of our two major SMOs, we will examine 
how they conduct international solidarity campaigns. And we will finish by looking at the 
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latest development in the anti-sweatshop movement’s strategy, the Designated Suppliers 
Program, which the movement is still in the process of attempting to implement. 
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Chapter 2: The Globalization of the Apparel Industry 
 
 
The Phillips-Van Heusen/ Camisas Modernas Campaign 
 In some ways, the Camisas Modernas factory owned by Phillips-Van Heusen 
(PVH), a major producer of men’s shirts, in Guatemala was a model factory. According 
to a report by Human Rights Watch (HRW), 
The company’s employee welfare programs […] were widely viewed by 
independent observers as exceeding the norm and arguably at the forefront 
of the maquila [production for export] sector. Managers expressed pride to 
Human Rights Watch in the company's support for a lunch room, at which 
the PVH subsidized hot lunches; a store, at which workers could make 
subsidized purchases; a clinic providing free medical attention on the 
plant's premises (which we were told is to include dentistry in the near 
future); a provision for interest-free loans; and generous provisions for ad 
hoc payments to be made to staff members or their families in the case of 
deaths and other family emergencies (Human Rights Watch 1997). 
Despite these perks, there were serious issues at the factory. The wages, at roughly 75-90 
cents an hour (pay was actually based on a piece-rate system), were only half of what was 
required to put a family of five over the poverty line (Armbruster-Sandoval 2005; Bounds 
1997a). There was also a long history on union-busting by management. 
 PVH opened up two Camisas Modernas factories in 1988, later merging them in 
January 1997. The first organizing campaign began in 1989, after management lowered 
the piece-rate payments, meaning workers would have to work longer and/ or faster--
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producing more garments--to make the same pay as before. There was also a general 
atmosphere of disrespectful treatment by management, such as restrictions on access to 
bathrooms. It was in response to this organizing campaign that management began to put 
in place the socially responsible policies listed above, at the same time as they fired union 
supporters, hoping to undermine the union. In 1991, the organizing campaign took off 
again, leading to the formation of the Camisas Modernas Workers’ Union (Sindicato de 
Trabajadores de Camisas Modernas or STECAMOSA). They made contact with several 
US labor rights groups, including the US/ Guatemalan Labor Education Project 
(USGLEP, now the US Labor Education in the America Project or USLEAP). The 
company responded by essentially bribing the union’s leaders to resign, offering them 
extremely generous severance packages if they did so, at the same time that they put them 
on poorly working machines, thereby dramatically lowering the money they could make 
through the piece-rate system if they remained employed (Armbruster-Sandoval 2005; 
Human Rights Watch 1997). 
 The HRW report documented the result--an unusually high turnover rate among 
union members: 
According to the company, union and labor inspectorate, forty-six of the 
131 union members registered with the labor ministry as of August 1995 
had quit the company by August the following year: an attrition rate of 34 
percent. This contrasts with company information from past years citing a 
turnover of from 2 percent to 5 percent overall (Human Rights Watch 
1997). 
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In all this, the Guatemalan government, including the Ministry of Labor, remained 
complicit, refusing to grant legal recognition to STECAMOSA. USLEAP and several 
other US groups, however, was able to pressure the US Trade Representative (USTR) to 
review the case, which might have lead to the suspension Guatemala’s privileges under 
the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). Faced with this, the government 
recognized STECAMOSA (Armbruster-Sandoval 2005) (Coates, interview, 2007). 
 The union still, however, needed to prove it represented at least 25% of the 
workforce in order for PVH to be legally required to bargain with it. This was not easy to 
achieve as management continued with their union-busting tactics. In August 1996, 
however, STECAMOSA undertook a clandestine organizing campaign, visiting workers 
at their homes. On September 2, in a surprise move, the union officially let management 
know that it had achieved the necessary 25% level. Rather than bargain, management 
refused to recognize that the union had gained the necessary number of employees, a 
move in which they were again supported by the complicity of the labor ministry. The 
company also hired armed security guards--an extremely intimidating move in the 
context of the pervasive political violence in Guatemala.2 Union members were forced to 
work at broken machines, a move that pushed twenty of them to quit so they could find 
jobs elsewhere (Armbruster-Sandoval 2005; Human Rights Watch 1997). 
 The irony in all this is that Bruce Klatsky, the CEO of PVH, considered himself a 
human rights advocate. He sat on the board of Human Rights Watch and was involved in 
the Clinton administration’s efforts to create a coalition of apparel companies committed 
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to socially responsible labor practices. Jeff Hermanson (interview, 2007), a board 
member of USLEAP, told me, 
During the meeting of USLEAP in New York City--a board meeting--it 
came to our attention that Klatsky was scheduled to give a keynote speech 
at a fundraiser for Human Rights Watch at the … it was at the Museum of 
Natural History if I’m not mistaken--[…] so we actually told Human 
Rights Watch that we were going to picket their fundraiser. And they 
[PVH] called us--called Stephen Coates, the director of USLEAP--and 
said, “What can we do to avoid this?” So we said, “Well, you can agree to 
send a Human Rights Watch investigation team to Guatemala and we'll 
rely on their findings. If they find that Philip-Van Heusen has violated 
Guatemalan labor law and international worker rights, we would call upon 
you to recognize the union and bargain.” And they said, “OK, we'll do 
that.” And they did that. And, lo and behold, the investigation disclosed 
that rights had been violated. 
Klatsky reluctantly agreed to bargain with the union, while expressing the usual concerns 
that a union would somehow be an outside force interfering with management’s 
relationship with its workers, saying, “When you can't have a direct dialogue with your 
own associates, then you get a labor problem” (Bounds 1997a, 1997b). He even went so 
far as to tell workers that they did not have to join the union if they did not want to, when 
he visited the plant (Ortiz 1997). 
  40 
 Fifteen months later, in December 1998, PVH closed the plant. They claimed to 
be doing so for economic reasons unrelated to the presence of a union, specifically the 
loss of a major client for the goods produced at Camisas Modernas. Many labor activists, 
however, regarded this claim with suspicion, seeing it as a move to eliminate the only 
factory in the Guatemalan maquila sector that had successfully unionized (Armbruster-
Sandoval 2005; Greenhouse 1999d) (Hermanson, interview, 2007). “Upon examining 
PVH’s 1998 Annual Report, U.S./GLEP found that its profits on men’s dress shirts, 
which were produced at Camisas Modernas, increased from $45 million to $50 million” 
(Armbruster-Sandoval 2005). Additionally, the work that workers had been doing at 
Camisas Modernas was now being outsourced to four other factories, with far worse 
conditions, including lower pay, longer hours, and none of the perks that Camisas 
Modernas had had (Armbruster-Sandoval 2005). 
 It is entirely possible that the decision was a strictly economic one and, at the 
same time, inspired by the presence of the union. The situation with Camisas Modernas 
was unusual not only in the benefits the workers received from the company, but in the 
very fact that PVH actually owned the factory. Most apparel companies actually 
manufacture very little of the goods they market and sell. Instead, outsourcing to 
contractors, often small companies barely scraping by, is the norm in the industry. In 
closing down Camisas Modernas and switching to outsourcing, PVH was simply 
following this established pattern. One of the reasons that most companies prefer 
outsourcing is that is cheaper. One of the reasons it is cheaper is that contractors 
generally do not have a unionized workforce--and therefore do not have to pay high 
  41 
wages, provide benefits, or respect health and safety standards. Indeed, when contractors 
do recognize unions, they--like Camisas Modernas--are usually forced to shut down in a 
year or two. This is not because the major apparel companies are punishing the 
contractors in some knee-jerk anti-union response. In fact, under pressure from the anti-
sweatshop movement, the major apparel companies have sometimes played a role in 
pushing their contractors to recognize the union in the first place. It is simply that, once 
the contractor recognizes the union, their costs of doing business go up and the major 
companies take their business elsewhere, to contractors who can produce for less--by 
ignoring workers’ rights. 
 In reporting on the PVH-Camisas Modernas case, Wall Street Journal reporter 
Wendy Bounds notes (1997a), “The controversy cuts to the heart of a central question for 
U.S. manufacturers competing in the global economy: Can they keep labor costs low and 
still respect human rights?” In short, the answer seems to be, no. 
 
A Brief History of the US Apparel Industry 
 To understand why the answer is no and why outsourcing is so prevalent, we need 
to understand the structure of the international apparel industry, which necessitates 
understanding some of its history. Early on in the development of the apparel industry--in 
the late nineteenth century--New York City became the fashion capital of the United 
States, with most apparel manufacturing concentrated there. Even at this early date, 
however, there was a ruthless search by garment manufacturers for ways to lower costs, 
driven by the competitive pressures of the market. There was also a need to keep 
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production flexible, that is to be able to switch what was being produced and the 
quantities in which it was produced very rapidly. This is an artifact of the changing trends 
in fashion, where manufacturers must constantly adapt, abandoning one line of goods for 
another as popular tastes change. These problems persist to the current day; indeed, if 
anything, the speed with which fashions change has only accelerated, creating ever 
greater pressures for flexibility. Then, as now, apparel manufacturers looked to the 
outsourcing of production as a solution to both cost reductions and flexibility (Green 
1997). 
When a firm outsources production, it hires another firm--the contractor or 
supplier--to produce the goods for it. Contractors may, in turn, hire subcontractors do 
some of the production they have been hired to do. In the eyes of the lead firms--that is, 
the companies who do the outsourcing--this system has two virtues. If a contractor’s 
production costs grow too high, they may simply switch to a cheaper firm, without any 
financial loss resulting from giving up their own factories. And, as fashions change, they 
may switch suppliers, finding ones better suited to produce the new goods. Then, as now, 
this system fostered rampant labor abuses. The workforce consisted--once again, then as 
now--primarily of young, immigrant women. Perhaps the most well known symbol of 
these abuses is the March 25, 1911 Triangle Shirtwaist Company factory fire, where a 
dropped cigarette started a conflagration. The owners of the factory kept the doors 
locked, in violation of safety codes, trapping many of the workers inside, with no way to 
escape. Some leapt out of the building to escape the flames, only to plunge to their deaths 
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below. The fire department came, but their ladders could not reach the top floors. In all, 
146 workers, mostly young women, died in the fire (Green 1997; Ross 2004). 
Such pervasive abuses fostered a strong labor movement in the industry, 
spearheaded by the International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU). The unrest 
included two major strikes--the “Uprising of the Twenty Thousand” (composed mainly of 
women workers) in 1909 and the “Great Revolt” of sixty thousand, mainly male cloak-
makers in 1910. Indeed, the Triangle Shirtwaist factory was one of the targets of the 
Uprising of the Twenty Thousand, though it was defeated there by the owners’ union-
busting tactics; the doors of the factory were locked on the day of the fire, in part, to keep 
union organizers from entering the building to speak to workers. Continued labor 
organizing, with the support of middle-class reformers from the Progressive movement, 
eventually lead to changes in public policy in New York State that better protected 
workers. These policies were rolled back during the highly conservative political 
atmosphere of the 1920s, following upon the Red Scare of 1919, which involved the mass 
deportation of immigrant labor leaders. With the rise of the New Deal in the 1930s, 
however, a system of reforms took hold again, this time at the federal level. Indeed, some 
of the key New Deal officials, such Labor Secretary Frances Perkins and President 
Roosevelt himself, had been among those reformers who had helped put into place the 
New York State reforms decades earlier. The combination of New Deal labor legislation 
and the post-war period of prosperity strengthened labor’s hand greatly (Ross 2004). 
Because of the peculiar nature of the garment industry, the ILGWU was able to 
successfully lobby for it to be exempt from the generally anti-labor 1947 Taft-Hartley 
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Act’s ban on secondary boycotts, that is boycotts that targeted companies not directly 
involved in a labor struggle in an attempt to place indirect pressure on the main target. 
The Garment Industry Proviso allowed the unions to treat the lead firm and its contractors 
as effectively one unit, allowing them to simultaneously tackle all of them. Using this 
proviso, the ILGWU was able to force the lead firms to agree to outsource only to 
suppliers that were unionized, thus guaranteeing that much of the garment industry was 
covered by collective bargaining agreements. Conditions were hardly idyllic though. The 
apparel industry was part of the lower tier of the economy, with low pay for its primarily 
female, African-American and Puerto Rican workforce. Some sweatshops remained, 
though far fewer then before. The operations of the union became increasingly top-down, 
with many members having little real connection to the union. Often ILGWU 
representatives worked more closely with the contractor than the actual workers. Still, 
overall, conditions for workers were much improved (Bonacich 2002; Ross 2004). 
 Given the long use of outsourcing in apparel, it is perhaps natural that the industry 
was one of the pioneers in pursuing relocation to poorer regions with weaker labor laws 
as a way to avoid labor unions and cut costs. In many ways, the model for other 
companies was Nike, which has never manufactured anything itself, but got its start 
importing running shoes from Japan, and then came to give orders on the design of the 
shoes as its profits increased in the US (Korzeniewicz 1994). As early as the 1950s, 
however, well before the rise of Nike, many lead apparel companies were relocating 
production to the southern US states, where they could find a union-free--and therefore 
more easily exploited--workforce. Even as they relocated to the US south, some lead 
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firms began outsourcing production to companies in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, 
where labor costs were considerably cheaper than the US. This was encouraged by the 
Truman and Eisenhower administrations, which wanted to foster the growth of the 
apparel industry among its allies in East Asia as a way of stimulating economic 
development and thus limiting the influence of Communist, mainland China. Such 
overseas outsourcing, however, was strongly opposed by the apparel industry’s 
traditional contractors in both New England and the South, who lobbied the government 
for protectionist legislation; in this, they had some success, as there was a strong 
protectionist bloc in Congress. The lead firms were also initially limited in how much 
they were willing to outsource overseas, due to the lower quality of Asian goods. By the 
1960s, however, Asian contractors had significantly improved the quality of the goods 
they produced. Thus, in the 1970s, overseas outsourcing increased dramatically as a cost-
cutting response to the economic downturn of that era (Bonacich et al. 1994; Rosen 
2002). 
The conflicts between those supporting overseas outsourcing--both the lead 
apparel firms and the executive branch--and those supporting protectionism--the 
contractors and their Congressional allies--produced a series of compromises. These 
consisted of a succession of multilateral agreements--the Short-Term Arrangement 
Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles (1961), the Long-Term Arrangement 
Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles (1962-1973), and the Multifber 
Arrangement (MFA) (1974-2004)--regulating overseas apparel outsourcing by setting 
quotas for different countries, which determined how much apparel they could export to 
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the US--and thus how much US firms could outsource to that country for production for 
the US market. These proved inadequate as protectionist instruments though and apparel 
imports in the US grew steadily. As Japan, South Korea and Taiwan began to meet their 
quota limits, firms began turning to other countries as well. It was not only US-based 
firms that did this; many of the Japanese, Korean and Taiwanese suppliers also began 
moving their production to other countries, seeking to escape the growing power of labor 
unions, which had successfully raised wages in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. While 
the contractors might directly set up their own factories in these new countries, they often 
subcontracted out production to new, local manufacturers in turn (Bonacich et al. 1994; 
Rosen 2002). 
One of the main driving forces behind such outsourcing and movement overseas 
was the class conflict between the companies’ owners and the unions representing 
(however problematically at times) apparel industry workers (Ross and Trachte 1990). 
The lead US apparel firms wish to escape the marginal improvements the ILGWU had 
won for garment workers--or more exactly, they wished to escape the extra costs such 
improvements entailed--and the easiest way to do this was to go to locales where the 
labor movement was weak and in no position to challenge apparel manufacturers. The 
southern states of the US, with their anti-union, “right-to-work” laws were only the first 
step in this process. Third-world countries, particularly non-democratic ones where 
governments had no qualms about violently repressing the labor movement, were a 
natural next step. This trend continues today, with contractors increasingly setting up 
shop in China and Vietnam, two countries where independent labor unions are totally 
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illegal, with only those controlled by and serving the interests of the nominally 
Communist governments allowed. 
Beginning in the late 1970s and accelerating in the 1980s, a dramatic shift 
happened in the policies of the US and other first world countries that, among other 
things, facilitated the ability of US and European firms to follow this pattern of 
outsourcing anywhere in the world. This was the rise of neoliberalism, which, though 
marked by a rhetoric of “free trade” and deregulation, is characterized more by a 
reorientation of the economic regulatory system, both domestic and international, in ways 
that undermines what collective power labor and other vulnerable social groups had built 
up in favor of multinational corporations. Although, in the US, many of these changes 
were initiated by the Republican administrations of Ronald Reagan and the elder George 
Bush, they were continued and strengthened by the Democratic presidency of Bill 
Clinton. Exploring them in full is beyond the scope of this dissertation and I will only 
highlight those aspects most relevant for understanding the rise of outsourcing here. It is 
important to stress that the picture painted of neoliberalism by many writers, especially 
those sympathetic to it (i.e., Castells 2001; Friedman 2000)--that it is the natural result of 
the growth of global markets and advances in telecommunications technology, a rising 
tide governments cannot control or hope to turn back--is grossly misleading. 
Neoliberalism, rather, is the result of policies deliberately pursued by corporations and 
governments, particularly US corporations and the US government. Different countries 
took different paths towards neoliberalism, some more ideological, some viewing it as a 
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matter of pragmatic adaptation to the global economy (Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 
2002), but it involved deliberate policy decisions by elites across the globe. 
One of the major events that allowed the US and Europe to successfully push 
nations in the third world to adopt outsourcing-friendly, neoliberal policies was the third-
world debt crisis, in which developing countries found themselves increasingly unable to 
manage the loans they had taken out to promote development over the course of the 
1960s and 70s. While countries were having trouble paying off their loans as early as 
1979, the debt crisis officially broke in 1982 when Mexico publicly announced that it was 
in danger of defaulting on its debts. Many more countries soon followed suit. The US 
Treasury Department worked together with the major commercial banks and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank--sister organizations, the two major 
multilateral organizations charged with ensuring the stability of the international 
economy and promoting development respectively--to arrange a bail out of the debt 
stricken countries. Most of the debt ridden countries were ordered to take out loans from 
the IMF; when they were unable to pay off these, they had to take out yet more loans; and 
the cycle continued on, as the supposed solution to the debt crisis drove them into ever 
deeper debt. In return for these loans, the IMF required that the recipient countries 
implement a set of economic reforms known as Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), 
which prescribed restructuring state policies along neoliberal lines (Babb 2009; Weaver 
2000; Wood 1986). 
These neoliberal policies in particular emphasized making the countries more 
open to investment by first-world corporations and in general re-orienting the economy 
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towards production for export. One major aspect of this was the rewriting of labor laws, 
to allow companies more “labor flexibility”--that is, an easier time firing workers, greater 
ability to hire contingent (part-time and temporary) workers, less need to recognize labor 
unions, more freedom in forcing workers to perform overtime, etc. Even where labor 
laws remain strong, governments often simply choose not to enforce them, in order not to 
alienate foreign investors (Moody 1997; Robinson 2003). The World Bank and US 
Agency for International Development (USAID) also promoted the creation of Export 
Processing Zones (EPZs), also known as “Free Trade” Zones. Within these zones, even 
such labor laws as remain on the books do not apply; and companies are exempted from 
all taxes for periods as long as ten years. The hope is that this will result in them putting 
down roots in the country, resulting in long-term economic growth. However, not only 
are abuses of labor rights rife, but companies frequently close down and then open up 
under a new name when their tax holiday comes to an end (Bonacich et al. 1994; Klein 
1999; Robinson 2003). 
These policies have strongly benefited core firms that use outsourcing as one of 
their main cost-reduction strategies--and also have contributed significantly to the 
problem of sweatshops. Contractors producing apparel for sale in the first-world fit right 
in with the emphasis on exports that underlies much neoliberal policy. The promotion of 
“labor flexibility” and EPZs create ideal conditions for contractors to keep down costs 
(by paying their workers as little as possible) and thus making themselves attractive to 
first-world companies--a dynamic we will look at more below. This method allows 
corporations or industries to play governments (not only national, but local as well) off 
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against each other, pressuring them to compete to create “business-friendly” climates that 
will attract investors (Ross and Trachte 1990; Silver 2003). This results in what is 
popularly known as a “race to the bottom,” where governments progressively lower their 
worker, consumer, and environmental protection standards, each government hoping that 
by having the lowest standards than the next they can attract investment (Brecher and 
Costello 1998). 
 Even as these events happened internationally, the rise of neoliberal ideology 
among conservatives in the US lead to the disintegration of the protectionist bloc in 
Congress during the 1980s; the promotion of neoliberalism (so-called “free trade”) 
became normative in the US government, among both Republicans and Democrats. Thus, 
Reagan was able to throw his full weight behind promoting the interests of the lead 
apparel firms in expanding the opportunities for overseas outsourcing. Reagan sought to 
promote such outsourcing not only in East Asia, but in Central America and the 
Caribbean as well. As with the US government’s promotion of outsourcing in East Asia 
in the 1950s, this was in part motivated by anti-Communism; Reagan hoped outsourcing 
would foster economic development, which would defuse the leftist insurgencies in the 
region. Lead apparel firms were among the first to take advantage of such Reagan-
initiated polices as the Export Processing Zones promoted by USAID and the World 
Bank; and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, a US government agency which 
provided companies doing business overseas with various services such as insurance, 
loans, investment missions, and information, thus encouraging them to invest abroad. 
Additionally, the Reagan, Bush and Clinton administrations signed various international 
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agreements, which encouraged US firms to outsource to different parts of Latin America-
-the Caribbean Basin Initiative II (CBI II) in 1986, the Enterprise for the Americas 
Initiative in 1990, and the North America Free Trade Agreement in 1994. These 
encouraged not only US firms to outsource to the Caribbean Basin, Central America and 
Mexico respectively, but the Asian firms to whom they outsourced to set up shop there as 
well. As a result, the networks making up the apparel industry span the entire Pacific 
Rim, plus the Caribbean. Finally, as part of the creation of the World Trade Organization 
in 1994 (a process fostered by the Clinton administration), it was agreed that the quotas 
of the Multifiber Arrangement would be gradually phased out over ten years; thus in 
2004, any country could export unlimited amounts of apparel to the US (Bonacich and 
Waller 1994; Rosen 2002). This has lead to heightened competition among countries to 
attract apparel production, leading them to push down wages even more, in an effort to 
make themselves attractive to the lead firms (Clean Clothes Campaign 2008b). 
Since the 1980s, the US apparel market has grown ever more stratified; US 
consumer markets have become increasingly fragmented so that different firms market to 
different populations, based on not only tastes but cost. Some firms such as Liz Claiborne 
focus exclusively on high fashion items, affordable only by the most affluent; others, like 
the Gap, market popular brand names to a wider market; while yet others--Wal-Mart, for 
instance--focus on producing cheap, often generic clothes whose main virtue is their low 
cost. These different sectors in turn have different strategies for outsourcing production, 
contracting with firms in different sets of countries. Much production for high fashion 
items remains located in such first-world countries as the US, France, Italy and Japan, 
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where they remain close to research centers, world-class input suppliers, and 
sophisticated consumer markets, all sources of their competitive edge. The production of 
lower quality goods for more popular brands or mass-merchandising firms is outsourced 
to what are generally increasingly low-income countries, ranging from the newly 
industrialized countries of East Asia through locations like China, Bangladesh and 
Central America, to the most marginal countries like Burma and Vietnam. Firms 
outsourcing to such countries seek to keep competitive through low production costs, in 
the form of both labor and materials (Appelbaum et al. 1994; Cheng and Gereffi 1994; 
Gereffi 1994). It should be noted that that production which remains in the US--primarily 
in the traditional centers of New York City and Los Angeles--is hardly free from 
exploitation. As in the early twentieth century, US apparel contractors tend to rely 
heavily on easily exploited immigrant labor and operate outside the law, resulting in 
highly exploitive conditions similar to production sites overseas, driven by the same need 
to keep down costs (Bonacich et al. 1994; Esbenshade 2004b; Ross 2004). 
These developments are not solely confined to the US. The MFA covered not 
only imports to the US, but Western Europe as well. European apparel firms have also 
made extensive use of outsourcing, relying on contractors in South and Southeast Asia, 
Central America, Africa and Eastern Europe. Many West European governments, such as 
that of Germany, have actively encouraged such outsourcing as far back as the 1970s. 
While their geographic range may be somewhat different than (though overlapping with) 
US lead firms, their practices are largely identical. Thus, European firms and 
governments contribute equally to the sweatshop problem (Clean Clothes Campaign 
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2008a, 2008b; Fröbel et al. 1980). 
Some of the competitive pressures to produce overseas can be seen in the 
experience of Levi Strauss. In 1990, the company--which was committed to keeping 
production in the US--dominated the jeans market, controlling a 48.2% share. As its 
competitors moved production abroad and were able to produce similar goods for less, 
Levi Strauss saw its market share shrink. Finally, in 1998, now with only 25% of the 
market, Levi Strauss felt compelled to move production to Mexico, resulting in mass lay-
offs in the US (Rosen 2002). Thus, it would be difficult for any one company to buck the 
trend by trying to be socially responsible--they would simply not be profitable enough. In 
other words, the problem is a structural one. It is, however, a structural one of the apparel 
companies’ own making--they pushed for the neoliberal policy reforms that facilitate 
outsourcing and have actively resisted any changes to these policies that would limit the 
potential for the abuse of labor rights. The apparel industry remains, therefore, 
collectively morally culpable for prevalence of sweatshops. 
 
The Structure of the Apparel Industry 
 The apparel industry’s extensive use of outsourcing results in a very complex set 
of relationships and hierarchies between firms. As a way of helping us make sense of this 
complexity, I will use the concept of “commodity chains” (Appelbaum and Gereffi 1994; 
Gereffi 2001; Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994). This concept has its roots in world-
system theory, an approach that focuses on the ways in which global inequalities in 
power between nations and regions have been both reproduced and transformed from the 
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initial era of European expansion and imperialism in the 1500s to the present. Most 
world-systems theorists have focused on the way some countries--what they refer to as 
the core or metropolitan countries--have exploited other countries--those on the 
periphery. Additionally, many world-systems theorists speak of semi-peripheral 
countries, which have an intermediate status, exploited by the core and exploiting the 
periphery in their turn. In today’s world, the core roughly corresponds to the nations of 
the first-world, the semi-periphery to those third-world nations such as Brazil or South 
Africa that are regional powers, and the periphery to the rest of the third world (Arrighi 
and Silver 1999; Chase-Dunn 1998; McMichael 2004; Robinson 2003; Ross and Trachte 
1990; Silver 2003; Wallerstein 2000). 3 The concept of commodity chains was developed 
by a group of world-system theorists who were discontented with that theory’s focus on 
the capacity of nation-states in definitions of the core-periphery hierarchy. Instead, they 
sought to develop an analytic tool that would let them focus on core-periphery relations 
within systems of production (Korzeniewicz and Martin 1994), an approach more 
consistent with world-systems theory’s Marxist provenance. 
A commodity chain refers to the extended system involved in producing any 
commodity, running all the way back to the harvesting of raw materials, through the 
various stages of production, with various types of labor contributing at each step, to the 
marketing of the finished product. These individual steps in the process are referred to as 
a nodes (Appelbaum and Gereffi 1994; Hopkins et al. 1994). In analyzing a commodity 
chain, one should look at 1) their input-output structure, that is the various goods and 
services that go into producing a profitable product; 2) territoriality, that is the geographic 
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distribution of production networks; and 3) governance structures, that is the system of 
power and authority within the commodity chain (Gereffi 1994). In analyzing the power 
structure of any industry, it is important to look both at the organization of each particular 
node, particularly capital-labor relationships (Appelbaum and Gereffi 1994; Dolan 2004; 
Hopkins et al. 1994), and the relationship between nodes (Gereffi 1994). In the case of 
the apparel industry, the latter has a major effect on the former, resulting in sweatshops 
being pervasive in the production process. Because each node is a site of capital-labor 
relations, it is also a decision-making arena in the political opportunity system--each node 
contains managers making decisions about what to produce and how to treat their 
workers. The relationship between the nodes tells how the different decision-making 
arenas are interlocked, particularly the hierarchy among them--which arenas are 
subordinate to others and which arenas can command decision-makers in the subordinate 
arenas. 
Power in a commodity chain is determined by which nodes have the highest 
barriers to entry and are the most profitable (Gereffi 1994). Different nodes in the 
production process have different rates of profit--the most profitable ones are the core 
nodes, the least profitable the peripheral nodes, and those of intermediate profitability the 
semiperipheral (Appelbaum and Gereffi 1994; Hopkins et al. 1994). The core nodes tend 
to have the greatest concentration of firms, i.e. a small number of companies dominate 
the market from that position (Gereffi 2001; Ross 2004). What part of the production 
process is most profitable varies from industry to industry. 
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The most familiar sort of commodity chain is what Gary Gereffi (1994, 2001) 
calls a producer-driven commodity chain, which are found in capital- and technology-
intensive industries, such as automobile, computer and electronics production. In such 
industries, the actual production of goods--or least certain stages in that process--remains 
the most profitable part of the process. Such industries tend to be highly centralized, with 
vertically integrated firms remaining dominant, though they may subcontract out the less 
profitable steps in the production process, such as making component parts. The apparel 
industry is, however, what Gereffi (1994, 2001) calls a buyer-driven commodity chain--
one in which the chain is dominated not by producers, but by retailers, marketers and 
merchandisers. This arrangement is typical of most labor-intensive, consumer-goods 
industries, such as apparel, footwear, and toys. The greatest profits are to be made not in 
actually producing the goods, but in designing and marketing them. Thus, these firms 
maintain control of advertising and retail while farming out production. There are also 
driven to constantly innovate--producing new styles of clothing, for instance--because 
their products are so easily imitated by competitors (Korzeniewicz 1994; Rabach and 
Kim 1994). As a result of this, for many core firms in buyer-driven commodity chains, 
their major asset is their brand image and identity, which is best understood as a non-
material form of capital. Much of the brand-name firms’ work becomes not about 
managing labor, but managing consumers, shaping how they use products and attempting 
to colonize ever more spheres of social life in a quest to increase the value of their brands 
(Arvidsson 2006; Klein 1999). Additionally, while the retailers, marketers and 
merchandisers were once largely distinct entities, with rise of retailers’ own private labels 
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(store brands) on the one hand and brand-name chain stores such as Nike Town on the 
other, the boundaries between the two have become increasingly blurred (Armbruster-
Sandoval 2005). 
It is this low profitability of actual manufacturing that leads the core apparel firms 
to outsource most, if not all, of the production to smaller companies (Gereffi 1994; Ross 
2004). While the resulting production process is highly decentralized, power remains 
concentrated in the retailers, marketing and merchandisers who control the most 
profitable part of the production process (Moody 1997). Retailers may charge as much as 
a 55-60% mark-up from what they pay the manufacturers/ contractors (Appelbaum and 
Gereffi 1994). Some of the contractors who do the actual production are themselves 
large, transnational firms, based out of Taiwan and South Korea, although they may do 
much of their production in other, lower cost countries (Gereffi and Pan 1994). Most 
contractors, however, are small operations, often owning only a single factory. In seeking 
to manufacture goods for the brand name companies, these contractors are essentially in a 
bidding war with each other--whoever can produce the goods for the lowest cost while 
maintaining a certain quality will get the contract. Most contractors operate at very slim 
profit margins, often just scraping by (Bonacich et al. 1994; Ross 2004). 
This relationship between the firms at the different nodes in the production 
process in turn defines the relationship between the owners of the contracting firms and 
their workers (Dolan 2004) and thus the sort of decisions management is likely to make 
within these arenas. Because the contractors operate at such slim profit margins, they in 
turn must shift the burdens of the drive to cut costs onto their workers, thus producing 
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sweatshops. These asymmetries of power between the brands and their contractors and 
between the contractors and their workers have important consequences for the anti-
sweatshop movement. On those occasions where suppliers have been successfully pushed 
to recognize unions, raise their wages, and improve working conditions, these victories 
have proved short-lived. Typically, we see the same pattern as in the Camisas Modernas 
factory--the factories that make such deals shut down within a year or two, since they can 
no longer afford to stay open. When contractors improve conditions for their employees, 
they raise their own costs of production--and consequently loose out in the bidding war to 
do business with the brands. The suppliers are simply not in a structural position to 
change the way business is done and how labor is treated. That power lies with the brand 
name companies that dominate the commodity chains, which thus have become the focus 
of the anti-sweatshop movement’s campaigns (Armbruster-Sandoval 2005; Esbenshade 
2004b) (multiple interviews, 2007). 
 
Implications for Activists 
The neoliberal restructuring of the global economy in general and the rise of 
outsourcing in the apparel industry in particular have major implications for activists--the 
ease with which they can gain access to different social arenas, what forms of leverage 
and standing they have, what grievances and demands are seen as legitimate, the degree 
to which their frames are considered credible. With the rise of neoliberalism, many elite 
actors have become openly hostile to labor unions and other economic justice advocates. 
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Even mainstream left-of-center parties, while maintaining their ties with the labor 
movement, have embraced neoliberal policies that actively erode unions’ power. 
In general, economic justice activists have the sense that they have less access to 
the major social arenas where decisions about global governance are made. Anti-
sweatshop activists have thus tried to develop strategies that bypass government 
enforcement. According to Jessica Rutter (interview, 2007), a USAS organizer from 
Duke University:  
I would say a lot the anti-sweatshop stuff that has been done has been 
because of a lack of government regulation or any kind of framework to 
look at labor standards in terms of free trade stuff. […] Generally the 
governments, both the US government and national governments of places 
where a lot of this stuff is being produced, were actually pretty much 
working against improved labor standards. So this was definitely a 
campaign that looked at companies as the decision-makers and was done 
because we thought it would be easier than using government as a target in 
terms of legislation, especially because it was so global. I would say the 
campaign itself really didn't address any kind of government regulation 
and did that on purpose because of the ineffectiveness of government to 
regulate this kind of stuff. 
Most of the anti-sweatshop activists I spoke with would like to see governments take a 
more pro-labor stance in their regulations, whether at the national level or through 
multilateral agreements. They have concluded, however, that, given the dominance of 
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neoliberal strategies on the part of governments, such regulation will not come about any 
time soon. They have also concluded that they actually have more leverage over private, 
for-profit corporations than they do over nominally democratic governments--a striking 
sign of the shallowness of democracy under neoliberalism. 
Which decision-making arenas have access to and/or leverage over is important, 
because not all decision-making arenas are created equal. Just as sites of production may 
be core, semiperipheral or peripheral, so may discursive or decision-making arenas. The 
major brand-name firms are core decision-making arenas, while their contractors are at 
best semiperipheral, if not peripheral decision-making arenas. Thus, activists have to 
find ways not only to influence decision-makers’ choices, but the choices of those 
decision-makers who occupy core arenas. Sweatshop workers and consumers are 
incorporated into the commodity chain at very different locations; while the workers are a 
peripheral population, consumers, depending on which market niche they represent, may 
be a semiperipheral or core population. The workers are at the bottom of this social 
structure, interacting with their employers, contractors who themselves have relatively 
little power in the larger picture. Both the workers and contractors are, essentially, 
disposable--the core firms can always find others to do their work. Consumers, on the 
other hand, have some potential leverage over the brand-name firms; the profits of these 
corporations depend on their reputation with consumers. And some groups of consumers, 
such as college students, are particularly valued. Given this, the brands worry far more 
about the attitudes and actions of students and other consumers than they do workers, 
giving students leverage that workers do not have. 
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 This structure in turn has consequences for both workers’ and students’ ability to 
form independent organizations, i.e. in how much organizing space they have. Workers in 
third-world sweatshops typically have very little space to organize, facing repression--
ranging from the firing of leaders to death squads--when they try to do so (Armbruster-
Sandoval 2005). As already noted, the contractors who employ the workers are not really 
in a position to collectively bargain with the workers even if they wanted to. Thus, 
contractors, due to their structural location, have many incentives to repress unions and 
few to tolerate them. US activists are far freer to organize without fear of unpleasant 
consequences, even in the case of students, who are subject to school administrations that 
are highly anti-democratic in their organization. Student activists may be arrested, even 
threatened with expulsion (though this is rare), but they do not need to fear for their lives 
or livelihoods. United Students Against Sweatshops has used this relative freedom to act 
in solidarity with workers, bringing pressure on companies to recognize workers’ 
independent unions--thereby altering the political opportunity system, creating greater 
organizing space for workers, something I will explore in more depth in chapters twelve 
through fourteen. 
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Chapter 3: The Beginnings of the Anti-Sweatshop Movement 
 
The Rise of Transnational Activism 
The rise of outsourcing and sweatshops did not go unchallenged by social justice 
activists. And, given the global nature of the problem, they found that they needed to 
organize globally themselves to have any hope of successfully challenging such labor 
exploitation. More precisely, sweatshop workers have found themselves in a position, 
where, even if they are well organized, they can do little to exact concessions from their 
employers. As we discussed in the last chapter, these factory-owners are not in a position 
to make concessions, since any increase in the cost of doing business could well put them 
out of business. The real power to improve conditions lies with the lead apparel 
companies in the Global North, who are the ones demanding that these factories they 
production keep costs as low as possible. Thus, sweatshop workers need to challenge 
these core companies as much as their own, peripheral employers if they wish to improve 
their working conditions. Unfortunately, there is little they can do to exert direct pressure 
on core firms. All too often, the major apparel corporations respond to labor disputes at 
their contractors by “cutting and running”--moving production to another factory where 
there is no open labor conflict which might attract unwelcome media attention. Therefore, 
if sweatshop workers want to successfully fight to improve their conditions, they have to 
find allies in the home countries of the apparel firms--that is, in the US and Western 
Europe--who may be able to find ways to successfully exert leverage over these 
companies. The result was the birth of transnational anti-sweatshop alliances and 
campaigns, which we will examine both below and in chapters twelve through fourteen. 
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This rise of the transnational anti-sweatshop movement was part of a larger trend 
of transnational movement-building, as more and more activists in more and more 
movements came to see this as the most viable means to exert leverage over their foes. 
Such transnational relationships within social movements go back as far as the nineteenth 
century, with the global anti-slavery movement and the frequent communication that 
happened between the feminist and labor movements in different countries. Transnational 
ties increased dramatically, however, in the late twentieth century, facilitated by advances 
in telecommunications and transportation technology that made forging and sustaining 
such ties easier. The first such transnational movements formed around human rights 
issues in the 1970s. Activists in countries such as Chile and Argentina that were ruled by 
utterly ruthless military governments who were willing to kill and disappear any and all 
dissenters found that they had little or no leverage over their own governments. They 
could, however, pass information on human rights violations to allies in the US, one of 
the main backers of these repressive regimes. US activists could in turn publicize this 
information and put pressure on their own government to withdraw support from the 
Chilean and Argentine juntas. Such activism seems to have played a rule in reducing US 
support for such governments and facilitating the transition to formal representative 
democracy (Keck and Sikkink 1998). 
Activists’ hopes that such formally democratic governments would be friendlier 
to them were soon dashed though. Constrained by IMF/ World Bank conditionalities as a 
result of the debt crisis and often dominated by internationally oriented sectors of local 
capital, many, if not most, of these governments had neither the power nor the interest in 
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implementing social-democratic reforms (Robinson 2003). Faced with such conditions, 
activists continued to rely on transnational networks. Indigenous rights activists, for 
instance, formed alliances with first-world environmentalists to pressure the World Bank 
to modify its lending policies. These campaigns had only a limited impact on the ground, 
but did result in the Bank at least formally committing to reviewing projects it lent to for 
environmental sustainability and respect for indigenous peoples’ rights (Keck and 
Sikkink 1998). 
In the 1980s, most of these transnational networks were formed on an ad hoc 
basis, focusing on specific campaigns. In the 1990s, these networks began to take on a 
more permanent character. Perhaps the most visible sign of the thickening of these 
networks were the major conferences that activists held, unified around a broadly defined 
opposition to neoliberalism. While activist groups had long used UN conferences as an 
opportunity to hold parallel conferences of their own and form ties with each other 
(Smith et al. 1997), the mid-1990s saw activists begin to set up their own conferences 
entirely independent of the UN. More radical groups who would not be caught dead at 
UN-sponsored conferences not only attended these, but often played a key role in them. 
The first such independent conference was the 1996 Encounter for Humanity and Against 
Neoliberalism or encuentro, organized by the Zapatistas, a radical indigenous movement 
based in Chiapas, Mexico. During this meeting, activists from around the world came to 
desperately poor Mayan Indian communities in the middle of the Lacadon Jungle, far 
from any urban center of power, to network with each other. A series of other encuentros 
followed, some in Zapatista territory, others elsewhere. The encuentros were eventually 
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succeeded by the World Social Forums, the first of which was held in 2001 in Porto 
Allegre, Brazil, attracting a somewhat wider range of groups--including more moderate 
ones--than had attended the Zapatistas’ gatherings. Both the encuentros and World Social 
Forums served as sites for left-wing activists from around the world to build ties and 
trade ideas with each other. Another sign of the thickening of transnational left networks 
was the rise of several permanent activist groups that are transnational in scope and goals. 
Among the more significant are Jubilee 2000, a predominantly church-based network 
dedicated to the total cancellation of third-world debt, with many of the more radical 
member groups calling for reparations from the former colonial powers to their ex-
colonies; People’s Global Action, a worldwide alliance of radical leftists, ranging from 
small anarchist groups in the US to massive grassroots organizations like the Movement 
of the Landless Workers from Brazil; and Via Campesina, an international alliance of 
small farmers and peasants, opposed to both the WTO’s agricultural policies and 
agribusiness in general. 
While people in the Global South were well aware of this rising transnational 
activism, it did not really gain visibility in the US--even among leftist circles--until the 
massive protests against the World Trade Organization in Seattle, Washington in late 
1999. It seems to be around this time that people began defining a wide range of left-
leaning networks and campaigns as constituting a unified, if very multifaceted and 
heterogeneous, movement. Some, particularly the movement’s critics, have referred to it 
by the rather inappropriate name of the anti-globalization movement; its supporters are 
more likely to speak of a globalization from below, the global justice movement or the 
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alter-globalization movement. Regardless of what one wishes to call it, the anti-
sweatshop movement was one of the activist networks that arose within this context of 
growing transnationalism and became one of the constituent movements of the larger 
global justice movement. Although much of this dissertation focuses on the student wing 
of the anti-sweatshop movement, its origins actually lie in international labor and 
religious networks; students were only brought into the movement later in the game. 
During the Bretton Woods era, the major US labor federation, the AFL-CIO had 
seen itself as business’s junior partner, identifying with its interests in many ways, a 
strategy known as business unionism (Moody 1997). One aspect of this was that it 
generally sided rather blindly with the US government during the Cold War, including 
offering it support for the often violent repression of progressive unions by governments 
allied with the US, all in the name of anti-Communism. As a result, the US labor 
movement had very poor relations with all but the most conservative unions in much of 
the third world (Armbruster-Sandoval 2005). The AFL-CIO’s leadership’s understanding 
of themselves as business’s junior partner left them unprepared for the neoliberal assault 
on the New Deal social compact. Instead of fighting against the concessions business 
demanded from labor, the AFL-CIO’s leadership grudgingly backed them. They bought 
into business leader’s arguments that such concessions were necessary to make US 
business competitive in the age of globalization. They also tended to assume that such 
austerity would be a temporary phenomenon, lasting until US businesses regained their 
footing, and that the era of generous wages and benefits would eventually return 
(Fantasia and Voss 2004; Moody 1997). 
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This, of course, never happened. The old guard leadership of the AFL-CIO was 
seemingly incapable of understanding that a fundamental shift in capital’s relationship 
with labor had happened and responding accordingly. Fortunately, however, there had 
always been progressive currents pushing for a reform of the labor movement from 
within the movement. The set-backs due to globalization gave the reformers more 
credibility and the culture of the US labor movement gradually began to change, taking 
on a more confrontational, progressive character . Among their major strategies were 
community-based campaigns, in which unions forged ties with non-labor groups, such as 
religious congregations and students, and framed their struggles in terms of a broad, 
social justice-based agenda, as opposed to a narrower one focus on union members’ 
interests alone (Fantasia and Voss 2004; Moody 1997). 
Nonetheless, some of the labor movement’s early responses to globalization were 
embarrassingly protectionist and conservative in nature. Brooks (2005, 2007), for 
instance, critiques a campaign in the early 1990s by the AFL-CIO and some of its allies, 
supposedly focused on ending child labor in the Bangladeshi garment industry. They 
organized the campaign, however, without actually consulting Bangladeshi labor and 
children’s rights activists. In these activists’ eyes, the legislation, which would have 
banned imports made with child labor, would do more harm than good, because it failed 
to address the root causes that lead families to be desperate enough to send their children 
to work in factories. They saw it the campaign as a thinly veiled push for protectionist 
legislation by the US labor movement. As a result, the Bangladeshi activists ended up in 
a strange alliance with Bangledeshi factory-owners in opposition to the legislation. 
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Brooks concludes that, while the reforms that eventually resulted from this campaign had 
some positive impact, they ultimately left much to be desired. (We will discuss this 
campaign in more depth in chapter fourteen.) 
Happily, the US labor movement began to move away from such protectionist 
impulses to strategies more genuinely based on solidarity, in large part due to face-to-face 
contacts between US labor activists and those from various parts of the third-world, often 
at the rank-and-file level. Such contacts were actively encouraged by reform groups 
within the US labor movement. For instance, Labor Notes, a left-wing labor periodical, 
helped facilitate ties between reformist currents in the United Auto Workers (UAW) of 
the US and the Ford Worker’s Democratic Movement, an independent labor union in 
Mexico’s maquila sector (Moody 1997). Particularly relevant for the roots of the anti-
sweatshop movement was the involvement of labor activists in the Central American 
solidarity movement of the 1980s. This primarily church-based movement opposed the 
Reagan administration’s numerous and bloody proxy wars in the region, pushing for the 
US to cease supporting repressive military governments in El Salvador and Guatemala, 
and, in Nicaragua, the Contras fighting against the socialist Sandinista government. 
Among other things, the churches involved sent missions to Central American countries 
to see the effects of the war firsthand. Some of the church members who went on such 
delegations were also labor activists. Their experiences there lead them to question the 
AFL-CIO’s blind support for US foreign policy. They also observed the ways in which 
the Guatemalan and Salvadoran governments repressed progressive labor unions and 
promoted Export Processing Zones--and thus fostered a climate in which sweatshop labor 
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was rampant. These religious and labor activists became instrumental in forming some of 
the first US anti-sweatshop organizations, such as USLEAP and the National Labor 
Committee (NLC) (Brooks 2007; Seidman 2007). 
As these things were happening at the grassroots level of the US labor movement, 
shifts were also happening in its national leadership. Even during the heyday of business 
unionism and Cold War loyalties, there had been some union locals with progressive 
leadership. Ironically, these unions tended to the older, traditionally more conservative 
craft unions, which were often highly decentralized, giving room for more diversity in 
local leadership. As it became clear that simply clinging to old-style business unionism 
was getting the labor movement nowhere fast, reformers began to exert more influence, 
coming to assume positions of leadership in some national unions. This culminated in the 
1995 election of the New Voices slate, lead by John Sweeney, to the national leadership 
of the AFL-CIO. Sweeney and his allies began to push for a more confrontational 
approach to dealing with business, more aggressive organizing strategies, and building 
ties with non-labor movement groups. The new leadership was only partially successful 
in this since many of the national leaders of the AFL-CIO’s constituent unions were still 
part of the old guard, unwilling to change and risk losing the base of their power. Still, 
significant shifts in the US labor movement were taking place (Fantasia and Voss 2004). 
Among the sectors where these changes took place was the apparel industry. 
There were two major unions in this sector--the ILGWU, whose membership consisted 
primarily of poorly paid immigrant workers; and the Amalgmated Clothing and Textile 
Workers Union (ACTWU), whose membership consisted of somewhat better paid native-
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born white and black workers, working in the less fragmented parts of the industry. With 
the movement overseas, both saw their memberships dwindling. In response to this, in 
1995 the two unions engaged in a somewhat messy merger, forming the Union of 
Needletrades, Industrial, and Textile Employees (UNITE); and began undertaking 
aggressive community-based campaigns, trying to form alliances with non-labor groups 
such as religious congregations and students, in their campaigns to pressure apparel firms 
such as Guess (Bonacich 2002). 
Another important development at the national level was Sweeney’s attempt to 
break with the AFL-CIO’s Cold War past in its relationship with third-world unions. In 
1997, Sweeny shut down the American Institute for Free Labor Development, which had 
worked closely with the US government in promoting its Cold War policies, and 
reopened it as the American Center for International Labor Solidarity (ACILS), popularly 
known as the Solidarity Center. Although still criticized by those to its left, the new 
Solidarity Center has played a much more constructive role in promoting labor rights 
globally and building alliances between the AFL-CIO and independent labor unions in 
the third world. 
 
International Labor Solidarity in the Apparel Industry 
Before turning to the rise of student anti-sweatshop activism, it is worth 
considering in some detail the strategic models that were already present in the anti-
sweatshop movement, when it consisted mainly of labor and religious groups. These 
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models, sometimes in modified form, became integral to the strategy of United Students 
Against Sweatshops, so it behooves us to look at their evolution. 
While the ILGWU had developed the strategies it needed to pressure both lead 
firms and their contractors into accepting the unionization of their workforces during the 
New Deal era, they faced increasing problems as the apparel industry globalized. In short, 
they were faced with the problem that many firms, rather than deal with a union, would 
threaten to move production overseas. In the early 1990s, they undertook a campaign 
against the brand-name firm Guess and its contractors in Los Angeles. Drawing on the 
strategic model of community-based campaigns, they not only organized workers to 
strike at the companies producing clothing for Guess, but worked with student groups to 
target Guess’s retail outlets for a boycott. The campaign failed for a number of reasons. 
One was that, in the midst of the campaign, the merger between the ILGWU and 
ACTWU happened; UNITE’s new leadership (primarily from the ACTWU) undertook a 
new direction in the campaign, following a more legally oriented strategy, leading to the 
resignations of Jeff Hermanson and David Young, who had been coordinating the 
campaign (Bonacich 2002). Second, as we will see later, boycott campaigns carried out 
by individual consumers are not actually a terribly effective tactic in most cases. Third, 
was that, while the union was certainly aware that Guess was threatening to move 
production to Mexico, they were not actually prepared for that eventuality. Hermanson 
(interview, 2007) recounts: 
At that time, I tried to convince our union leadership to follow the work 
and go to Mexico and assist Mexican workers in organizing. 
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Unfortunately, our leadership did not see the virtue of that--we basically 
had to drop the campaign. 
Hermanson, who had been an organizer with the ILGWU since 1977, just as overseas 
outsourcing was beginning to pick up, moved on to work with the AFL-CIO Solidarity 
Center. 
During this period before the merger of the ILGWU and ACTWU, the two unions 
were, however, involved in a more successful campaign, one which focused on overseas 
solidarity. Much of what was involved in this work was adapting the model that the 
ILGWU had used successfully in organizing apparel domestically within the US to the 
global stage. The campaign targeted Bibong, a Korean-owned factory in an EPZ in the 
Dominican Republic (DR), which produced raincoats for London Fog, Capezio, British 
Mist and (their largest customer) Misty Valley. Beginning in 1992, thanks to the efforts 
of the Dominican Secretary of Labor, Rafael Albuquerque, a pro-union reformist, 
employers operating in Dominican EPZs were legally required to recognize independent 
labor unions. In practice the members of the employers association, the Dominican Free 
Trade Zone Association (Asociacion Dominicana de Zonas Francas de Exportacion or 
ADOZONA), refused to do so; the labor courts which were supposed to enforce labor 
rights were completely corrupt and complicit with ADOZONA, much to the frustration of 
Albuquerque. According to the law, any union with at least twenty members was 
supposed to receive legal recognition, though the factory-owners were not required to 
negotiate a collective bargaining agreement unless at least half the workers voted for it. 
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Instead, they fired and blacklisted union leaders with impunity (Jessup and Gordon 
2000). 
In was in this context that, in 1992, the workers at Bibong tried to organize a 
union, in response to such conditions as physical abuse by managers, sexual harassment, 
inadequate sanitation, and forced overtime without pay. Unfortunately, the National 
Federation of Free Trade Zone Workers (Federacion Nacional de Trabajadores de Zonas 
or FENATRAZONAS) had a poorly thought through strategy. As soon as they had the 
legal minimum number of twenty members for the Bibong Workers Union, they publicly 
announced this; Bibong’s management responded by promptly firing these workers. It 
was at this point that FENATRAZONAS contacted the AFL-CIO Solidarity Center, the 
ILGWU, and the ACTWU for help. Twenty-five people from the Bibong plant and 
FENATRAZONAS came to the US for a training on organizing strategy, lead by 
Hermanson and other staff from the ILGWU and ACTWU. Upon their return, they 
undertook a second organizing campaign, recruiting 318 out of the 565 workers, meeting 
the 50% requirement that would legally require management to bargain with them. 
Rather than bargaining, Bibong’s management responded with firings and various forms 
of intimidation. Their tactics, compounded with a highly publicized case of sexual 
harassment, were so aggressive that they backfired, causing a wave of bad publicity for 
the company in the DR. Meanwhile, the ILGWU and ACTWU were busy in the US. 
They brought Bibong workers to testify before Congress; turned up the pressure on the 
Bibong’s customers, particularly London Fog, which had a contract with the ACTWU in 
the US; and pressured the US Trade Representative (USTR) to do a review of the 
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Dominican Republic’s status under its trade agreement with the US. While initially 
reluctant to do so, the USTR concluded the labor rights violations were so flagrant, a 
review was warranted. As a result of these actions, Bibong finally agreed to sign a 
collective bargaining agreement with the union in 1994. This set an important precedent, 
enabling FENATRAZONAS to organize a number of other factories in Dominican EPZs 
(Jessup and Gordon 2000). 
One important thing to note here is that this was a solidarity campaign. The US 
labor movement did not go in and try to start a union where there was none. Instead, it 
worked to support an already existing union. As we shall see later, across the board, the 
anti-sweatshop activists I interviewed emphasized that such activity on the part of the 
workers is necessary for the success of a campaign. A solidarity campaign cannot 
succeed if there is no one to act in solidarity with. 
As for the US allies’ tactics such as pressuring London Fog, according to 
Hermanson (interview, 2007) 
[T]hat was a tactic that we in the [International Ladies] Garment Workers 
Union had been using for twenty years, long before I got there. […] If we 
wanted to organize a subcontractor, we could not do it without putting 
pressure on the brand that was ordering the work. Otherwise, even if you 
successfully organize that subcontractor, the brand would just take the 
work out and put it somewhere else. We basically had to look at this as a 
system of production, not as a single workplace. […] The subcontractor is 
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vulnerable to a work stoppage, but the brand is not; the brand is vulnerable 
to public pressure, image pressure. 
Hermanson noted, however, that this has become much harder in the era of globalized 
production. For one thing, when most of the contractors were primarily in the US, it was 
sometimes possible to coordinate the actions of workers at multiple contractors, so that 
they could strike simultaneously. This would cut off all the brand’s production, leaving it 
with no goods to sell. Pulling this same thing off on a global scale is quite another matter. 
One of the struggles of the anti-sweatshop movement has been to find ways to adapt this 
old strategic model of organizing and pressuring the lead firms to deal with the problem 
not simply of outsourcing but global outsourcing. 
 
Anti-Corporate Campaigns 
 Another strategic model that has been important to the development of the anti-
sweatshop movement has been the anti-corporate campaign. While targeting lead firms in 
order to organize their contractors is a long-standing tool of the trade for labor organizers, 
at least in the apparel industry, anti-corporate campaigns are relatively new. Indeed, 
activists, both inside and outside the labor movement, developed them in the context of 
the decline of the New Deal social contract and the rise of neoliberalism. As the US 
government became increasingly conservative, it became increasingly difficult for 
activists working on a wide range of issues to pressure it to enact new legislation or 
enforce existing regulations in a way that might help them achieve their goals. 
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Increasingly then, activists turned to directly targeting corporations they regarded as 
guilty of labor abuses or other offenses. 
 In the mid-1970s, an activist group called the Corporate Data Exchange (CDE), 
influenced by the work of New Left sociologist C. Wright Mills, began looking at the 
connections between corporations, attempting to determine the power relations between 
them and other institutions in US society. In doing so, these activists began doing careful 
research not only on interlocks between boards of directors, which Mills had emphasized, 
but which other companies they were dependent on for finances, for component parts, or 
as customers who bought their products. In other words, they were looking at the power 
relations within commodity chains. This was not intended to be merely an intellectual 
exercise, but a means to finding points of leverage over various corporations. CDE’s 
work influenced the National Council of Churches in their efforts to use their stock 
ownership to pressure corporations to withdraw from doing business in apartheid South 
Africa (Manheim 2001). 
The anti-corporate campaign really began to come into its own though during a 
campaigns by the ACTWU to organize two southern, anti-union companies--the Farah 
Jeans company in El Paso, Texas and J.P. Stevens, a major textile manufacturer. As part 
of these campaigns, the ACTWU hired Ray Rogers in 1973 as lead organizer; Rogers in 
turn hired Michael Locker, one of the members of CDE who had developed their method 
of power analysis. In these two struggles, Rogers and Locker developed the first full-
blown anti-corporate campaigns. The campaign against Stevens involved not only a strike 
and a boycott of the goods produced by the company, but boycotts against companies 
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with ties to Stevens, such as Manufacturers Hanover Trust (on whose board Stevens’ 
chairman sat) and the banks that financed Stevens. Faced with the threat of an 
institutional boycott--specifically the withdrawal of $1 million in union pension funds--
Manufacturers Hanover Trust ousted Stevens’ chairman from its board (Manheim 2001). 
 While tactics like these were effective, they were also a bit much for the old guard 
labor leadership which then headed the ACTWU. They fired Rogers, but he went on to 
work with other groups. As labor’s political influence eroded and more progressive 
leaders came to the fore in some unions, anti-corporate campaigns became increasingly 
common in the labor movement. Non-labor groups also increasingly waged anti-
corporate campaigns. Rainforest Action Network, for instance, targeted the Japanese 
conglomerate Mitsubishi for its destructive logging practices in the tropics. In many 
cases, where the targeted companies were well known brand names, part of the anti-
corporate campaign would involve getting exposés of the company’s offences into the 
mass media, thereby damaging its image (Manheim 2001). Perhaps one of the classic 
examples this is also an early example of a major transnational campaigns--the “Nestlé 
Kills Babies” campaign, launched in the mid-1970s; this targeted the food company for 
unethically marketing its baby formula to poor women in the third world as a substitute 
for the much healthier practice of breast feeding (Keck and Sikkink 1998). As noted 
above, in certain industries, such as toys and apparel, where the core firm is a marketer, 
not a manufacturer, the company’s brand image is often their main asset; such attacks on 
brands can be especially damaging. 
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 Some of the most striking examples of this come from the early stages of the anti-
sweatshop movement itself. In 1995, Charles Kernaghan and his organization, the 
National Labor Committee, launched an anti-corporate campaign in support of workers at 
the Mandarin International factory in the San Marcos EPZ in El Salvador. The main 
target of the campaign was the Gap, which supplied Mandarin International with 80% of 
its orders; the Gap had also attempted to cultivate a reputation of being socially 
conscious, making it somewhat more vulnerable to charges of connections with 
sweatshops. 
From the moment Mandarin opened up [in 1992], workers complained of 
poor working conditions, such as forced overtime, regulated bathroom 
breaks, lack of drinking water, and poor ventilation. Mandarin workers 
also stated that the company’s personnel manager, a retired army colonel, 
verbally and physically abused them, hitting them on the top of their heads 
with his fists for alleged “mistakes” and “poor quality work” (Armbruster-
Sandoval 2005). 
As a result of this, Mandarin workers made several attempts to organize a union. The first 
two attempts came to nothing, as a result of such union-busting techniques as firing 
organizers and bribery. In 1995, Mandarin workers founded their third attempt at a union, 
the Mandarin International Workers Union (Sindicato de Empresa de Trabajadores de 
Mandarin International or SETMI). The company responded both by setting up a 
company union and firing SETMI members. SETMI members responded with a strike 
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that shut down not only Mandarin International, but the entire San Marcos EPZ 
(Armbruster-Sandoval 2005; Brooks 2007). 
 Meanwhile, the NLC started a campaign against the Gap; this included the 
production of a movie on EPZs and child labor called Zoned for Slavery: The Children 
Behind the Label and an NLC-sponsored speaking tour by some of the young woman 
working at Mandarin (Armbruster-Sandoval 2005; Brooks 2007). Such “information 
politics”, especially the speaking tour, can be a powerful framing strategy for 
movements. Not only does it put a human face on the struggle of the workers, but the 
testimony of the workers themselves lends an authenticity and legitimacy to the campaign 
that US activists, no matter how dedicated, could not give it themselves (Armbruster-
Sandoval 2005; Keck and Sikkink 1998). The NLC also launched the campaign during 
the Christmas shopping season, when the Gap felt particularly vulnerable to bad 
publicity. It also coincided with a raid by the Department of Labor on a garment factory 
in El Monte, California where Thai immigrants were being held in what was essentially 
slavery. All this resulted in a wave of media coverage on sweatshops that put the Gap on 
the defensive. As a result, they suspended their orders with Mandarin International and 
pressured the contractor to improve working conditions. As a result, not only did 
Mandarin make some concessions to the union, but they also agreed to a system of 
independent monitoring (Armbruster-Sandoval 2005; Brooks 2007); this was a first for 
the garment industry and something we will explore in more detail below. 
 Another important case was the Kathie Lee Gifford scandal. As briefly mentioned 
in chapter one, Gifford was a prominent celebrity and talk show host, who had cultivated 
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a wholesome, maternal image; she sponsored her own line of clothing sold through Wal-
Mart, half of the proceeds from which would go to charities that benefited children. In 
1996, Charles Kernaghan of the NLC, while visiting Honduras, learned that workers at 
the Global Fashions factory were producing goods for Gifford’s line--and working under 
sweatshop conditions. Kernaghan brought this information back to the US, where he 
publicized it. A few months later, UNITE revealed that workers in a New York City 
sweatshop had contacted them for help--and that they too were produced for the Gifford 
line. Given the contrast between Gifford’s maternal image and the charges against her--
including use of child labor--the media had a field day with the case, running a number of 
salacious stories. The success of the story caught Kernaghan by surprise; he had simply 
been following the model of a classic anti-corporate campaign, looking for any and all 
vulnerabilities that he could exploit. It quickly became clear to the NLC and UNITE that 
Gifford’s image was her main vulnerability and they ran with the media coverage. 
Gifford’s initial reaction was one of outrage and denial. After a number of meetings, to 
her credit, she changed her position and came around to supporting independent 
monitoring of the factories producing her clothes. By contrast, a number of other 
celebrities, such as Nike sponsor Michael Jordan, continued to avoid the issue, saying 
such policy issues were outside their purview (Brooks 2007; Ross 2004). 
 Many of the activists I spoke with saw this burst of media coverage as essential to 
the take off of the movement. Eric Dirnbach (interview, 2007), a researcher and 
campaign coordinator for UNITE, said 
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The media played a vital and essential role from '96 up through the next 
five years. […] There were a few early scandals in the mid- to late 90s that 
got a lot of media attention. I've seen studies that looked at the mention of 
the word sweatshop in media reports and there were hundreds if not 
thousands of hits a year in various news articles.4 […] Without the media 
really propagating that, we wouldn't have had the success that we had. 
What apparel firms like the Gap found so threatening about the media coverage is that it 
negatively affected their brand image, by associating them with sweatshops. As discussed 
in the last chapter, for many apparel firms, their brand image is their most valuable asset, 
their main form of capital (as opposed to more traditional forms of capital, such as 
factories). This is particularly damaging when, as Gifford had done, the company sought 
to build a socially responsible image. What activists discovered through these anti-
corporate campaigns was that attacking a brand’s image in the arena of the mass media 
not only gave them an advantage in terms of framing and boosted their legitimacy, but 
actually gave them structural leverage over the company. By threatening a company’s 
image, they were potentially threatening its profitability, giving them a certain amount of 
power they could use against it. 
Such coverage, alas, was not to last, due to the rules that govern the mass media 
as a social arena. One of the norms of mainstream news-reporting is that a journalist 
cannot simply cover an issue. They must cover an event--that is, there must be a “hook,” 
a story, which one can cover, in order to raise a larger issue. And such hooks must be 
new and fresh--once something becomes “old news,” the mainstream media will 
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generally cover it only rarely, even if it is still a serious social issue (Ryan 1991). After a 
few years of salacious celebrity and brand-name scandals, the issue of sweatshops 
became “old news” and reporting on it decline dramatically. 
 Even when the media reported on such things as the Kathie Lee Gifford scandal, 
there were many problems with the coverage. Journalists consistently framed sweatshops 
not as a systemic problem, but as an aberration, the result of a few bad apples (Brooks 
2007). In the case of US-based sweatshops, such as the El Monte slave labor case, the 
media frame frequently put the blame on immigrants and immigration for making 
sweatshops possible, by creating a pool of easily exploited labor, rather then looking at 
the policies of the lead firms in the apparel industry (Ross 2004), a bizarre reversal of 
responsibility. This is part of a wider pattern in which journalists as social actors, 
positioned comfortably in the professional-managerial class and socialized in mainstream 
institutions, tend to assume that the social system as it exists is basically sound. Thus, 
while they may call individual corporations to account for particular scandals, they rarely 
articulate a larger critique of the system in which corporations are embedded and which 
shapes their choices, pushing them to maximize profits by any means they can (Ryan 
1991). 
The media also consistently depicted sweatshop workers as victims, rather than 
active agents, fighting for their rights. In the case of this last problem, many have argued 
the NLC shares some of the blame, actively choosing sensational issues like child labor 
over the right to organize and freedom of association (Brooks 2007). The rules that 
govern the mass media arena, however, gave the NLC incentives to do so. Marion Traub-
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Werner (interview, 2007), a USAS member who spoke critically of “National Labor 
Committee-type victimhood stuff,” captured some of the dilemma faced by anti-
sweatshop groups in dealing with news reporters and media audiences: “The victim stuff 
is just the easier sell, right? You know, people have forced overtime, beatings, all the sort 
of sweatshop horror stories that happen. […] But even if they didn’t happen, the system 
is still totally fraught and fucked up.” She pointed to the Camisas Modernas case as an 
example--there were no horror stories to tell, but workers’ rights were nonetheless being 
violated when the factory’s management resorted to union-busting. And, in terms of the 
bigger picture, while narratives of sweatshop workers as victims may generate media 
coverage, they obscure the systemic nature of the problem. USAS member Ken Abrams* 
(interview, 2007) said such early emphasis on victimhood “makes it harder, in some 
ways, to get press around stuff that is more common […] like [violations of] the right to 
organize. It’s like this race to the bottom in terms of the most salacious thing which is 
needed to get media attention.” 
 Nonetheless, whatever its problems, the press coverage of the mid-1990s helped 
the anti-sweatshop movement grow considerably. It also made clear to activists the power 
of attacking a brand-dependent company’s image, a tactic that was to remain a critical 
part of activists’ repertoires in future campaigns. Finally, the strategic model of the anti-
corporate campaign, which helped generate this coverage, has remained central to the 
anti-sweatshop movement. Indeed, as we shall see, USAS’s origins lie in UNITE’s 
attempts to apply the anti-corporate campaign model in innovative ways. 
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Independent Monitoring 
 Out of the agreement between the NLC and the Gap that ended the former’s 
campaign against the latter came the industry’s first agreement to set up an independent 
monitor to check on the conditions in a factory. Although this agreement has been 
criticized on a number of grounds, independent monitoring has become a central strategic 
model for the anti-sweatshop movement, with USAS and the WRC considerably refining 
it beyond this first attempt. 
 As popular awareness of the many environmental and social problems caused by 
TNCs under neoliberalism grew, calls--both from within and outside of the corporate 
sector--for corporate codes of conduct and programs to monitor their implementation 
grew in a wide range of industries. Advocates of monitored codes as a means of 
promoting corporate social responsibility point to the Sullivan Principles, a code of 
conduct which applied to US firms doing business in apartheid South Africa, as the first 
instance of such a program and a model for others. There is some irony in this, since both 
the US and South African anti-apartheid movements took a dim view of the Sullivan 
Principles, regarding them as a way for companies to save face while avoiding what the 
movement actually wanted them to do--pull out of South Africa altogether. Additionally, 
companies’ compliance with the Sullivan Principles was measured by Arthur D. Little, an 
accounting firm with no expertise in human rights, by means of a process that even the 
firms involved complained was non-transparent. At the end of the day, it appears that 
beyond encouraging companies to contribute to charities in black neighborhoods, the 
Sullivan Principles had little real impact on the situation in South Africa. The real change 
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came when the threat of divestment by colleges (under pressure from student activists) 
caused companies to completely withdraw from the country. It was the resulting 
economic crisis that lead white South African business leaders to pressure the apartheid 
government to negotiate an end to the racist system with the African National Congress 
(Seidman 2005, 2007). 
Despite this lack of apparent effectiveness (or perhaps because of it), codes of 
conduct and monitoring programs have become popular among corporations who want to 
make a show (whether serious or superficial) of being socially conscious. There is, 
however, a great deal of variation in such codes and monitoring programs. Some are little 
more than a façade, simply meant to allow an industry to present itself as socially 
responsible while doing very little. Other monitoring programs are genuinely independent 
affairs that have brought pressure to bear on companies to address labor rights abuses 
among their suppliers (Esbenshade 2004b; Seidman 2007). We will explore this more in 
the chapters nine and ten, when we look at the differences between the corporate-
sponsored Fair Labor Association and the independent Worker Rights Consortium. 
In the wake of the bad press generated by the Gifford and other, similar scandals, 
a number of core apparel companies began to adopt codes of conduct for their suppliers. 
Most lead corporations initially claimed that they had no responsibility for the working 
conditions at their contractors’ factories. These contractors were, after all, independent 
businesses and the lead firms could not very well be expected to know what went on 
there--or such was their argument (Klein 1999). They soon recognized that these claims 
would not only fail to appease the anti-sweatshop movement, but even many average 
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consumers concerned about the reports they saw in the news. Thus, many brand-name 
firms such as Nike and the Gap began to adopt codes of conduct as a way of protecting 
their brand image. Even in the best of cases, however, the follow-through on 
implementing them has been uneven, while in the worst cases, it has been virtually 
nonexistent. Still, such codes can give activists some framing advantages in the mass 
media--if they can argue that a company is failing to live up to its own proclaimed 
standards, that can be especially damaging to the company in question (Esbenshade 
2004b). 
 Independent monitoring of such codes entered into the strategic conversation of 
the anti-sweatshop movement as a result of the campaign targeting Mandarin 
International and the Gap described above. As noted, the Gap was one of the many firms 
that had adopted a code of conduct for its suppliers; the NLC used the failure of 
Mandarin to live up to the Gap’s code as one of the weapons in its framing campaign 
against the Gap. And part of the agreement the NLC reached with the Gap as a result of 
the campaign was the creation of an organization--the Independent Monitoring Group of 
El Salvador (Grupo Monitoreo Independiente de El Salvador or GMIES)--to monitor 
whether or not Mandarin was actually complying with the Gap’s code. GMIES itself 
consisted of four local, Salvadoran organizations--the University of Central America 
Human Rights Institute, the Legal Aid Office of the Archbishop of El Salvador, the 
Archdiocese of San Salvador, and the Center for Labor Studies. These in turn reported 
their findings to a number of US organizations, including the NLC and the Independent 
Monitoring Working Group, which included the Gap. GMIES was able to make regular, 
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unannounced inspections and met with workers privately (off of company grounds), both 
important conditions for getting an honest sense of what is actually happening in the 
factory. Most of the fired SETMI members were rehired and many of the more abusive 
conditions they had to endure were brought to an end (Armbruster-Sandoval 2005; 
Brooks 2007; Esbenshade 2004b). 
There have been, however, a number of criticisms of the agreement that produced 
GMIES and GMIES itself. While SETMI signed the final agreement that created GMIES, 
it was not part of the negotiations leading to that agreement, which took place solely 
between the Gap and the NLC. Additionally, because the Gap’s code of conduct does not 
provide for a living wage, workers are still paid only the inadequate Salvadoran minimum 
wage. Most problematically, SEMTI has never been able to conclude a collective 
bargaining agreement with Mandarin International. As a result, GMIES has to some 
extent displaced the union, as workers bring their complaints to GMIES, which then 
speaks to Mandarin’s management. Unlike a union, however, GMIES is not structured in 
a way that it is accountable to the workers; as part of maintaining its independence, it 
must be formally neutral between management and labor (Armbruster-Sandoval 2005; 
Brooks 2007; Esbenshade 2004b). Future attempts at creating independent monitoring 
organizations, such as the WRC, would try to address these faults. 
 
Conclusion 
This, then, was the state of anti-sweatshop around 1996. They had a keen 
understanding of the structural problems that lay at the root of sweatshops, but were still 
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searching for strategies with which they could successfully bring pressure to bear on the 
core firms of the apparel industry. We have reviewed some of the more successful 
campaigns above, but there were many others that were less successful. And, even in 
cases of relative success, the story we saw with the Camisas Modernas plant is all too 
common--the union will win a victory, only to see it evaporate in a year or two as the 
factory is closed down, often to be reopened under a different name, sometimes 
elsewhere, sometimes in the very same EPZ (Armbruster-Sandoval 2005). And for every 
factory where there is an international campaign to support workers, there are certainly 
many more where a workers’ struggle never gets off the ground or where they have no 
international contacts and must fight alone, an almost certain recipe for failure. On the 
other hand, there was an increasing popular consciousness about the sweatshop problem 
among consumers in the US. Even before USAS was founded, students on many college 
campuses were engaging in anti-sweatshop activism. And organizations such as UNITE 
were searching for new strategies they might use in the struggle. In the coming chapters, 
we will look at how UNITE and USAS essentially stumbled on a new method for 
fighting sweatshops, using the leverage of colleges as institutional consumers over the 
brand-name companies that had licensing contracts with them. 
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Chapter 4: The Political Economy of Higher Education 
 
The Corporatization of Higher Education 
 The media coverage of sweatshop scandals discussed in the last chapter did not go 
unnoticed on college campuses. Student groups on a number of campuses began 
engaging in anti-sweatshop activism. Over the course of the 1997-1999 school years, this 
lead to the formation of a national organization, United Students Against Sweatshops. 
They proved to be dynamic force, dramatically changing the landscape of anti-sweatshop 
activism, putting apparel companies on the defensive. Before exploring USAS’s history 
and the strategy they pursued, however, we first need to understand the power structure 
and the political opportunity system on college campuses, how they work as both 
decision-making and discursive arenas. Just as it is necessary to understand how the 
structure of the apparel industry shapes the options open to workers and their allies, we 
must understand how the structure and culture of higher education shapes the possibilities 
for student activism. 
As part of this, we need to examine the increasing corporatization of higher 
education. The corporatization of higher education--the penetration of neoliberal ideology 
and practices into the academy--is a significant part of the context in which student 
activists must operate. On the one hand, it creates an atmosphere on campus that is not 
conducive to activism, as administrators focus on maximizing revenues and students 
focus on training for jobs after graduation and the enticements of consumer culture. On 
the other hand, this very corporatization is what has given students a potential point of 
leverage over the apparel industry, for it is the very ties that apparel companies have 
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formed with colleges and universities that students are turning against the brands to 
pressure them. 
Corporatization refers to the fact that school administrators have increasingly 
adopted both the values and the techniques of big business in managing their campuses, 
students, faculty, and other employees such as janitorial and food-service staff. In many 
ways, schools are increasingly operating as if they were for-profit organizations, while 
still maintaining their formal non-profit status (Rhoades and Slaughter 1997; Slaughter 
and Rhoades 2004; White 2000). Ties between the academy and business are nothing 
new. In the nineteenth century, colleges served essentially as finishing schools for the 
children of the nation’s elite. In the early twentieth century, as the industrial revolution 
came into its own and scientific research became of more importance to business, the first 
US research universities began to develop. Much of the work they did was with the goal 
of providing knowledge that was valuable to business; during the Cold War, universities 
also received extensive subsidies from the Pentagon to develop knowledge that would be 
of benefit to military leaders. Nonetheless, prior to the 1970s, both business and the 
Pentagon had a relatively hands-off attitude towards academic research. Not that this was 
a halcyon period--the Pentagon could and did demand loyalty tests from academics, for 
instance. And it was expected that academic would contribute to the good of business and 
the military--but they expected them to do so as much by pursuing knowledge for its own 
sake as by working on specific projects favored by the military or specific companies. 
There was an understanding that enlarging society’s pool of knowledge would, in the 
  91 
long term, produce work that was of benefit to elite institutions (Aronowitz 2000; 
Slaughter and Rhoades 2004). 
Corporatization has altered this equation, so that now schools have much closer 
ties with not just the business community as a whole, but specific businesses, for whom 
they specifically perform research. Thus, instead of encouraging scholars to perform 
general research to expand the pool of knowledge on which business can draw and 
benefit from in the long run, the focus has increasingly become on producing knowledge 
that will immediately turn a particular company a profit. Schools have also increasingly 
come to regard their purpose vis-à-vis students not as providing them with a broad 
education that will allow them to be informed citizens, but as training them quite 
specifically for administrative and technical positions in TNCs (Aronowitz 2000; 
Slaughter and Rhoades 2004). 
The on-going corporatization of higher education has taken place in the context of 
the rise of neoliberalism, described briefly in chapter two. Part of the reason for the shift 
lies simply in the shift in the larger ideological climate of the country (Aronowitz 2000). 
There are two other important sources for the change though--changes in government 
policy and the flow of ideas from the businesspeople sitting on schools’ boards to school 
administrators. In the 1970s, Congress dramatically changed national policies on 
financial aid for higher education. While formerly federal money had principally been 
used to subsidize colleges and universities as a whole, now federal money would be 
channeled in the forms of grants and (mainly) loans to individual students, based on the 
neoliberal rationale of empowering students as consumers. This lead, however, to 
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increased focus by schools on marketing to students, with all the deceptions that involves; 
and the growing stratification of higher education, as students from poorer families could 
less and less afford to go to elite schools (Rhoades and Slaughter 1997; Slaughter and 
Rhoades 2004). 
In the 1980s, Congress enacted a number of laws to promote “national 
competitiveness” in the globalized economy. Much of this legislation provided incentives 
for research universities to develop ties to individual businesses, in order to develop 
goods that could turn a profit for both the school and the company. The decline in 
government funding has also encouraged schools to form close ties with business as a 
way of raising money. As the norms of the business world increasingly became the norms 
of society as a whole and ties between higher education and big business tightened, the 
corporate executives who had long sat on school boards were increasingly able to 
implement policies at their schools that came out of the for-profit world (Rhoades and 
Slaughter 1997; Slaughter and Rhoades 2004). 
It should be emphasized that corporatization is an uneven process, the depth of 
which varies considerably from school to school, some having become more deeply 
committed to it, while others retain more of an affinity for older ideals of academic 
autonomy and the pursuit of knowledge for the common good. Even in schools that are 
deeply corporatized, many members of the faculty may still adhere to older ideas, 
resisting the new imperatives the administration tries to impose of them. Administrators 
themselves may often try to reconcile the two contradictory ideals (Slaughter and 
Rhoades 2004). 
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The corporatization of higher education is evident in a number of ways. It can be 
seen in changing patterns of employment of faculty. Administrators on many campuses 
have made moves to reduce the number of tenure-track positions, instead hiring adjunct 
instructors, who are little better than academic temps. This follows the increasingly 
corporate practice of replacing full-time employees with various forms of contingent 
labor. The use of adjuncts allows administrators to save a great deal of money, since they 
are paid far less than full-time faculty for the same work and they do not get benefits. 
School administrators have also increasingly chosen to outsource such things as janitorial 
and food services. Again, this follows the practices of the corporate world and is a means 
of cutting costs. The companies to whom such services are outsourced typically pay 
lower wages, provide fewer benefits, and engage in union-busting activities. As noted, 
research universities are increasingly encouraging their faculty members to work in 
partnership with big business. They also may encourage faculty to create their own start-
up business. In both cases, the tie to business is built on the ability of faculty to develop 
products that can both be patented and turn a profit, a share of which goes to the school. 
Patents, however, privatize knowledge, contradicting the traditional academic ideal of the 
pursuit of knowledge for the common good (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004; White 2000). 
Perhaps the most significant part of corporatization for the anti-sweatshop 
movement is in the procurement contracts that most schools now have with corporations 
in a wide number of industries. As of 2000, Barnes and Noble operated roughly 350 
campus bookstores, often displacing independent bookstores that had run them 
previously. Food services have long been outsourced; but, while they were once 
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outsourced to low-profile companies like ARAMark and Soxeho-Marriott, such high-
profile brands as Taco Bell, Pizza Hut and Starbucks are increasingly taking over the 
campus. The Coca-Cola and Pepsi soda companies now compete with each other for 
exclusive contracts on campus. All of these companies have tremendous labor problems 
in one form or another. And they all see students as a captive audience for marketing, 
among whom they can build brand loyalty (Klein 1999; Kniffin 2000b). Colleges have 
also built such relationships with apparel corporations--and, since it is these relationships 
which the anti-sweatshop movement has focused on, we will look at them in more depth 
here. 
 Anyone who has set foot in a college bookstore has probably noticed the 
numerous items for sale, including t-shirts, baseball hats and other forms of apparel, with 
the school’s logo imprinted on them. The schools do not produce these goods themselves. 
Instead, they typically sign a contract with an apparel company to produce these goods 
for them, giving them a license to use the school’s logo; as with normal apparel 
production, the lead firms then outsource the production of the licensed goods to 
contractors throughout the world. Such licensed apparel constitutes a $2.5 billon market, 
one that is highly lucrative for both the colleges and universities and the apparel firms 
involved. The company pays the schools 7.5-8% of the revenue from the sales of the 
licensed goods, providing additional income for the schools (Ross 2004). Some licensees 
are less visible companies, such as Champion and Russell, while others are high-profile 
brand-names, such as Adidas, Nike and Reebok (Benjamin 2000; Kniffin 2000b; 
Slaughter and Rhoades 2004). About 180 schools, including many of the biggest, operate 
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though the Collegiate Licensing Corporation (CLC), which negotiates and manages these 
licensing relationships for them (Ross 2004). 
In total, school-licensed apparel constitutes only 1-2% of the apparel market 
(Ross 2004). Because of the advertising and branding potential of this market, however, 
the lead apparel companies value it highly--well beyond any revenues they may bring in--
and would be loathe to simply give it up. Having a license with a college essentially gives 
them a captive audience to which to advertise, an audience whose long-term brand-
loyalty they hope to build up. Licenses with big-name sports schools are particularly 
sought after, because this gives the brands an opportunity to create synergy between their 
own brand and that of the school’s sports team, boosting their caché further. Additionally, 
when the games are broadcast, the television audience will see the brand’s logo alongside 
the school’s on the players’ uniforms, giving them free advertising of the most sought 
after sort (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004) (Dirnbach, Nova, Rutter; interviews, 2007). It is 
worth reiterating the critical point here that, for companies such as Nike and Reebok, 
their brand is their most valuable asset, so their ability to build their brand image through 
relationships to schools is particularly important to them. It also gives them an 
opportunity to manage consumers’ preferences, something as central to their operations, 
if not more so, than managing their employees. 
The licensed goods are not produced in specific factories; like any other product 
produced by contractors for apparel firms, the production of such goods is scattered over 
the world in numerous factories, alongside non-licensed goods, both by the same brand 
and by others. Given this, the anti-sweatshop movement has sought to use this licensing 
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relationship as a point of leverage, which they can use to pressure licensees to change the 
way they produced not only licensed goods, but all of their apparel. Specifically, the 
movement seeks to force the licensees to abide by codes of conduct when producing 
licensed goods, which, given the dispersed way they are produced, could potentially 
affect working conditions in the apparel industry beyond the narrow 1-2% over which 
schools have direct influence. As Jessica Rutter (interview, 2007), a USAS organizer at 
Duke University, noted, “It's definitely a niche market, but it's also a market that 
universities have almost total control over, because they can say yes or no [to the 
licensing agreement]. The stuff is made or it's not made. So that's a very powerful 
relationship, one that doesn't necessarily exist in regular purchasing.” As we shall explore 
in chapter six, colleges’ and universities’ status as institutional consumers gives them 
leverage far greater than that of any individual consumers, even if the latter pool their 
efforts into a boycott. 
In addition to reshaping school’s relationships with corporations themselves, 
corporatization has also had a substantial impact on how schools treat their student body. 
Administrators have become less concerned with a broad-based education that allows 
students to be active citizens and more in training students to take administrative and 
technical jobs with large corporations. They have come to see school as a place where 
students can gain the skills they need to succeed in the corporate world--an attitude 
students facing an increasingly competitive job market easily buy into (Aronowitz 2000). 
In general, education is seen less as something that contributes to the common good and 
instead as an individual good which students as consumers purchase. Thus, it should not 
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be surprising that the campus culture encouraged by school administrators also socializes 
students into thinking of themselves as consumers, not only of education, but in general. 
The high profile presence of brands such as Taco Bell, Coca-Cola and Nike on campus 
all help reinforce the consumerism of the surrounding culture (Klein 1999; Slaughter and 
Rhoades 2004). 
The role such major companies play on campus can have a stifling effect on 
activism. Students may be so invested in having brands they identify with on campus, 
that they may be indifferent to the labor rights violations and other abuses committed by 
the companies involved, whether on or off campus. Amanda Plumb (interview, 2007), 
recounted a story from USAS’s efforts to keep the anti-union fast-food chain Wendy’s 
from setting up shop on the campus of Duke University: “I remember when we were 
petitioning against Wendy’s being so mad when I tried to get one of the Duke basketball 
players, a freshman, to sign the petition and he was like, No, I want my Frosties, I care 
about Frosties. I said, You care about Frosties from Wendy’s more than you care about 
workers rights? That’s insane.” Scott Nova (interview, 2007), the executive director of 
the WRC, told me, 
We operate in an intellectual, moral culture where it is difficult--not for 
working people--but difficult for the educated classes to recognize 
corporate malfeasance, because we've been trained by our educational 
experiences and the media to cut corporations a great deal of slack and to 
find it difficult to conceptualize that they're capable of violating the law 
and basic human rights. So the brands are able to behave in ways that if it 
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was a behavior carried out by an individual, people would immediately 
recognize as illegal and morally offensive but are much less prone to 
recognize that when it's done by a corporation. 
As we will see below though, activists have been able to turn the tables in some 
cases, using the emotional attachment people feel to brands against the brand-name 
companies. When consumers find out that a company such as Nike that likes to portray 
itself as socially conscious is actually complicit in sweatshop exploitation, they may feel 
betrayed, fueling activism against the betraying company. This, in turn, becomes an 
avenue for activists to more widely educate new-comers to the movement about the 
realities of the global economy (Klein 1999). It remains, however, an uphill battle. 
 
Campus Governance and Student Activism 
Perhaps the most obvious challenge students face in influencing decision-making 
on campus is the highly authoritarian, anti-democratic nature of campus governance, 
where power is centered in the hands of administrators who are not formally accountable 
to students. Traditionally, however, because administrators were mostly former faculty 
members, there was a good deal of accountability on the part of administrators to the 
faculty. As the campus becomes corporatized though, this limited accountability has also 
growing weaker, as school administrators become increasingly accountable mainly to the 
nation’s business elite (Waugh 2003). The boards of trustees of private schools and the 
boards of regents of public schools--the people who get to appoint school administrators--
are not composed primarily of those with the most obvious connection to higher 
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education--“educators, alumni, and local community stakeholders” (Kniffin 2000a). 
Instead, they are--and long have been--dominated by corporate executives. College and 
university presidents themselves frequently sit on corporate boards; when they do not do 
so in order to avoid any semblance of impropriety, less visible administrators may sit on 
corporate boards instead. School presidents may also form ties with the corporate world 
by acting as consultants and sitting on the boards of non-profits alongside corporate 
executives (Kniffin 2000a; Rhoades and Slaughter 1997). 
Corporatization has produced significant changes in the structure and culture of 
school administrations. An increasing number of school administrators come not from 
within the ranks of the faculty, as is traditional, but from outside academia, often the 
business world. As a result, they have little understanding of academic values or culture, 
imposing in their place the technocratic norms of the business world--norms that such 
administrators tend to see as value-neutral, not an ideology in their own right. Such 
administrators, in addition to applying for-profit standards to academic work--valuing 
departments based on how much revenue they bring in, for instance--but also have little 
patience with faculty’s expectation that they should get to participate in school 
governance. The norms of the business world are, after all, even more authoritarian than 
those of higher education, with administrators from business backgrounds used to 
imposing their decisions from the top-down and having little patience for opposition 
(Steck 2003; Waugh 2003). And, if such administrators have little patience with faculty’s 
traditional prerogative to play a role in campus decision-making, one may imagine they 
have even less patience for students’ demands for such a role. In other words, as schools 
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grow more corporatized, college and university presidents--particularly those at the upper 
echelon schools--are increasingly seeing their primary loyalty as being to the business 
world--and not the academy. 
William L. Waugh, Jr. (2003) concludes that, given this trend of school presidents 
becoming increasingly accountable to outside constituencies, particularly business, they 
have to worry less and less about their on-campus legitimacy. He worries what this may 
mean for the future of higher education and campus life. Happily, as we will see below, 
the experience of USAS indicates that things may not be so cut-and-dried as Waugh 
fears. There are a number of factors that provide a counterweight to corporatization. One 
is the legacy of the student movement of the 1960s. Many of the current administrators 
themselves came of age in that era and some even participated in protests, giving them 
somewhat more comprehension of student activists than a previous generation of 
administrators might have had (Greenhouse 1999a; Zernike 1999). Student activism has 
also simply become a normative part of campus life. As such, campus administrators 
cannot simply afford to brush student activists off, but must make at least some gestures 
towards listening to them and engaging with them (Robert J.S. Ross, personal 
communication, 2008).5 As we will see, administrators often try to get away with empty 
gestures, such as creating committees to study the issue raised by campus activists, but 
nonetheless they cannot simply ignore them out altogether--and often have to make 
substantial concessions, not simply empty gestures. 
This points to a broader phenomenon--administrators are still part of a relatively 
small campus community and they must maintain some legitimacy in the eyes of that 
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community, no matter how corporatized their campus. As Rutter (interview, 2007) put it, 
“A campus is a closed environment and it's easy to get access to the press, at least the 
campus press. There's also an enclosed decision-making process. As students, you have 
access to the college president, the person who makes the decisions, something a lot of 
other groups don't have.” There are three things at work here. One is the simple question 
of scale--the college or university as a quasi-polity is so small that this in and of itself 
gives activists influence they might not have in another setting. The second is that the 
organizing space for students on campus is wide open; student groups with a fair amount 
of autonomy are one of the norms of campus life and administrators would be hard-
pressed to justify restricting them. The third factor is that, while formal decision-making 
power may be monopolized by the administration, the discursive arena of college 
campuses is wide open. Most schools have at least one student newspaper, as well as 
other student publications; students can organize a wide variety of their own events; 
sympathetic professors can speak out in their support. This gives student activists 
multiple venues to make their case to the wider student body and build up their 
legitimacy. As Steven Lukes (2005) argues, while there is power in controlling the levers 
of decision-making, there is also power in being able to set the public agenda. And 
student activists can set the public agenda at their schools, forcing administrators to deal 
with questions like sweatshops they might prefer to ignore. Getting something on the 
public agenda and getting the decisions about that issue made the way you want are 
certainly two different things, but even putting the issue of sweatshops on the agenda in 
the first place changes the nature of the playing field. 
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And administrators do have to worry about their legitimacy. According to Thomas 
Wheatley (interview, 2007), a USAS member at the University of Wisconsin--Madison, 
“These folks are public figures; even though they're not elected, university presidents are 
public figures.” Eric Brakken, also a USAS member at UW--Madison (interview, 2007), 
told the story of how the school’s Chancellor, David Ward, was forced to resign after 
mishandling a student protest. On February 21, 2000, Ward not only had fifty-four 
students conducting a sit-in in his office to press the administration to join the Worker 
Rights Consortium arrested, but sent in the riot police to do the job. Brakken noted that 
Ward “took a lot of heat from the community and the campus for arresting fifty-four 
students and for profiteering from workers at sweatshops. Within three days of those 
arrests happening he took a vacation for two or three weeks, when he came back from his 
vacation he resigned,” effective January 1st of the next year. Many college and university 
presidents today hope to make a career of leading schools, moving from being the head of 
one to another; when a president discredits themselves as Ward did, this can be damaging 
to their long-term career (McSpedon, interview, 2007). Thus, administrators, even when 
unsympathetic, need to handle student activists with care. 
None of this is to say that corporatization has not had an impact. It means that 
administrations’ priorities often conflict with those of progressive student activists, 
making any attempt to persuade the former to adopt anti-sweatshop policies a difficult 
and highly confrontational process. But corporatization has not been total--as already 
noted, it is an uneven process. In the experience of WRC executive director Nova 
(interview, 2007), who has had extensive dealings with many college officials, “Most 
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administrators […] are torn. On the one hand, they want to accommodate students and 
they want to do the right thing. On the other hand, they have an obligation to maintain 
good relationships with the business community.” The degree of corporatization also 
varies considerably from school to school. USAS member Amanda Plumb (interview, 
2007) contrasted her experience with the relatively responsive administrators at Duke 
where she was an undergraduate with those of the University of Massachusetts--Amherst, 
where she was a grad student. As we will see in the next chapter, the administrators of 
Duke shared a concern with social justice issues with USAS; as a result, they were 
responsive to the students, willing to negotiate them with them and to implement a pro-
labor code of conduct for their licensees. At UMass, in contrast, Plumb met far greater 
administration resistance while working on the Killer Coke campaign, targeting Coca-
Cola for its complicity in the use of death squads against union leaders at its bottling 
plants in Colombia. “We met with the chancellor and he said, My job is to get the most 
money for your eyeballs, meaning, My job is to make money for the school and if that 
means selling ad space to Coca-Cola all around the university, that's my job--and I'm not 
going to cancel Coke’s contract because they kill union activists. It is my job to make 
sure that the school is financially solvent.” Clearly, the UMass Chancellor saw his 
responsibilities entirely within corporatized terms, of maximizing school revenues, a far 
cry from the Duke administrators who, as we will see, sought to balance such concerns 
with more humanitarian ones. 
The type of school can also make a difference. Zack Knorr (interview, 2007), a 
national organizer for USAS, said, 
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With smaller schools, there's not as much at stake. Schools like the 
University of California who have very large contracts with companies 
like Nike, they also don't want to make pro-labor statements anywhere, 
right? So to say that they support the right of workers abroad to form a 
union, I think they always fear that that somehow can be used against 
them when it comes to their own workers. And they definitely don't want 
to deal with that. So I just think that the big universities have more at 
stake, and so oftentimes are more resistant. And sometimes these smaller 
schools or even some of the bigger public schools, they may actually want 
to portray an image that they really encourage student activism--and some 
of them may somewhat mean it. The big universities, I think, are just more 
run like businesses. 
Catholic schools have also been more responsive to student demands, given the influence 
of the Church’s teachings on the importance of economic justice (Krupa 1999). It should 
also be noted that the issue itself may make a difference in many cases. As Knorr 
describes, the last thing many administrators want to deal with is their own employees 
unionizing, since this represents a direct challenge to their power on campus. Thus 
administrators who are willing to support monitoring their licensees to ensure that they 
do not use sweatshop labor may fight tooth and nail against organizing by workers on 
their own campuses, essentially supporting sweatshop practices at home while opposing 
them abroad. 
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 Having examined the political opportunity system within which it takes place, we 
can now turn to look at the rise of student anti-sweatshop activism. 
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Chapter 5: The Rise of United Students Against Sweatshops 
 
The Start of Student Anti-Sweatshop Activism 
 As already noted, the media coverage of sweatshop scandals generated a good 
deal of student anti-sweatshop activism on college campuses. While these students were 
adept at engaging in creative guerilla theater and other similar actions, they initially had 
relatively little impact on either the national debate around sweatshops or the policies of 
core apparel firms. This began to change dramatically in the 1997-98 school year, as the 
national network that would become United Students Against Sweatshops took shape. 
They soon found themselves at the cutting edge of the US anti-sweatshop movement, due 
to a combination of creativity and the leverage the college licensing agreements discussed 
in the last chapter gave them. Their actions expanded well beyond guerilla theater to 
include not only sit-ins in administration buildings, but crafting an independent 
monitoring organization--the Worker Rights Consortium--which they then pressed their 
colleges and universities to join; this development gave the anti-sweatshop movement 
real teeth, since these schools had the power to penalize companies that failed to live up 
to their codes of conduct. 
 What happened to so dramatically change the nature of the student anti-sweatshop 
movement? There were several important developments, which we will explore in this 
and the coming chapters. A number of national anti-sweatshop organizations--most 
importantly the apparel union UNITE--took the student movement under their wing. 
They trained a new generation of student leaders, helping them to move from taking 
actions that were simply tactical, such as guerilla theater, to developing coherent 
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strategies, both for campaigns on campus and on the global stage. As part of this, they 
conveyed an ideology emphasizing worker empowerment (as opposed to paternalism on 
the part of affluent, first-world consumers) as central to the success of any campaign to 
abolish sweatshops. They also fostered the founding of USAS, a national organization 
that could coordinate actions across campuses and train successive generations of student 
activists in USAS’s ideology and strategic models. 
 Many narratives of the student anti-sweatshop movement represent USAS as 
having originated solely with a group of students who interned with UNITE in the 
summer of 1997. While these students certainly played a critical role, it is important to 
note that anti-sweatshop activism sprung up independently on a number of campuses, 
particularly after the Gifford and other scandals brought the issue to general public 
attention. Some of these groups grew out of ones that had been working on international 
solidarity issues for a while, as at the University of California--Berkeley (Abrams*, 
interview, 2007); some out of student groups in support of labor, such as the Student 
Labor Action Coalition at the University of Wisconsin--Madison (McSpedon, interview, 
2007); and others were set up for the specific purpose of addressing the issue of 
sweatshops, such as the Just Don’t Do It Campaign (playing on Nike’s slogan of “Just do 
it”) at the University of Michigan (Dirnbach, interview, 2007). There was, however, little, 
if any, coordination or sharing of ideas between campuses. 
The actions students took consisted mainly of guerilla art and theater. Eric 
Brakken (interview, 2007), later USAS’s first staff person, recalled, “At the University of 
Wisconsin[--Madison], we protested when UW signed its contract with Reebok. We 
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made t-shirts that said ‘Free Bucky,’ the badger mascot of UW. A lot of guerilla art, 
guerilla theatre. At the University of North Carolina, they painted tires to say ‘UNC 
Sweatshop’--the basketball coach has a relationship with Nike.” Eric Dirnbach, now a 
research and campaign coordinator with UNITE HERE, recalled of his days as a student 
activist at the University of Michigan, “Our demands were a little incoherent at that 
point--it basically was, drop the Nike contract or get them to do the right thing. It was not 
quite clear to us at the time exactly what the right thing would be.” What the students had 
noticed though was that many schools had lucrative licensing contracts with major 
apparel companies. While they may not initially have been sure how to take advantage of 
this to exert real leverage over these corporations, this connection would later prove 
critical to USAS’s strategy. 
Despite this pre-existing student activism, UNITE played a critical role in helping 
students shape their actions into what would become the cutting edge of the anti-
sweatshop movement. It does not appear, however, that UNITE initially expected student 
anti-sweatshop activism to become the dynamic force it did. The eleven students who 
interned at UNITE’s New York City in the summer of 1997 did so as part of a larger 
program of the AFL-CIO, Union Summer. This program brought college students in to 
intern with AFL-CIO-affiliated unions throughout the US. It was part of AFL-CIO 
President Sweeney’s strategy of building greater ties between the labor movement and 
other groups, part of the general thrust towards a more progressive, activist, community-
based unionism. The goal of Union Summer was to raise awareness among college 
students of the importance of unions in securing economic justice for workers--an uphill 
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battle in a country, where many--particularly among the affluent, but among much of the 
working class as well--regard unions as relics of the past, at best irrelevant to today’s 
economy, if not as actively corrupt forces preying on workers. Sweeney also hoped that 
some of these student interns would go on to become professional organizers in the labor 
movement, revitalizing it with some new blood. The name of the program itself comes 
from Freedom Summer, the program initiated in 1964 by the Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee, one of the major civil rights groups, to bring Northern, white 
college students to the deep South to work on voter registration and other civil rights 
issues (Levin 1996). 
At the time the students were interning with UNITE, the union was uncertain 
about which way to go forward. Its traditional membership base of textile and apparel 
workers was rapidly eroding as the lead apparel firms outsourced production overseas. 
Those workers who remained were often in small sweatshops that were difficult to 
organize. Ginny Coughlin, the UNITE organizer who supervised the student interns, had 
them working on any number of issues, of which the connection between colleges and 
sweatshops was initially only one. They were simply following the strategic model of the 
anti-corporate campaign, looking for any and all weaknesses of the apparel industry that 
they might be able to use as leverage over the core firms (McSpedon, Plumb; interviews, 
2007). Laura McSpedon, a student intern from Georgetown University, recalled, “Ginny 
Coughlin […] came to our Union Summer site and did a presentation on the garment 
industry and the structure of the industry and how it's set up to screw over workers pretty 
much. And said, We think students have a role to play in solving this problem, and kind 
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of posed the idea of students getting involved.” While UNITE was aware of the issue of 
university procurement, they originally encouraged students to get involved with the 
Guess campaign, which had little direct connection to campus life (McSpedon, interview, 
2007). 
It was only as the students researched the issue of colleges’ and universities’ ties 
with the apparel industry that it became clear that they had a potentially significant point 
of leverage there. Amanda Plumb (interview, 2007), a student intern from Duke 
University, said, 
They gave us basic information about sweatshops and how the garment 
industry works, but a lot of the research on licensing and procurement, we 
did. It was a new strategy in anti-corporate campaigns; it was a new tactic 
to look at these connections to universities. They knew there was a 
connection, they knew there were these contracts, but I just remember that 
we did the original research on our own schools and that hadn't been done 
yet. It's not hard to do, it's literally picking up the phone and calling and 
looking up some websites. It didn't take a professional researcher to figure 
this stuff out. 
At the time, college and university officials were willing to talk freely about these issues. 
Plumb doubts this would be the case today, after years of anti-sweatshop activism, but at 
the time, the information did not strike most of the people the interns called as 
particularly sensitive. 
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Having gathered the details on these relationships for a number of schools, the 
interns began to put together an organizing manual and, when they returned to classes in 
the fall of 1997, began organizing on their own campuses, while contacting students at 
other schools. This networking lead to conferences in New York City during July of 1998 
and Washington, DC in July of 1999, the latter of which saw the official founding of 
USAS (United Students Against Sweatshops 2009c). Even before USAS’s official 
beginning, however, campaigns to get college and university administrations to adopt 
codes of conduct began to take off in 1997, with students coordinating their campaigns 
with each other nationally. As these events unfolded, what had started off as something 
based on the strategic model of anti-corporate campaigns evolved into a period of 
substantial strategic innovation. As the students contended with successive challenges, 
their strategy morphed from a campaign that might target one corporation into something 
substantially different, targeting and monitoring not simply one, lone firm but a 
significant sector of the apparel industry. 
 
The Duke University Code of Conduct Campaign 
 As of 2007 (when I conducted my interviews) USAS’s strategy operated on two 
parallel levels. On one level is the strategy they used to pressure the administrators of 
their colleges and universities, which we will explore in this and the immediately 
following chapters. On the second level is the strategy they used to pressure the brands 
and their contractors operating on the international stage, which we will look in at more 
depth in chapters twelve through fourteen. A successful strategy on the campus level is a 
  112 
necessary precondition for a successful strategy on the international level, since few 
college administrators have voluntarily been willing to implement the codes of conduct, 
which are a critical element of the international strategy--and those schools which did 
implement the codes more or less voluntarily did not form enough of a critical mass on 
their own to have a real impact. Thus, once the student interns at UNITE had identified a 
potential point of leverage over the apparel industry, they then had to look for points of 
leverage over their own administrators--for it is the administrators, not the students, who 
sign and control the contracts with the likes of Nike, Reebok and Champion. 
 Before analyzing the workings of USAS’s campus strategy, it makes sense to take 
an in-depth look at the campaign for a code of conduct as it took place on one campus, 
Duke University in Durham, North Carolina. As a big sports school, Duke had 700 
licensees and sold $20 million worth of licensed goods every year at the time of USAS’s 
formation (Greenhouse 1998a). Duke was home to two of the student interns, Tico 
Almeida and Amanda Plumb. It was also the first school where students conducted a sit-
in to pressure administrators, an action that inspired a wave of similar actions at other 
schools. In some ways, Duke served as a reference for activists at others schools and it 
can serve us as useful example in understanding the political opportunity system on 
campus and the student strategy to pressure administrators. 
 Duke students had something of an advantage over students at other schools in 
that they started with administrators who were sympathetic to their concerns about 
sweatshops. Jim Wikerson (interview, 2007), the Director of Trademark Licensing and 
Store Operations (and now a member of the WRC’s board of directors), had 
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independently taken an interest in the issue in the summer of 1997 after watching a show 
on the History Channel on the history of sweatshops. He also notes that, “In those days, 
Nan Keohane was the president of Duke and she had a very personal interest and 
commitment to these types of social justice issues, something very rare among university 
presidents.” Beyond the individual beliefs of the administrators, the administration as a 
whole sought to cultivate an image of an enlightened, liberal school, with a culture more 
akin to that of the Northeast than of the conservative South (Plumb, interview, 2007). 
This did not mean that relations between the administration and the student activists in 
Students Against Sweatshops (SAS) was all smooth sailing; it did ensure, however, that 
such relations remained cordial and lines of communication open, even during the middle 
of the sit-in that was the culmination of the student’s campaign for the code of conduct. 
 Plumb (interview, 2007) recalls that when SAS began its campaign for a code of 
conduct in the fall of 1997, “we made a tactical decision to really focus on beginning to 
educate students.” “Such efforts include[d] Bryan [Student] Center tabling, presenting to 
campus organizations and even creating a coloring book explaining how a Blue Devil 
[Duke’s mascot] can help stop sweatshops,” (Parkins 1997b) as well as a number of 
articles and an op-ed (Almeida and Au 1997) in the student newspaper, The Duke 
Chronicle. Plumb (interview, 2007) and some other SAS members also taught a class on 
issues related to sweatshops and globalization; they were, among other things, concerned 
that many of SAS’s leaders were seniors and they wanted to use the class to cultivate a 
new generation of such leaders. SAS also immediately began building a coalition of 
student groups around the issue of sweatshops, forming ties with such student groups as 
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the Students of the Caribbean Association. SAS also joined a regional labor rights 
coalition, which held a protest in the city of Durham on October 5th, the National Day of 
Conscience to End Sweatshops and Child Labor, in front of a local mall (Parkins 1997b). 
Additionally, the student activists took advantage of Duke’s alternative spring break 
program to take some of their peers to New York City and, with the help of New York 
University professor Andrew Ross, see some of the sweatshops there and speak to the 
workers (Plumb, interview, 2007). 
Even as they began their educational campaign in the fall, SAS contacted the 
administration about creating a code of conduct for Duke’s licensees. Although the 
administration did not respond to SAS’s initial e-mail in September, by October, SAS 
had gathered enough support to send a few hundred e-mails to President Keohane; this 
secured them a meeting with her, which lead to the formation of a committee to draft a 
code (Lam 1998). In addition to members of SAS, the committee included Wilkerson and 
Executive Vice President Tallman Trask. Given their own concerns, the administration 
had already taken a first step in this direction, notifying the CLC in August that they 
wished to add a clause to their licensing contracts, calling upon their licensees not to 
engage in “unfair labor practices or labor abuse” (quoted in Parkins 1997a). While some 
schools, such as Notre Dame, had already implemented codes of conduct for their 
licensees, they left the actual monitoring to the licensees, a clear conflict of interest. SAS 
insisted that Duke work with an independent monitor to verify that its licensees were 
sweat-free, a position on which the administration soon came to agree with them (Parkins 
1997a). The students strengthened their position by gaining informal endorsements of 
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their proposed code and the need for an independent monitor from Susan Cowel, the 
vice-president of UNITE (Parkins 1997c), and former US Labor Secretary Robert Reich 
(Woo 1997). As we shall see in the next chapter, the issue of what constitutes an 
effective, independent monitor proved to be a contentious issue between students and 
administrators, not only at Duke, but nationally. By March 1998, SAS and the 
administration had tentatively agreed on a code of conduct that included a prohibition of 
child labor, health and safety standards, a recognition of workers’ right to collective 
bargaining, disclosure of the factory locations to the university, and independent 
monitoring (Lam 1998). 
 As events evolved in the fall of the next school year (1998-1999), however, it 
became clear that SAS and Duke’s administrators had not reached total consensus on the 
contents of the code of conduct. SAS had two major issues. One was the issue of 
disclosure. Even at this early stage of the game, it was clear that in order for any code of 
conduct to actually be enforceable, outside monitors had to have access to the factories so 
they could actually inspect them for code violations. To do so, they needed to know 
where the factories were located. The apparel companies, as one might imagine, were 
loath to part with this information. They argued that it was a trade secret, which could 
harm their business if publicly revealed. The claim was absurd, since different brand-
name firms often used the same contractors and the same factories; one could go to a 
factory and find rival brands’ products being produced right next to each other. The 
brands really had no trade secrets to hide from each other--only the truth about the 
working conditions to hide from the public (Abrams, Dirnbach; interviews, 2007). The 
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Duke administrators had negotiated a compromise with their licensees, where the apparel 
companies would disclose the location of their factories to the administration only; the 
administration in turn would make public the country, city and name of the contractor, 
but not their owner’s name, their address, what they produced and in what quantities. 
SAS insisted that all this information had to be fully and publicly disclosed. Even at this 
stage, it was clear that it would be difficult for an individual school to properly monitor 
its licensees on its own; SAS argued that by making the information publicly available, 
any human rights group could take up the task of monitoring (Sostek 1998). 
The other disagreement between students and administrators was over the issue of 
a living wage. The university’s code contained vague language about wages needing to 
meet “basic needs,” while specifying that the wage had to equal the country’s legal 
minimum wage or the prevailing wage in the local industry, whichever was higher. SAS 
members objected that neither of these standards was actually enough to cover a worker’s 
basic needs--workers were routinely paid sub-subsistence level wages and often less than 
the legal minimum wage. The students wanted more specific and stringent language so 
that a worker would be able to support a family (Sostek 1998). Like disclosure, this was 
something that the brands strongly opposed. In this case, however, they could not say so 
outright--saying that you oppose paying workers enough to live off is not the best way to 
frame your position and the corporations knew that. Instead, they insisted (and continue 
to insist) that the concept of a living wage is too vague and that there is no clear way to 
measure what it would need to be, especially given the variability between countries. 
While there may be a grain of truth in these claims, as Nancy Steffan (interview, 2007), a 
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former USAS member and current WRC staff person put it, “Wages are very clearly, 
right now, below what workers need to survive. And it would not be that difficult to 
decide on a number that would put workers in a much better position and implement it.” 
Even as these disagreements were unfolding at the campus level, the campaign 
began taking on national dimensions, as students at other colleges undertook similar 
steps. This lead a number of schools to take an interest in trying to solve the problem 
through the Collegiate Licensing Corporation. Duke administrators, particularly 
Wilkerson, tried to take the lead in the CLC in forging a code of conduct, negotiating 
both with other college and university administrators and with the licensees (Korein 
1998a). As is the nature of such negotiations when not all parties are terribly enthusiastic 
about the idea to begin with, the result was a series of compromises. Opposition came not 
only from the licensees, but from other college and university administrators, who were 
relatively indifferent to the issue of sweatshops. Without the full backing of even the 
other schools, it was difficult for Keohane and Wilkerson to put meaningful pressure on 
the apparel companies. Thus, in the process of negotiations, Duke administrators soon 
found themselves backing away even from their commitment for full disclosure to 
schools, instead settling for disclosure only to the agency the CLC would contract with 
for monitoring. In response, SAS pushed Keohane and Wilkerson to not only adopt a 
stronger code at the campus level, but to take a stronger stand in the CLC; if the CLC 
would not agree to a stronger code, they argued Duke should not sign any code at all 
(Stroup 1998a, 1998b; Weber 1998). The situation only became more controversial when 
in January 1999 it became clear that the CLC would turn to the Fair Labor Association 
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(FLA) as a monitoring agency, something student activists opposed because of the FLA’s 
close ties to the apparel industry (Stroup 1999a), a point we will explore in more depth in 
chapter nine. 
 As the disagreement between SAS and the Duke administrators heated up over the 
1998-1999 school year, the students took a number of actions to build support--and thus 
their legitimacy--on campus. Along with students from the nearby University of North 
Carolina--Chapel Hill, who were waging a similar battle on their own campus, they 
staged protests outside of Durham’s two Wal-Marts on the October 5th National Day of 
Conscience; they drew a connection between Wal-Mart’s sweatshop practices and its 
refusal to disclose its contractors and Duke’s similar reluctance (Korein 1998b). They 
persuaded Duke’s student government to pass a resolution in support of their position, 
asking Keohane to press in the CLC for full disclosure (Rubin 1998); gained the 
endorsement of The Chronicle, which published an unsigned editorial in support of SAS 
(The Duke Chronicle 1998), as well as numerous op-eds by SAS supporters (e.g., 
Almeida 1998; Ferenczi and Harbison 1998; Harris 1998; Kumar and Mandel 1998; 
Weber 1998); circulated a petition, which secured over 1,000 student signatures; built a 
coalition of thirty student groups (McBride 1999), including the Duke chapter of 
Amnesty International (Ferenczi and Harbison 1998) and the service learning 
organization Learning through Experience, Action, Partnership, and Service (LEAPS) 
(Kumar and Mandel 1998); and staged protests outside the president’s office. Keohane 
attempted to defend the administration’s position, including at one of these protests, 
insisting that no agreement was viable without compromise (Stroup 1998a; Weber 1998). 
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Finally, when they felt as if the administration would not be persuaded by other 
means, following a rally, twenty members of SAS staged a sit-in at the president’s office 
on the afternoon of January 29th. The sit-in was relatively brief, only thirty hours. The 
administration did not seek to have the students evicted, but instead allowed them to 
spend the night in the building, even as they negotiated with them during the day. Despite 
being seriously ill, Keohane put in a brief appearance to listen to the students’ grievances, 
before delegating negotiations to Trask (Stroup 1999d). Plumb (interview, 2007), who 
took part in the sit-in, relates that one of the vice-chancellors even took the time to simply 
hang out with them, joining in a game of Taboo. In the end, the administration and 
students reached a mutually acceptable settlement, where Duke would add a clause 
requiring full disclosure in its code of conduct and would push for the same in the CLC; 
if the CLC did not agree to this within a year, Duke would pull out of the organization 
(Stroup 1999b, 1999d). Plumb (interview, 2007) notes that the settlement was relatively 
easy to reach, given that the administration agreed with the students in principle and 
simply questioned the practicality of their position. Despite the work the students had 
done to shore up their position with the campus community before the sit-in, the 
precariousness of their legitimacy can be seen in the reaction of editors of The Chronicle 
(1999): “While the cause was noble and the end-goal worthy, the tactics of the Students 
Against Sweatshops were excessive--and a little silly;” the editors felt that the students 
should have continued their negotiations with the administration. Tensions between 
students and administrators remained, however, as the administration decided to join the 
FLA in March (Stroup 1999c, 1999e). 
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In terms of implementing the new policy, Wilkerson relates 
Within just three or four weeks following [the sit-in], I sent notices to all 
of Duke’s licensees telling them that within thirty days from the date of 
the notice, they would have to begin publicly disclosing that information. 
[…] And I think at that time there were probably twenty companies out of 
four hundred who said, No, we’re not going to do it. The twenty who said 
they were not going to do it were issued cancellation notices; and within a 
week or two of the cancellation notices, all of those companies except six 
agreed they would publicly disclose the factory locations. And so it wasn’t 
nearly as difficult as some expected it might be. 
As noted above, full disclosure has not proved to be a burden of any sort for the 
licensees; indeed, more recently, it has become clear that even with full disclosure and 
independent monitoring, the apparel industry still has far too much room to perpetuate 
sweatshop conditions--a problem we will return to in chapter fifteen. 
 Inspired by the success of Duke’s SAS, students at a number of other campuses--
including Georgetown; the University of Wisconsin--Madison; Notre Dame; UNC--
Chapel Hill; and the University of Arizona--undertook sit-ins, often in the face of 
opposition by far more recalcitrant administrations (Featherstone and United Students 
Against Sweatshops 2002). Brakken (interview, 2007) recalled, “We ere egging each 
other on--if they're going to do it, then we're going to do it. […] We had this wave of sit-
ins, […] there were like five or six schools. This was something new and some campuses 
had gotten media; we began to get a lot of phone calls from students or e-mails from 
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students that had heard about this. They wanted to figure out how to do this themselves.” 
Not only did all the sit-ins succeed, in many cases the students also felt empowered to 
escalate the level of their demands, for instance calling for the inclusion of a living wage, 
a demand they won in several cases. At other schools, they won concessions from their 
administrations without needing to resort to a sit-in, though in many cases the at least 
implicit threat of one lay in the background (Featherstone and United Students Against 
Sweatshops 2002). 
 USAS--or, more properly, the network of student activists that would become 
USAS--had thus won its first round of victories. In the coming chapters, we will examine 
more closely how they achieved these (and future on campus) victories, looking at the 
role of their ideology, strategic models, and organization. While looking at the course of 
events illuminates a certain amount, for a deeper understanding, we must examine the 
social process by which United Students Against Sweatshops worked out and 
implemented their strategy. 
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Chapter 6: USAS’s Ideology of Worker Empowerment 
 
The Role of Ideology 
An activist groups’ strategy is shaped by a number of factors--the social context 
in which they operate, the models for action with which they are familiar, their decision-
making processes, and their ideology. We have already looked at some of the ways in 
which the campus social environment shaped USAS’s strategy. We will now turn to their 
ideology, the set of ideas through which they make sense of the world--including the 
political opportunities and constraints created by their environment. USAS’s ideology 
was very heavily shaped by its early ties with UNITE, resulting in a strong emphasis on 
worker empowerment and independent labor unions as the main means to such 
empowerment. On the other hand, it would be a mistake to assume that USAS’s ideology 
emerged fully formed as soon as the students began coordinated campaigns for codes of 
conduct at schools across the nation in the fall of 1997. As USAS members struggled 
with both their own administrations and the transnational apparel corporations, they 
reflected on those struggles and deepened the development of their ideology. We will 
look at some of the crucial turning points in the evolution of their ideology in chapters ten 
and fifteen, as we look at the reasons USAS began to develop first the Worker Rights 
Consortium, then the Designated Suppliers Program. Here, I present more of an ideal-
typical overview of their ideology. It should also be noted that this ideology is more 
likely to be more clearly held by USAS’s leaders, particularly national leaders who are 
part of coordinating actions across campuses. Newer members and members focusing just 
on their own campuses are less likely to fully grasp the importance of worker 
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empowerment and acting in solidarity and more likely to be animated by an ill-defined, 
humanitarian opposition to sweatshops. 
As discussed in chapter one, Oliver and Johnston (2000) define an ideology as 
consisting of a set of values, an analysis of the workings of society, and a set of norms for 
action, by which activists hope to alter the workings of society to better realize their 
values. The core value of anti-sweatshop groups such as USAS is that of worker 
empowerment--that workers should be able to control their own lives and should be able 
to exercise their own power, not needing to rely on the good-will of others to guarantee 
their well-being. The anti-sweatshop movement’s theories consist of a sophisticated 
analysis of the international apparel industry and the ways in which it consistently fosters 
the disempowerment of workers and encourages the abuse of their rights. In particular, 
this theory emphasizes that the problems are structural and not a matter of a few bad 
apples or misguided policies that can be corrected through corporate good will. The 
norms of the movement involve supporting independent unions for workers; fighting for 
concrete, incremental victories, such as the unionization of a particular factory; and 
solidarity between students and labor, emphasizing working for a relationship founded on 
equality instead of paternalism. 
Some may question whether this set of beliefs and norms truly constitutes an 
ideology, as the word is often used, referring to such systems of thought as anarchism, 
conservativism, fascism, feminism, liberalism, libertarianism or socialism. While the 
anti-sweatshop movement’s beliefs are not a grand ideology in this sense, they 
nonetheless constitute a coherent set of beliefs about the social and political world, one 
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which has a profound impact on how the movement acts. Further, the anti-sweatshop 
movement’s beliefs have all the elements that Oliver and Johnston (2000) identify as 
composing an ideology. For these reasons, it seems useful to me to refer to the 
movement’s beliefs as an ideology, while acknowledging that this ideology of worker 
empowerment is not in exactly the same category as such grand ideologies as socialism 
or conservativism. It is also worth noting that, in addition to the ideology of worker 
empowerment that members of USAS and the larger movement hold, individual members 
generally hold to beliefs from one of the grand ideologies of the left--anarchism, 
socialism, progressivism, feminism or liberalism. Other than adhering to broadly left 
beliefs though, there is no consensus within the movement on anything larger than the 
ideology of worker empowerment. Nevertheless, this gives activists quite enough 
common ground to work together effectively. 
 
Values: Worker Empowerment 
If USAS has one core value above all others, it is that of worker empowerment. In 
describing the long-term goals of the movement, Laura McSpedon (interview, 2007), a 
USAS member at Georgetown University, said 
It was to create the room for workers to organize in this industry--
ultimately what workers need to guarantee better working conditions and 
better pay and all of that is a union contract. […] The long-term goal for 
me was to create a structure and to create systems that opened up space for 
workers to organize in a way that it was closed when we started. And so 
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then, within that, creating the codes of conduct, creating a monitoring 
system, all of that was really toward that end of workers having the power 
in their workplace to organize and have a voice and these structures are 
just meant to facilitate and support that. Not that any code of conduct or 
any monitor was going to be able to create good working conditions--that 
we know is not true--but they could create the possibility of workers 
organizing and being able to appeal to these structures that support that. 
What is worth noting here is that McSpedon--and most of the other anti-sweatshop 
activists I interviewed--defined their goals not simply as eliminating sweatshops, but 
specifically as empowering workers by creating the conditions for strong labor unions in 
factories across the globe. 
 There is an obvious tension here--the USAS members I spoke with were well 
aware that, at this stage of the game, it was only pressure from US activists, particularly 
the college students affiliated with USAS, that gave these workers the power to organize 
(an issue we will look at in more depth in chapters twelve through fourteen). Liana 
Dalton (interview, 2007), a former USAS member at the University of Wisconsin--
Madison, told me, “Ultimately, we want to transcend this whole idea of brand power over 
workers. The idea is that through engagement within these power structures, we will 
challenge these power structures. If what we’re doing isn’t working to build the capacity 
of the workers themselves to enforce [their demands] and ultimately looking to our own 
phase-out in the process, if it’s requiring more and more monitoring and more and more 
involvement on our part, then that isn’t really a sustainable alternative and that isn’t 
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really the direction we want to be heading.” Ilene Harris* (interview, 2007), a USAS 
member at the University of Oregon, made the same point when she said that her goal “is 
always to make my role more and more obsolete.” USAS members understand that there 
are structural conditions that preclude worker empowerment and it is these structural 
conditions they seek to change. Additionally, they adhere to norms of solidarity, where 
they seek, as far as possible, to put the workers, and not themselves, at the front and 
center of their organizing efforts. We will look at both these points in more depth below. 
 Such an emphasis on worker empowerment may seem surprising in a student 
organization. McSpedon (interview, 2007) noted that this value was “definitely fostered 
by folks at UNITE and by the students who had originally thought through what this 
campaign could look like.” Indeed, it was not immediately obvious to the first students 
involved in getting USAS’s organizing efforts off the ground. USAS member Amanda 
Plumb (interview, 2007) (who comes from a middle-class household) noted that, “I think 
in the very beginning I don't remember that much of a focus on the right to unionize. It 
was more about living wages [and] disclosure. […] I also grew up in [the anti-union state 
of] South Carolina so this was all relatively new to me. I think a lot of us learned a lot 
about unions and their importance by doing this.” It was not simply contact with UNITE 
that fostered this awareness; specific USAS members worked to foster this consciousness 
as well. Marion Traub-Werner (interview, 2007), a USAS member at the University of 
North Carolina--Chapel Hill, said, “My big thing with USAS from the beginning was 
trying to do education among students to make it more around labor rights and 
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specifically union rights, than around the National Labor Committee-type victimhood 
stuff.” 
The actual process of hammering out what an ideal code of conduct and 
monitoring system might look like, which we explore in the chapters nine and ten, also 
served to heighten students’ consciousness around these issues. And, as USAS grew, the 
students started having more contact with the sweatshop workers themselves, both by 
participating in delegations to inspect the factories where licensed apparel was being 
made and through internships with unions and labor rights NGOs in the Global South, 
both of which we will look at in more depth in future chapters. Finally, USAS members’ 
own experience with their administrators lead them to see the importance of worker 
empowerment. Jess Champagne (interview, 2007), a USAS member at Yale University, 
told me, 
The other piece [in coming to realize the importance of worker 
empowerment] was having sort of the same experience on campus--
negotiations with administrators never went anywhere and that the only 
way you could succeed is when you actually built power on campus and 
when we put pressure on administrators. And in some ways, it was almost 
like how to do you do it in parallel, from student organizing to workers 
organizing on their own in really repressive circumstances? [There was 
the] realization that's really how you make change complemented the 
realization that in factories that workers need to do the same. 
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Thus, while the seeds of a strong commitment to worker empowerment were planted by 
USAS’s initial ties to UNITE, they really bloomed both as the students explored these 
issues in more depth in the midst of struggling with both their own school administrations 
and with the core apparel companies and as they built closer ties to those on whose behalf 
they were organizing. 
The significance of worker empowerment can be seen in the fairly critical way in 
which a number of my interviewees spontaneously contrasted USAS and its allies’ 
approach with that of the fair trade movement, which they regarded as paternalistic 
instead of empowering. USAS member Jessica Rutter (interview, 2007) said, 
Fair trade is very, very consumer-based--it's about having consumers take 
action, it's about making certain certifications, which sometimes end up 
being kind of problematic, because they don't always have to do with 
worker voice. And worker voice is the key part of the anti-sweatshop 
movement […], supporting very concrete worker demands to organize and 
build power, whereas the fair trade movement was much more about 
getting consumers to buy certain things that would ostensibly support 
these [fair trade] farms, but the certification process wasn't necessarily 
based completely on the idea of workers building power. 
It is important to understand that these principles are not only a matter of values, but 
instrumental as well. As noted in chapter one, Polletta (2005) argues that the ideology-
instrumental distinction is a false dichotomy. Thus anti-sweatshop activists argue that 
empowering workers is not only ethically desirably in and of itself, but, based on their 
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social theory, the only way to effectively fight sweatshops over the long-term. As Traub-
Werner (interview, 2007) put it, “It depends on how you think political change works.” It 
is not simply that anti-sweatshop activists reject fair trade because it is inconsistent with 
their values; but, based on their values and social analysis, they don’t think fair trade can 
possibly end sweatshops, at least over the long term. If workers are not in a position to 
enforce their own rights, it is all too easy for those rights to be abused, if, say, the 
consumer interest in fair trade drops off. 
 
Social Analysis: A Structural Problem 
USAS’s social analysis consists of a sophisticated sociological understanding of 
sweatshops being a structural problem, which requires structural change. They 
understand that sweatshops are a normal part of the working of the global economy and 
that, to really tackle the problem, the rules of the global economy need to be changed. 
Given that a number of academic experts on sweatshops, such as Richard Appelbaum, 
Edna Bonacich and Robert J.S. Ross, are allies of USAS and the anti-sweatshop 
movement, it is not perhaps surprising that they have such an analysis. For example, Eric 
Dirnbach of UNITE HERE (interview, 2007) summarized the problem as follows: 
The entire business model is a model that creates sweatshops. There's 
tremendous price pressure on the contracting factories to lower the prices 
that will charge for the apparel, which means wages have to be lowered. 
There's tremendous pressure on factories to deliver huge orders at the end 
of the month, which means you've got to work your workers a hundred 
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hours a week. It's a buying model that creates sweatshop conditions, no 
matter what the companies say. 
This analysis closely follows the one laid out in chapter two. Dalton (interview, 2007) 
noted that, “Without that systemic analysis we’re just putting band-aids on gaping 
wounds.” 
As part of its analysis, USAS is keenly aware of where they, as students, fit into 
the larger power structure, principally as consumers. Though consumers are important to 
apparel producers--indeed, many spend a great deal of time cultivating consumers with 
expensive ad campaigns--because they are a diffuse, unorganized group, consumers have 
little real power within the commodity chain. Based on their experience with the limited 
usefulness of boycotts by individual consumers, USAS emphasize using their schools’ 
power as institutional consumers within the apparel commodity chain. According to 
McSpedon (interview, 2007), “It's fine to tell people not to buy things in a sweatshop--
that they should seek out goods made under better conditions--but what's actually going 
to add up to impacting these companies financially are these larger institutional contracts 
and customers.” Thus, they focus their efforts on changing the purchasing and licensing 
practices of schools, not those of individual consumers on college campuses. According 
to Rutter (interview, 2007), 
In terms of actually affecting Nike as a company, there's not really so 
much that you can do as an individual consumer. But if you bring in the 
university as a consumer, as an institutional buyer--[…] because the 
college market is extremely important [to the brands]… We could very 
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much more easily influence our universities than the brands themselves, so 
the campaigns are structured in ways that we're kind of going up against 
the brands, but we're more going up against our universities to make them 
demand that the brands do certain things, which is just a much more 
effective strategy. 
This strategy is more effective for the simple reason that it is in the relatively contained 
social arena of the college campus that students can most easily exert power, not in the 
more diffuse networks that make up commodity chains as a whole. Trina Tocco 
(interview, 2007), a USAS member at Western Michigan University, put it this way: “If 
the goal is to impact the most amount of purchasing possible, how do you do that one 
consumer at a time and make it worthwhile?” 
What is interesting to note here is that, while anti-sweatshop activists repeatedly 
told me that the lead apparel firms’ major weakness was their investment in their brand 
image, this strategy does not exclusively or even primarily focus on brand image as the 
main point of leverage over the industry. This is not to say that brand image does not play 
a role--USAS’s activism certainly calls into question the image the brands would like to 
construct for themselves in consumers’ minds; and part of the reason the brands want to 
be tied to schools is the way such ties enhance their image. On the other hand, the brand 
image is not USAS’s main line of attack--it is using the leverage of their schools’ 
collective, institutional buying power. In using this institutional power, USAS is able to 
exert a more concentrated form of power than they would if they simply relied on 
disrupting the brand’s carefully constructed image in a more diffuse way. Not only does 
  132 
USAS hves far more power within schools than in the commodity chain as a whole, they 
have more power within schools than they do in the more diffuse arenas of the popular 
mass media where consumer culture and brand images are shaped. So, while USAS has 
identified brand image as the apparel industry’s major vulnerability, they have actually 
focused their attack elsewhere, where they as activists are stronger--that is, where they 
can exert more leverage over the apparel industry. 
USAS members are well aware that in targeting that apparel made under contract 
with colleges and universities, they are directly targeting only 1-2% of the apparel 
market. They believe, however, that they nonetheless can have a wider impact. Traub-
Werner (interview, 2007) put it this way: 
There was this particular segment of the US clothing market, the 
university market, that you could actually push things through that would 
maybe set the standard for the larger industry also. If you were going to 
raise the standard in any way, universities were the right place to start. 
[…] First universities and then the rest of the industry, right? That's what 
happened with disclosure, right? Universities were the first to demand 
disclosure and now disclosure is quite normal for the brands. 
 
Norms: Solidarity in Support of Unionization 
Rooted in these values and this social analysis, USAS has developed a number of 
norms of action, the most significant of which are support for unionization, solidarity 
with workers, and a focus on concrete goals. In the eyes of USAS members, independent 
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unions are the best organizational vehicles through which workers can become 
empowered. According to Ken Abrams* (interview, 2007), a USAS activist at UC--
Berkeley, central to the work of USAS is “the belief that if workers are able to exercise 
their right to organize without management interference, then the chances of seeing other 
rights respected is much greater because they can advocate for themselves in the factory, 
dealing with management directly when an independent monitor is not there--and most of 
the time monitors are not there.” In other words, it is workers’ right to organize which 
serves as the guarantee of all other rights. This belief was reinforced by the relationships 
they built with groups in the Global South. Dalton (interview, 2007) said, that at the end 
of an internship she did with a Hong Kong labor rights groups, “Basically, what my 
director in Hong Kong told me when I was going back to the US was that if you do 
nothing more, at least go back and tell students over and over again, promote the right to 
organize, promote freedom of association. That’s the heart of it because only when 
workers have collective power in their workplaces can sweatshops truly be eliminated.” 
The norm of solidarity is one in which USAS tries to avoid the sort of 
paternalistic relationship that they see as a danger of the fair trade movement, in favor of 
a relationship in which workers’ concerns are put front and center. This means USAS 
tries to consult with unions representing sweatshop workers and other grassroots labor 
rights organizations as they develop their strategy--something we will see more clearly in 
chapters ten and fifteen, when we look at the development of the WRC and DSP. 
According to Rutter (interview, 2007), “Overall, what we do is about student-worker 
solidarity and using the power of the university to support worker demands--that's the 
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very core of it. So everything that we do in USAS is about that fundamental relationship, 
which is building student-worker relationships and then supporting what workers are 
demanding.” As with the value of worker empowerment, USAS members do not see this 
simply as a matter of principle, but also a matter of sound strategy--without the input of 
workers being central, a campaign is unlikely to have the information it needs to be 
effective. 
Plumb (interview, 2007), in reflecting on a campaign (with which USAS was not 
directly involved) that had targeted the Gap and had not only failed to correct the labor 
rights violations, but gotten the workers involved fired, said, 
I remember being reflective about the fact that we could do some damage 
without being connected to actual workers struggles going on in places. I 
remember for me it was like, whoa ... kind of like a halting ... I wanted to 
make sure that we are connected to what is going on in other places. I 
think well-meaning people can do damage by acting on principles but not 
really being connected to what's going on on the ground. I think the way 
USAS dealt with that was they started having students go on trips to 
maquiladoras or doing research abroad and actually work with workers. 
There was also this effort to make sure there were organizations of 
workers involved with USAS and it wasn't just well-meaning students 
trying to save the world and in the process kind of being oblivious to some 
things. 
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Here again, we see that important elements of USAS’s ideology developed not simply as 
a the result of the influence of UNITE, but USAS members reflecting on their own 
experiences and the experiences of others’ campaigns. 
 There is a tension in this ideal of solidarity though. A quote by Lila Watson (an 
Australian Aborigine activist) featured prominently on USAS’s website (and relatively 
well known in activist circles) reads, “If you’ve come to help me, you are wasting your 
time. But if you’ve come because your liberation is bound up with mine, then let us work 
together.” This quote speaks to the fact that, in some ways, even the privileged are 
harmed by systems of oppression. And even the most privileged students suffer from 
some oppression on college campuses, with their total lack of democracy; indeed, a 
number of USAS activists (Champagne, Dalton, Knorr; interviews, 2007) told me that 
student empowerment was as central to USAS’s mission as worker empowerment. On the 
other hand, there is a world of difference between the oppression students face and the 
oppression workers in sweatshops face. The solidarity that students show to these 
workers is then, while rooted in the same ideals, distinctive from the solidarity that 
different parts of the labor movement have shown each other. 
Traub-Werner (interview, 2007) spoke to this tension, when she said, 
The fundamental problem of solidarity--labor solidarity--in the world is 
that because of the international division of labor we don't really have ... 
You have a textile sector that's dying in the US, and it’s not really real 
worker solidarity that's happening internationally across the textile 
industry, right? And so what we're trying to do is this ... unfortunately it's 
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a consumer model, and the consumer model means that the basis of 
solidarity isn't, We have shared interests ... although it should be, it would 
be nice. It's often more, How can I help you? Your situation sucks, I profit 
from it in some way or the political economy in my country does, I want 
to do something to help--that's the motivation for our solidarity work. 
There is probably no complete, practical solution to this problem. USAS simply tries to 
get as much input from labor groups around the world as possible in designing their 
strategy; but, at the end of the day, they are the ones who know the social terrain of the 
US and what will be an effective strategy here. The influence of USAS’s third-world 
labor allies comes as much in defining the goals of the movement--worker empowerment, 
as embodied in the creation of independent labor unions--as in the details of the strategy. 
USAS has also emphasized helping workers win concrete victories, specifically 
being able to unionize and gain concessions from management in specific plants. Many 
of my interviewees emphasized that this was what drew them to USAS--the possibility of 
seeing concrete gains, which is not always something easily realized in other movements. 
For instance, USAS national organizer Zack Knorr (interview, 2007) said, 
It was the first time where I really saw that activism had a real concrete 
achievable goal and there was a real power analysis, that these are the 
institutions that have power, this is how we can leverage our universities 
to have power over these brands like Nike, and then seeing the supply 
chain map--how we can see that if we do that, it has an effect on what 
workers are doing here on the ground. And seeing that was really, really 
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powerful for me, and just seeing that students could really make a 
difference. 
This ability to make concrete gains is partly a result of USAS’s strategy; it is also 
partly a result of their structural location and the issue they are working on. Activists 
seeking to pressure, for instance, the World Trade Organization, have almost no forms of 
leverage over the multilateral body and, even if they were to win a victory there, it is not 
clear how tangible it would be in terms of the actual, immediate impact on specific 
people’s lives. USAS activists are well aware of this and are therefore not particularly 
critical of other social justice movements, simply because they have trouble producing 
concrete results (as opposed to the ways in which they are critical of the paternalism of 
the fair trade movement). And, as we shall see, it is not clear that these specific concrete 
victories have actually contributed to the wider structural changes USAS members see as 
necessary in the global economy; this realization precipitated the strategic changes we 
will look at in chapter fifteen, on the DSP. 
Having analyzed USAS’s ideology, we now turn to their strategic model for 
campus-based campaigns. 
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Chapter 7: USAS’s Campus-Level Strategy 
 
Introduction 
 While USAS’s ultimate goal may be empowering workers through concrete 
victories that strengthen independent unions, many of their actions focus on pressuring 
college and university administrators and take place in the social arena of the college 
campus. This seemingly odd choice is because, as we have seen, they have discovered 
that colleges’ and universities’ institutional consumer power gives them a key point of 
leverage over the apparel industry that it has been difficult to find elsewhere. USAS’s 
strategy is thus a multi-layered one, with both the campus-based campaigns we will 
explore in this chapter and the transnational campaigns in support of sweatshop workers 
at particular factories we will explore in chapters twelve through fourteen fitting together 
as elements in a larger strategic model. It is in many ways USAS’s ability to organize 
successful campus campaigns that makes it possible for them to also organize successful 
transnational campaigns, a strategic marriage of the local and the global. 
If they are to use college buying power as a lever though, USAS activists also 
need to find ways to exert leverage over their schools’ administrators. We have looked in 
depth at a campaign on one campus in chapter five--the initial campaign at Duke 
University to pressure the administration to agree to a code of conduct and (the major 
point of controversy) full disclosure of factory locations. Campaigns on many other 
campuses proceeded in a similar fashion, though not all culminated in a sit-in. Part of this 
depends on the political opportunity system on any particular campus, with some being 
more open to student influence than others. For example, at Haverford College, not only 
  139 
were students there dealing with a progressive administration, but they already had an 
institutionalized voice in the form of the Committee on Investment and Social 
Responsibility (CISR), a legacy of anti-apartheid struggles in the 1980s. As a result, the 
administration agreed to join the WRC without a great deal of contention on campus 
(Grigo 2000) (Caine*, interview, 2007). In other cases, school officials agreed to 
students’ demands without a sit-in, but it was the implicit threat of such disruption that 
worked--knowing that a sit-in was a distinct possibility, administrators sometimes gave in 
to avoid actually having to deal with one. Despite these variations, most campaigns 
followed a similar pattern. 
That USAS’s campus campaigns resemble each other should not be surprising. 
College campuses as arenas of contention are similar enough to each other that students 
are working within similar political opportunity systems. More than that though, USAS 
has a standard campus strategy which they have found gives them leverage over school 
officials; while students do not follow it blindly, but adapt it to the circumstances of their 
particular school, they are working from a common strategic model. Here I want to 
explore what the strategic model for a campus campaign looks like as an ideal type, 
drawing on USAS’s experience at multiple schools and with multiple campaigns--not 
only the initial 1997-1999 campaign for codes of conduct, but also the 1999-2000 
campaign to press schools to join the Worker Rights Consortium and the currently (as of 
2010) on-going campaign in support of the Designated Suppliers Program. 
 The importance of looking at the ways in which practices such as organizing, 
framing and choosing from among one’s tactical repertoire are interlinked into a larger 
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strategy can be seen in the ways that USAS runs campaigns on campus. On the face of it, 
USAS’s experience at places like Duke and many other schools would seem to simply 
confirm the argument of political process theorists that disruptive tactics are what work 
as leverage. Whether in the initial campaign for codes of conduct or for latter ones, 
USAS has had to use a sit-in--or at least the threat of one, whether explicit or implicit--at 
most schools to achieve their ends. Looking more closely at things, however, reveals a 
more complicated picture. 
Though USAS activists are well aware of the possible necessity of engaging in a 
sit-in, they almost never start their campaigns with this tactic, for the very simple reason 
that it would likely backfire. Instead, they engage, over the course of one or two school 
years, in a campaign of gradually escalating tactics. They start with moderate tactics that 
allow them to build popular support on campus; only once they have this support are they 
in a position to engage in more confrontational actions, such as sit-ins, with any 
significant hope of success. USAS national organizer Zack Knorr (interview, 2007) 
summed up the process as follows: 
We start out doing more educational events, bringing people in, getting 
more people, and then once you've really made a name for yourself on 
campus, once people know what you're doing, once you've developed 
stronger leadership within your group and gotten more members, and also 
once you've given the administration time to look at this so you can, in a 
sense, justify moving to more serious protests, then we started to really 
turn out those numbers in bigger and more aggressive form. 
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This gradual escalation has to be fit into a quite specific schedule--that of the 
school year, with its beginning in September and its end in May. According to USAS 
member Liana Dalton (interview, 2007), student activists 
have to look at a campus organizing timeline and try to think about what 
can be won, realistically, in a semester or a year-long timeframe. You 
have to take into account student turnover and the fact that you have to 
constantly be doing leadership development in your group because people 
are graduating and whatnot. Some people are only involved with this for 
one or two years. How do you train them to be organizers in that time and 
win something on campus? 
This somewhat limits the flexibility of student activists in deciding when to take what 
actions. They need to hit the ground running in September, working on educational 
programs from the start of the school year. At least, they must do so if they wish to be in 
a position where they can begin escalating tactics in the spring semester and possibly 
resort to a sit-in towards the end of the school year, while retaining broad support for 
their demands and actions in the campus community. 
 
Phase One: Education 
As at Duke, USAS activists generally start their campus-level campaigns with 
meetings with the administration and various relatively low-key public actions. Speaking 
of his involvement with the campaign for the DSP at the University of California system, 
Knorr (interview, 2007) said, 
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The events we had in the first quarter… We did an initial rally and 
delegation to the chancellor just to present our demands. We did a teach-
in, we did a fashion show, we did a mock sweatshop, a street theater kind 
of event, and we ended all of them with a little rally and some marching, 
just so that people would gain the experience of organizing those kinds of 
events. But we never tried that much for a huge turnout or to shut anything 
down, just because we were using that time mostly to educate the campus 
and to develop our group. 
These sorts of actions are important opportunities for student activists to frame 
their message and thus gain legitimacy, convincing the campus community that 
sweatshops are a significant issue in which the school has some stake. Through 
educational events and articles in the campus newspaper, they are able to convey their 
frame to a wider campus audience. The openness of the campus as a discursive arena and 
the many means students can use to convey their message--teach-ins, op-eds, rallies, etc.-
-greatly facilitates this. This preliminary educational work serves a valuable organizing 
purpose, increasing the number of their active supporters--people who will turn out to 
protests or even engage in sit-ins--and increasing the number of passive supporters--
students who were generally sympathetic to USAS’s demands that their clothes be sweat-
free. USAS chapters typically make a point of building alliances with other student 
groups, as they did at Duke, groups that will support them later when they ramp up the 
level of confrontation. In addition to other groups on campus, they may draw on the 
support of progressive organizations in the surrounding community. This stage of the 
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process also gives USAS activists experience in doing organizing work in a non-
threatening context, experience they can then draw upon when the stakes are raised later 
in the campaign. 
 Popular stereotypes of students as left-leaning notwithstanding, organizing 
students in support of anti-sweatshop measures on campus is not necessarily easy, given 
the impact of the corporatization of higher education. Students have increasingly come to 
see themselves as consumers and in training for jobs, not learning how to be active 
citizens. There may be some organized opposition from conservative students--Amanda 
Plumb (interview, 2007) recalled a group of followers of Ayn Rand calling themselves 
“Students Against Students Against Sweatshops” at Duke--but for the most part this is a 
minor phenomenon, limited mainly to such activities as asking obnoxious questions at 
teach-ins. The main organized opposition comes from the administration. The challenge 
USAS faces with students is, instead, simply convincing students that they should care 
about these issues. 
Plumb (interview, 2007) said that they when organizing on campus, “We weren’t 
telling students not to wear Nikes or ‘You’re bad if you wear Nike’ or ‘Don’t shop at the 
Gap,’ because we would have really alienated most of the students. But people could 
understand ‘Don’t let Duke’s name to be put on this stuff [made in sweatshops]’ and 
‘We’re asking Duke to set up some standards.’” As with commercial brands, many 
students have a strong identification with their school’s image--many schools are, in their 
own way, just as much brands as any for-profit affair. Just as activists off-campus can 
sometimes turn that emotional attachment to the brands against them, by pointing out the 
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gap between the image and the brand’s ugly practices, thus generating a sense of betrayal 
(Klein 1999), USAS activists can do the same on campus. Many students, including not 
particularly political ones, feel betrayed when they realize the clothing bearing the logo 
of the schools they so identify with are made in sweatshops (Featherstone and United 
Students Against Sweatshops 2002). It is this basic reaction that USAS harnesses and 
uses to educate members of the campus community about the realities of the global 
economy and the necessity of codes of conduct and independent monitoring as a way of 
fighting labor exploitation. 
At this early stage of the game, USAS activists are not only educating other 
students, but also their school’s president and other top administrators. By meeting with 
the administration, they also gain some legitimacy in the eyes of the administration, as 
they make clear, cogent arguments for their demands and establish their willingness to 
start with institutional procedures. One point that they particularly need to counter is the 
misconceptions promoted by the apparel industry that USAS members are dupes of 
UNITE and simply being used to promote the latter’s protectionist agenda, which will 
harm, not help third-world workers. UNITE, despite its shift towards doing international 
solidarity work, still sometimes employs protectionist rhetoric, which does not 
particularly help the student cause (Featherstone and United Students Against 
Sweatshops 2002) (McSpedon, interview, 2007). Still, USAS members are quite capable 
of making clear their independence from UNITE and making sophisticated arguments for 
their position. This effort to establish some legitimacy in the eyes of the administration, 
to make themselves look reasonable, is important in being able to conduct negotiations 
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over the long run, even when the campus USAS chapter’s actions grow more 
confrontational. “I felt like being able to write professional letters to the administration 
and have good meetings with them would make it easier to get stuff out of them, because 
when push came to shove they felt like we were reasonable people--and I don't think it 
limits at all how radical you can be in your tactics” (Reville, 2007, interview). 
 
Phase Two: Escalation 
But, as USAS member Laura McSpedon (interview, 2007) argues, 
Ultimately I'm not sure it was arguments that won anybody over […]--you 
have to have all that stuff in place and know your facts and be able to 
respond to each of those charges and have the literature you need to back 
it up--but ultimately we could have talked till we were blue in the face. It 
was really about the power we developed on campuses to embarrass the 
universities into doing the right thing. 
In a sense, the first stage of any campaign is building that power; the second stage is 
exercising it through a series of more and more contentious tactics. 
For many students, however, part of the process of learning how to organize on 
campus has been learning the necessity of exercising such power. Particularly among 
middle-class students at elite schools, there is initially often a belief that they can win 
over the administration through rational arguments. According to Jess Champagne 
(interview, 2007), a USAS member at Yale, 
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Kids who go to Ivy League schools […] are much more prone to this idea, 
that if you just have the right argument and make the right point and 
explain how workers are exploited, university administrators and others in 
power, they'll be like, Oh, OK, let's do that. And I think we're really kind 
of trained to do that. […] Part of my freshman and all my sophomore year 
we spent primarily negotiating with administrators, doing education on 
campus and just having these meetings. And clearly things were not 
changing and they [the administrators] lied to us and they clearly didn't 
care--and that was when we realized […], Oh, they just don't care and the 
only way they are going to care is power. 
It was at this point that Yale’s USAS chapter began to focus on building a broad coalition 
of supporters on campus and resorting to increasingly confrontational tactics. 
It is only as, however, over the course of a school year or two, when they show 
that institutional procedures are leading nowhere that the student activists can establish 
such contentious tactics like a sit-in as legitimate in the eyes of the wider campus 
community. Without that legitimacy, the administration would have a much easier time 
simply arresting the students. It is not only a matter of preparing the campus community 
as a whole, however; it is also a matter of preparing the student activists themselves to 
engage in something as confrontational and disruptive as a sit-in. Knorr (interview, 
2007), describes the escalation actions from the UC campaign for the DSP in light of this: 
By the start of the second quarter, we were in a position where we had the 
group members organize bigger, more aggressive actions. We started out 
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with an eighty-person rally where we marched inside the administration 
building and shut down the lower level for only a short period of time. 
And then we did the same thing with our bookstore. And then at that point 
it was really clear that we were going to have to do a sit-in, so we started 
trying to slowly train people and get them used to doing more kinds of 
aggressive and confrontational actions. So we tried to take a small step 
each time, instead of jumping from a teach-in to a sit-in, where people 
have no experience with anything in the middle. So we tried for those 
rallies to get more and more confrontational. So then we did a dance-in in 
our chancellor's office once. We issued her an ultimatum and she missed 
it, and so twenty of us went in with boom boxes and we just had a dance 
party in her office for about a half-hour. […] And when the next quarter 
came around, that's what we did a sit-in. 
It should be stressed that not all USAS chapters at all schools had to engage in sit-
ins. As noted, in rare cases such as Haverford, a progressive administration may go along 
without a sit-in. In some cases, USAS used other high pressure tactics, such as hunger 
strikes. Such tactics work by shaming the administration, calling into question their 
legitimacy. At many schools, such attempts to embarrass the administration played a 
significant role in the escalation of the campaign, even when it culminated in a sit-in. 
McSpedon (interview, 2007) recounted a story where she and other USAS members 
handed out leaflets before a large fundraiser, in which students’ parents would get to 
meet Georgetown’s president, Father Leo O’Donovan. The leaflets urged parents to ask 
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O’Donovan why he did not support sweatshop workers. “Probably, no one said anything 
to the president of the university, but it really freaked them out, just because we were 
trying to embarrass them--and I think we accomplished that.” 
In other cases, administrators gave into student demands before such high 
pressure, high profile actions, in order to avert them. McSpedon (interview, 2007) tells 
such a tale from when they were campaigning to press Georgetown to leave the FLA and 
join the WRC, the year following a successful campaign involving a sit-in that got 
Georgetown to agree to a code of conduct. “To our total shock and amazement, about a 
week before we were planning on doing the sit-in, they gave in on all of our demands. 
[…] I was sitting next to the president of the university as he delivered his speech to us 
and I was floored. I actually was looking at his notes in front of him and they said 
nothing about agreeing to get out of the FLA and into the WRC, but he was saying it.” 
While they had not publicized the fact that they were going to a do a sit-in, “it's certainly 
possible that they got wind of it. And also that they remembered what happened the year 
before--we were building up our rhetoric and escalating our tactics.” 
In some cases, USAS has actively given administrators implicit but very clear 
warning of their power to exert leverage through disruption. Dalton (interview, 2007) 
noted of her work at UW--Madison, 
You can exert power by having fifty [community] people come sit in a 
meeting […], especially on public campuses where they can’t really kick 
people out as easily. For our labor licensing committee meetings 
sometimes we just pack them--they do introductions in the beginning and 
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then you’re like, I’m so and so and I’m an organizer with SEIU; hi, I’m so 
and so and I’m organizer with AFSCME; etc. And you just go around and 
the school gets scared because they know you can actually mobilize these 
people. […] I think stuff like that is effective because [administrators] see 
different faces and then they’re like, Oh shit, all these people could be in 
my office, then I’d ask them to leave and then I’d have to arrest all of 
them and that would really suck to arrest the head of the Federation of 
Labor, 
especially in a liberal town like Madison, Wisconsin, where labor exerts a considerable 
amount of political clout locally. 
A sit-in plays a dual role in terms of strategy--it is both potentially disruptive of 
the workings of the college or university and, with sufficient press coverage, it becomes 
an embarrassment that damage the administration’s legitimacy, both on campus and 
nationally. Speaking of his experience with the sit-in at the UW--Madison during the 
initial campaign for the code of conduct, USAS member Thomas Wheatley (interview, 
2007) said, 
There's two kinds of power you have [in a sit-in]. You have the power to 
interrupt work. If you can physically shut down the university's 
administration office, then you're interrupting the basic function of the 
university. In Wisconsin, that didn't happen--you'd have to have five 
thousand students sitting-in to actually shut down the building. To a 
certain degree it was disruptive to the work though. People were less 
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productive in the administration office. The other thing is, Boy, there's a 
sit-in at the university--that hasn't happened since '68. So the local papers 
and local radio are going wild. 
My interviewees to some degree differed among each other on the reasons for the 
effectiveness of sit-ins, some emphasizing the disruptive effect they have on the workings 
of the school, others the potential loss of legitimacy for administrators. To some extent, 
this may be a product of the schools within which they were sitting-in--it is easier to 
disrupt a small school through a sit-in, since such disruption requires fewer people when 
aimed at a small target; it may also be easier to embarrass better known, larger schools, 
since they are more likely to become the subjects of widespread media attention. In most 
cases, there is probably a mix of the two at work. Even in the case of the University of 
Wisconsin, Wheatley (interview, 2007) said they found a way to intensify the sit-in to the 
point where it was truly disruptive; not only did more and more students begin joining the 
sit-in over the course of three or four days--“it was forty students to start with, and then it 
was fifty-five, and then it was sixty-seven, and then it was one hundred”--but “on the 
final day, students decided to escalate and started banging on the walls in the middle of 
the day so that the administration staff could not complete their work.” It was this move 
that made it the final day of the sit-in, after an hour of it convinced the university 
president to negotiate with the students and concede to most of their demands. 
 There are other means of disruption that student activists can use short of a full-
blown sit-in or something else equally drastic. USAS member Trina Tocco (interview, 
2007) noted that, “students have the ability to step out of this system that administrators 
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understand and work within” and that this alone may be disruptive. As an example, she 
told me of the campaign at Western Michigan University, where they had succeeded in 
getting the school to join the WRC, but not to sign onto a code of conduct for the WRC to 
monitor compliance with, even a year later.  
So I hosted an anniversary party in the president’s office. I brought them 
cake and balloons and […] we also sent invitations to all of them for the 
anniversary party and they all freaked out […] [because] it’s the unknown-
-they don’t get invitations from random students and, more importantly, 
how often do people plan things in the president’s office without telling 
them? I remember it’s just one of these funny things where two days later 
the executive assistant called me and said, Okay, we reserved the 
boardroom for you. I think it was just out of process, out of protocol--it’s 
the same way I’ve seen corporations react [in working for the NGO 
International Labor Rights Fund]. If you go outside of their day-to-day 
[routines] they don’t know what to do. 
This stepping out of known protocol had the desired effect--at the anniversary party, “we 




One danger USAS activists face in such campaigns is getting entangled in the 
counter-measures favored by administrators, who seek to sidetrack students by having 
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them deal with school officials who actually have very little decision-making power or 
tying the students up in committees. McSpedon (interview, 2007) noted that, in the early 
days of USAS, “The university's first reaction as we were raising this stuff was to send us 
to the licensing department in the schools, which are usually part of the athletic 
department.” This was a diversion because the licensing directors do not actually have the 
power to make such decisions, particularly given schools’ close relationship with the 
brands and the latter’s opposition to enforceable codes of conduct and disclosure. It was 
only through getting sidetracked like this at a number of campuses that USAS learned 
that they had to refuse to deal with lower-level officials and insist on dealing directly 
with a school’s president. 
The other sidetrack college and university administrators often send students 
down is setting up committees, whose stated purpose is to consider the issue in more 
depth and create an opportunity for dialogue between different members of the campus 
community. On the face of it, such committees sound reasonable and in some cases, such 
as Duke, where school administrators are sincerely interested in finding a solution, they 
may lead somewhere. By the nature of their jobs, administrators tend to be cautious and 
want to examine any new policy, even one they in principle may support, carefully before 
implementing it. In many cases though, school administrators are not interested in 
actually coming up with a mutually agreeable policy. Instead, committees are intended to 
indefinitely tie student activists up in bureaucratic procedures that lead nowhere. 
According to Knorr (interview, 2007), 
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The committee will be made up of one or two students, a couple faculty, 
and they'll ensure that there's enough administration members on the 
committee that the committee would never decide to do anything unless 
the administration wanted to. And then they'll take six to seven months to 
meet occasionally and have meetings that don't go anywhere. And their 
hope is that throughout this time they can appear that they're taking every 
step they possibly could, but they're basically trying to wait out the 
students until either they get tired of the issue, till key people graduate, or 
until it just kind of goes away. 
USAS is now wise to this danger, but, as with being sent to deal with minor officials, this 
did not happen without activists at a number of schools falling into administrators’ traps 
first. 
In some cases, such committees have been made to work, even when the 
administration has not wanted them to. But for this to happen, students need to step 
outside the protocols of the committee process and continue taking confrontational 
actions. McSpedon (interview, 2007) told me the story of the committee that was set up 
at Georgetown in the wake of the 1999 sit-in there. 
We participated in it […], but we also continued to do public education. 
We actually had a number of the committee meetings where thirty or forty 
students sat outside waiting to hear what happened, and made it clear we 
were not just four students sitting on this committee agreeing to things on 
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behalf of everyone else--there was still actually a movement that cared 
about what was happening behind those closed doors. 
The administration eventually gave in to student demands, creating a code of conduct. 
McSpedon says she cannot be entirely sure why this did so, but suspects it was “the fear 
of us disrupting things on campus again.” 
 At other times, USAS has decided they essentially need to pull the plug on the 
committee process and start escalating their tactics again. USAS member Molly McGrath 
(interview, 2007) told me of the campaign for the WRC at UW--Madison: 
David Alvarado and I sat on this committee and we went to a lot of 
meetings and did a lot of paperwork but then eventually we decided that 
the only way to get the committee to agree to join this idea of the WRC 
would be create this crisis of legitimacy. […] We withdrew, publicly, from 
the committee […] and that made big news on the campus papers. I think 
we started giving deadlines to the chancellor--decide by this date to join 
the WRC or else. 
The “or else” was a sit-in, which USAS managed to build such support for that the 
campus was struck by what McGrath described as “sit-in fever--[…] a lot of the activists 
in Madison had heard about the sit-in the year before and they wanted to do another sit-
in. It was kind of funny.” 
 
Conclusion 
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What all this shows is that for success, it is necessary for activists to fit together a 
broad range of tactics, from the relatively routine, such as lobbying the administration, to 
the more disruptive, such as sit-ins; develop and spread a particular frame to the campus 
community, building up the legitimacy not only of their cause, but of themselves as social 
actors; and mobilize sympathetic students around this issue; all in a particular way that 
follows a strategic progression. Looking at these elements in isolation reveals much less 
about the dynamics of social movements than looking at how these pieces fit together 
into an overall strategy. As it turns out, at least in the context of the mini-polity of the 
college campus, both those scholars who emphasize the importance of disruptive action 
(Flacks 1988; Gamson 1990; McAdam 1983; Piven and Cloward 1977; Tarrow 1998) 
and those who emphasize changes in the overall cultural discourse (Jasper 1997) are 
correct. USAS’s success depends on building up their standing on campus, allowing them 
to shame and embarrass the administration; and then, shielded by their legitimacy, to take 
highly confrontational actions that can coerce the administration into agreeing to at least 
some student demands. This strategy interacts with the particular political opportunity 
system of the college campus, where students can work within a very open organizing 
space and discursive arena; this, in turn, allows them to mobilize so that they can often 
exert a great deal of leverage over school officials, despite the anti-democratic structure 
of the formal decision-making process in higher education. 
We will now turn to take a closer look at USAS’s organization, both at the 
campus and national levels--the means through which they mobilize to carry out this 
strategic model. 
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Chapter 8: The Organization of USAS 
 
Sustaining the Organization 
 The development of such strategies as we discussed in the last chapter does not 
happen spontaneously, but is fostered by social movement organizations such as United 
Students Against Sweatshops and its allies. USAS does not exist in isolation, but forms 
part of a network of anti-sweatshop organizations, such as UNITE, Global Exchange, and 
the National Labor Committee; this network is, in turn, part of a larger network of 
progressive activist organizations. Such SMOs and the networks they form play two 
critical roles--creating a system of institutional memory, whereby the knowledge of 
ideology and strategic models is passed onto new generations of activists and the 
movement is sustained over the long term; and facilitating communication and a process 
of deliberative decision-making, in which activists actively interpret their social 
environment in light of their ideology, deciding how to apply their existing strategic 
models and what innovations they need to adopt. 
 Especially in its early days, the larger social movement network in which USAS 
was embedded was particularly important for fostering the student group’s ability to act 
strategically. In a sense, other SMOs acted as collective mentors for the newly formed 
student organization. UNITE obviously was central for the role it played in nurturing the 
strategic skills of the students who interned with it. Under the supervision of UNITE 
staff-person Ginny Coughlin, they developed an organizing manual that was critical to 
the early organizing campaigns. UNITE continued to work with USAS, giving the 
student activists not only advice, but resources they could use to build up USAS as an 
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organization. As noted in chapter six, one lasting legacy of this relationship is USAS’s 
labor-inspired ideology of worker empowerment. 
Other anti-sweatshop organizations that played a critical role included the 
National Labor Committee, Global Exchange, Sweatshop Watch and the US Labor and 
Education in the Americas Project (USLEAP). Different campus groups tended to form 
close relationships with different organizations, depending in large part on geographical 
proximity--east coast chapters tended to work more with UNITE and the NLC and west 
coast chapters with Global Exchange and Sweatshop Watch (Brakken, Champagne; 
interviews, 2007). All these organizations had extensive knowledge of the issue of 
sweatshops that they shared with USAS, helping the first generation of student organizers 
develop their own expertise on these issues. According to USAS member Eric Brakken 
(interview, 2007), these organizations were all eager to work with USAS. “By this point 
[USAS’s 1999 founding convention], the student movement was the hot thing and a lot of 
people tried to advise us,” coming to their conference, seeking to speak and form closer 
ties with the student organization. This was both because USAS represented a potentially 
large pool of grassroots members to mobilize in the various campaigns different 
organizations were working and its successes in pushing colleges to adopt codes of 
conduct put it at the cutting edge of the movement. 
Additionally, both the NLC and Global Exchange had a long history of taking US 
activists on “tours” of sweatshops in the Global South. Such tours were important for 
many of USAS’s early leaders, giving them a more personal perspective on the 
sweatshop problem and fostering ties between US students and third-world workers (an 
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issue we will explore more in future chapters). According to USAS member Laura 
McSpedon (interview, 2007), “I think the opportunity to go to other countries and meet 
workers … The tours that those groups did were really critical in terms of motivating 
what was probably a relatively small group of students, but still a core group of 
leadership, who could then communicate that back to other students and motivate folks.” 
This was important not only in terms of motivating people, but in legitimating USAS’s 
work, since their connections with actual sweatshop workers made their claims more 
credible when challenged by their opponents (cf. Keck and Sikkink 1998). And these ties 
were also to play a role in shaping their global strategy, something we look at more in 
chapters fourteen and fifteen. 
A number of USAS members remarked that UNITE and the other mentoring anti-
sweatshop organizations, despite their influential role, also respected and encouraged 
USAS’s autonomy, wanting to see an independent student movement grow. McSpedon 
(interview, 2007) reflected, 
UNITE definitely incubated this piece of student activism for a good 
probably year-and-a-half or two years. […] I would say certainly Ginny 
Coughlin and other folks from UNITE continued to play a really key role 
in supporting a few of us who were trying to make this work, but they 
were also really excited that it had taken on a life of its own. […] I never 
felt like there was hesitation around students having autonomy and kind of 
taking this where we wanted to take it and being in partnership with 
UNITE. […] Having done this work now for ten years, it's actually pretty 
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surprising, I think, the level of control that UNITE gave up in the 
campaign, and how much they really did incubate something that was in 
their interest and then let the students take it where it made sense on our 
campuses. 
Another progressive SMO, but one not part of the anti-sweatshop movement, that 
played an important role was the United States Student Association (USSA), a long-
standing student advocacy organization, founded in 1947. Through initial contacts at the 
University of Wisconsin--Madison, where USSA and USAS co-existed, USSA had a 
significant impact on USAS’s strategic capacity. USAS members attended trainings by 
USSA organizers, in which the latter organization gave the anti-sweatshop activists a 
number of analytic tools for analyzing power structures on campus and developing a 
long-term strategy. In particular, USSA played an important role in transmitting the 
campus-level strategy of escalating tactics to USAS (Champagne, McSpedon, Wheatley; 
interviews, 2007). 
Additionally, a number of groups, both national networks such as Jobs with 
Justice and smaller, local groups, sometimes played critical roles in supporting individual 
USAS chapters in their campus campaigns. Such help could range from speaking at 
teach-ins, to offering strategic advice, to organizing rallies in support of the students 
during sit-ins (McSpedon, Traub-Werner; interviews, 2007). USAS member Molly 
McGrath spoke of the UW--Madison USAS chapter’s relationship with a local Central 
American solidarity group: 
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They were always around, helping influence students, supporting students, 
doing educational events. In a lot of ways it wasn’t like they gave a lot to 
us, we actually gave a lot to them. We went to a lot of their events. But 
when it came time that they could do something, helping us get press 
coverage, showing community support when it’s needed, like when we all 
got thrown in jail, they were there. 
As an organization, USAS has to pass on the lessons it learned from its allies and 
from its own experience on to new members. Creating such a system of institutional 
memory is particularly an issue for a student organization like USAS, with its constant 
turnover of membership and leadership as activists graduate from college and move on to 
new things (often other activist organizations). McGrath (interview, 2007) told me, 
“USAS does do a lot of training. All the trainings that they do and all the conferences 
constantly process through all these different students--so I think that is USAS’s main 
mechanism for passing on institutional memory and building skills.” USAS holds annual 
conferences, in which attendees are, among other things, socialized into the ideology of 
the anti-sweatshop movement and trained in USAS’s strategic model and the skills they 
need to run a successful campaign on campus. The first conference happened in July of 
1998 in New York City, before USAS was even officially founded. It was at the second 
conference of the emerging network of campus anti-sweatshop groups, in Washington, 
DC in July of 1999, that USAS was officially founded; USAS’s first staff person, Eric 
Brakken was hired shortly beforehand, while its official structure was set up at the 
conference (United Students Against Sweatshops 2009c). McSpedon (interview, 2007) 
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recalls that the first conference only had forty students, while three or four hundred 
attended the 1999 one; USAS’s website (2009c) puts the latter number at two hundred. 
Regardless of the exact figure, this is indicative of USAS’s rapid growth when it first 
took off. 
USAS national organizer Zack Knorr (interview, 2007) went to his first USAS 
conference in 2005; before attending, “I actually didn't even know that USAS was a 
national organization. I thought it was a group on my campus.” He spoke of how 
inspiring the conference was, seeing the history and very real impact USAS had had. 
I found out that there's this eight year history of running these campaigns, 
that we've created this organization--the Worker Rights Consortium--that 
we've really used our power to support workers in winning really concrete 
victories. And I think I could see after being there, really see, the strategic 
vision of what USAS is and where universities fit in. […] And seeing that 
was really, really powerful for me--just seeing that students could really 
make a difference. 
As of 2007 (when I conducted my interviews), USAS has two annual conferences, 
“a bigger one in February, which is more geared towards bringing new people in; and a 
smaller one […], generally in August, which is more about strategic visioning for the 
next school year” (Knorr, interview, 2007). At the larger conference, there are a number 
of panels and workshops, today largely run by students, in which USAS’s vision and 
strategy is laid out. Training and mentoring happen in both formal and informal venues. 
On the one hand, there are formal workshops where students are trained in strategic 
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thinking, using a variety of tools (Champagne, interview, 2007). On the other hand, 
students form relationships with more experienced activists from other campuses who 
can give them advice. USAS member Thomas Wheatley (interview, 2007) said, “It can 
be pretty empowering to come together and meet other folks who are doing the same kind 
of thing that you're doing, build that community of people, and then you can go back to 
them [during the course of a campus campaign] and say, You guys at this school 
succeeded in your campaign, how'd you get it done?” We will look more at the 
significance of these relationships below. 
These national conferences and networks are all the more important because, as 
with many campus activist groups, USAS chapters tend to be small. McSpedon 
(interview, 2007) recalled that at Georgetown, “Probably, at our most active point, we 
had fifteen people coming to weekly meetings and hashing all this out; and then a larger 
list of a few hundred who would maybe come to stuff, maybe send e-mails when we 
asked them to.” As a result of both this small size and high-turn over as members 
graduate, campus USAS chapters face even more challenges in sustaining themselves 
over the long-term than the national-level organization. For one thing, mentoring new 
members while simultaneously carrying on the business of the organization can be a 
challenge. Nick Reville (interview, 2007), a USAS member at Brown University, noted 
that, “It's always hard, with the intake of new people, figuring out how to get them 
involved, get them to do something that's useful; and it's hard to balance that with the 
people that are spending a lot of time on things like the [campaign for the] WRC; [it’s 
hard] trying to be really inclusive, while getting things done, having the meetings.” 
  163 
The unfortunate fact is that, while some USAS chapters stay strong for many 
years, others do not last. Knorr (interview, 2007) said, 
There's some groups that are always there, some groups that are really 
strong for a while and then fade away for a while; someone new comes in 
that's really excited and really wants to make things happen and they start 
to grow again. […] There's not one kind of common trajectory, but there 
have definitely been groups that were very, very strong that either 
dwindled or don't even exist anymore; there's groups that come out of 
nowhere that never really had that much going on and then all of a sudden 
they get a few really strong leaders, and they become really big; and then 
there's groups that have just kind of always been very steady groups, like 
the University of Wisconsin--Madison or Georgetown, that have had like a 
very steady presence throughout all ten years that USAS has been around. 
Knorr was uncertain if there were any consistent reasons one could pinpoint for the long-
term durability of different USAS chapters, but suggested that the individual personalities 
of the activists involved (which becomes critical in small groups), the culture of the 
particular campus, and the density of allied social movement networks (especially labor 
networks) in the local area around the campus all might play a role. 
When a chapter does fade away, this lessens USAS’s strength. According to 
Plumb (interview, 2007), 
There were many schools where there was a campaign, for example at 
UMass--they signed onto the WRC, they got a code of conduct, but it 
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hasn't been enforced in years. There's no students enforcing it, so probably 
if someone went to the student center and looked at where the sweatshirts 
from, it may be completely going against the code of conduct or against 
the agreement, but no one's enforcing that, so who cares? 
 One way USAS has tried to address this problem of turn-over is to have key 
members remain involved, both at the national and campus levels, as mentors for a few 
years following their graduation. At the same time, they do not want these graduated 
activists to be managing the campus chapters, but for those chapters to benefit from the 
more experienced activists’ knowledge and experience, while retaining their autonomy. 
McGrath (interview, 2007) kept up her ties with UW--Madison chapter even after she 
graduated. “I know people like myself and David [Alvarado] and people who are not 
students, but part of solidarity groups in Madison who mentor these leaders every year. 
That helps to develop a really close relationship in day-to-day contact.” She recalled that 
immediately after she graduated, she was involved in USAS’s first major solidarity 
campaign, in support of the workers at the Kukdong plant in Mexico (which we will look 
at more in chapter twelve). “I was in kind of a weird place. I wasn’t part of USAS 
anymore but I was still doing a lot of work for it […]. We always made a concerted effort 
in USAS to transition out. It was like no, you don’t have influence or decision making 
powers, we have a new group of leaders and it’s going to be their responsibility to do 
this. I think I had some influence and I definitely talked a lot to people--but I don’t think I 
had any decision making ability within USAS at that point.” 
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Another way in which USAS has been able to draw on the experience of 
graduating members is to hire them to the national staff--including as paid national and 
regional organizers--for a period of a few years, before they fully move on to other 
things. Knorr (interview, 2007), one of these national organizers, said an important part 
of his job was training younger activists. 
A lot of what we do as the [national] staff--and also the other organizers 
we have that work regionally--is really trying to encourage people to see 
that the most important thing they're doing is that they're developing 
leaders--so to always organize with the idea in mind that you're trying to 
organize yourself out of a job, that you're trying to make yourself 
unnecessary by helping to train two or three younger people that can do 
everything that you're doing. 
This, in turn, contributes to the longevity of both individual USAS chapters and the 
national organization as a whole, ensuring there are replacements for people as they 
graduate and move on. McGrath (interview, 2007) noted that most staff people, 
particularly the women, found working in USAS’s national office very stressful, 
principally she thought because of the high turn over of staff and the lack of a long-term 
manager. “It’s been a really, really hard experience. It’s amazing that it’s still around and 
that it still draws people to work for it after having a reputation like that. I think that 
people see it as a sacrifice, they want to make this sort of sacrifice for a year or two.” 
 Another important way in which USAS has tried to strengthen its sustainability is 
by diversifying its membership. When it was founded USAS was a predominantly white, 
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middle-class organization (Featherstone and United Students Against Sweatshops 2002; 
Krupat 2002) (Brakken, interview, 2007). Although Brakken (interview, 2007) said that 
there was strong women’s leadership from the start, women leaders also complained that 
they were often stuck with the more undesirable work (Featherstone and United Students 
Against Sweatshops 2002). USAS has made efforts to do more outreach to students of 
color and working-class students, with some success (Krupat 2002) (Brakken, interview, 
2007).6 Although nationally the organization remains predominantly white, some of the 
individual chapters now consisted predominantly of people of color (Rutter, interview, 
2007). These chapters are concentrated in New York City and the west coast, where there 
are a greater number of Latino activists. Additionally, many predominantly white 
chapters now include a greater number of working class students (Robert J.S. Ross, 
personal communication, 2010). 
Beyond simple recruitment, USAS has sought to actively foster and 
institutionalize the voices of students belonging to oppressed groups--not only working 
class students and students of color, but women and gay/ lesbian/ bisexual/ transgender 
students--through educational programs (Brakken, interview, 2007) and caucuses (Krupat 
2002) (Champagne, Plumb; interviews, 2007). Education programs are important in 
highlighting issues of oppression to the more privileged members of USAS, who may not 
be naturally aware that these issues remain important (Plumb, interview, 2007). Caucuses 
create both an “independent space” where members of these groups can organize 
themselves to raise their concerns within USAS and, since the caucuses have 
representatives sitting on USAS’s national leadership, “structured opportunities” which 
  167 
actively promote their leadership (Gooding 1997). Additionally, USAS has mandated that 
a certain number of its leadership positions be held by women (Krupat 2002). 
Another important means USAS has tried to use to sustain itself and its local 
chapters is branching out to deal with new issues. Although it is not something I look at 
closely here, the outsourcing of campus service work, mentioned in chapter four, has 
become one of USAS’s major issues. They see strong parallels between this on-campus 
exploitation and the off-campus exploitation that happens in apparel factories. When, due 
to their successes, there was a temporary lull in organizing around apparel sweatshops, 
USAS was able to keep students involved and its ties with the labor movement active by 
taking on this issue--something that has probably contributed significantly to USAS’s 
long-term existence (United Students Against Sweatshops 2009a) (Knorr, interview, 
2007). 
 
Decision-Making and Communication 
Both at the national-level conferences that determine USAS’s overall direction 
and in the organization’s individual campus chapters, members usually make decisions 
through consensus, a form of participatory democracy that puts a great deal of emphasis 
on deliberation. This consensus-oriented culture also shaped the relations between 
national USAS and its chapters. McGrath (interview, 2007) described the decision-
making process on national campaigns as follows: “The [elected national] coordinating 
committee would make the bigger decisions on actions. Campuses, a lot of times, made 
their own decisions about what they were going to do locally, but they would always try 
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to coordinate as much as they could with the national center. There’s always that 
negotiating back and forth with what national USAS would to do and what the campuses 
would do.” National USAS would also consult with allied groups in planning these 
campaigns, “but USAS made its own decisions.” At the local level, members of campus 
chapters will meet and talk among themselves to discuss the best way to reach their goals 
on their campus, drawing on their local knowledge of the campus, even as they also draw 
on the standard USAS model of how to conduct a campus-based campaign. When 
appropriate, they might use a modified form of consensus, delegating certain 
responsibilities to subcommittees. McGrath (interview, 2007), for instance, said of the 
UW--Madison chapter’s operations during a sit-in: “At times we did have different types 
of decision making trade-offs, like this group of people were empowered to make 
decisions if the cops came--we did recognize the need to expedite decisions in some 
cases.” 
Both Francesca Polletta (2002) and Marshall Ganz (2000, 2009) have argued that 
such participatory-democratic, deliberative models of decision-making foster better 
strategic decisions than models in which decisions are made in a top-down form and 
passed on by fiat to the membership. There are a number of reasons for this. Both 
scholars stress that deliberative decision-making, since it involves more people, brings in 
a wider range of information and ideas, thus producing more creative solutions. Polletta 
further suggests such decision-making methods promote the development of participating 
activists’ abilities, as they learn new skills through the process of deliberating with others 
and taking on new responsibilities; and encourage solidarity within the organization, as 
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everyone comes to feel they have a stake in the outcome of any action, since they helped 
to shape it. In top-down organizations, by contrast, only one person or a small group of 
people make decisions; since no one is able to challenge them, they may simply go along 
with whatever strategic models and tactics they are comfortable with, even if they are ill-
adapted to the current situation (Ganz 2000, 2009). Members are encouraged to simply 
follow orders, which stifles the development of new leadership. Members may also feel 
less invested in the organization’s program--people are much more likely to resent being 
ordered to carry out some strategy they may not fully understand than they are a plan they 
hand some hand in actively creating (Polletta 2002). 
The experience of USAS activists confirms Polletta (2002) and Ganz’s (2000, 
2009) claims, although they also sometimes noted the difficulties with consensus--it can 
be a time-consuming and sometimes frustrating process, especially when there are strong 
differences of opinion. In the end though, they all seem to have felt the benefits 
outweighed the drawbacks. McGrath (interview, 2007) who described the process of 
consensus at UW--Madison as “torturous,” thanks in part to factionalism, nonetheless 
contrasted it with her experiences at the Solidarity Center positively: 
Looking back at it now, I think that it strengthened us, because now I’m 
part of […] the Solidarity Center, which is extremely hierarchical. If 
there’s just a group of people at the top making decisions, there’s no 
investment off the grassroots. And we need those numbers. It was very 
educational as far as listening to people talk for hours about their opinions 
and what they think. I think it did strengthen us. 
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Even Wheatley (interview, 2007), who declared, “I might stick a fork in my eye if I have 
to go back to that model of organizing now,” admitted, “but it really enabled everyone to 
step up into playing the role and to learn the ropes as you go. I think if it had been more 
top-down I probably would not have gotten the experience that I got just being at the 
table and figuring out strategy.”  
These campus chapters are not isolated from each other. Members of different 
USAS chapters have contact with each other not only at annual conferences, but, as noted 
above, drawing on the relationships formed there, they stay in touch with each other 
during the school year, sharing information, tactics and strategies, and other ideas with 
each other. In this, telecommunications technology such as e-mail list-servs and 
telephone conference calls are important. The period when USAS was first forming was 
also, it should be noted, when e-mail was just coming into its own as a major 
communications medium. Despite all the hype around the internet, research on its role in 
social movements has shown that it is not enough to create long-distance social 
movement networks on its own; instead, it seems critical for activists to form face-to-face 
ties first (as at USAS’s national conferences), ties which can then be maintained by the 
internet and conference calls (Fox and Brown 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Olesen 
2005). One important feature of e-mail list-servs and conference calls have over older 
forms of telecommunication technology is that they allow what Thomas Olesen (2005) 
calls two-way, many-to-many communication; older forms of communication were either 
two-way, but one-to-one, such as traditional mail or phone calls; or one-way and one-to-
many, such as the radio, television, and other traditional forms of the mass media. The 
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two-way, many-to-many nature of the internet and conference calls facilitate the 
maintenance of long-distance networks, involving multiple people speaking back and 
forth to each other, in a way that older forms of telecommunications simply can’t. 
As already noted, after Duke students decided to carry out a sit-in demanding 
public disclosure, the information spurred students at other schools to take similar 
actions. While part of the push came from getting information about the sit-in from the 
traditional mass-mediated news (whether by television or newspaper), direct 
communications between students by e-mail and phone were also critical. In this early 
stage, UNITE’s role was again critical, by funding the conference calls. According to 
USAS member Marion Traub-Werner (interview, 2007), “Now [those conference calls] 
would all be free, but at the time it was a very expensive service, and UNITE paid for the 
entire thing--and paid all the long distance charges. […] We would have like eight-hour 
conference calls. We were talking thousands of dollars; I mean, literally, twenty or thirty 
thousand dollars in conference calls.” Even if these figures were somewhat lower than 
Traub-Werner recalls, this would still be a substantial sum of money; few other SMOs 
besides a labor union would even have the resources to pay for such a thing. 
They were resources well spent though. The information students shared could be 
as simple as a flier they had designed, all the way to sharing strategies for a sit-in. Often 
times, the students would discover that their administrations were using similar 
arguments or delaying tactics (such as referring the matter to a committee, as discussed in 
the last chapter) against them--and they could learn from each other’s responses to them. 
Once students at a few campuses learned that committees were a dead end, for instance, 
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intercampus communication allowed it to become part of USAS’s common pool of 
knowledge that they should avoid agreeing to them--and allowed the student activists to 
learn this in the midst of their campaign during the school year and not need to wait until 
the next summer conference. They might also coordinate a common day of action, where 
students on multiple campuses would all mobilize on the same day around the same 
issue, simultaneously pressuring their administrators. Caroline Stoppard* (interview, 
2007), a USAS member at Indiana University, recalls, 
Nothing we did would have been as effective if it had only been one 
campus. […] There was a lot of communication as to what's going on 
among campuses […] and there continues to be. That's a really important 
part of the movement. I guess [it’s part of] what makes USAS so effective-
-I sort of take it for granted that everyone's going to know what's going on 
around campus, but I guess I shouldn't. It is kind of an accomplishment 
that those networks were established and maintained.” 
The national staff also play an important role in coordinating actions between 
campuses and passing on strategic knowledge. Znorr (interview, 2007) described his 
work as a regional organizer, coordinating the campaign among the University of 
California system campuses in support of the DSP: “I ended up doing a lot of the 
groundwork. I would travel to different campuses and hang out with the group leaders, 
get to a point where we were friends basically, and then I would keep in touch with them 
about how their campaigns were going, try to offer advice or support, and then we would 
make our decisions collectively on our conference calls during the week.” Trina Tocco 
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(interview, 2007) recalled that when she first started organizing at Western Michigan 
University in 1999, shortly after USAS was founded, “I remember the training for me 
was in the form of sitting for hours on the phone with [then lone national staff person] 
Eric Brakken. I remember being nineteen years old, having never met this man, but I 
talked to him more than anyone else in my life at that point.” 
It is such organizations and networks, and the knowledge that they hold in their 
collective memory, that allowed USAS and its allies both to develop such innovations as 
the Worker Rights Consortium and the Designated Suppliers Program and to wage 
successful international campaigns in support of workers in specific factories, processes 
we will examine in the following chapters. 
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Chapter 9: The Brands Strike Back: Corporate Social Responsibility and the 
Creation of the Fair Labor Association 
 
 
The Limits of Corporate Social Responsibility 
 As noted in chapter five, during the first wave of student anti-sweatshop activism 
at Duke and other schools, the brands were not passive in their response to the student 
campaign, but actively fought against them. The companies that collectively form the 
apparel industry are not simply inert structures which constrain the actions of the 
movement. They are also social actors who respond strategically to the movement (Jasper 
and Poulsen 1993; McAdam 2004), developing counter-measures, i.e. actions they hope 
will thwart the movement or at least blunt its impact. These counter-measures must be 
considered part of the social environment and therefore the political opportunity system 
within which the movement must operate. The principle counter-measure which the 
brands eventually settled on were corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs, 
including both in-house “social compliance” departments and corporate-dominated 
NGOs, such as the Fair Labor Association (FLA), charged with monitoring their member 
companies. While factory owners may rely on repression of workers as their favored 
counter-measure (an issue we will look at in chapters twelve and thirteen), in the US the 
brands are usually not in a position to have thugs beat up their critics, so they have had to 
rely primarily on countering the students’ frame--something at which they have been 
relatively successful through the use of CSR. 
Most of the literature on these CSR programs has looked at them primarily in 
terms of their effectiveness in protecting workers’ rights (e.g., Barrientos and Smith 
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2007; Esbenshade 2004b; Locke et al. 2009; Locke et al. 2007; O'Rourke 2003; Pearson 
and Seyfang 2001; Rodríguez-Garavito 2005; Seidman 2007; Tsogas 2009; Wells 2007). 
While this is an important consideration--and I draw on this research here--in this 
chapter, I would like to suggest that it makes as much sense to consider these programs as 
much in terms of their success in allowing apparel companies to frame themselves as 
socially responsible in the master discursive arena of the national mass media, thereby 
restoring their legitimacy and their brand image following the attacks by the anti-
sweatshop movement. 
The unfortunate fact is that these programs have not been terribly effective in 
ending sweatshop working conditions. For instance, Richard Locke, Fei Qin, and Alberto 
Brause (2007) came to the conclusion that Nike’s internal compliance program was 
lacking, based on data provided by Nike itself--which, if anything, should be biased in 
favor of the company. Using a “data set based on factory audits of over 800 of Nike’s 
suppliers located in 51 different countries” (p. 20), they concluded that the results were, 
at best, uneven, with improvements in some factories, but many others showing no 
improvements or actually deteriorating in their treatment of workers over time. 
“Interviews with other global brands, NGO representatives, and leaders of the major 
multi-stakeholder initiatives indicate that Nike’s experience with monitoring is by no 
means unique” (p. 21). John Ruggie, the special representative of the UN Secretary-
General on human rights and transnational corporations, offered a similarly pessimistic 
conclusion: “We keep hearing now, from just about everywhere … monitoring doesn’t 
work. […] Just about everybody, at least off the record, will tell you that monitoring 
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doesn’t work and auditing of supplier factories doesn’t work because people cheat” 
(quoted in Zarocostas 2009). 
If CSR programs have been ineffective at improving working conditions, what 
they have done effectively is acted as a counter-framing tool that has restored the apparel 
industry’s legitimacy. CSR programs create at least the appearance that these companies 
are sincerely trying to do something about the problem of sweatshops. While I would 
hesitate to claim that the companies with CSR programs have absolutely no interest in 
fighting sweatshops, we do need to consider the facts that, as we saw in chapter three, 
they only initiated these programs in response to attacks by the anti-sweatshop movement 
and that they have consistently refused to address the root causes of the problem, instead 
maintaining the business practices that force their contractors to cut costs on the backs of 
their workers. 
In looking at monitoring programs, whether they are CSR programs or genuinely 
independent affairs like GMIES (which we looked at in chapter three) or the Worker 
Rights Consortium (which we will look at in chapters ten and eleven), it is important to 
consider not only their effectiveness in protecting workers’ rights, but what sort of rights 
they are designed to protect. In their analyses of labor monitoring programs, both César 
A. Rodríguez-Garavito (2005) and Stephanie Barrientos and Sally Smith (2007) 
distinguish between protective rights (or outcome standards) and enabling rights (or 
process rights). Protective rights cover such basic quality of life elements as decent health 
and safety standards, levels of pay, reasonable overtime hours, etc. Enabling rights are 
those such as freedom of association (i.e., the right to form an independent union), 
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collective bargaining and freedom from discrimination that give workers the power to 
pursue respect for protective rights on their own. In other words, enabling rights are those 
that facilitate worker empowerment, the main goal of the anti-sweatshop movement. 
According to both Rodríguez-Garavito (2005) and Barrientos and Smith (2007), 
corporate-sponsored monitoring programs, even if they include both on paper, tend in 
practice to put much more emphasis on protective rights than they do on enabling rights. 
Different scholars have suggested different reasons for this disparity: According to Ruth 
Pearson and Gill Seyfang (2001), protective rights like child labor receive more media 
coverage than enabling rights like freedom of association; since companies are primarily 
responding to consumer perceptions, they focus on the former. According to Barrientos 
and Smith (2007), focusing on protective rights is also more consistent with a top-down 
technocratic approach that corporations are comfortable with. I would suggest that, while 
these are doubtless factors, the most important reason is probably that suggested by Jill 
Esbenshade (2004b)--companies’ desire to preserve the balance of power in their favor, 
which protecting enabling rights would undermine. One sees equal weight given to both 
protective and enabling rights only in movement-sponsored monitoring programs 
(Barrientos and Smith 2007; Rodríguez-Garavito 2005). Thus, even if CSR efforts were 
actually effective, they would still be fundamentally flawed in the eyes of anti-sweatshop 
activists, for the same reasons that the fair trade movement’s efforts are. Corporate social 
responsibility programs are, at best, paternalistic, not creating conditions for worker 
empowerment--thus leaving workers vulnerable if interest in such programs ever 
declines. Rodríguez-Garavito and Barrientos and Smith, based on their own empirical 
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research on the effectiveness of monitoring programs, have reached similar conclusions 
to anti-sweatshop activists, arguing that to be effective, monitoring programs must 
guarantee workers’ enabling rights, countering some of the great asymmetries of power 
in the global production process and giving workers the power to protect themselves. 
Like other CSR programs, the FLA fails to do this. 
 
The Creation of the Fair Labor Association 
 When students first began pushing for labor rights codes of conduct, the brands 
actively tried to persuade schools to oppose them, particularly the requirement for 
disclosure. They could not, of course, simply defend the existence of sweatshops. Instead, 
according to USAS member Laura McSpedon, they deployed two arguments. First, 
“They […] tried to make [USAS] out to be a protectionist front for UNITE and used the 
history of both UNITE and the labor movement as being somewhat protectionist to try to 
discredit us. […] [They claimed,] ‘These students are really nice, but they're just 
misguided, they're being used by the union’” (interview, 2007). Second, they tried to 
argue that disclosure of factory locations would harm them. 
Their main argument--and administrators totally bought it at first--was, 
“You know we can't tell you where our factories are because it could give 
away trade secrets--our competitors could know how we make our very 
special T-shirts.” And obviously in an industry like the garment industry, 
it's just an absurd argument--how you make a T-shirt is not like a drug 
patent, it's not a really complicated thing where someone has a much 
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better recipe for making a T-shirt than someone else (McSpedon, 
interview, 2007). 
Indeed, it is quite common for competing brands to use the same contractors and for their 
products to be made right alongside each other. The brands, however, were able to make 
a case that many administrators found persuasive, leading them to take the companies’ 
stated concerns seriously. 
The brands were not about to regain the moral high ground by simply opposing 
students’ efforts to fight sweatshops though. They had to offer an alternative solution of 
their own and they focused on CSR programs as the answer. In this, they were aided by 
an outside initiative, which soon came under industry control. In August 1996, 
responding to the Kathy Lee Gifford scandal and other, similar revelations in the media, 
the Clinton administration had formed a taskforce initiated by Secretary of Labor Robert 
Reich--the Apparel Industry Partnership (AIP), which brought together a number of 
representatives of the apparel industry and their critics from the human rights and labor 
community. The administration’s goal in forming the AIP was to create a system of 
independent monitoring which would have the support of both industry and labor rights 
advocates; their hope was that such a “multi-stakeholder” initiative could effectively 
address the problem of sweatshops, particularly those outside the US, where the 
government had no formal jurisdiction. This culminated in the creation of the Fair Labor 
Association, a “multi-stakeholder” initiative whose stated goal was to monitor apparel 
production in an effort to ensure that it was sweat-free. 
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The negotiations were long and arduous, with industry and labor advocates 
disagreeing on a number of important issues--workers’ right to freedom of association; 
the issue of whether contractors’ should be required to pay a living wage; and what 
actually constituted effective, independent monitoring. There was no agreement on how 
companies should operate in countries such as China and Vietnam where only 
government-controlled unions are legal and independent unions are banned. The industry 
representatives opposed the concept of a living wage, pushing for language that instead 
required their contractors to pay the local minimum wage or the prevailing wage in the 
industry, whichever was higher--which often meant that contractors did not have to pay 
any more than the inadequate wage that they were already paying. There were two major 
issues related to the definition of independent monitoring. First, the companies wanted to 
be able to select their own monitors--which would make their actual independence 
questionable. Second, while it was agreed that human and labor rights groups would be 
accredited as monitors, industry also wanted to accredit accounting companies, despite 
the fact that they had no expertise in labor issues and often had close ties to apparel firms, 
to whom they provided auditing and consulting services (Esbenshade 2004b). 
 When it became clear that the AIP as a whole could come to no consensus, nine 
members of the taskforce--Liz Claiborne, Nike, Reebok, and Phillips Van Heusen from 
the apparel industry; and Business for Social Responsibility, the Lawyers Committee for 
Human Rights, the National Consumers League, the International Labor Rights Fund, and 
the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights, all moderate NGOs--began 
to meet separately to hammer out an agreement among themselves, deliberately 
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excluding the unions who had been part of the AIP. The industry groups made two minor 
concessions to their critics: First, they agreed that they could only hire their monitors 
from a list accredited by the organization as a whole, thus creating some room for NGO 
in-put into who qualified as a monitor. Second, they agreed that the US Department of 
Labor would conduct a study of whether or not the minimum wage in countries where 
they had operations was sufficient to meet workers’ needs. After reaching a consensus 
among themselves, they presented their agreement as a fait accompli to the other 
Partnership members. The nine AIP members who forged their separate consensus 
secured the support of four other apparel companies--LL Bean, Patagonia, Nicole Miller 
and Kathie Lee Gifford--but UNITE, the Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union 
(RWDSU), and the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR) refused to have 
anything to do with the agreement. Despite this, the remaining groups went forward and 
on November 2, 1998 officially formed the Fair Labor Association. In short order, 
UNITE, the RWDSU, and ICCR all officially pulled out of the AIP and publicly 
denounced the agreement, as did the AFL-CIO (Esbenshade 2004b; Greenhouse 1998b, 
1998c). Those NGOs that remained part of the FLA argued that by doing so, they could 
continue to push for higher standards in the future. “‘Those of us on the nongovernment 
organization side are continuing to fight for higher wages in this industry,’ said Michael 
Posner, executive director of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights. ‘This issue is 
central to our thinking going forward. Remember, this a first step and we have a lot of 
work to do to make this work’” (Greenhouse 1998b). 
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 Despite the fact that industry representatives had largely been able to set the terms 
of the agreement, the FLA still had trouble attracting additional companies as members. 
Indeed, some companies initially involved in the negotiations rejected the FLA as too 
restrictive and the monitoring scheme as too expensive (Greenhouse 1999b). It was 
unclear if the organization actually had a meaningful future. As these events were 
unfolding though, so was the first wave of student anti-sweatshop activism, demanding 
disclosure and independent monitoring, as we saw in the last chapter. College 
administrators quickly realized that they simply did not have the expertise or 
infrastructure to monitor the codes of conduct they created in response to student 
demands. They also hoped to find a way to placate the students, thus bringing some quiet 
to their campuses. Meanwhile, both the Clinton administration and those companies that 
were part of the FLA began actively recruiting colleges to join the Association. Nike 
offered to disclose its factory locations in return for schools joining the FLA, a powerful 
incentive since Nike was one of the principle licensees of many schools at which USAS 
was active. Since becoming a member of the FLA seemed like the perfect solution to 
several of the problems college administrators faced, this recruiting effort soon proved 
fruitful (Esbenshade 2004b). 
On March 15, 1999, seventeen colleges and universities, including Duke 
University, became the first members of the FLA representing higher education (Krupa 
1999); by late April, fifty-six colleges had joined (Greenhouse 1999b). (As of April 2009, 
the FLA had 209 college and university affiliates (Fair Labor Association 2009).) Not 
only did all these new members ensure the stability and relevance of the Association, but 
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the presence of colleges and universities greatly enhanced the FLA’s legitimacy 
(Esbenshade 2004b). USAS member Eric Brakken (interview, 2007) said, “We really saw 
and they really saw this move by FLA and the universities as their attempt to legitimize 
the FLA after they had been attacked by the anti-sweatshop community”. USAS activists 
were deeply upset by this decision on the part of administrators--they saw the FLA as 
deeply flawed, for reasons we will explore below. They soon began a campaign to push 
their administrators to leave the FLA, a campaign that would eventually culminate in the 
creation of the Worker Rights Consortium, a truly independent monitoring organization, 
without industry ties--a process we will look at in the next chapter. 
 
The Operations of the FLA 
To understand why USAS and other members of the anti-sweatshop movement 
are so critical of the FLA, we need to look at the details of how the FLA is organized and 
operates.7 As originally constituted, 
[t]he FLA’s board was to be made up of six NGOs and six companies, 
plus a neutral chair. To become a participating member, a company would 
need only majority approval. However, two-thirds of each side would need 
to approve any decertification, making it necessary for four companies to 
vote another company out. In fact, any important change would require a 
“super-majority” vote, virtually congealing what was touted as a 
preliminary arrangement with room for improvement (Esbenshade 2004b 
182) (see also Wells 2007). 
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With the addition of colleges and universities to the organization, the board was changed 
to give member colleges three representatives (Esbenshade 2004b), later changed to a full 
complement of six (Fair Labor Association 2008a). Companies initially paid membership 
dues of $5,000 to $100,000, based on their annual sales; colleges and universities paid 
membership dues of 1% of their annual licensing revenues, to a maximum of $50,000 
(Krupa 1999). The federal government also originally provided some funding, though 
this was later cut back (Esbenshade 2004b). 
 The FLA oversees a monitoring process, which certifies companies as being in 
compliance. Participating companies are supposed to both monitor all of their factories 
they contract with through their own internal monitoring system; and hire an outside, 
FLA-approved monitor to regularly inspect a percentage of the factories. As noted above, 
these monitors could be either NGOs or accounting firms, despite the lack of labor rights 
expertise on the part of the latter; in addition, a number of for-profit monitoring firms 
have sprung up that have been accredited by the FLA. For the first three years of a 
company’s membership, outside monitors had to inspect 30% of their factories; each year 
afterward, the monitor would check on between 5-10% of the company’s factories to 
ensure they were in compliance with the FLA’s code. Companies had significant 
influence over which factories were actually inspected. Such inspections were announced 
beforehand, which effectively allows management to clean up their act, eliminating any 
problems, at least for the duration of the inspection. The results of the inspections were 
considered confidential and not made available to the public (Esbenshade 2004b; 
Greenhouse 1998b). A typical inspection would last only a day or two and, while the 
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monitors would typically interview workers, they would do so on factory premises, thus 
denying them the protection of confidentiality (Blasi, Schmaedick; interviews, 2007). 
 Many of the NGOs that initially stayed with the FLA in the hopes of improving it 
grew increasingly frustrated over time, as the industry members vetoed any significant 
improvements. Eventually, all of the groups with any meaningful connection to the labor 
movement withdrew. The final one to pull out was the International Labor Rights Fund 
(ILRF), which resigned from the Association on October 4, 2001. The resignation of the 
ILRF, along with the success of the WRC and continued pressure from the anti-
sweatshop movement, did, however, finally prompt the FLA to make a number of 
important reforms to its operations in late 2001 and 2002. Participating companies no 
longer select and pay for their monitors; this process is now done by the FLA’s staff. The 
system of selecting factories for outside inspections was randomized, inspections were 
made unannounced, and some degree of public disclosure of the reports was implemented 
(Esbenshade 2004b). What is note-worthy here is that the FLA has felt some need to 
emulate at least part of the practices of truly independent monitors, such as the WRC, 
indicating that there are some limits to just how successful CSR is as a legitimating 
strategy in the face of continued movement opposition unless there is at least some 
appearance of independence and transparency (Rodríguez-Garavito 2005). 
Despite these important improvements, problems remain with the FLA’s 
programs. The monitoring reports, while summarizing the results of the inspection, report 
only the name of the lead apparel firm, the monitoring organization, the region where the 
factory is located, the problems and progress being made towards correcting the 
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problems. The public reports do not contain the actual name and location of the factory, 
however, making it extremely difficult for third parties to verify the accuracy of the 
reports. Additionally, due to a loss of government funding, the number of inspections 
decreased--to only 10% of factories during the initial period and 5% of factories each 
year thereafter (Esbenshade 2004b). Monitoring visits are still brief and still do not 
protect worker confidentiality (Blasi, Schmaedick; interviews, 2007). 
 Beginning in 2007, the FLA began to reconsider its whole approach, developing a 
new monitoring methodology that they refer to as “FLA 3.0,” a strategy consistent with 
what Richard Locke, Matthew Amengual and Akshay Mangla (2009) call a 
“commitment-oriented approach.” It is not only the FLA that is looking more closely at 
such a program--Ruggie, the UN official quoted above on the ineffectiveness of 
monitoring programs, has suggested that the FLA’s 3.0 approach could be a solution to 
the problems he named (Zarocostas 2009). Locke (an MIT business school professor who 
has worked closely with Nike on its labor standards)8 and his colleagues drew the 
conclusion that the “commitment-oriented approach” was far more effective than the 
traditional monitoring model after reviewing the internal CSR programs of an FLA 
member company known by the pseudonym of ABC. Inspectors who sought to monitor 
ABC’s contractors in the conventional style had less success in improving working 
conditions at these contractors than inspectors who worked in a more cooperative fashion 
with the contractors’ management to help them identify and fix problems. Locke, 
Amengual, and Mangla characterize this commitment-oriented approach as follows: 
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In this […] approach, information, incentives, and power relations also 
play important roles. But they are utilized in different ways [than the 
traditional compliance approach]. Rather than simply employing factory 
audits and the threat of sanctions (in the form of reduced or terminated 
orders) to drive behavioral change, the commitment approach uses this 
same information and the frequent presence of auditors in the factories to 
engage in a process of root-cause analysis, joint problem solving, 
information sharing, and the diffusion of best practices that is in the 
mutual self-interest of the suppliers, the auditors, and the global 
corporations for which they work (p. 321). 
In 2008, the FLA began experimentally implementing its own commitment-
oriented approach in the form of the FLA 3.0 program in Central America and with 
selected companies in China and Thailand. This change in direction was based on the 
recognition of a significant flaw in the assumptions underlying the FLA’s old 
methodology--that compliance with fair labor standards is the norm in the apparel 
industry and that deviations from it are exceptions that can easily be corrected. With the 
switch to the FLA 3.0 approach, the Association acknowledged that sweatshop conditions 
are pervasive in the apparel sector. While this is an important step forward, the FLA 
attributes this problem to simple ignorance on the part of both factory managers and 
workers of what proper labor standards consist of and a lack of the necessary resources 
on the part of managers to comply. Following the commitment-oriented approach, the 
FLA will switch away from an adversarial approach to monitoring and focus on helping 
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factory-owners assess how well they are complying with the FLA’s labor standards 
through consultations with both management and workers. They also encourage 
management to voluntarily report any violations they have committed, assuming that this 
is due to not knowing how to meet the standards. The FLA will then work collaboratively 
with management to find ways to correct the problems. They may, for instance, provide 
companies with training in proper human resources practices to eliminate discrimination 
in hiring (Fair Labor Association 2008b; FLA Watch no date; Sweat-Free Stanford 
Campaign 2007). 
 The FLA has a centralized code of conduct, which all member companies are 
expected to abide by themselves and ensure that their contractors do so as well. The code 
includes prohibitions on forced labor, child labor (defined as workers under fifteen years 
old), harassment or abuse of employees (verbal, physical or sexual), and discrimination in 
hiring and management practices. Management is supposed to ensure that adequate health 
and safety conditions are met and recognize workers’ right to form a union and engage in 
collective bargaining. In paying both standard and overtime pay, employers are supposed 
to conform with either local law or the prevailing wage in the local industry, whichever is 
higher. The workweek itself is supposed to be no more than forty-eight hours, plus twelve 
hours overtime, with one day off a week guaranteed; exceptions, however may be made 
in the case of “extraordinary business circumstances” (Fair Labor Association 2008c). 
Some of the problems with this code have already been noted--it does not deal with the 
question of freedom of association in countries where independent unions are illegal and 
it contains no provisions for a living wage. Additionally, many fear that the exception 
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allowed to the workweek time limit in case of extraordinary business circumstances 
leaves a lot of room for abuses (Esbenshade 2004b). 
 
The Movement Critique of the FLA and CSR 
 The anti-sweatshop movement’s critique of the FLA operates on two levels. One 
is a critique of their monitoring and certification practices, which anti-sweatshop activists 
argue are carried out in such a way that their effectiveness is highly questionable. At a 
more fundamental level, the movement critiques the FLA for being built on an inherent 
conflict of interest, in that the core apparel companies play a significant role in governing 
and funding the very organization that is supposed to monitor them. It is, as one 
newspaper report quoted University of Oregon student Mitra Anoushiravani, like having 
“a fox monitoring a chicken coop” (quoted in May 2000). It is this fundamental conflict 
of interest that in many ways accounts for the faulty monitoring practices. 
 
The FLA’s Compliance Program 
 One major point of criticism that the anti-sweatshop movement has of the FLA is 
the very fact that they certify brands as being compliant with their requirements, a 
practice activists view as highly misleading. Brakken (interview, 2007) recalled, “Within 
the framework of the FLA, people were deathly afraid of that.” Strictly speaking, the 
FLA certification simply indicates which participating brands are in compliance with its 
monitoring requirements, not that they are sweat-free. As sociologist Gay Seidman 
(2007) points out though, most consumers do not have a terribly sophisticated 
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understanding of such certification programs. Even a well intentioned consumer does not, 
generally speaking, have the time to thoroughly investigate what any particular 
certification may actually entail--and so it is all too easy to take a certification like the 
FLA’s as an indication that the brand in question is actually sweat-free. Brakken 
(interview, 2007) explained, “Obviously the idea of providing labels is a huge incentive--
a lot of companies, one would think, would want that label with the increasing scrutiny 
and consumer concern about sweatshops. But there was a debate about whether or not a 
factory could ever be sweatshop-free.” Ultimately, anti-sweatshop activists decided that, 
even in the case of the monitoring organization they created, the WRC, they were not in a 
position to certify anything as sweat-free. The sheer scope of the problem, both in terms 
of the pervasiveness of the sweatshop problem and the size and global distribution of the 
industry, mitigated against any surveillance system that could actually continually 
monitor factories or brands for violations. And anti-sweatshop activists did not want to 
mislead consumers with the idea that the problem could be so easily solved. (As we will 
see in chapter fifteen, USAS would eventually back a certification program--the 
Designated Suppliers Program--but it has a much more limited scope.) The FLA 
apparently did not have such concerns. 
 The monitoring program which the FLA uses to certify participating companies’ 
compliance is also highly problematic. First, there is the question of “who the monitors 
would be again--this question of is it [the accounting firm] Ernst & Young being hired by 
a company to do a self-assessment or is it NGOs that are explicitly fighting for workers' 
rights?” (McSpedon, interview, 2007). Even some of the monitoring organizations that 
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are nominally non-profits, such as Verité, are primarily oriented towards providing a 
service to the major apparel firms and operate very much like commercial firms, not 
workers’ rights organizations (Esbenshade 2004b). In Monitoring Sweatshops, sociologist 
Jill Esbenshade (2004b) extensively analyzes the organization and practices of the 
commercial and quasi-commercial monitoring firms on which the FLA relies so heavily. 
She found them, for the most part, to be unfit for the job. While the heads of the 
monitoring firms might have some experience with labor issues, most of the monitors 
they hire do not--they may be recent college graduates, or former Peace Corps volunteers, 
or missionaries, the last of whom are valued for their foreign language skills. They are 
insufficiently trained and, at the end of the day, generally have little understanding of 
workers’ rights. She found their actual monitoring practices to be inconsistent and sloppy. 
Additionally, private monitoring firms attribute little importance to the violation of such 
enabling rights as freedom of association and collective bargaining. Both they and the 
companies that hire them see what they do as a substitute for unions, ensuring the well-
being of workers without the need for intervention of the “third party” of a union. 
 In addition to the lack of qualifications on the part of many of the monitoring 
organizations the FLA uses, their actual monitoring practices leave much to be desired on 
multiple fronts. To this day, the FLA still does not disclose factory locations. As noted in 
the previous chapter, disclosure has been central to the anti-sweatshops’ demands. 
According to McSpedon (interview, 2007), 
We felt like if there were a public list of factories that produced 
Georgetown apparel, then a human rights group in El Salvador could look 
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at that list and say, I'm going to talk to workers in the factory, because I 
know that this university has said they don't want certain things, right? 
People could look at that list and hold these companies accountable in a 
way that we could never do with supposedly random inspections of a 
privately held list of factories. 
The FLA, however, relies on such privately held lists, making independent verification of 
their reports impossible. 
There is also the fact that the FLA, at least initially, gave factories advanced 
notice of inspections--giving managers a chance to cover up any violations (Esbenshade 
2004b) (Brakken, interview, 2007). While the FLA corrected this in 2001, other problems 
remain. For one thing, the inspections are usually very brief. According to Agatha 
Schmaedick (interview, 2007), a former WRC investigator, “They take place over just a 
few days to at most a few weeks,” in contrast to the WRC’s inspections which normally 
take several weeks. Such short inspections do not last long enough to uncover serious 
abuses, which may require extensive investigation. According to Locke, Amengual and 
Mangla (2009), monitors at the ABC company themselves complained that such short 
visits were ineffective.  
ABC auditors typically spend one working day on a factory visit; more 
than half of this time is consumed by reviewing documents, while the 
physical inspection of the factory may take a few hours. The worker 
interviews may consume less than an hour. Thus, the audit is primarily 
based on factory records, which the auditors themselves claim to be 
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unreliable and often inaccurate. With limited time, auditors cannot verify 
all factory records, making it very difficult to find noncompliance in 
factories that falsify records (p. 332). 
In the case of the FLA, there is also frequently little continuity in inspections, 
according to Schmaedick (interview, 2007). Here, in fact, the in-house monitoring 
departments actually perform better. 
The [monitors] that are inside corporate entities [i.e., CSR departments], 
there's actually a little bit more continuity because it's the brand who's in a 
factory for a long period of time, they will continue to do assessments, 
versus Verité and SAI that will be hired to do an assessment and they'll 
just come in for a few days or week to do the assessment and then give the 
report and leave. There's not much follow-up. 
Such follow-up is often critical to fixing problems, however. “Finding violations, 
unfortunately, is almost too easy, the violations are so blatant. But the follow-up ensures 
that promises that are made are kept” (Schmaedick, interview, 2007). As we will see in 
chapter eleven, such follow-up is central to the WRC’s methodology. 
Ken Abrams* (interview, 2007), who has experience with monitoring, also 
critiqued the FLA for the fact that its monitors “interview workers inside the factory 
which hampers their ability to be candid--the managers are there watching those who are 
being interviewed. That's the standard--ninety-nine percent of all audits done by social 
control auditors are done based on interviews inside the factory.” The FLA’s official 
guidelines for its inspectors advise them to interview workers in places where they will 
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be safe from their employers’ surveillance and not to ask leading them questions. These 
guidelines, however, are both vague and suggestions only, not requirements. It appears 
that, in practice, FLA monitors rarely follow these guidelines closely (Wells 2007). Such 
lack of confidentiality leaves workers vulnerable to retaliation--being fired for instance--
should they report serious problems, a fact that managers in some plants take advantage 
of. USAS member Liana Dalton (interview, 2007) told of her experience aiding workers 
while interning in Hong Kong: 
I translated a lot of documents that [mainland Chinese] workers were 
given before the interview--Here’s the top forty questions asked by 
auditors, memorize the answers, if you answer wrong, you’re going to be 
fired. The last question is, Have you been told how to answer any of these 
questions or lied during this interview? And they’re supposed to answer 
no. I was talking to workers about that and they said the auditors come in 
and they send half of us home from work; they interview hand chosen 
workers--that kind of stuff. 
Managers, on the other hand, are given a guarantee of confidentiality by FLA inspectors, 
in a double-standard that favors the very party that is least vulnerable to retaliation 
(Esbenshade 2004b). Additionally, while FLA guidelines require that factories provide a 
means for workers to complain directly to the Association, the guidelines are again vague 
and, it would seem, ineffective or poorly implemented--the FLA has received only a 
handful of complaints directly from workers (Wells 2007). As we will see in chapter 
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eleven, this is much different than the WRC, whose monitoring program is centered 
around worker complaints. 
 Caroline Stoppard* (interview, 2007), who has experience with monitoring, told 
me, that, as one might expect, 
That kind of monitoring is just not effective at identifying what the most 
serious kind of violations are and getting them fixed. They're very good at 
finding health and safety violations, things like the floor mat should not 
have been three inches from the door; it should have been four inches 
from the door. Like the fire extinguisher is located three feet from the 
ground; it really should be four and a half feet from the ground. Maybe 
even more serious violations like machines not having certain guards. But 
they're almost never going to get to the bottom of problems to do with the 
freedom of association of workers or harassment of the workers, that they 
wouldn't talk about even if they know or are aware. And then there are all 
sorts of other problems the factories can cover up--forced overtime, 
excessive overtime--if they want to. 
In other words, the FLA performs best at finding violations of protective rights, while 
failing miserably when it comes to enabling rights. 
Stoppard (interview, 2007) went on to tell me of a report by Bureau Veritas, a for-
profit monitoring company, that her group had gotten a copy of, describing conditions in 
a coffee mug factory in China. 
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Of course the only violation they find is that there aren't enough lights by 
the exits, so they need to install more lighting by the exits. I'm sure it's a 
great thing for them to be reporting, but the fact that it's in China--I'm sure 
there are few more problems than there's not enough light by the door so 
workers can see their way out. But the best part is in the section on 
freedom of association. There's this whole two or three sentence 
explanation of their findings on freedom of association which says 
something like, “All workers without distinction have the right to form 
trade unions of their own choosing and bargain collectively.” This is in 
China--you get thrown in jail if you try to form a trade union of your own 
choosing, bargain collectively, or to form any kind of organization that's 
not sanctioned by the Communist Party. Where do they get this? Clearly, 
they didn't get that from talking to workers--that's not even the language a 
normal person would use. Clearly, they pulled it from some code of 
conduct and decided it was the right finding and put it in there. It's just a 
joke. It doesn't mean anything. That's just one report, but that's an example 
of what this kind of auditing is about, and that's, unfortunately, the 
majority of the FLA's program. 
 The inadequacy of corporate-sponsored monitoring systems--not only the FLA, 
but the major firm’s own social compliance departments--can be seen in the fact that, at 
least in some cases, the brands themselves actually have very little idea what is 
happening on the ground. Agatha Schmaedick (interview, 2007), a former WRC monitor, 
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said, “I've written stuff for Adidas before on what Indonesian law is. It's ridiculous that 
they don't know that themselves--if you've worked in the country for years and you've 
actually done business here, you should know what the investment laws are, you should 
know what the labor laws are. But we're constantly having to educate them on that.” 
Trina Tocco (interview, 2007) of the ILRF has also concluded that the problem is partly 
sheer ignorance. She said of Wal-Mart’s monitoring program,  
 They don’t do well with freedom of association, whether it’s in the US or 
elsewhere--and I’ve actually come to the conclusion that it’s really 
because they don’t understand it. They don’t get it. So it’s just spending 
some time outside of our escalation of tactics, like making sure that they 
even understand what the difference is between an independent union and 
a company union and stuff like that. […] I think that some would say that 
they were just playing with you but to me, the various people that I spoke 
to, just the questions that they were asking, I was just like, What? You say 
that you audit a couple thousand factories a year, how are you not able to 
clearly identify what’s a proper union and what’s not--freedom of 
association is on your check-list. 
Schmaedick went on to relate to me the story of an investigation the WRC had 
done of PT Panarub, a factory with which Adidas frequently did business; Adidas had 
actually invited the WRC in to mediate a conflict they were having with the international 
development NGO Oxfam. “The main issue there was the freedom of association issue 
and Adidas was pretty honest with us about the concerns they had about the union 
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situation and that they thought there were some violations around freedom of 
association.” The WRC’s investigation uncovered far more than union-busting though. 
For several years, the factory had been failing to be pay into Indonesia’s national 
healthcare and pension system, as they were legally required to do. There is also an old 
Indonesian law, rooted in traditional local mores, that allows menstruating women to take 
time off from work. Rather than simply giving women time off when they asked, as most 
factories did, PT Panarub forced the women to undergo a humiliating physical 
examination by company nurses. “When Adidas found out that this was happening they 
just freaked out and they were really shocked--they didn't want it to get out there that this 
was something that was happening for years and they didn't even know this was 
happening,” since this could severely damage their brand image (Schmaedick, interview, 
2007). Thus, even from the brands’ perspective, never mind from the anti-sweatshop 
movement’s, their monitoring programs would frequently seem to leave much to be 
desired. The disparity between the WRC’s and Adidas’s performance is all the more 
striking when one remembers that the WRC is a small non-profit with a staff of fifteen 
and Adidas is a transnational corporation that generates profits in the hundreds of 
millions of dollars a year. 
 Members of the anti-sweatshop movement do not regard the Fair Labor 
Association’s new FLA 3.0 approach as a meaningful improvement, since it involves 
looking in the wrong place for the causes of the problem. Locke, Amengual and Mangla 
(2009), in their defense of the “commitment-oriented approach,” explicitly argue that the 
inequalities in power in the global economy are not the main cause of sweatshops. It is 
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worth quoting their explanation of this position at length: 
For most apparel suppliers [i.e., contractors], individual global brands 
constitute but a small fraction of their total business (and thus of dedicated 
factory capacity), and even this is usually for only part of the year, for a 
season or two, and with no guarantee that orders will be repeated in the 
future. In this context, it is not at all clear that global buyers have the 
ability or leverage (let alone credibility) to pressure these suppliers to raise 
wages, reduce working hours, or even invest in costly improvements to 
their production systems to improve working conditions. It is an open 
secret that very few brands ever exit factories, even when they are found 
not to be in compliance with the codes of conduct. It is also well 
understood that most compliance officers have less influence than their 
purchasing or sourcing colleagues when deciding whether or not to place 
(or continue) an order with a noncompliant factory. Moreover, when 
brands do leave a factory, they lose any leverage they once had if the 
factory finds other, less-demanding clients. If the factory does go out of 
business, this penalizes both the workers and the management, and as a 
result many labor rights groups are now pressuring brands to stay with 
factories and work to remediate problems rather than exiting. All of this 
challenges the received wisdom that global brands, if only willing, are 
able to “force” their suppliers to comply with their codes of conduct (pp. 
325-326). 
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 There are several things worth noting here. First, Locke and his colleagues (2009) 
explicitly acknowledge that most brands are simply not deeply committed to enforcing 
their labor standards; their CSR programs take a distant second place (if that) to 
maximizing profits. Locke, Amengual and Mangla, however, accept this as a given, 
rather than suggesting steps that should be taken so that the core apparel companies make 
labor rights a greater priority.9 Second, in denying the importance of power inequalities 
in the global economy, they leave out two crucial issues. One, they look only at the 
relationships between companies, not focusing on the lack of power workers have to 
protect themselves in the global economy. But, according to Rodríguez-Garavito (2005) 
and Barrientos and Smith (2007), it is this inattention to workers’ lack of power in the 
form of enabling rights that vitiates the effectiveness of most monitoring efforts. 
Second, Locke and his colleagues (2009) ignore some of the important facts we 
discussed in chapter two: While contractors may sometimes be in a position to switch 
which lead apparel firms they do business with, all the brands across the board demand 
that the contractors keep costs down as much as possible--and it is this that more or less 
compels factory-owners to engage in sweatshop labor practices. They may well also be 
overestimating the independence of the contractors, many of whom operate on a shoe-
string budget and cannot necessarily afford to be selective about which brands they work 
with. As the Stanford University USAS chapter notes in its critique of the FLA 3.0 
program, “While we find it plausible that a factory, under the new system, might report 
overtime violations in order to be trained in better management skills, we see no reason 
for a factory to voluntarily admit that they force applicants to take pregnancy tests, or that 
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they refuse to allow their workers to unionize. How would factories benefit by reporting 
these problems?” (Sweat-Free Stanford Campaign 2007). The FLA 3.0 assumes good 
will on the part of factory-owners, ignoring the fact that many labor rights violations are 
quite deliberate attempts to control costs, in turn a response to the policies of the lead 
firms (Sweat-Free Stanford Campaign 2007). 
 Additionally, Locke, Amengual and Mangla (2009) elsewhere in their article 
advocating a commitment-oriented approach note it can only work if the lead apparel 
firms make a long-term commitment to the contractors they work with. While they may 
have such relationships with a few key suppliers, on the whole the brands have resisted 
forming such relationships. As we will see in chapter fifteen, USAS has explicitly pushed 
for forming such long-term relationships in its proposed Designated Suppliers Program; 
the core apparel companies are, however, deeply opposed to any such program. Locke 
and his colleagues also acknowledge that, even at their most effective, such monitoring 
program cannot stand on their own, but must also be accompanied by the “countervailing 
power” of strong unions and state regulation (see also Locke et al. 2007). As already 
noted, however, the brands tend to see monitoring as a substitute for unions; additionally, 
they have opposed strengthening any form of countervailing power to their own, whether 
state or labor union. Therefore, it seems unlikely that the apparel industry will be willing 
to create the conditions Locke and his colleagues see as necessary for a commitment-
oriented approach such as FLA 3.0 to effectively protect workers’ rights. 
 It should be noted, however, that members of the anti-sweatshop movement were 
not totally disparaging of the FLA’s efforts. Stoppard (interview, 2007) said, “They do 
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respond to complaints, which can be helpful at times, especially when the WRC is 
working on a case too and they can reach agreement with them on what the problem is. 
They usually reach agreement with the FLA on the problem. The problems are in the 
documents--it's the action [recommendation] writing that results in a disagreement. But 
it's still helpful for the WRC to have the FLA acknowledge that the same problem is 
going on.” While the WRC may be better at detecting problems, the FLA has more 
weight with the core apparel companies. If the WRC can persuade the FLA to come on 
board and bring the brands with it, then it is far easier to solve the problem, since the 
brands have far more influence with their contractors than anyone else does (Esbenshade 
2004b; Rodríguez-Garavito 2005). 
 
Corporate Power in the FLA 
 There is, of course, a good reason that the FLA has continually failed to develop 
an adequate monitoring system and why its 3.0 approach is so wildly off target in 
identifying the causes of sweatshop conditions. It is not necessarily a lack of commitment 
on the part of the FLA’s staff, at least some of whom are genuinely committed to 
workers’ rights. For instance, Auret van Heerden, who served as both director of 
monitoring and executive director for the FLA for many years, came out of a background 
as a labor activist under the apartheid regime in South Africa. While one might question 
the wisdom of the approach he has taken in working closely with the apparel industry, his 
dedication to labor issues seems to be real (Esbenshade 2004b) (Hermanson, interview, 
2007). Tocco (interview, 2007) has drawn a similar conclusion about the people in 
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companies’ in-house CSR departments: “There are individual people within these 
companies that do kind of get it at a variety of levels. But a lot of times the weakness is 
that that person is kind of put over in the CSR corner and is not given decision-making 
power to really fix some of the root problems.” Just as CSR personnel lack real power in 
most companies, it is not labor rights activists who exert the most influence in the FLA. It 
is rather the major apparel firms that sit on the Association’s board that prevent the FLA 
from being effective. 
Long-time labor activist Jeff Hermanson (interview, 2007) observed that 
[I]n their first couple of tests, or at least the first couple of big tests, in my 
opinion, the FLA actually did act honorably and effectively. […] But from 
there, it's been a decline in effectiveness--I don't want to attribute this to 
Auret, because I think Auret's an honorable guy--but I think there's been a 
decline in the honesty of the process, a lack of commitment to it by Nike. 
Duke administrator Jim Wilkerson, who was actively involved with the FLA, but 
withdrew from the organization in 2001 (later to join the WRC), expressed a similar 
sentiment: 
I personally am quite disappointed in the results achieved by the Fair 
Labor Association since 2001. They have done some good work, but I 
don't feel that they have gone after these issues aggressively enough, nor 
achieved results that lead to lasting improvements in the conditions in the 
factories and in the lives of the workers. And I feel that there over time has 
developed too much corporate influence in the Fair Labor Association, 
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which I think has contributed to a softening of its approaches towards 
remediating labor rights violations. 
The problem is that “private monitoring […] was built on irreconcilable 
contradictions. These contradictions can be summarized as follows: First, manufacturers 
[brand name companies] are in control of a program meant to discipline them; and 
second, workers are not participants in a program meant to benefit them” (Esbenshade 
2004b). The Fair Labor Association is a creature of the core apparel companies that sit on 
its board, provide much of its funding, and collectively wield veto power in decision-
making. USAS member Thomas Wheatley (interview, 2007) recalled that as soon as 
USAS members heard about the FLA and its composition, they were suspicious: “We 
were all thinking, Well, who are those people, what's that about, that doesn't sound good-
-it has corporations and the workers representatives and community groups together--but 
we don't think that corporations should be at the table.” The reason corporations should 
not be at the table is there is an inherent conflict of interest involved--the FLA essentially 
allows the corporations involved to monitor themselves, while creating a façade of 
independence. It is the corporations on the board that help set policy--and have veto 
power over policy changes. While the FLA may now hire monitors itself, instead of 
allowing member companies to do so directly, creating something of a buffer, it is still 
the member companies that help define the code of conduct to which they will be held 
and the standards for choosing which groups will be hired as monitors (Esbenshade 
2004b; Wells 2007). 
 The major apparel companies that sit on the FLA’s board have no interest in 
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reforming the system of production which causes sweatshops in the first place, since 
doing so would reduce their flexibility and increase costs; nor do they have an interest in 
a monitoring system that would enforce enabling rights, allowing workers to organize 
independently and wield some power in the workplace (Esbenshade 2004b). Schamedick 
(interview, 2007) observed, “There's still such a huge disconnect between compliance 
departments and enforcement departments. Factories that have taken strides in 
compliance and have signed path-breaking contracts with workers ensuring meaningful 
wage increases, health insurance, all compliance with local laws--often those contracts 
are not even fully in force before the factory loses all of its orders and eventually has to 
shut down or outsource the majority of its production.” This is the pattern we have 
observed before: Decent working conditions increase contractors’ cost of doing business, 
leading the apparel firms to pull out in response--even when the contractors took their 
actions to comply with the lead firms’ own codes of conduct. USAS member Molly 
McGrath (interview, 2007) said, “Time and time again the FLA still makes excuses for 
companies, in specific circumstances where it really matters, like when they close a lot of 
factories, they’ll say, Sorry, it’s the global economy. They don’t really have any real 
analysis of the fact that you can see a correlation between factories closing and whether 
or not the factory has a union.” While it is true that the global economy does, in a sense, 
force companies’ hands, they have collectively helped write the rules of the global 
economy and resisted rewriting them in a more worker-friendly fashion. 
In regard to worker empowerment, Esbenshade argues, that under the FLA and 
other such corporate-sponsored monitoring schemes, 
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the manufacturer [brand name company], which profits from the workers’ 
exploitation, is charged with eradicating that exploitation. The 
manufacturer is both the profiteer and the protector. It is precisely this 
paternalistic relationship that makes monitoring an attractive form of labor 
relations for manufacturers. It is a form in which they control--to some 
degree--both the abuse of workers’ rights and the defense of those rights. 
Workers are neither empowered nor truly protected by this system 
(2004b). 
 Brent Wood* (interview, 2007) also made pointed criticisms of those NGOs that 
continued to work with the FLA or chose to work cooperatively with major apparel firms 
in other situations. While acknowledging that they were well intentioned and often doing 
good work in other contexts, he felt their approach was a naïve one. Such joint corporate-
NGO approaches as the FLA 
are not based on exceeding the expectations of the brands and retailers set 
themselves. […] The premise which all of this goes back to is that Nike 
lacks that power [to reform conditions] in the form of being involved in 
some kind of protracted, pains-taking process to overcome the obstacles to 
compliance, those exist, and it's not Nike's fault or under their direction. 
It's ridiculous and it's an intellectual and moral failing, obviously on the 
part of the brands but also on the part of their critics that fail to recognize 
[…] that you have to distinguish between what they're willing to do and 
what they have the power to do. We shouldn't fool ourselves into thinking 
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that they don't have the power to fix the problem effectively overnight 
because they do. They choose not to because it's very profitable to produce 
under shitty conditions with very low wages. Their codes of conduct are 
primarily designed to let them continue to do that without suffering 
reputational damage that they would suffer if they didn't have some 
justification for continuing to operate in that manner. 
All this highlights some of the flaws of “multi-stakeholder” approaches such as 
the FLA. It assumes that all “stakeholders” are equal, when in fact some wield far more 
power than others, disproportionately shaping the outcome of any agreements between 
“stakeholders” (Rodríguez-Garavito 2005). It also assumes that the “stakeholders” have 
interests that can easily be reconciled, instead of recognizing the deep antagonisms built 
into social structures where power is not equally distributed. There is also the question of 
who is actually considered a “stakeholder” and invited to the negotiating table--as I have 
quoted Esbenshade (2004b) on, workers are not considered “stakeholders” in this 
process, a very odd omission when one considers that it is supposedly for their benefit. In 
agreeing to such initiatives, progressive groups, such as anti-sweatshop activists, risk 
buying into an approach that is fundamentally at odds with their goals. 
 Some of Esbenshade’s (2004b) and Seidman’s (2007) findings highlight this all 
the more. In their extensive analyses of monitoring programs, they conclude that, with a 
few honorable exceptions such as the WRC, most of them are in fact quite consistent with 
neoliberalism. Both the US and German governments have quite explicitly supported 
various monitoring schemes because such schemes are market-oriented, in keeping with 
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neoliberalism’s search for market-oriented solutions to problems caused by capitalist 
markets in the first place (Esbenshade 2004b; Seidman 2007). Rather than considering 
the monitoring and enforcement of labor regulations a public responsibility to be carried 
out by democratic governments, corporate social responsibility programs and monitoring 
bodies such as the FLA privatize the process--what Dara O’Rourke (2003) has referred to 
as the “outsourcing of regulation.” Indeed, monitoring has become a sizeable for-profit 
business, one that itself is not subject to public, democratic regulation or certification, 
allowing all sorts of firms with questionable credentials to freely engage in monitoring, 
making decent profits while producing a deeply flawed service that does little to protect 
workers (Esbenshade 2004b). 
 Even at its most effective, monitoring programs create what Pearson and Seyfang 
(2001) call “policy enclaves”--only some workers in specific industries are protected in 
them, while others remain vulnerable to exploitation. The industries that are covered are 
those must vulnerable to consumer pressure. Indeed, even within these industries, the 
coverage of workers is likely to be highly uneven. While corporate codes of conduct 
cover workers in factories, they often do not cover those workers (predominantly women) 
doing “homework”--that is, when contractors subcontract out production to people 
making goods in their own homes. Even if codes do formally cover homeworkers, in 
practice it is extremely difficult to monitor the conditions under which they work 
(Pearson and Seyfang 2001). And, since they usually work in isolation from each other, 
homeworkers would be hard pressed to form a union or other vehicle of collective action 
through which they could protect themselves, leaving them even more vulnerable to 
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exploitation. Additionally, even in an industry where consumer pressure can make a 
difference, not all companies are equally responsive to such pressure. As we will see in 
chapter fourteen, while Nike may act quickly in order to control damage to its brand 
image, a company like Hanes that has much less invested in its image may well be 
relatively indifferent to such pressure. Additionally, monitoring programs do absolutely 
nothing to protect workers outside the formal economic system, those forced to work in 
the informal sector (Pearson and Seyfang 2001). 
 Esbenshade (2004b) summarizes the problem as follows: 
Private monitoring is adapted to the globalized production system, but it 
does not challenge that system. Private monitoring accepts as given the 
industry’s production practices--such as mobility and hidden chains of 
production--and its multilayered structure, both of which foster 
sweatshops. Thus, although monitoring purports to, and may minimally, 
improve conditions for workers, it cannot systematically address the 
sweatshop problem (p. 10). 
The only long-term solution is the strengthening of both labor unions and public, 
democratic regulation of the economy, whether through local governments or some 
transnational system of enforceable labor regulation. Even the monitoring of movement-
linked programs such as the WRC still creates policy enclaves, in the WRC’s case, tied to 
college production. The critical difference is that the anti-sweatshop movement is aware 
of the limits of monitoring; its members generally advocate strong unions and public 
regulation. They have resorted to civil society-based monitoring programs because they 
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believe that, at this historical juncture, they will have an easier time changing corporate 
policy than government policy. As we will discuss in the conclusion though, they hope 
that over the long run their activism will lead to changes in public policy as well, leading 
to a more worker-friendly regulatory system. 
 
The FLA as a Corporate Counter-Framing 
 If the Fair Labor Association and similar programs largely fail to improve 
conditions for workers, they do succeed in another way--countering the success that the 
anti-sweatshop movement had had early on in framing the issue of sweatshops in the 
national mass media. Indeed, it seems likely that this latter purpose, not eliminating labor 
abuses, was the primary aim of apparel companies such as Nike and Reebok in 
developing corporate social responsibility programs and supporting the FLA. Wood 
(interview, 2007) argued, 
You have to understand how corporations function. The goal of the 
corporation is to maximize shareholder returns. It is recognized within the 
corporation on the part of the decision-makers that doing that requires 
protecting, extending and bolstering the brand image, if you're a sports 
apparel brand. When there is a threat to the brand image the corporation 
has to respond, not for moral reasons, not for reasons of pride, but because 
it has to respond in order to carry out its function. Deciding that it has to 
respond, the corporation, for the same reasons, will try to find the least 
expensive, least difficult, least costly in every respect, method for 
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responding. It will choose the path of least resistance. 
The path of least resistance is corporate social responsibility programs such as the 
FLA--programs which do not fundamentally alter the structure of the apparel industry, 
particularly the pattern of contracting out production for the lowest possible cost that is 
the main driving force behind sweatshops. Wood (interview, 2007) continued, 
The brands are interested in solving their [public relations] problems. If 
they could solve the workers’ problems at the same time at no cost, they 
would because, why not, it would be safer. But there is a substantially 
larger cost in solving workers’ problems than there is solving the brands’ 
problems. Not surprisingly, they chosen a path which allows them to solve 
their problems without, in fact, solving workers’ problems, which would 
require more change and more expense and more hassle. 
Based on his experience with both the FLA and WRC, Wilkerson (interview, 2007) has 
concluded that the leadership of the major apparel firms know that their programs are 
largely ineffective. When the brands ask their contractors to sign onto codes of conduct, 
“the factories as a matter of survival say, We'll do it--we will adhere to the code of 
conduct. And the companies know that the factories cannot adhere to the code of conduct 
standards for the price that the companies have dictated to the factory. It's a bait and 
switch. It's a PR game.” 
What is worth noting here is that, in a sense, the movement has been successful, 
in that they have forced the industry to respond. They have changed the nature of the 
decisions that are made within the social arenas constituted by the major apparel 
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corporations, pressuring them to shift their strategy. The brands’ original response to the 
rise of the anti-sweatshop movement was to deny there was a sweatshop problem. When 
they could no longer credibly do so, they denied that they were responsible, since they 
were not the actual employers of the workers being exploited and had no way of knowing 
what was going on within the factories they did business with (Klein 1999). Progressive 
journalist Naomi Klein reports the challenge Disney’s spokesman Ken Green gave to one 
journalist: “‘We don’t employ anyone in Haiti,’ he said […]. ‘With the newsprint you 
use, do you have any idea of the labour conditions involved to produce it?’ Green 
demanded of Cathy Majtenyi of the Catholic Register” (1999). Scott Nova of the WRC 
(interview, 2007) observed to me, “When brands tell you today how committed they are 
in respect to the rights of workers you always have to remember that it wasn't that far in 
the past when they had exactly the opposite position. […] That was their position and it 
did not work. It didn't protect Nike's reputation. Consumers did not buy it. They were not 
persuaded by the logic and it took the brands a while to realize that.” Thus, at least 
briefly, the anti-sweatshop movement forced the core apparel firms on the defensive, 
until the brands realized they needed to shift gears. 
Unfortunately, the switch to emphasizing their corporate social responsibility 
programs proved a successful line of attack for the apparel industry. It is important to 
remember that the initial victory that the movement won in the discursive arena of the 
national mass media was an unusual one. They mass media is not an even playing field, 
but one where major corporations have a tremendous advantage over movements. This is 
not simply because corporations have more resources with which to try to shape the 
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coverage of the issue, though that is a large factor. There is also the fact that most 
reporters and editors--the people who ultimately decide which frames will be featured in 
the news and which will be marginalized or ignored--have been socialized in such a way, 
including through their training as journalists, to accord corporations and other powerful 
social actors more standing or legitimacy than they do more marginal groups, such as 
social movements (Ferree et al. 2002; Gitlin 1980; Ryan 1991). While the sensational 
nature of the initial exposés of sweatshops may have allowed activists to persuade 
journalists that they had something newsworthy to say, ultimately, journalists were 
inclined to believe the brands once they came up with a credible response to the 
movement’s critique. 
Here it is worth recalling Seidman’s (2007) arguments about the often deceptive 
nature of corporate monitoring programs, which can create the illusion of an effective 
commitment to ending sweatshops when there is no such commitment. Indeed, in the 
experience of some of my interviewees, they can create such an illusion even when it is 
clear that CSR programs are not actually working. As I quoted one activist arguing 
above, the brands depict the problem of sweatshops as an intractable one, for which they 
are not actually responsible. This framing of the problem has proved quite successful for 
the apparel industry. UNITE staff person Eric Dirnbach (interview, 2007) observed, 
Just issuing a report talking about the code of conduct and all the factory 
monitoring really does a lot to reassure reporters and the public that 
they're trying. And folks will be like, OK, I understand they haven’t 
solved all the problems, but they're trying. You know, it looks like they're 
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trying. The Gap puts out a report every year now or every two years, they 
do thousands of factory monitorings a year, they have ninety people in 
their social compliance program, with a VP as head of social compliance 
[…]. They have folks in dozens of countries, they're issuing reports, 
they're candid about what's wrong--I mean, it looks like they're trying. Yet 
if you go to the factories and take a look at what's going on, you see the 
same problems. I think the industry has done a good job of placating the 
public and the media--that's what we have to figure out how to get past. 
Given the credulous attitude most journalists hold towards corporations, figuring out how 
to get past this framing is no easy matter.  
 The major apparel firms do not simply use CSR as a generalized defensive frame 
against the anti-sweatshop movement, but in fighting the movement in specific cases as 
well. They deploy the CSR frame strategically in particular conflicts with the anti-
sweatshop movement in order to counter individual allegations of labor abuses. 
Esbenshade notes, “Liz Claiborne and Kathy Lee Gifford, for example, both used their 
monitors’ findings to publicly repudiate workers’ reports of violations. […] Companies 
such as Nike, the Gap, and Guess send information to consumers, investors, those who 
have signed petitions against them, and the like, proclaiming their progressive labor 
practices based on their monitoring programs” (2004b). 
 To some extent, United Students Against Sweatshops has managed to circumvent 
the dominance of the industry’s framing in the national mass media by waging their 
battles in the discursive arena of the college campus. But, of course, it is not as if their 
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audiences there are isolated from the national mass media. As noted in the last chapter, 
USAS has to deal with the pervasiveness of consumer culture on college campuses and 
the resulting valorization of the brands among students. It is not just students who buy the 
corporate framing hook, line and sinker though--the college administrators whose 
decisions activists must shape frequently also buy into it. Stoppard (interview, 2007) told 
me, in some frustration, of her experiences in meeting with administrators who had been 
won over by the industry: 
Go to these meetings at universities and you can guarantee that one of 
these administrators is going to stand up and say, "I think we agree that we 
all--the university, USAS, the brands, and the WRC--have the same goals. 
We just disagree about the strategy for implementing them." I'm like, "Are 
you kidding? You think USAS and Nike have the same goals? I can't 
believe this." And they've gotten people to say this. But administrators 
will almost always put the brands and the WRC on the same playing field. 
They claim "It's a dispute over the facts--we need to get to the bottom of 
the facts." They're not thinking, "Nike's making money off of abusing 
workers' rights and has everything to lose if that's revealed, whereas WRC 
has no financial stake in the outcome. Maybe the WRC's right." [The 
brands] have a lot of allies. They have some credibility among the 
audiences we need to convince of our positions. 
 Despite the frustrations of activists though, the shift in the apparel firms’ framing 
strategy is an important one. In acknowledging their responsibility for working conditions 
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in their contractors’ factories and setting up their own codes of conduct, the brands have 
made themselves vulnerable in certain ways they were not before. When a factory used 
by a brand is caught clearly violating the brand’s own code of conduct, activists can 
highlight this hypocrisy. This can prove very useful in solidarity campaigns with workers 
struggling in sweatshops (Esbenshade 2004b)--a topic we will return to in chapters 
twelve through fourteen. But first we must examine the creation and operations of the 
Worker Rights Consortium. 
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 Having analyzed why exactly the US anti-sweatshop movement finds the Fair 
Labor Association so problematic, we can now look in depth into the process by which 
they responded to its formation. This process produced the Worker Rights Consortium, a 
genuinely independent monitoring organization, whose creation proved to be a significant 
strategic innovation. As with the UNITE staff asking their student interns to look into 
campus procurement as a possible point of leverage over the apparel industry, it seems 
that the activists involved did not necessarily start out expecting to craft such an 
innovation. According to Eric Brakken (interview, 2007), USAS’s first staff person, the 
WRC was originally simply a paper proposal, meant as a conceptual alternative to the 
FLA, but it came to take on a life of its own as it became the focal point of the 
movement’s response to the Association and the apparel industry. Sometimes social 
movement innovation is a deliberate process, sometimes a haphazard one. The launching 
of the student campaign for campus codes of conduct was a bit of both--veterans of the 
movement at UNITE were deliberately experimenting with various potential points of 
leverage, but the way the student movement took off and its impact seems to have been 
unplanned and unexpected (if not unwelcome). The creation and launching of the WRC 
was also simultaneously haphazard and deliberate. This was not something activists 
initially planned to do, but something they did in response to new obstacles, specifically 
the rise of the FLA and other CSR programs. Responding to new obstacles, however, 
seems to be a frequent source of innovation in movements. And once the movement 
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decided to respond to this move by the apparel industry, they quite deliberately and 
carefully crafted their response, bringing together many activists to plan and coordinate 
the creation of this new organization. 
 One thing that is important to note here is that the movement is not simply 
innovating in isolation. Rather, the creation of the WRC was part of a larger series of 
moves and counter-moves by the movement and the industry: The movement generated a 
series of media scandals for the apparel sector, then launched a new variant of the anti-
corporate campaign, trying to use college licensing agreements as a way to exert pressure 
over the lead apparel companies. The companies in their turn responded first by denying 
their responsibility for sweatshops, then creating a semblance of action through their CSR 
programs, including the FLA; in doing so, they hoped to undermine the power of the 
movement’s framing. The anti-sweatshop movement responded in their turn, creating a 
new monitoring organization with which to counter the companies’ CSR programs and 
the FLA. Like a chess game, each actor responds to the other’s actions. Unlike a chess 
game, however, each side does not start with even control of the board or with the same 
number of pieces. In the social world, the board--the field of play--is structured in such a 
way as to favor one player (in this case, the apparel industry). And the end goal is to 
change the nature of the game, so the layout of the board and the rules of the game (the 
social structure) and the distribution of playing pieces (resources) are not so unevenly 
tilted, so that those who started out with less power have more at the end of the struggle. 
 The anti-sweatshop movement--or any other movement--faces two major 
challenges in dealing with the uneven field of play. One is seeking points of leverage that 
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will allow them to turn the rules of the game to their favor, ways they can manipulate the 
social structure to exert power over their foes. We have explored this in chapter seven 
and will return to it in chapter thirteen. The other challenge is deal with their relative lack 
of resources. Marshall Ganz (2000, 2009) argues that, to counter this unequal distribution 
of resources, movements must be resourceful, seeking to outwit their opponents and look 
for their vulnerabilities, places where they can undermine their legitimacy and/or exercise 
structural leverage over them. To do so, a movement organization or network must have a 
high degree of strategic capacity--the ability to strategize creatively, based on a clear 
understanding of the social terrain in which they are operating. As discussed in chapter 
four, consensus as a process fosters innovation by fostering debate about ideas and 
forcing people to come to creative solutions for resolving disagreements (Ganz 2000, 
2009; Polletta 2002). As we will see below, in planning their response to the FLA, the 
anti-sweatshop movement used such a consensus process, fostering the resourcefulness 
they needed to generate the innovation of the WRC and counter the apparel industry’s 
latest move in the form of the FLA. 
 
Innovation in Action: Crafting the WRC 
 The student anti-sweatshop had really begun to take off in the 1997-1998 school 
year, with the first national student anti-sweatshop conference happening in July 1998. 
They continued their campaign for codes of conduct, including requirements for public 
disclosure of factories, in the 1998-1999 school year. The FLA’s founding was 
announced in November 1998; schools began joining it as a means to deal with student 
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demands in January 1999. USAS was not officially founded until July 1999, but, even 
before then, the network of student anti-sweatshop groups, and their allies in the labor 
and human rights communities, was strong enough that they began to strategize how they 
would respond to the creation of the FLA and the decision by many schools to join it. 
USAS member Jess Champagne (interview, 2007) spoke to the student group’s 
main motivation for creating the WRC: 
We felt that it was clear to have something clear to offer to universities 
that would counter-balance [the FLA]. They [school officials] would say, 
Well, every university can't have its own code of conduct, how about we 
support this, the brands aren't going to want to follow it if it comes from 
us, there's going to be too many codes, you have to tell us who's going to 
monitor it, if you don't get anyone that would monitor this, etc. So, we had 
to have answers to those questions. And the universities were telling us 
that they were going to join the FLA, which we thought that the more 
universities joined, the more effective it would be in covering up what was 
actually happening on the ground. So we decided that we needed to make 
a clear alternative that would bring universities together, that would have 
an impact on sweatshops. 
Thus, USAS was spurred to create the WRC first and foremost out of fear of what the 
consequences would be if the FLA became the only game in town in terms of monitoring 
the production of college apparel. 
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 It is likely, however, that, even without the formation of the FLA, the student anti-
sweatshop movement would eventually have been pushed to create something like the 
WRC. As discussed in chapter three, the movement had already begun experimenting 
with independent monitoring as a means of keeping companies in check, though the first 
such monitor organization, GMIES, produced mixed results. USAS member Thomas 
Wheatley (interview, 2007) recalls, “At the beginning we were really focused on 
disclosure. [We thought] we just needed to have the names of the factory, that if we had 
the names of those factories, people all over the world would bring up the list and look up 
those factories” and then undertake the monitoring and investigations themselves. Local 
labor rights groups were not likely, however, to get easy access to the places they wanted 
to inspect simply because the factory was on a list that said it was producing for certain 
colleges that had codes of conduct. Factory owners would have little incentive to admit 
such groups to their facilities, particularly if they did have something to hide. USAS’s 
various organizational mentions--UNITE, the National Labor Committee, Global 
Exchange, the People of Faith Network, Sweatshop Watch, the Campaign for Labor 
Rights, USLEAP, and the Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility, among others--
saw the problems with the approach of leaving monitoring to local groups more clearly 
sooner than the students did. Wheatley (interview, 2007) said, “The more we dug into it, 
the more we understood, the more students went to visit, did research, the more 
information we got from our allies in the movement, Nikki [Bas of Sweatshop Watch], 
Medea [Benjamin of Global Exchange], Charlie [Kernaghan of the NLC] and other folks 
saying, This is great, but what are you going to do next, how are you going to do this? 
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We need to talk about how we enforce these codes. This is really fabulous, 
congratulations, kids, now comes the hard part.” 
The WRC thus represented an alternative to the FLA, but attempts by individual 
schools to monitor the implementation of their codes of conduct--something no school 
had the resources or expertise to actually do properly, the size of the undertaking being 
simply too large for even the wealthiest universities. Eric Dirnbach (interview, 2007) of 
UNITE noted the important ways in which the WRC was conceptually different than the 
previous approach towards monitoring that USAS had taken, based only on schools’ 
individual codes of conduct: 
The WRC was going to be this collective, multi-university effort, roughly 
a common code of conduct and a common way of doing things, that was 
not at all industry-dominated and would be able to present a stronger, 
more unified front against the egregious sweatshop labor practices that 
were happening. So it started to get more away from individual efforts at 
universities--just pass your own code of conduct, do you own thing--to 
join the WRC, pay your dues money and become part of this collective 
effort. 
The Consortium, by pooling the resources of member schools, would have the ability to 
monitor the implementation of their codes in a way no school could have managed on its 
own, even on the part of those schools such as Duke that were serious about doing so. 
The formation of the FLA and its partnership with commercial and quasi-
commercial monitoring outfits only gave USAS and its allies further concern about the 
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viability of an approach based on individual codes of conduct. USAS member Laura 
McSpedon (interview, 2007) said, 
We were realizing there were plenty of independent monitors who we 
wouldn't want enforcing this code and we needed to help create a body 
that would bring together the folks in countries who were on our side who 
could do that monitoring. [The WRC] grew out of, Okay, now we have a 
bunch of places that have said, Here's our code, we need an independent 
monitor, and we should create one that's an option besides the 
questionable agencies that were out there. 
USAS believed that by designing an alternative to the FLA that was truly an independent 
monitoring organization, they could undermine the FLA’s legitimacy. Such an alternative 
would also strengthen the position of the anti-sweatshop movement, both in the framing 
contest that was on-going in the national media and in bargaining with college 
administrators. If they didn’t want colleges to join the FLA, USAS had to be able to 
present journalists and school officials with another option. 
 The process of designing the WRC involved consultations between a wide range 
of groups in the anti-sweatshop movement, working more or less through consensus. 
Brakken (interview, 2007) noted that, “By this time the students were the thing that was 
going forward with the anti-sweatshop movement, we were the group that all the other 
anti-sweatshop groups were paying attention to. We were the grassroots energy 
happening around the country.” Thus, USAS had many allies who wanted to work 
closely with them in designing their response to the FLA. We will, however, see this 
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pattern of a wide range of groups working together repeatedly as the movement makes 
important decisions, whether in how to coordinate a campaign in support of workers at a 
particular factory, or in designing future strategic innovations, such as the Designated 
Suppliers Program. Having such a wide range of groups involved--and thus people with a 
wide range of knowledge and experience--strengthened the movement’s strategic 
capacity (cf. Ganz 2000, 2009), facilitating their ability to innovate creatively as they 
designed the Consortium. 
 The people, both students and veteran anti-sweatshop activists, involved in 
crafting the Worker Rights Consortium held a series of conference calls (paid for by 
UNITE) and also met face-to-face immediately before USAS’s founding conference in 
July 1999 (Brakken, Wheatley; interviews, 2007). Like any large group of people, there 
were tensions and rivalries between some of the groups involved. According to Brakken 
(interview, 2007), “That [July] conference […] became a place for those who were critics 
of the FLA, despite their internal divisions, to hash things out. With us. A place where 
they could talk with each other--they wanted to be at our table.” The relationship between 
the student wing of the movement and the veteran activists was a complex one. The 
veterans clearly respected the students and tried to allow them their independence and 
initiative; at the same time, these activists were USAS’s organizational mentors, 
providing essential information and insights to them. USAS member Nick Reville 
(interview, 2007) recalls, the more experienced activists 
were trying to take sort of a backseat role because they didn't want to be 
seen as dominating student movements, they wanted the students to have 
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autonomy. But, in a lot of cases, they were the people that we were getting 
our information from. How do we even know what's happening in these 
countries? We know through other organizations […] we needed those 
groups, we needed their professional expertise, we needed their 
understanding of what are we trying to do. 
Wheatley (interview, 2007) recalls Steve Weingarten of UNITE and Kate Pfordresher of 
the People of Faith Network as being particularly central in these discussions. 
One thing worth noting is, at this stage, the groups involved were all US-based. 
The workers who USAS sought to act in solidarity with were not directly involved in 
designing the WRC. All of the more established groups, however, had extensive contacts 
with labor unions and labor rights in the Global South; drawing on these ties, they were 
able to relay the concerns and priorities of third-world activists to the USAS members 
involved in designing the WRC. USAS member Laura McSpedon (interview, 2007) told 
me, “I just remember feeling that the NGO partners--like Global Exchange, the National 
Labor Committee and Sweatshop Watch--they were the people with the relationships on 
the ground in other countries--and that was the key to making this happen.” At the same 
time, some individual USAS members did have their own ties to groups representing 
sweatshop workers. Alyssa Caine* (interview, 2007), a USAS member from Haverford 
College, said, 
There are some people in USAS that had there own relationships--Marion 
Traub-Werner took [two years] off and worked for STITCH [a group 
building bridges between women workers in Central America and the US] 
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and so she had contacts. […] Miriam [Joffe-Block] really helped forge a 
lot of the relationships in Thailand, as a USAS activist who got a Fulbright 
and spent time there. Agatha [Schmaedick] was again a USASer, who 
spoke Bahasa Indonesian and decided to go to Indonesia and had some 
relationships there. 
Despite this, USAS had no institutional ties with groups in the Global South. As we shall 
see in chapter fourteen, this changed as the movement grew--USAS would develop close, 
consistent ties with groups abroad and these groups would come to be more directly 
involved in future planning by USAS and its allies. 
 As one might expect, given the circumstances, the discussion among anti-
sweatshop activists as they designed the WRC was very much shaped by the FLA, in the 
sense that the WRC emerged out of critiques of the FLA. The most obvious aspect of this 
is the firm belief of all the groups involved that corporations should have no role in the 
governance or funding of the WRC--otherwise it could hardly be called independent. 
Their critique of the FLA also shaped the way they designed the monitoring program--
specifically, what they call the “fire alarm” model of monitoring (which we will look at 
more closely in the next chapter). According to Brakken (interview, 2007), 
One of the things the FLA wanted to do, they actually wanted to put a tag 
on the clothing saying it was sweatshop-free or FLA-approved. […] The 
debate within the anti-sweatshop movement around the FLA was whether 
a label would actually work, could a product actually be certified 
sweatshop-free. […] So I think part of the framework of the WRC came 
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out of the [realization that] there's thousands of factories around the world, 
we're a limited organization, we're never going to be able to have a 
permanent presence that would actually be able to certify these factories. 
[…] The WRC was […] primarily set up to respond to workers complaints 
and to be reactive, instead of pro-active. I think that was a result of those 
early debates. 
One thing that is noteworthy is that no one I interviewed mentioned GMIES or other 
existing attempts at creating independent monitoring programs as an influence on their 
discussions. This is not to say that it had no influence--it may well be that some of 
USAS’s mentor organizations had the successes and failings of GMIES and like 
programs in mind when they gave their advice. The prime influence in the development 
of the WRC’s monitoring approach, however, seems to have been the negative one of the 
FLA, with the fire alarm model designed in direct response to many of the FLA’s obvious 
problems. 
 The use of a deliberative, participatory process not only fostered a better design 
for a monitoring organization, it also fostered the ideological development of those 
involved. Brakken (interview, 2007) said that for him and many of the others involved, 
particularly students, but also their NGO partners, 
Going through some of those questions, it definitely changed my 
worldview around. I hadn't really thought about the long-term vision of 
how people would be empowered. The question isn't whether American 
consumers are going to be able to dictate the needs of the apparel workers 
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in China or El Salvador, the questions are whether Salvadoran or Chinese 
workers have their own needs which need to be dealt with and need a good 
way to deal with that stuff. At that point at time, for some people, it was a 
little bit of a learning curve. […] It definitely affected a lot of students' 
worldviews. 
What Brakken and the others involved in designing the WRC ultimately concluded was 
that the end goal was not simply to create a US-based monitoring organization, but 
creating an organization that could help foster “a permanent organization of workers who 
could monitor [the factory] themselves on a day-to-day basis--that's called a union” 
(Brakken, interview, 2007). This was a question which “wasn't just students [one] that 
had to grapple with, it was the other organizations too, they had to do it too” (Brakken, 
interview, 2007). 
Over the course of these discussions, the participants developed a “white paper” 
that “outlined a case for why [the WRC] was necessary, a case for why this was possible, 
and some principles, like monitors ought to be independent, they ought to be within or 
connected to the local community, and workers ought to be interviewed off-site and those 
kind of things” (Wheatley, interview, 2007). On October 19, 1999, they made this white 
paper and the Worker Rights Consortium public, calling on all colleges and universities 
to withdraw from the Fair Labor Association and join the Consortium (Greenhouse 
1999c). They planned to hold the WRC’s founding conference in April of 2000. In 
January 2000, the anti-sweatshop network hired Maria Roeper (interview, 2007) as the 
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WRC’s first staff person, charged with the task of actually bringing the organization to 
life before the April convention.  
 
The Campaign for the WRC 
 Simply because the Worker Rights Consortium was potentially a better 
monitoring organization than the FLA did not mean schools were going to automatically 
sign up to it. As discussed in chapter four, most school administrators have close relations 
with major corporations through interlocking boards of directors. They also value their 
commercial contracts with corporations such as Nike and Reebok and were loath to 
offend them by such actions as signing onto an organization designed by some of their 
most vocal critics. USAS member Caroline Stoppard* (interview, 2007) noted, “It was 
something that was proposed by student activists; and universities were being asked to 
commit tens of thousands of dollars to an organization that was basically designed to go 
around and embarrass their business partners that had sweatshop conditions in their 
factories--but somehow we got them to do it.” Another obstacle, as we saw in the last 
chapter, is that many school administrators seem to genuinely believe that the major 
apparel firms are sincerely interested in ending the sweatshop exploitation of workers and 
that it is important to work cooperatively with them in doing so. 
USAS therefore was going to have to pressure the leaders of their schools to sign 
on to an alternative approach, using the same confrontational tactics as were necessary to 
get schools to adopt codes of conduct in the first place. The 1999-2000 school year was 
thus marked by another wave of intensive student activism, again culminating in a wave 
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of sit-ins in the spring semester. According to Caine (interview, 2007), “students took 
that founding conference as an opportunity for their campaign. They built sit-ins and 
hunger strikes and all that stuff around the founding conference, saying, We want our 
colleges and universities to join the Worker Rights Consortium before the founding 
conference. It became a kind of deadline.” It was also intended as an incentive to the 
schools, since if they took part in the conference, they could play some role in shaping 
the WRC (Caine, interview, 2007). 
 As noted above, the network of people involved in designing the WRC met with 
each other right before USAS’s official founding conference in July 1999 in Washington, 
DC. According to Caine (interview, 2007), the hope was that USAS would officially 
adopt the WRC at this conference, even though at this point the WRC was still under 
development and didn’t even have a name (some of the early proposals included the 
Worker Empowerment Licensing Accountability Plan and Rights Consortium Inter-
Continental). 
We developed a cadre of USAS people who understand [the WRC] and 
then they called basically everybody and talked to them and basically 
convinced them that this was the plan we would have to adopt. […] 
Because even though USAS initiated the process and students were 
involved in creating it, it wasn’t all of USAS. There was no membership 
support for it necessarily. So the initial hope was that USAS conference 
would happen and everyone could adopt it. We didn’t actually have 
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anything for people to adopt other than, Yes, we’re going to support this 
alternative plan (Caine, interview, 2007). 
Although USAS did agree to officially align itself with the WRC and campaign 
for it, this did not happen without debate. The FLA had been trying to entice USAS to 
join the Association by offering them one of the NGO seats on the board (Esbenshade 
2004b). There was a minority who advocated joining the FLA, not because they thought 
it would work, but, according to Brakken (interview, 2007), because they “thought it 
would be a fine position to join the organization and then we quit if we could show that 
we couldn't change it.” There were two arguments against this: First, that some of 
USAS’s close allies such as UNITE and ICCR had already quite publicly resigned from 
and condemned the FLA (Brakken, interview, 2007); second, that if USAS joined the 
Association, it would only lend legitimacy to the organization without bringing about any 
meaningful change (Esbenshade 2004b). After extensive debate, the USAS members 
present at the conference voted on the issue, with the majority choosing to support the 
WRC and reject the FLA and only a small group of roughly seven people voting in favor 
of the FLA (Brakken, interview, 2007). It is noteworthy that, in all the interviews I 
conducted, this is the only time that anyone mentioned making a decision by majority 
vote as opposed to consensus--a sign both of the contentiousness of the issue inside 
USAS and the strong culture of making decisions by consensus within the movement. 
In a sign of how disconcerting USAS’s decision was for the establishment--and 
the degree to which the Clinton administration was invested in the FLA--the White 
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House got in touch with USAS, hoping to persuade them to reverse their decision. 
Brakken (interview, 2007) told me: 
After that conference, […] I got home […] back to Madison--I had just 
been hired to be the first staff person for USAS, I'm trying to get all my 
stuff together, figure out where I was going to move, and we got a call 
from the top economic advisor at the White House, inviting us to a 
meeting at the White House to convince us to work with them and not 
against them. They called this federation meeting, I went back to DC, I 
called a bunch of students and there were probably eight or ten students 
that went. They [the Clinton administration] brought a couple of human 
rights groups that were signed onto the FLA into the meeting. They said, 
You can come in and change this […]. We had this pretty good theatre set 
up in the meeting, where we all pulled out a list of questions, many of the 
problems of the FLA, and put them on the table and said, This should 
never have been signed. 
Having committed themselves to the WRC, members of USAS had to figure out 
how to get their colleges’ administrations to do the same. They used the same range of 
tactics and the same strategy of escalation that they had used in their campaigns for the 
codes of conduct over the previous two school years. They had the problem, however, of 
convincing their administrators to join an organization that, unlike the FLA, did not 
actually exist and had no significant financial backing. According to Reville (interview, 
2007), “It was this bootstrapping thing--how do you go from nothing to something? We 
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needed schools to sign on, but they wanted to sign on to something. So we were basically 
trying to convince them to sign onto this document that nobody had signed onto--it was 
like agreeing to join an organization that didn't exist. It was kind of a funny situation but 
we had to do that in order for it to start existing.” One seemingly simple measure that 
Reville and another student at Brown University, Will Schachterly, took was to set up a 
website for the WRC. According to Reville (interview, 2007), “That was a way of 
creating some sense of reality, of existence for the organization. […] It gave kids 
something to show. Back then, websites were still kind of mysterious, so it seemed like, 
Oh, if it has a website, it must be real.” 
The first school to officially join the WRC was, in fact, Reville’s (interview, 
2007) own school, Brown University. This struggle had actually begun in the spring of 
the previous school year, when students began pressing school president E. Gordon Gee, 
a conservative who did not fit in well with liberal Brown, according to Reville, to 
withdraw from the FLA. “We went to them and said, Okay, here's the issues we have 
with the FLA--we want you to withdraw. And then we said, Okay, how about if they 
don't make improvements on these issues in the next six months, then we'll withdraw. 
And I think we said that because we felt like we did not have an alternative to offer, so 
just saying, Let's pull out, was not as credible as that might be. And so they agreed to” the 
six month test period. Of course, after six months, the FLA had not improved at all--but 
Reville and the other Brown USAS members now had the proposal for the WRC to 
present as an alternative. The Brown students used Gee’s promise to withdraw from the 
FLA and the threat of a sit-in as leverage to force him to come to an agreement. They 
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settled on a compromise, where Brown would remain in the FLA, but also join the WRC 
(Reville, interview, 2007). Gee made this public on October 19, 1999, the same day the 
anti-sweatshop network officially released the WRC white paper, inviting schools to join 
(Marklein 1999). 
Within USAS, the compromise the Brown students struck with their 
administration was controversial. Reville (interview, 2007) said, 
I think there were a lot of people at other schools that thought that was a 
bad idea and felt that it furthermore set a bad precedent. I guess I didn't 
really agree. To me it seemed like it was much more important to get 
schools into the WRC rather than getting them out of the FLA. Even if 
you got all the schools that had USAS chapters out of the FLA, you still 
would have had a bunch of random schools in it--and it would still have 
that legitimacy of having schools in it. […] I still really think that we did 
the right thing because it was the best that we could have gotten at the 
time from Brown. And I think getting that first school on was crucially 
important--it's not clear what would have happened if we hadn't gotten on 
there, because I know that a lot of schools used us as an example and 
relied on us in order to get their school to sign on. I think especially being 
able to take advantage of this Ivy League cachet, that was always 
something that helped other schools. 
The first few colleges and universities to join the WRC after Brown were also 
small, Ivy League schools. By mid-February 2000, in addition to Brown, only Bard 
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College, Loyola University in New Orleans, and Haverford College had also signed on 
(O'Neill 2000). While their Ivy League status lent the WRC legitimacy, they had little 
clout with the brands, because their licensing programs were either small or non-existent, 
instead having only procurement programs. What the movement needed as a next step 
was for some of the major sports schools to sign on. On February 15, 2000, USAS 
chapters on many campuses began to systematically step up the pressure on their 
administrators. As a result, they netted their first three big sports schools--the Universities 
of Indiana, Michigan and Wisconsin--Madison. This did not happen without significant 
confrontation--it took sit-ins at Michigan and Wisconsin and the threat of one in Indiana 
(backed up by news reports of sit-ins elsewhere) to get the schools’ administrators to 
agree (Caine, Stoppard; interviews, 2007). According to Caine (interview, 2007), “The 
administrators talked together and they then affiliated with the WRC at the same, all 
together. I think it was fear of going alone and going up against Nike specifically and the 
fact those Big Ten schools were able to join together, I think made it possible for them 
join. So that was a big boost to the credibility of the [WRC].” 
The degree of conflict at schools over the question of joining the WRC varied 
considerably. Some schools with progressive traditions, like Haverford College--where 
Caine was a student--joined without much of a struggle. Haverford had an official 
Committee on Investment and Social Responsibility (CISR), the result of a campus 
movement to divest from apartheid South Africa in the 1980s, which allows for some 
institutionalized student voice at the school. Caine and other USAS members brought 
their arguments for joining the WRC before the Committee, which then created a 
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subcommittee, including USAS members, to look at the matter. The sub-committee 
concluded that the WRC would indeed be a better monitor than the FLA. President Tom 
Tritton followed their recommendations and on December 23, 1999, Haverford officially 
became the third school to join the WRC (Grigo 2000) (Caine, interview, 2007). 
At the other extreme was the University of Pennsylvania. Penn’s USAS chapter 
had given school president Judith Rodin a February 1, 2000 deadline to withdraw from 
the FLA. When she missed it, fifteen or so students sat-in on February 7th, in order to 
press her not only to withdraw from the FLA but also to join the WRC (Bruch 2000). As 
the sit-in went on, more students joined, swelling their ranks to thirty. A week after the 
action started, on February 14th, not having reached an agreement with Rodin, the 
students escalated their actions even further by going on a forty-eight hour hunger strike 
(Snyder 2000b). The next day, Rodin conceded to one of the students’ demands and 
agreed to withdraw from the FLA, while compromising on the other demand and 
promising to study the issue of joining the WRC (Snyder 2000a). The following school 
year, Penn did in fact join the WRC (Featherstone and United Students Against 
Sweatshops 2002). 
As USAS’s one staff person and professional organizer, Brakken (interview, 
2007), said, 
That whole year, I was pretty much driving around the country trying to 
help students get to the point where they were ready to call the question on 
their schools with direct action. It was kind of a fun year. That wave of sit-
ins really forced universities into the WRC and helped to create this new 
  237 
thing--the idea of institutionalizing some of the gains. The commitment 
from the universities was that they were going to put money into this 
organization, commit their licensees to be monitored by this organization. 
The whole thing had been drawn from this draft document--it was sort of 
unreal. 
Between January and the April founding conference, “we went from three to forty-four 
schools” (Roeper, interview, 2007), with the ten-school University of California system 
affiliating with the WRC the day before the conference. 
Even more than in the 1997-1999 campaign for codes of conduct, coordination 
between campuses was important in the drive for the WRC. Molly McGrath (interview, 
2007), a USAS member at UW--Madison, recalled, 
I remember when we did our sit-in in Madison, we were in direct 
communication and coordination with Indiana University and Michigan 
the whole time. My friends made fun of me because when I was with 
them, I was on my cell phone. There’s pictures of it. Pretty much the 
whole time we were coordinating with these other universities. And the 
leaders of those universities did the same thing back. In that way there’s 
just more pressure because there’s more people who are trying to put out 
fires and there’s more sense of urgency from the university administrators. 
It becomes a bigger and bigger deal and […] causing trouble all over the 
place and newspapers pick up on it and people hear about it--it becomes 
more interesting. 
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Unlike the code of conduct campaign, the USAS chapters were not simply working to get 
their individual school administrations to adopt individual programs, even if the actions 
at each school influenced each other. Instead, the campaigns on individual campuses 
clearly joined together to form a relatively unified national campaign. Campus USAS 
chapters were not simply sharing strategic information, but working to get their schools 
to join a common program, which would not work if there was not a critical mass of 
membership. The campaign for the WRC represented a step up from the campaign from 
codes of conduct in terms of both strategic goals and strategic coordination. 
Neither the FLA nor the apparel industry reacted positively or passively to these 
developments. Their primary response was to try to frame the issue in a way that allowed 
them to maintain the moral high ground both in the mass media and with college and 
university officials. While representing themselves as respectful of the students’ efforts, 
various groups affiliated with the FLA argued that the WRC would have neither the 
resources nor the reach to properly engage in monitoring. They argued that including the 
companies in the FLA gave it the necessary means to monitor effectively (Greenhouse 
1999c). Roberta Karp of Liz Claiborne said, “You need buy-in from the people who have 
a stake in this. […] Corporations have a stake in protecting their names and making sure 
the facilities they contract with are operated fairly, efficiently and effectively” (quoted in 
Snyder 2000a). Michael Posner of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights told The 
New York Times, "I welcome any new initiative that broadens the base of information and 
monitoring of factories. […] [But] this is a big industry […] and there needs to be a 
comprehensive system that looks at the industry across the board, and that's the Fair 
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Labor Association" (quoted in Greenhouse 1999c). Some companies, such as Liz 
Claiborne and Reebok, claimed to well ahead of USAS in terms of fighting sweatshops, 
pointing to their own CSR programs as evidence (Krupa 1999; Snyder 2000a). 
Representatives of the apparel industry also objected to the lack of corporate 
involvement in the WRC and its policy of unannounced inspections. Vada Manager of 
Nike said, "We object to the Workers Rights Consortium because it does not provide a 
seat on the table for companies. […] Another issue is it has a 'gotcha' monitoring system, 
which in our minds is not a serious way to achieve the common goal that we all want to 
achieve, which is to eradicate sweatshop conditions" (quoted in Greenhouse 2000a). Here 
again, as in the last chapter, we can see the core apparel corporations using corporate 
“social responsibility” programs as a means to avoid and obfuscate the real issue, the 
structure of the industry whose commanding heights they control, while presenting the 
appearance of caring about and trying to solve the problem of sweatshops. They tried to 
make the case that, not only are they willing to be partners in the quest to end 
sweatshops, but that without their involvement--and on their own terms--the movement 
cannot succeed. 
Nike was not only particularly vocal in its criticisms of the WRC as it attempted 
to reframe the issue, but went beyond other companies in the counter-measures it took--in 
April 2000, the company began actively retaliating against schools that joined the WRC, 
specifically Brown University, the University of Michigan and the University of Oregon. 
Nike started by canceling its three-year contract with Brown to supply hockey uniforms, 
with one year remaining in the contract (Asher and Barr 2000). Michigan was next--Nike 
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abruptly cancelled talks on a six-year extension of its contract with Michigan (Asher and 
Barr 2000; Greenhouse 2000b). While the Brown contract may have been small potatoes 
for Nike, this was not the case with Michigan, one of the Big Ten sports schools--
“Michigan's contract extension would have been worth between $22 million and $26 
million over six years […]. That would have made it the most lucrative such deal in 
college sports history” (Asher and Barr 2000). In both cases, Nike justified its actions by 
saying that, through joining the WRC, the schools had unilaterally changed the terms of 
the contracts, specifically the conditions under which production would be monitored 
(Asher and Barr 2000; Greenhouse 2000b). In the case of Oregon, the retaliation was of a 
more personal sort. Nike’s president Phil Knight was an alum of Oregon, as his father 
had been before him, and over the years Knight had donated $50 million to the school. In 
response to the university’s decision to join the WRC, Knight canceled the donation of an 
additional $30 million he had pledged (Asher and Barr 2000; Greenhouse 2000a, 2000b). 
A Nike spokesman explained Knight’s decision: "The University of Oregon, despite its 
unique relationship with Nike and Phil, is free to align itself with the Workers Rights 
Consortium. However, it does not mean that we are required to support those efforts with 
which we have fundamental disagreements" (quoted in Greenhouse 2000a). 
On one level, Nike’s retaliation seems to have been successful--the University of 
Oregon’s administration, which never had been very committed to the WRC, soon 
withdrew from the organization (Steffan, interview, 2007). On another level, however, it 
backfired. According to Caine (interview, 2007), 
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It brought more attention to the issue and it gave the WRC a different 
legitimacy too. […] This is the Worker Rights Consortium, it’s just a 
small organization starting up, there was nothing to say that they were 
going to be able to do anything, but if Nike's going to cancel a $30 million 
[donation] over it, then it makes it seem like they really could do 
something. So that was a bad campaign strategy for them to try to prevent 
the WRC from going forward. It made the WRC look more legitimate, not 
less. 
Nor did Nike’s decision cause Michigan or Brown to withdraw from the WRC; Michigan 
in fact made a lucrative deal with Nike’s rival, Adidas (Steffan, interview, 2007). 
 
The Foundation of the WRC 
 Even as this campaign was unfolding, as the WRC’s first staff person, Roeper was 
doing the necessary work to prepare for the organization’s founding conference, 
including setting up an office and finding a fiscal sponsor for the grant they had already 
secured for the WRC. Her job involved more than just paperwork though. She had to 
establish a distinctive identity for the Worker Rights Consortium, so that it was clear that 
it was autonomous not only from the apparel industry, but also from USAS and the labor 
movement, particularly UNITE. “I was supposed to be in the role of establishing an 
organization with the credibility of a research organization, not an activist one” (Roeper, 
interview, 2007). This was necessary to create a group that colleges and universities 
would feel comfortable joining, one that they felt they had some ownership of and was 
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not simply the tool of the student activists who had been occupying their offices or a 
labor union like UNITE, which many administrators saw as having dubious, protectionist 
motives. Thus the WRC office was originally established in New York City--not 
Washington, DC, where both USAS and the FLA were headquartered--to clearly mark 
this independence (though the WRC did later move its offices to Washington) (Roeper, 
interview, 2007). At the same time, the activists involved in creating the Consortium 
wanted to ensure that it remained true to its original purpose. Thus, according to Thomas 
Wheatley (interview, 2007) the group drafting 
the initial framework for the by-laws, which was probably all of three 
paragraphs, […] wrote it intentionally to make sure that universities would 
never have a majority of their own, they would have to share power with 
external advocates, who were not the most radical of them, it wasn't 
UNITE or Charlie Kernaghan [of the NLC], but it was Kate Pfordresher 
[of the People of Faith Network], David Schilling [of the Interfaith Center 
for Corporate Responsibility] and folks like that. 
 The founding conference itself took place on April 7, 2000. Attendees were 
organized into three caucuses--USAS members; members of an Advisory Board--the 
external advocates--consisting of advocates and scholars who had long been involved in 
the anti-sweatshop movement, including representatives of groups from the Global 
South; and college and university administrators. Members of each caucus were to elect 
members to the WRC’s board of directors and four working groups that would finalize 
the by-laws and help define the details of the WRC’s policies. The conference itself 
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consisted of a day-long meeting, featuring a panel of activists and scholars who had been 
instrumental in creating the WRC, taking questions from the audience about how exactly 
the Consortium would work and what the working groups’ tasks would be. It also 
featured two speakers who were third-world labor activists, Alice Ming-wai Kwan of the 
Hong Kong Christian Industrial Committee and Maritzah Paredes of the Collective of 
Honduran Women (United Students Against Sweatshops 2000). The situation was an 
unusual one, because in this forum the anti-sweatshop activists were clearly in command 
of the situation. While USAS and its allies were well organized, the college and 
university administrators were meeting with each other for the first time; they had to 
request more time in order to organize themselves and decide how they would elect 
members from their caucus to the governing board and working groups (Featherstone and 
United Students Against Sweatshops 2002; United Students Against Sweatshops 2000). 
School officials also had a wide range of concerns about various aspects of the 
WRC, raising a number of issues with the presiding panel. Some were basic questions 
about how the Advisory Board’s membership had been selected. Others were about how 
much the proposed structure of the WRC was open to change. College and university 
administrators were particularly concerned that the Consortium be open to engaging in 
dialogue with major apparel firms and that USAS’s firm anti-FLA position not be that of 
the WRC. Many schools also belonged to the FLA, with officials from such schools 
arguing that the goal should be to reform the Association, not undermine it. The panel 
explained many of the details of the WRC were open to negotiation and that the 
Consortium was certainly open to dialogue with industry; certain core features, however, 
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were non-negotiable, such as the absence of industry representation on the WRC’s board, 
which would compromise its independence. The panelists also indicated that USAS’s 
anti-FLA position was its own and would not be the position of the Consortium. At the 
request of one school official, the working groups were expanded from four to five in 
order to address some of these concerns (United Students Against Sweatshops 2000). As 
we shall see in the following chapters, the WRC has indeed maintained a cordial 
relationship with apparel companies and the FLA, engaging them in dialogue and 
working with them, as long as doing so does not compromise their principles. 
Roeper (interview, 2007) said of her experience working with school officials in 
the various working groups: 
At the time I thought [their behavior] was obstructionist, but really it was 
more that I was young and wanted to move forward quickly and colleges 
and universities are among the most cautious institutions out there. […] 
They just were worried about everything, so we had to get opinion letters 
about this legal issue, opinion letters about that legal issue; there was all 
kinds of legal issues that I think a lot of the colleges and universities were 
actually genuinely concerned about. 
Through the founding conference and the working groups, college administrators were 
able to have some role in shaping the WRC--and thus to develop a stake in the 
organization--but in a way that the Consortium remained true to the ends for which the 
anti-sweatshop movement had initiated its creation. By late 2000, the by-laws were 
finalized and the board hired Scott Nova as the WRC’s executive director. 
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In the next chapter, we will look at the organization of the WRC and their “fire 
alarm” approach to monitoring sweatshops; and, in the chapters following that, the 
international work that the WRC, USAS and other anti-sweatshop organizations have 
done in collaboration with groups in the Global South. What we have seen unfolding in 
the past few chapters is a conflict between the anti-sweatshop movement, on the one side, 
and the apparel industry and the FLA, on the other, made up of a series of moves and 
counter-moves by the social actors involved. Following our review of the WRC, we will 
see another series of moves and counter-moves, leading to more innovation on the part of 
the anti-sweatshop movement, in the form of the Designated Suppliers Program. 
What we have also see in this chapter, in the crafting of the WRC as an 
innovative, strategic response to the FLA, is the dialectic between action and reflection 
(Ryan and Jeffreys forthcoming; Ryan et al. forthcoming), ideology and experience that 
is at the heart of the development of strategy by social movements. The US anti-
sweatshop movement had been taking action based on its existing ideology and strategy, 
seeking new points of leverage over the apparel industry, in particular experimenting 
with codes of conduct for college licensees as a means to this end. As they did so, they 
ran up against obstacles: the realization of the impracticality of relying solely on local 
labor rights groups to carry out monitoring and the apparel industry’s formation of what 
USAS saw as a deeply problematic monitoring organization in response to the 
movement. The movement then took the time to analyze their experiences, reflecting on 
them in light of their ideology of worker empowerment. They did so collectively, 
drawing together activists from a range of groups, with different constituencies, 
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experiences, and networks, thus greatly broadening the range of insight they could draw 
on, far beyond what any one individual or group would have brought to the table alone. 
In doing so, they generated a new strategic innovation--not simply the Worker Rights 
Consortium as an organization, but a new model of monitoring; and they deepened their 
understanding of worker empowerment and its relevance to their struggle, coming to 
understand that monitoring would never be enough, that workers needed to be able to 
exercise voice and power through their own organizations. 
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Chapter 11: Embedded Autonomy and the Fire Alarm Model: The Organization 
and Monitoring Practices of the WRC 
 
 
The WRC’s Embedded Autonomy 
 Although it was USAS and other members of the anti-sweatshop movement who 
pushed for the creation of the Worker Rights Consortium, once created, college and 
university administrators formed a significant part of the organization’s constituency. If 
the WRC was to have credibility in the eyes of this group, the organization had to take 
into account their perspectives and concerns, as well as those of the anti-sweatshop 
movement. This meant that it had to have some autonomy from USAS and the other 
organizations of the anti-sweatshop movement--it could not be seen as a simple extension 
of USAS, something that was a real danger early on. As we saw in the last chapter, 
school officials were particularly concerned that the WRC engage in dialogue with the 
apparel industry and the FLA, instead of simply taking a purely oppositional stance to 
them, as many USAS activists were inclined to do. The WRC has in fact been willing to 
engage the apparel industry in dialogue and show some sensitivity for their concerns; 
indeed, the WRC’s staff have found this to be a strategically wise choice and central to 
their success in many ways. At the same time, to accomplish its goals, it has been critical 
for the WRC to maintain ties with an extensive network of anti-sweatshop groups, not 
only in the US, but throughout the Global South, wherever factories producing licensed 
goods for schools might be found. These groups in the South form the WRC’s “eyes and 
ears” (Schmaedick interview, 2007), who alert it to cases of potential labor rights 
violations that it should investigate. Thus, the WRC has forged a wide, strategic network 
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of ties with both industry and the anti-sweatshop movement, while remaining relatively 
independent from the organizations that make up both sectors. 
 The WRC’s relationship with other groups, particularly in the anti-sweatshop 
movement, is perhaps best characterized by a phrase Peter Evans (1995) coined in a 
much different context--embedded autonomy. Evans used the phrase to refer to the 
relationship that successful industrializing states (such as those of Japan, South Korea, 
and Taiwan) have to other social groups in their country, particularly business elites. In 
much of the third world, states have been captured by local business and/or landed elites-
-that is the state is largely under their control, following their dictates. In most of these 
cases, such elites are too short-sighted and too focused on their immediate self-interest to 
strategically promote anything like a coherent industrialization program. To promote 
successful, broad-based industrialization (“economic development”), states must instead 
have some independence from these elite economic interests, so that they can shape the 
policies of the business sector with a combination of regulations, incentives and central 
coordination. However, while being captured by business interests will not let the state do 
this, neither will be completely isolated from such social actors. Instead, state bureaucrats 
in charge of promoting industrialization must develop dense social networks with 
business leaders. This may be by both formal means, such as joint state-business councils 
that determine industrial and economic policy, and informal means, with retired state 
bureaucrats assuming positions in industry. These ties allow state bureaucrats to negotiate 
and coordinate with leading capitalists in order to define their goals vis-à-vis 
industrialization and the strategic policies to reach those goals. This relationship is what 
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Evans meant by “embedded autonomy”--the state is embedded in a set of social networks 
without being controlled by any of the other social actors in these networks, instead 
maintaining its autonomy. 
 Using this frame of reference, it is clear that the Fair Labor Association was 
captured by business interests from the moment of its creation. The structure of the 
FLA’s board and the nature of its funding has allowed business to play a disproportionate 
role in shaping the Association’s policies, resulting in successive monitoring programs 
that have been largely ineffective at addressing the problem of sweatshops (though they 
have been quite effective in allowing business to maintain its legitimacy, arguably their 
main goal). Indeed, “capture” may be the wrong word, since this implies that at one point 
the FLA was independent, when it never has been (although, as noted in chapter nine, 
some anti-sweatshop activists see it as having grown less independent--and consequently 
less effective and honest as a monitor--over time). 
 In contrast, the WRC was designed to be autonomous from industry--no 
representatives of business sit on its board nor does the WRC take money from the 
business community. Instead, its board is made of up five representatives each from three 
constituencies--college and university administrators, United Students Against 
Sweatshops, and the independent labor rights experts who make up the WRC’s Advisory 
Council (Worker Rights Consortium 2007c). As we saw in the last chapter, this 
autonomy from business was fundamental to the way anti-sweatshop activists conceived 
of the WRC. USAS member Thomas Wheatley (interview, 2007), who played a role in 
crafting the WRC, said of the FLA, “It's the fox guarding the chicken coop. You can't 
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have the people who have it in their interest to drive wages and working conditions to the 
bottom guarding the door of the monitoring process that is designed to do the opposite. 
Structurally it just doesn't work.” According to USAS member Ken Abrams*, in looking 
at the WRC vs. the FLA and other similar corporate-sponsored monitoring programs,10 
The WRC just represents universities, they’re multi-university. The fact 
that they’re independent of industry allows the WRC to be more 
aggressive in pressing companies because no one has veto power over 
what they do publicly. All these other organizations, either through formal 
or informal means, there are very powerful voices of the companies in 
determining what gets said, what gets done. 
Despite this emphasis on autonomy from industry, the WRC does maintain connections 
to apparel companies. In particular, when inspections reveal that a contractor has been 
violating workers’ rights, the WRC tries to work with the companies involved--both the 
core apparel firms and their contractors--to rectify the problem. This means that the WRC 
needs to maintain open lines of communication with the FLA and the apparel industry, 
particularly companies’ social responsibility departments. We will explore this 
relationship with companies in more depth below, after looking at how the WRC carries 
out its inspections. 
 Through the university and USAS caucuses, it is instead, as Abrams said, 
members of the higher education community who have the most weight with the WRC. 
The university caucus is structured in such to reflect the diversity of interests among 
schools--two of the five university board members must come from schools with large 
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licensing programs, two from schools with small programs, and one from among the 
schools with no licensing programs (only procurement agreements) (Worker Rights 
Consortium 2007c). Affiliated schools pay an annual fee to the WRC, which varies from 
school to school. Those with licensing programs pay 1% of the previous year’s gross 
licensing revenue to a maximum of $50,000, with a minimum of $1,500; schools without 
licensing programs pay a flat fee of $1,500. These fees make up 45% of the WRC’s 
budget, with the bulk of the remainder coming federal and foundation grants (Worker 
Rights Consortium 2007b). Although the WRC has a model code of conduct (Worker 
Rights Consortium 2007d), member schools are not required to follow it. Instead, they 
may implement their own codes of conduct. Such codes must include disclosure of all 
factory locations and provisions regarding “basic protection for workers in each of the 
following areas--wages, hours of work and overtime compensation, freedom of 
association, workplace safety and health, women's rights, child labor and forced labor, 
harassment and abuse in the workplace, non-discrimination and compliance with local 
law” (Worker Rights Consortium 2007b). One point of contention that remains between 
the university caucus on the one hand and the USAS and labor rights experts caucuses on 
the other is that many schools’ codes of conduct only have provisions requiring the local 
minimum or prevailing wage (which usually is a paltry sum), not a living wage (though a 
living wage is part of the WRC’s model code of conduct). 
 Through the involvement of USAS and its Advisory Council of labor rights 
experts, the WRC is also embedded within the network of organizations that make up the 
anti-sweatshop movement. Yet it is careful to maintain some autonomy from the 
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movement as well, a strategic necessity to maintain its credibility. In particular, “we don't 
take money from unions on purpose because we want to maintain our position as an 
entity that can assert itself as a neutral investigative body” (Blasi, interview, 2007). In the 
eyes of both the university caucus and many publics, close ties with the labor movement 
would be as suspect and delegitimating as close ties with the apparel industry. This is 
particularly important given that “the Fair Labor Association, tried to make this [the 
campaign for the WRC] out to be a protectionist front for UNITE and use the history of 
both UNITE and the labor movement as being somewhat protectionist to try to discredit 
us” (McSpedon, interview, 2007). The WRC also is careful to remain distinct from 
USAS, with which it could all too easily be identified, given that USAS was instrumental 
in its creation and in pressing school officials to join the Consortium. According to WRC 
staff person Nancy Steffan (interview, 2007), 
USAS is just a different kind of organization. They're the student anti-
sweatshop movement. We’re monitors and investigators, reporters. So 
they [USAS] have a very different relationship with the universities. […] 
We don't do protests. We don't condone protests. We don't work directly 
with unions or on behalf of unions. […] We do different kinds of things. 
But then we can also talk to universities and brands and get a very 
different kind of reception than USAS does. 
Again, we see that the WRC’s autonomy is crucial to its work. But so are its ties with the 
anti-sweatshop movement. As we will explore in more depth below, the network within 
which it is embedded is essential to alerting it to problems is should investigate. And, if it 
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cannot work with companies to solve a problem, it is this network (not the WRC) that 
mobilizes to pressure the companies to change their course. 
 Both labor unionists and USAS members understand and appreciate the 
strategically distinct role that the WRC plays in the anti-sweatshop movement--and thus 
the necessity for its embedded autonomy. Eric Dirnbach (interview, 2007) of the apparel 
union UNITE-HERE said of the WRC, “I think they have helped probably a dozen 
unions at a dozen factories organize a union. […] We actually are able to help workers in 
a number of factories and organize and that's tremendously important in this kind of 
issue, where that is almost impossible to do.” USAS member Nick Reville (interview, 
2007) observed that it was extremely exciting for student activists to see something as 
concrete as the WRC and its monitoring program come about as the result of their efforts. 
He saw the WRC as “lock[ing] in our wins,” creating an institutional presence that has, 
through colleges’ and universities’ ability to suspend and cancel licensing agreements, 
some enforcement power. There was no sense among the people I interviewed that the 
WRC was potentially vulnerable to capture by universities, but an understanding that the 
WRC was strategically placed to carry out a role--credible, independent monitoring--that 
no other organization in the anti-sweatshop movement could perform. 
 
The WRC’s “Eyes and Ears on the Ground” 
 One of the first things that the WRC had to do following its official founding in 
April 2000 if it wished to effectively carry out its goal of independently monitoring 
conditions in apparel factories was develop a network of contacts throughout the Global 
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South. As USAS member Laura McSpedon (interview, 2007) said, when they were 
designing the WRC, “it seemed important that there was someone who was not at a 202 
[Washington, DC] area code phone number for workers to call.” It was not enough for 
the Consortium to have a relationship of embedded autonomy with anti-sweatshop groups 
in the US; it had to develop a similar network of relationships with groups who were in 
contact with the workers it hoped to aid. These groups are, in the words of Agatha 
Schmaedick (interview, 2007), a former investigator for the WRC, the Consortium’s 
“local eyes and ears on the ground. They have contact with the workers and if there's a 
problem at a factory they get word of that and they pass it on to us.” Groups and people 
who serve as the WRC’s local contacts include “unions, community organizations, faith-
based organizations, women's rights organizations, doctors who work in occupational 
health and safety--there's a whole gamut of individuals and organizations that are 
constantly hearing worker's grievances” (Schmaedick, interview, 2007). The WRC’s 
inspection program, which we will look at in more depth below, also relies on the 
expertise, both professional and local, of these groups and individuals to aid them in their 
inspections. As part of maintaining its autonomy, however, the WRC must be careful not 
to use contacts who report potential labor rights violations to them to do investigative 
work on the same cases, since this would involve a conflict of interest. This further 
reinforces the importance for the WRC of developing a wide network of “an extensive 
variety of people so that we could always have somebody available for the assessment 
team” (Schmaedick, interview, 2007). In describing these networks, I am relying 
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primarily on reports by WRC staff; I am not in a position to evaluate how successful they 
have been in developing these relationships--only what their intentions are in doing so. 
Schmaedick (interview, 2007) gave me some specific examples of the sort of 
groups the WRC works with from her own experience in Southeast Asia: 
In Indonesia, one of the groups that we work a lot with is [Yayasan] 
Lembaga Bantuan Hukum (LBH). It's one of the oldest and more 
competent NGOs in Indonesia. It's a legal aid organization and it's one that 
workers frequently turn to for legal advice because it's free--you can just 
go in and get a consultation and they also have chapters all over Indonesia. 
They were one of the first groups we started working with in Indonesia. 
We let them know that we existed and where our factories were. We also 
frequently go to them and involve lawyers from their organization in our 
factory assessments. In Thailand there's an organization called WEPT and 
it's an organization of survivors of occupational injury. It was started by a 
woman who has brown-lung disease--she has essentially dedicated her life 
to this cause. She's constantly talking to workers, particularly in the textile 
industry, which she was in herself and where she got sick. She hears about 
problems and she reports them to us and sometimes we would involve 
people from their network in our factory assessments. 
 The initial process of setting up this network took about three years, from 2000 to 
2003, (though the WRC is always working to expand its networks) (Schmaedick, 
interview, 2007). Schmaedick (interview, 2007) was deeply involved in this process, 
  256 
particularly in Southeast Asia, an area she had worked in before and had personal 
connections with. Of forging these relationships with local groups, she said, 
We had to get our message out there that we existed and that we were a 
sympathetic ear and moreover an avenue for redress. If they had a 
violation to report we might be able to do something about it, if they were 
making collegiate apparel or if their factory had made collegiate apparel in 
the recent past or when the violation had taken place. A lot of the work I 
did was just trying to understand the lay of the land and to essentially 
understand who the players were and gaining their trust, which takes a lot 
of time. 
Indeed, people who had been involved in the relationship-building process repeatedly 
emphasized the importance and difficulty of building up trust with the WRC’s contacts in 
the Global South. Common goals and ideals do not mean that groups automatically trust 
each other or can work easily together. In particular, US imperialism and the US labor 
movement’s complicity with such imperialism during the Cold War has left a lot of bad 
blood between US and third-world groups (Armbruster-Sandoval 2005), as have the 
patronizing attitudes some US groups continue to hold (Krupat 2002). 
According to the people I spoke with, whether or not the WRC was able to 
overcome such mistrust often had a great deal to do with whether there were previously 
existing ties between the WRC’s contacts in the US anti-sweatshop movement and those 
groups it hoped to form ties with in the South. USAS member Marion Traub-Werner 
(interview, 2007), who had worked extensively with women’s and labor rights groups in 
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Central America before the founding of the WRC, played a role in helping establish the 
Consortium’s network in that region. In the case of Guatemala, she told me it was her ties 
with the AFL-CIO Solidarity Center which ended up determining which of the major 
unions the WRC was able to establish a long-term relationship with. 
In Guatemala, there were three main union federations. One was the one 
that had an organizing project with the Solidarity Center. One was the one 
that had had that kind of project for years but was part of that Cold War 
era [phase of the Solidarity Center’s work], so it was the most 
conservative union federation and they [the Solidarity Center] were kind 
of transitioning out of that into this more middle-of-the-road one. And 
then there was the left one, which projected itself as the most popular and 
grassroots and also had ties to the former guerrilla movement, which is 
now a part of the UNE [political party]. So I would go talk to the left one, 
right? But we never did direct work with them. We weren't going to fund 
them and the Solidarity Center wasn't funding them, so they didn't have a 
reason to talk to us. They also didn't trust us, I'm sure--I don't think they 
would trust US groups so much. 
As the above quotes indicates, one of the challenges the WRC had in building ties 
with groups in the South was that the sort of relationship it was hoping to build was one 
that differed significantly from that which most third-world NGOs were used to forming 
with US groups. “As soon as it's a Northern organization that was networking with this 
other [Southern] one, you have to be upfront about what the question is about funding, 
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financing, right? Because all these relationships have been totally monetized through the 
NGO-ization of life. So you know, all these NGOs are looking for funding. And the 
WRC is not a funder--so to even get in the door sometimes when you say that, you have 
to explain what's the incentive and what's the motivation to work with the WRC” (Traub-
Werner, interview, 2007). This monetization and NGO-ization to which Traub-Werner 
refers is one of the major trends among non-governmental organizations, both North and 
South. Increasingly, such groups are not grassroots, membership-based groups, drawing 
their members’ fees and donations for funding. Instead, they are smaller, professionalized 
organizations, which rely on groups in the Global North--not only NGOs and private 
foundations, but governments and multilateral bodies--for their funding. This has caused 
some concern, because it allows these Northern funders to heavily influence the agendas 
of many Southern NGOs--not the people the NGOs are officially working on behalf of 
(Sikkink 2002). In the WRC’s case, because it did not fit this established model, it made 
building bridges more difficult. Indeed, as Traub-Werner explained in the case of 
Guatemala, they sometimes had to rely on US allies such as the Solidarity Center who did 
have funding ties with groups the Consortium hoped to work with. 
 In the experience of the people I spoke with, once the WRC forms its initial ties 
with a local group, they are strengthened over time through jointly working on 
investigations of specific allegations of labor rights violations. WRC staff person Jeremy 
Blasi (interview, 2007) said, “The real quality relationship is built through practice. If the 
first time the union or NGO makes a complaint about a case, we do a good job 
documenting what happened, and are able to work with various stakeholders to achieve a 
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successful outcome, that's a foundation for a good relationship.” According to Blasi 
(interview, 2007), those groups that have had good experiences with the WRC will often 
also pass the word on to other groups in their networks; this may lead those groups to in 
turn get in touch with the WRC if they are dealing with a problem in which they think the 
WRC might be able to help. To help strengthen its existing relationships with groups 
abroad and make it easier for new groups to contact it, the WRC has permanent staff in a 
number of countries around the world (Blasi, interview, 2007), including (as of February 
2010) Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, India and 
Thailand (Worker Rights Consortium 2007f). 
Once the WRC began developing this network of ties, representatives of the 
organization had to work with local groups to help them understand what the Consortium 
could and couldn’t do. Schmaedick (interview, 2007) took part in this process. 
It was basically helping them to understand that we weren't looking to 
parachute in and parachute out like many other factory monitors, but that 
we were about building local capacity and that's what the local mechanism 
feature was about. It bolstered up those local networks that already existed 
and it gave them an extra tool in their toolbox to address grievances. A lot 
of that in those early years was going and meeting people, understanding 
how they work, where they work, going over the factory disclosure 
database with them, and helping them understand what that information 
meant. We would interpret it and show them how to file reports. 
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Once the WRC had some successes under its belt (a process we will look at in the 
next chapter), its field representatives such as Schmaedick (interview, 2007) incorporated 
those into their trainings. 
A lot of times I would facilitate trainings where workers got to talk with 
other workers. That was probably by far the most valuable thing, I felt. 
One of the fun things to do is to go and introduce workers who have 
successfully won a union drive or got their people reinstated or had people 
get compensation for injuries, things like that, to sit down with other 
workers who were facing the exact same problems and they would help 
them understand how it [the complaint and inspection process] works and 
walk them through it. 
The WRC does not simply educate its contacts about what it does though. There 
is much the WRC can learn from the members of its network, since they have a local 
expertise that the Consortium, based in the US and with small staff to execute a global 
mandate, cannot develop on its own. Blasi (interview, 2007) told me, “Groups that are 
primarily based in these countries that represent garment workers know far better than 
anyone else the problems in the country. One thing that baffles me about corporate 
monitoring is that if I was trying to do a real credible job and I worked for Nike or 
whatever, the first thing I would do is go ask the union what are the problems in this 
zone, in these factories.” Local organizations’ expertise in their countries’ legal and 
regulatory system can also prove important. 
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For example, in Central America, the Caribbean, most of the countries 
have a law called fuero sindical, which means you can't fire the union 
committee leader without establishing just cause--you just can't under any 
circumstances. And if you want to fire someone for just cause you have to 
get prior approval from the government to do that. It's a very important 
law for unions in those countries and it's also much easier to enforce than 
more general laws, which say you can't retaliate against workers because 
of their participation in the union. […] It's just real black-and-white 
whether or not the company got permission to fire them […]--there's no 
room for debate. […] That's the kind of thing we might learn from the 
[local] union or labor lawyers (Blasi, interview, 2007). 
Such knowledge is crucial--knowing what laws are easier to get enforced and can thus 
more easily be used as tools to fix problems significantly increases the WRC’s chances of 
success in any particular case. 
 
The Fire Alarm Model: The WRC’s Monitoring Practices 
 Just as the WRC’s structure and relationship to other groups differs fundamentally 
from corporate-sponsored monitoring organizations like the FLA, so does its approach to 
monitoring. The FLA and its kin rely primarily on some form of certification, whether of 
factories or of brands (Esbenshade 2004b). As noted in the last two chapters, anti-
sweatshop activists saw serious problems with this practice, fearing it could mislead 
consumers into believing that goods so labeled were genuinely sweat-free. Former WRC 
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staff person Maria Roeper (interview, 2007) noted that when the WRC was first being 
created, there was some confusion around this point among rank-and-file USAS 
members. “Many people tried to say, ‘Join the WRC and be sweat-free.’ And many of us 
in the leadership [of the movement] were saying, ‘We won't actually be sweat-free, 
because you don't overnight have perfect working conditions anywhere. It’s a long, 
involved process […] They're not going to fix it overnight.’” Unlike the FLA, the WRC 
does not regularly inspect factories--instead, it responds to news of possible violations of 
workers’ rights. They rely heavily on their local networks of their allies for such news. 
Further, as I quoted Schmaedick saying above, the WRC has tried strategically to design 
its monitoring approach to strengthen the capacity of its local contacts over the long run, 
with the hope that they will increasingly have the capacity to address labor rights 
violations on their own. 
 The staff of the WRC refer to their approach towards monitoring as the “fire alarm 
model”. Rather than relying on regular inspections of factories, followed by certification, 
the fire alarm model as a strategy involves investigations of factories in response to 
complaints by workers or their advocates or other reports of potential code of conduct 
violations. According to Steffan (interview, 2007), “We work with local organizations to 
check out the factories where we have received complaints of problems and where there's 
local interest in working with us to improve working conditions. One of the most 
common complaints we receive is from workers who have allegedly been fired illegally 
for attempting to exercise their associational rights,” i.e. trying to organize a union. 
Workers filing a complaint can do so either directly with the WRC or through the 
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intermediary of one of the Consortium’s local contacts. The complaint process is meant 
to be a worker-friendly one (Esbenshade 2004b), not something that involves large 
volumes of paperwork or working with a labyrinthine bureaucracy. Thus the means of 
submitting the complaint is purposefully flexible--it can be verbal or written and can be 
delivered to the WRC through any medium--phone, fax, postal mail, e-mail or a form on 
the WRC’s website. Further, the complaint does not need to get into the technical details 
of how the alleged labor rights violations contravene the codes of conduct of the WRC’s 
affiliate schools--it is enough that it is clear that a serious problem has occurred; the 
complaint must, however, be specific about what these problems were. Throughout the 
ensuing inspection process, the Consortium and its partners protect the confidentiality of 
the complainants to guard them against retaliation by management (Worker Rights 
Consortium 2007e). 
Once the complaint has been filed, the executive director of the WRC (a position 
held by Scott Nova since the inception of the organization) looks into the charges to see 
whether a full-scale investigation is warranted, consulting the WRC’s staff, the WRC’s 
Board and three constituent caucuses, its network of local allies in the place where the 
alleged violation took place, and anyone else whose input may be valuable. Members of 
the Consortium’s Board can call a special meeting to override the executive director’s 
decision to investigate or not, if they feel the director has made an incorrect decision. A 
particularly important standard in determining whether the WRC will carry out an 
inspection is whether or not the workers affected by the alleged violations want the 
Consortium to intervene (Worker Rights Consortium 2007e). Again, we see the WRC 
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attempting to put the workers who the monitoring is supposed to help at the center of the 
process--instead of at the margins, as with the corporate “social responsibility” programs, 
which leave business at the center. 
 According to Blasi (interview, 2007),  
A substantial percentage of our complaints involve workers who've been 
fired for trying to organize their union or organize in some other way in 
their workplace to improve the conditions, eliminate violations. And so, 
case after case after case, the actual work of what we're doing involves, in 
part, documenting the ways in which the firing of these workers, who are 
seeking to improve things in their factory, was illegal, because you can't 
fire someone for organizing a union or trying to improve conditions in 
your factory. And then trying to get those workers reinstated into the 
factory, if that's what they want, so that the efforts, the collective efforts of 
workers in these factories to improve things, can go forward. 
 Officially, the WRC only has jurisdiction in cases where collegiate apparel is being 
produced. In practice, they end up dealing with a wide range of companies, many of 
whom do not produce college-licensed goods. This is due to the fact that any one factory 
produced goods for several brands and so will be producing goods for the general market 
alongside college apparel. Blasi (interview, 2007) told me, “Although our focus is on 
collegiate apparel factories, many of the cases where we have been most successful have 
been instances in which the factory was producing for both collegiate and non-collegiate 
brands. There are many non-collegiate brands that, like collegiate licensees, have adopted 
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codes of conduct and may even have their own compliance staff. We've found that some 
non-collegiate brands that have experience dealing with these issues can be responsive 
when we contact them about a particular case.” Thus, the WRC’s influence is wider than 
the small part of the apparel market over which it has formal surveillance powers. And 
many of the non-collegiate brands that the Consortium deals with have plenty of 
incentive to do so--they care about their brand images and there is always the danger that, 
if they do not deal with the WRC, then they will have to deal with USAS or other more 
confrontational members of the anti-sweatshop movement. 
 As discussed in chapter five, members of the anti-sweatshop movement are 
generally critical of the shortness of the inspections done by the Fair Labor Association, 
which usually last only a few days--what Schmaedick (interview, 2007) referred to above 
as “parachuting in and parachuting out”. Such short inspections not only prevent the 
investigators from doing a thorough job; they also prevent the inspectors from building 
and drawing on ties with local groups and helping them build their own capacity to carry 
out monitoring--thus the metaphor of parachuting in and out, with its implications of a 
lack of any long-term connection to the site of the inspections. Rather than a few days, 
the WRC carries out its inspections over a period of several weeks. Once the inspections 
are complete and the reports issued, the Consortium remains in touch with the local 
actors, trying to ensure that its recommendations have actually been implemented--
something the FLA has not historically done. Thus, the WRC is usually involved with a 
particular factory for at least a few months; in some cases, where either the factory’s 
management or the brands who patronize them have been resistant to changes, the 
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Consortium can remained involved for years on end, as it did with the BJ&B factory in 
the Dominican Republic (though this was an extreme case). Schmaedick (interview, 
2007) told me of her experience as one of the WRC’s field representatives and monitors, 
I used to spend months worth of time in Asia and then I'd come back to 
the States for a month and then I'd go [to Asia] again for a month or two. 
There's a lot of back and forth. Obviously I wouldn't be working on just 
one factory, I'd work on several. It's a lot of time to build up the trust and 
the rapport and to make sure we understand what the problems are and 
then, more importantly, that the recommendations that we put forward 
make sense in terms of actually addressing the issue at hand. 
 Steffan (interview, 2007) noted that “The first step is never going to a factory and 
doing inspections--it's always talking with workers. That's the only way to get the real 
information about what's going on and make sure we do something meaningful, that 
people want to happen and are going to work to try to [work with us to] obtain the truth.” 
Again, we see a monitoring strategy that is meant to be worker-centered and emphasizes 
building local relationships. The WRC’s representatives also take care in putting together 
their inspection teams. Although the Consortium consults with unions representing the 
workers on what problems need to be addressed and the best way to do so, union 
representatives are never included in inspection teams because of the obvious conflict of 
interest (Steffan, interview, 2007). As noted above, any advocacy group which filed a 
complaint with the WRC in relation to a particular case is also barred from the inspection 
team working on that case, though the inspectors may consult with them in the same 
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manner they do with unions. Any inspection team must include both representatives of 
the WRC and representatives of local groups who have relevant expertise. In a case 
where there are charges of the violation of labor laws, this would include lawyers with 
expertise in local labor law; in a case where there are charges of health and safety 
violations, this would include doctors specializing in occupational injuries and diseases; 
and so forth. The Consortium may also draw on people with expertise from outside the 
region (Worker Rights Consortium 2007e) (Schmaedick, interview, 2007)--for instance, 
Mark Barenberg, a professor of Law at Columbia University who specializes in labor 
issues, has been involved in a number of WRC inspection teams. 
All sorts of specialized knowledge may prove useful in surprising ways. Roeper 
(interview, 2007) told me of an early case where the Consortium was investigating labor 
rights violations at PT Dada, a Korean-owned factory in Indonesia: 
A lot of tensions and a lot of difficulties sometimes comes up between 
managers and workers who don't speak the language, and there's also a lot 
of cultural differences between Korean management and Indonesian 
workers, so we brought along a Korean person who would be working on 
health and safety issues. […] There were allegations that workers had been 
fired for organizing. They [management] had written on a form in English 
that a person had been fired for something work-related, but it was written 
in Korean “union instigator” on the form. It became very clear to us that 
the actual reason that she was fired was because of her union activity, but 
we only knew this because we had the Korean investigator with us. 
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The WRC’s inspection teams rely on a wide range of means to gather data. These 
include actually visiting and inspecting the factory, as well as going through the factory’s 
records--for instance, going through its payroll records to look for evidence of failure to 
pay workers’ their wages properly. The inspection teams also rely heavily on interviews 
with a wide range of concerned parties. Particularly central to the inspections, as already 
noted, are interviews with workers. In chapter nine, I discussed the ways in which the 
anti-sweatshop movement critiqued the FLA and corporate CSR programs for failing to 
protect workers’ confidentiality in such interviews. The basic inspection protocols of the 
WRC (2007e), on the other hand, mandate such confidentiality. The protocols also 
require the monitoring teams to approach workers for interviews outside of work, through 
intermediaries, such as local advocacy groups or sympathetic doctors, that the workers 
know and trust. Without this, workers have no way of knowing that the WRC’s 
assessment team is not actually affiliated with factory management or the brand-name 
companies who contract with the factory--and without such knowledge and trust workers 
would have plenty of reasons to be less than candid, if only to protect themselves from 
retaliation by their employers. The investigation protocols also require the Consortium to 
redact quotes from workers in their final reports in such a way that all information that 
might identify individuals is removed. 
In some cases, it is important to get out information promptly, before the 
investigation is complete. WRC Executive Director Scott Nova (interview, 2007) told me 
of the case of Kukdong, a maquiladora in Mexico (which we will look at in more depth in 
the next chapter). 
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Union leaders were fired during the [organizing] campaign--it was critical 
that they were reinstated. The purpose of the firing was not just to deprive 
workers of their leaders, but to scare the hell out of those who hadn't been 
fired. So it was critical that the chilling effect be halted […], which 
required responsiveness on our part. So we were able to investigate very 
quickly and issue a preliminary report within a matter of a day clearly 
outlining the obvious violations, the illegalities of the firings. 
If the union leaders had not been reinstated promptly, they would have been forced by 
economic necessity to find work elsewhere, eliminating the workers’ own leadership over 
the long run. Groups such as USAS were able to use this preliminary report (Worker 
Rights Consortium 2001b) to put pressure on the brands, such as Nike and Reebok, that 
did business with Kukdong’s owners to reinstate the fired workers. Meanwhile, the WRC 
continued on with a more in-depth investigation, eventually putting out a full report 
(Esbenshade 2004b) (Nova, interview, 2007). 
As part of the WRC’s long-term orientation towards monitoring, they try to 
remain involved to see that the recommendations they make for correcting labor rights 
violations are actually implemented--unlike the FLA and many other corporate-sponsored 
monitoring programs. In chapter nine, I quoted Schmaedick (interview, 2007) critiquing 
the FLA for its lack of follow-up in seeing that problems its inspectors found were 
addressed. To her, such follow-up is central to any successful monitoring program. 
Finding violations, unfortunately, is almost too easy--the violations are so 
blatant. But the follow-up ensures that promises that are made are kept. 
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Moreover, say for example the issue is excessive overtime or excessive, 
forced and even unpaid overtime, often it's easy to correct the unpaid part-
-people can be paid. But to correct the excessive part means the 
restructuring of the factory production lines and the workday and 
spreading out production over more time, more days. That takes longer 
and sometimes you think you have addressed it--and then it shows up in 
other problems where people aren't making the production deadlines or 
something, so you need to readjust, you need to reassess. That requires 
going back and forth and finding solutions that actually address what you 
were trying to address rather than creating new problems. 
Monitors who simply parachute in and out are unable to see if management has made the 
recommended changes, to see if these changes adequately address the problems found, 
and to build the long-term relationships with factory-owners, workers, and local 
advocacy groups that ensure such changes are carried out. The WRC, with its long-term 
commitment, has a much better chance of doing so. 
The WRC also seeks to build the capacity of local groups with which it works, so 
that they are better able to address labor rights violations on their own (Worker Rights 
Consortium 2007e)--again a major difference between it and programs like the FLA. 
Schmaedick (interview, 2007) told me, “It's all really about capacity building […]--
especially in setting up internal grievance systems within the factory that really work, 
making sure there's new respect […] formed between management and the workforce and 
that the workforce has a voice, an organized voice, in the workplace, so they can address 
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grievances in real time and rely less and less on external monitors such as myself.” The 
WRC is also interested in building the capacity of local advocacy groups besides unions, 
both so that they can work with the Consortium on future investigations more effectively 
and so that they can act on their own to more effectively fight sweatshops (Worker Rights 
Consortium 2007e). The WRC, a small organization, only has the capacity to be involved 
in so many investigations; thus building the capacity of local groups means there are 
fewer cases where it needs to intervene directly and it can use its limited resources more 
effectively. 
The Worker Rights Consortium has thus developed a large network of contacts--
its “eyes and ears”--throughout the Global South with whom it tries to maintain mutually 
beneficial relationships. Being embedded in this network is essential for the WRC if its 
monitoring strategy is to have any hope of real success. In turn, the WRC offers its 
partners a means of strengthening their own hand in the battle for labor rights. If the 
WRC was not embedded in these networks, it would be a far less effective organization. 
At the same time, it needs to maintain its autonomy for its factory inspections and reports 
to have credibility. Its wide range of contacts means that it is not dependent on any one 
organization in its network when it is carrying out an investigation. Not only does this 
mean it has a wide range of experts with which it can work, it means it can avoid 
conflicts of interest that would compromise its integrity. 
 
Issuing Reports and Working with Companies 
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 While the WRC works with anti-sweatshop groups in the context of its 
investigation of alleged worker rights abuses, it primarily works with companies--both 
the major apparel firms and their contractors--in the context of trying to correct those 
abuses they find. Roeper (interview, 2007) told me, that, unlike USAS, in the case of the 
WRC, “there's a fair amount of talking and working with the companies rather than 
against them,” especially their CSR departments. Such lines of communication need to 
be kept open if the companies are to take the WRC’s recommendations seriously and 
even consider implementing them. Thus, the Consortium needs to remain embedded in a 
set of relationships with the apparel industry. At the same time, it works to ensure that its 
autonomy is never compromised. Not only are corporations barred from sitting on the 
WRC’s board or donating money to it, but the Consortium places a high value on 
transparency. It makes all its reports public, documenting the violations it has found--
unlike the FLA and other corporate-sponsored monitoring groups, which treat such 
reports as the confidential property of the lead apparel firms (Esbenshade 2004b). The 
Consortium tries to maintain this balancing act of both keeping good relations with 
industry and transparency by giving the companies involved in any particular case the 
chance to correct labor rights violations before the Consortium publishes the report and 
acknowledging any such corrective action in the report. On the other hand, if the 
companies fail to address the problems the WRC inspectors raised, the WRC will publish 
this failure as well--leaving the companies vulnerable to campaigns by USAS and its 
allies. 
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 The nexus through which the WRC both works with companies to persuade them 
to comply with its recommendations and maintains its public transparency is the reports 
that its investigate teams put together. These reports not only document violations of 
labor rights and codes of conduct, but they also contain recommendations for actions on 
the part of the companies involved, put together by the monitoring team in consultation 
with local advocacy groups. The WRC’s office in Washington, DC then goes through 
them to prepare them for the final public release, editing them as necessary and clarifying 
points that may be obscure to those uneducated about workers’ rights. Steffan (interview, 
2007) told me of a report she had just finished working on, “It came from our field staff 
in Thailand and Cambodia, and it was written by a guy in Cambodia who doesn't speak 
English as a first language, so it just needed a lot of editing.” Beyond that Steffan needed 
to clarify why some problems were actually problems, so that the reports can stand up to 
critiques by the anti-sweatshop movement’s detractors, whether in the university or 
industry sector. 
For example, maybe there's a factory in Cambodia where one of the 
problems was verbal abuse by this supervisor in the embroidery 
department and one of the things she was doing was screaming at workers 
who would leave work at the end of the shift even if they hadn't finished 
their quotas--you can't legally force a worker to past their shift even if they 
haven't finished their quota. […] Well, the skeptic here might say that, 
Well, the person didn't finish their work. Of course they should've gotten 
yelled at […]. So I had to put in a footnote saying that it is a violation of 
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Cambodian law […]. We have to make sure we're thoroughly explaining 
why everything's a violation because there's always going to be someone 
who says, Well, that doesn't sound so bad to me. Clearly, these are people 
that have no idea what it's like to be a low-wage worker in Cambodia. 
We're taking the problems as workers describe them to us […], but we 
have to make sure we're explaining it in a way that's airtight, and see 
whether they're a violation of law, a violation of codes of conduct, a 
violation of ILO principles. It's got to be described in that way and in 
relation to something that's not controversial (Steffan, interview, 2007). 
In some cases, these reports may even serve to strain relationships with the 
companies the WRC needs to work with by publishing things those companies would 
prefer not to be known. It is, however, the principle of the thing that is important. 
According to Roper (interview, 2007), “It was a big, big issue early on in the creation of 
the WRC that all of these other monitoring organizations--the FLA, Verité, etc.--did not 
make their reports public. Part of the concept of the WRC is that public accountability is 
very important. Disclosure of factory locations is important, as is public disclosure of 
information.” Even if few people read the reports thoroughly, the fact that they are public 
makes them available to those groups, like USAS or the Solidarity Center, that might 
launch a campaign against a company that fails to deal with the problems in good faith. If 
the WRC’s efforts to work with companies through making recommendations does not 
lead to public accountability, such campaigns may be able to do so instead--an issue we 
will look at in the next few chapters. 
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 After the report is put together, but before it goes public, according to 
Schmaedick (interview, 2007), 
We will give a copy of that to the brands involved, to the factory 
management, and to the workers that filed the complaint or the trade 
unions, depending on what the situation is with the labor at the factory. 
We give the main parties involved a chance to look at everything before it 
goes public. We say these are the violations and there are some very 
serious ones but if you agree to these recommendations, we will definitely 
put that in our public report. It gives everybody a chance to save face. It 
gives the management and the brands a chance to say, Wow, we didn't 
realize that was happening and it's really bad and […] we're going to do 
whatever we can to fix that right away. So we would put that in the public 
report. I don't think brands were expecting us to do that, initially. […] I led 
a lot of those initial visits with brands, where we would report our findings 
to them quietly at first and they still knew we were going to go public with 
it, but they started to feel, overtime, that if there was cooperation from 
them in the beginning, it would fare far better for them in the long run. 
Beyond the obvious issues of trying to maintain good relations here, there are also some 
issues of cultural sensitivity. Since many factory-owners come from East Asia--Japan, 
South Korea, Taiwan--giving them a chance to say face is especially important. 
Schmaedick (interview, 2007) said, “Especially as a young female, if I had gone into 
their factories and just read them the riot act right off the bat and didn't even give them 
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the chance [to fix things], it would have destroyed any opportunity to really work with 
them to change things.” 
 In addition to working with companies, the WRC has also at times worked with 
the FLA, as discussed in chapter nine. The FLA’s public view is that the two 
organizations play complementary roles in fighting sweatshops. Auret van Heerden, the 
former executive director of the FLA, said of their relationship, “The WRC has great 
connections on the ground and an early-warning system that is invaluable at times. There 
is an obvious synergy emerging. They can uncover problems. We can get the brands to 
get us both in the door” (quoted in Esbenshade 2004b). 
 The WRC staff people I spoke with felt like that they had successfully established 
cordial, constructive relationships with the factory-owners and the core apparel firms, 
achieving some degree of respect from them. Steffan (interview, 2007) told me, “The 
brands were very skeptical at first; then we went through a period where we were 
developing good relationships with them, at least in terms of specific factory cases. If 
there was a problem that we had documented at a factory, we could generally count on at 
least the bigger brands to intervene--they're more sophisticated with corporate social 
responsibility programs.” Obviously, the relationships the WRC had with the brands and 
even the FLA were never as tight as those it had with the anti-sweatshop movement, 
since the Consortium’s purpose is to act as a watchdog over those companies. In any such 
relationship, there is bound to be some degree of strain. And those relations--with both 
the companies and the FLA--have since grown more strained over the last few years, as 
the WRC has pursued implementing the Designated Suppliers Program (DSP). This is 
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because the DSP asks of the brands more than simply fixing violations at the factory 
level, but changing the way they do business--an issue we will look at more closely in 
chapter fifteen. 
 Clearly, there are marked differences in the way in which the Worker Rights 
Consortium has related to other organizations in the anti-sweatshop movement and to the 
companies it monitors. In both cases, however, the relationships may be characterized as 
embedded autonomy, though with more emphasis on the embeddedness in the case of the 
anti-sweatshop movement and more on the autonomy in the case of the apparel industry. 
To pursue its monitoring strategy effectively, the WRC has needed to maintain 
relationships with a wide range of organizations, including anti-sweatshop and workers’ 
advocacy groups that alert it to problems and help it carry out its task of monitoring; and 
the companies that are monitored, in order to find ways to address the problems that its 
monitoring program reveals. At the same time, to maintain its credibility as a watchdog 
organization, it must clearly not be beholden to any other organization or set of 
organizations that have a stake in the wider conflict over labor conditions. In many ways, 
the WRC has proved an effective monitor. Indeed, one of the signs of their success is that 
they are usually able to say in their public reports that the companies involved have taken 
steps towards fixing the problems raised. This is not, however, always the case; in such 
cases, the wider anti-sweatshop movement takes advantage of the information the WRC 
has documented to undertake campaigns against the non-compliant companies. We will 
look at these campaigns in the following chapters. 
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Chapter 12: Solidarity Campaigns 
 
 
The Kukdong Campaign 
 The campaigns we have examined so far--to win codes of conduct for licensees at 
college and universities and to establish the Worker Rights Consortium--were not fought 
for their own sake. They were fought to give the anti-sweatshop movement more leverage 
in its efforts to support workers in sweatshops fighting for their rights, particularly the 
right to form labor unions, so that they can exercise power and voice on their own. To do 
this effectively, US groups must work closely with the workers they wish to support, 
letting those workers set the main agenda--in other words, the US groups must find ways 
to act in solidarity and seek to empower the workers not only in their own workplaces, 
but in the transnational campaigns against sweatshops. Such solidarity and empowerment 
includes not only engaging in specific campaigns to help workers at specific factories, but 
also finding ways to establish long-term relationships between US groups and groups 
representing the workers they wish to help. While the majority of campaigns are in 
support of workers in the Global South, United Students Against Sweatshops has 
engaged in at least one major campaign to support workers at a US factory, the New Era 
Cap factory in Derby, New York. In the next two chapters, we will look in depth at the 
global political opportunity system within which these campaigns take place and at the 
strategic models that guide USAS and their allies in these campaigns. First, however, it 
will be useful to examine at least one of these campaigns in depth to see the process by 
which they actually unfold, much as we did with the campaign on Duke’s campus in 
chapter five. 
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The first major solidarity campaign that USAS undertook after the establishment 
of the WRC was in support of workers at a Korean-owned factory, Kukdong, in the town 
of Atlixco, in the state of Puebla in central Mexico. The plant--owned by a multinational 
that also had factories in Indonesia, Bangladesh, China, and South Korea--produced 
goods mainly for Nike and Reebok, both of which had licensing agreements with colleges 
belonging to the WRC (Hermanson 2009; Ross 2006). Long-time labor solidarity activist 
Jeff Hermanson (interview, 2007), who at the time was with the AFL-CIO Solidarity 
Center’s Mexico office and participated in the Kukdong campaign, told me, “This was 
really the campaign in which USAS and the WRC established themselves as effective 
players in the global sweatshop arena--very effective players.” Indeed, they were central 
to the success of the Kukdong solidarity campaign. As such, it makes sense to take the 
Kukdong campaign as our illustration of what such struggles look like. 
 Atlixco and the surrounding area consist of impoverished villages; traditionally an 
agricultural region, it was devastated by the glut of cheap agricultural goods that flooded 
Mexico as a result of NAFTA. It was also a region with a long history of rebellion and 
resistance to injustice among the peasants and workers. Prior to the opening of Kukdong, 
the major employer in the region was the Matamoros Garment factory, where locals 
considered the conditions to be abysmal. The main alternative to working in the 
maquiladoras, however, was immigrating to the US. When Kukdong was opened in 
November 1999, the managers recruited workers by promising them better working 
conditions at their factory than were available elsewhere in the region (Hermanson 2009; 
Ross 2006). Particularly attractive was the promise that management would provide free 
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breakfast and lunch--a strong draw when many families did not have enough money to 
feed themselves adequately (Worker Rights Consortium 2001c). As with most such 
factories, the employees at Kukdong were predominantly young women--85% of the 
eight-hundred-person workforce were women between the ages of sixteen and twenty-
three (Ross 2006). 
 Conditions at the Kukdong factory proved to be less than ideal. Managers, many 
of whom were inexperienced and had little training, both physically and verbally abused 
the young women working there. The wages did not even meet the minimum required 
under Mexican law, let alone reach a level sufficient to support a family. Workers were 
denied both maternity leave and sick leave. Clean water for drinking was often 
unavailable and the bathrooms were filthy. Even the promised meals were problematic. 
The lunches were made from rancid food, served on dirty plates, causing a number of 
workers to fall sick. The breakfast consisted only of coffee and bread, in a region where 
the cultural norm was for breakfast to be a substantial, nourishing meal (Hermanson 
2009; Worker Rights Consortium 2001c). 
 In May 2000, the Kukdong workers also discovered that, without their knowledge 
or consent, management had, shortly after opening in December 1999, struck a deal with 
the Revolutionary Confederation of Workers and Peasants (Confederacion 
Revolucionario de Obreros y Campesinos or CROC) to “represent” them as their union. 
The CROC is the smaller of the two unions that are associated with the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional or PRI), which ruled Mexico 
when it was a de facto single-party state from 1910 to 2000. Even after the transition to a 
  281 
multi-party system following the PRI’s loss of the presidency in December 2000, it 
remained dominant in many areas--including Puebla. Given its close connection with 
state power, the CROC cannot be considered a genuine, independent union. Indeed, in 
most cases, as with Kukdong, it makes no efforts to actually represent the workers 
enrolled in it. Instead it signs contracts with management that guarantee workers only the 
wages, etc. that are the minimum requirement under Mexican law, while providing that 
any worker who refused to join the union and pay dues would be fired. The union 
officials make their living off these dues, while in return they help management control 
the workforce and repress any dissidents (Hermanson 2009; Ross 2006; Worker Rights 
Consortium 2001c). 
 Following the establishment of the WRC, with the aid of the Solidarity Center, 
David Alvarado, a former USAS member originally from Mexico who had attended the 
University of Wisconsin--Madison, traveled around his home country in the late summer 
and early fall of 2000. His purpose was to let Mexican workers at factories producing 
goods for schools affiliated with the WRC know about the new organization and the ways 
in which it might aid them--something only possible because of USAS’s victory in the 
earlier struggle over the disclosure of factory locations. Alvarado also laid the 
groundwork for a larger, five-person USAS delegation to come through later, one that 
would be accompanied by Hermanson. One of the places he visited was Kukdong, where 
there was enough discontent among workers and interest in what Alvarado had to say that 
this became one of the places the USAS delegation visited in November 2000. They did 
not make any attempt to organize the workers, but simply let them know that USAS was 
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willing and able to support them in any struggle they undertook (Hermanson 2009; Ross 
2006) (McGrath, interview, 2007). USAS member Molly McGrath (interview, 2007), 
who took part in this delegation, told me, 
That's the first time I think I had ever been in an apparel factory. It was 
pretty neat for me. […] We ended up meeting with these Kukdong 
workers. It was a short meeting--it was like having a cup of coffee after 
dinner. I think they had just gotten off work, so we had an hour-long 
conversation with them, explained to them what USAS was and what we 
had been doing for the last couple of years. That was it, but I think it 
helped to give them and other workers an idea that there would be an 
international network there. 
The knowledge that such an international solidarity network existed and might 
have the power to help them was apparently sufficient to transform the workers’ 
discontent into open revolt. Hermanson (interview, 2007) told me, 
Those workers, all of a sudden, began to organize themselves. It wasn't 
really predicted, but it wasn't totally unexpected either. And as soon as 
that began to happen, we began to plan how we would support these 
workers if their organization actually reached critical mass. And then as 
we're in the midst of planning that, of course, there was the rebellion of 
the workers, which was crushed by the state authorities and then all of our 
planning had to really be rushed and we had to move into action. 
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On December 15, 2000, the five workers who had met with the USAS delegation 
organized a one-day boycott of the cafeteria, demanding better food. Based on trumped 
up charges, Kukdong’s management fired the leaders of the boycott on January 3, 2001, 
sparking a larger revolt, as six hundred workers (out of an eight-hundred person 
workforce) walked off the job on the 8th. They escalated their demands to include not 
only better food and the reinstatement of the fired leaders, but the right to join an 
independent union, instead of the CROC. On the 11th, the police, thugs working for 
CROC, and the local head of the CROC himself attacked the workers as they camped out 
around the plant in the middle of the night. The young women sat with their hands in the 
air, singing the Mexican national anthem, as they were beaten up. Seventeen ended up in 
the hospital, while the assault was broadcast on Mexican national television (Hermanson 
2009; Ross 2006; Worker Rights Consortium 2001c). Management and the CROC 
refused to allow many of the striking workers to return to work; others were required to 
sign loyalty oaths to the CROC or forced to resign (Worker Rights Consortium 2001c). 
 Upon receiving word of the start of the strike, USAS and other US anti-sweatshop 
groups began to mobilize. The day immediately following the attack on the workers, 
Evelyn Zepeda, a Salvadoran-American USAS member at Pitzer College in California, 
arrived in Atlixco to help coordinate actions between the workers and USAS via the 
internet. She remained there for the duration of the campaign, with the financial support 
of the Solidarity Center, staying with Marcela Muñoz, one of the fired leaders 
(Hermanson 2009; Ross 2006). 
USAS also began mobilizing in the US. USAS member Eric Brakken (interview, 
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2007) recalled, 
We had a lot of schools who by this point had gotten their 
[administrations] to do the code of conduct, signed on with the WRC and 
some, on some level, were looking for something to do. What's the next 
stage of this, what are we going to do? They had already had a mobilized 
student base and were ready to be activated around something and this 
gave us the excuse to do that. It was nothing huge. I don't think we even 
had any sit-ins around Kukdong. We had protests, we had letter-writing 
campaigns, we had e-mails campaigns. 
Specifically, USAS put out an e-mail, urging its members to take action, targeting both 
Nike and Reebok, as Kukdong’s major customers, and those colleges who had contracts 
with the two companies. USAS took advantage of newly developed technology, to which 
they were given access by the AFL-CIO, to inundate Nike and Reebok with mass e-
mailings, demanding action--now a standard tactic, but then something that took the 
companies somewhat by surprise. They also held protests outside Nike stores in a number 
of cities, committing civil disobedience in Chicago and San Francisco (Ross 2006) 
(McGrath, Stoppard*; interviews, 2007). McGrath (interview, 2007) noted that by this 
point, of the anti-sweatshop groups in the US, USAS, “was the one that had the most 
ability to turn out the grassroots arm. […] Whatever USAS decided to do as far as actions 
on campuses or sending public messages to companies had a lot of influence.” 
USAS also pressured their schools’ administrations to follow up on their 
commitments as members of the WRC. By this point, most administrators were relatively 
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responsive to USAS--they had been through enough sit-ins and other such actions that 
they knew there could be trouble if they didn’t respond to students’ demands. Thus, 
USAS members needed to do little more than hold educational events and public rallies 
(McGrath, Stoppard; interviews, 2007). Additionally, now that they had joined the WRC, 
a minority of administrators genuinely felt they had some stake in this issue and in seeing 
that Nike and Reebok actually abided by their agreements (Nova, interview, 2007). At 
this stage, USAS was not asking schools to suspend their contracts with Nike or Reebok--
just to get in touch with them and let them know of their concern. The threat of 
suspended or canceled contracts was certainly in the background of these conversations 
though and both Nike and Reebok knew there could potentially be unpleasant 
consequences if they did not follow through on their commitments to maintain high labor 
standards among their contractors (McGrath, Stoppard; interviews, 2007). 
Other groups in the US also took actions in support of the Kukdong workers. 
USLEAP and the Campaign for Labor Rights also had sizeable grassroots networks they 
mobilized through their e-mail lists (Brigham 2003) (McGrath, interview, 2007). UNITE 
put up a video on its website behindthelabel.org, in which a fourteen year-old girl who 
had worked at Kukdong spoke about her experiences. All this activity generated 
significant media coverage, including in such prominent papers as The New York Times, 
The Washington Post and The Financial Times, which further increased the pressure on 
Nike (Brigham 2003; Hermanson 2009) (Hermanson, interview, 2007). Nike tried to 
actively counter both its bad press in the national media and the e-mails circulated by 
USAS. Brakken (interview, 2007) told me, “We'd be writing communiqués all the time 
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on our list-serves about what was going on there and Nike would be responding in real 
time. They had a special Kukdong section on their web site. We had this running 
dialogue with Nike, each of us putting out communiqués--and that is a testament to the 
fact that a lot of people were engaged all over the country and they were taking action.” 
Additionally, on the advice of the Solidarity Center and USAS, the workers at Kukdong 
filed a formal complaint with the WRC in January 18, 2001. As a result, the Consortium 
began to prepare to investigate the situation on the ground (Ross 2006; Worker Rights 
Consortium 2001c). 
 As a result of the pressure on them, Nike and Reebok soon began, in their turn, to 
pressure Kukdong’s management to reinstate the fired leaders. Kukdong, however, was 
reluctant to do so. In an effort to move things along, Hermanson drew on his own 
contacts and invited in some Korean allies of the Solidarity Center, the Korean House of 
International Solidarity (KHIS), a group of lawyers and academics who were supporters 
of the progressive Korean Confederation of Trade Unions. Given their status as 
professionals, Kukdong’s management was willing to give them a hearing. One of them, 
Francisco Chang, was a Korean raised in both Argentina and the US; as a result he spoke 
Korean, Spanish and English and had an understanding of the cultures of all three 
societies. Chang and the rest of the KHIS delegation found a way to bridge the cultural 
gap between Kukdong’s management, the Mexican workers and the US solidarity 
activists, and on February 19, 2001 persuading the company to reinstate the workers and 
recognize an independent union (Brigham 2003; Hermanson 2009) (Hermanson, 
interview, 2007). 
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They explained to management how the return of the leaders was required 
by law and by the codes of conduct of their customers. The reinstatements 
had to be seen not as an admission of guilt by the company, but as an 
‘olive branch’ to try and put the dispute behind them and get back to work. 
In fact the reinstatement of the workers would prove that Kukdong was an 
ethical company, committed to generous treatment of their workers 
(Hermanson 2009, italics in original). 
 As a result, three of the five leaders of the striking workers were rehired. 
Following this, they set out to persuade as many as possible to return to work (and their 
worried parents to let them), with the goal of continuing the struggle from within. After a 
couple of months of such organizing, about half of the workers did so. They set up a new 
union, the Independent Union of Workers of Kukdong International--Mexico (Sindicato 
de los Trabajadores de la Empresa Kukdong Internacional de Mexico or SITEKIM), but 
they could not get official recognition for it. The Puebla Local Board of Conciliation and 
Arbitration--the official body charged with settling labor disputes in the maquiladora 
sector--was controlled by the PRI. The last thing the PRI wanted to see was the CROC 
decertified or workers allowed to vote for an independent union--this might set a 
precedent and encourage workers in other factories to pursue the same course of action 
(Brigham 2003; Hermanson 2009) (Hermanson, interview, 2007). 
 Even as the workers were moving forward with their struggles at Kukdong, a 
number of separate delegations came to visit the factory and the region to evaluate the 
situation. One was sent by Nike, which sought to assess the situation itself. The 
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delegation was lead by Arturo Alcalde, a Mexican lawyer who sat on the board of the 
International Labor Rights Fund (ILRF), one of the few labor rights groups still 
associated with the FLA, but one which the Solidarity Center continued to regard as a 
genuine ally (Brigham 2003) (Hermanson, interview, 2007). USAS member Marion 
Traub-Werner (interview, 2007), with the help of the Solidarity Center, set up a second 
delegation, consisting of administrators and students from a number of colleges and 
universities. 
I was there for like a week and something setting up all the groundwork, 
and then within three weeks, there was a delegation of twelve university 
lawyers and administrators. And there were a couple of students on that 
too. I led them on this one-week, fact-finding mission, and we interviewed 
everyone. The idea was, Okay, here we have this case and what are 
universities going to do? We took them to the factory, we took a tour, we 
talked to management, and then we took them to the different towns, 
because this was a factory where the workers actually migrated daily from 
indigenous towns around it. […] They talked to workers about what 
happened, talked to the government, to the Solidarity Center, all the 
players. 
This allowed the university representatives to assess the situation independently of both 
Nike and the WRC. Since this was the WRC’s first case, the school officials could not be 
sure what sort of job the Consortium would actually do. 
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Under pressure from Nike, Kukdong’s owners also agreed to a joint delegation by 
representatives of the WRC and Verité, an FLA-accredited monitoring firm (Brigham 
2003). They took care, however, in putting the inspection team together. It was lead by 
Mark Barenberg, then president of the WRC’s Board of Directors and a professor at 
Columbia University who specialized in US, Mexican and international labor law. Other 
members of the team included Scott Nova, the WRC’s recently hired executive director; 
two representatives of USAS, Marikah Mancini and David Long; Marcella David, a 
professor at Iowa College, who represented the WRC’s university caucus; Rev. David 
Dyson and Rodrigo Olvera, both labor rights activists; and Huberto Juarez Nuñez, a 
professor of economics at the Autonomous University of Puebla, who was also part of 
Verité’s team (Worker Rights Consortium 2001c). Given the urgency of the situation, the 
WRC put out a preliminary report on January 24, 2001, stating that the Kukdong 
employees’ right to freedom of association had clearly been violated and that the striking 
workers, particularly their leaders, should be reinstated immediately (Worker Rights 
Consortium 2001b). If this was not done, the workers would need to find work elsewhere, 
thus endangering the efforts to set up an independent union (Nova, interview, 2007). 
Meanwhile the WRC continued with its investigation, in preparation for a more 
in-depth report, which was published on June 20, 2001. Since this was the Consortium’s 
first report, they spelled out their methodology in some detail, in order to bolster their 
credibility. “The WRC Panel of Investigation made findings of fact on evidentiary points 
only when corroborated by several, credible eyewitnesses and by accurate documentary 
evidence […]. On points of fact seriously contested by any party, the full report recounts 
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evidence weighing for and against each finding” (Worker Rights Consortium 2001c). The 
inspection team spoke extensively not only with the Kukdong workers, but 
representatives of Kukdong’s management, officials from both the CROC and the Puebla 
state government, local human rights activists and academics, Alcalde (the ILRF 
representative who had conducted the earlier inspection for Nike), and a representative of 
Reebok, who was coincidentally at the plant at the same time as the WRC. Explaining the 
evidence for their conclusions in pains-taking detail, the report largely confirmed the 
workers’ complaints, noting that these were serious violations of colleges’ codes of 
conduct, Mexican law, and the International Labor Organization’s standards. As became 
the custom with its future reports, it noted in its June report the steps Nike, Reebok and 
Kukdong had taken towards dealing with the problems, while also discussing the ways in 
which they still fell substantially short of their obligations (Worker Rights Consortium 
2001c). 
 During the course of all this, Nike refused to talk to representatives of USAS, 
since they considered the organization outsiders without a legitimate stake in the dispute, 
who were simply intent on destroying their company (Hermanson, interview, 2007). They 
also publicly attacked the WRC, arguing that its lack of experience made it unqualified to 
conduct an investigation (Brigham 2003). Nike did, however, get in touch with the 
Solidarity Center, after being referred to them by the director of the ILRF. Since their 
inspection team did not consist of Nike employees, they were a bit unsure of its reliability 
and wanted a second opinion. According to Hermanson (interview, 2007), 
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The Solidarity Center has an institutional presence and the prestige of 
being an institution of the AFL-CIO, not viewed as radicals or crazies or 
extremists, and I think that helped. I don't think that's enough--I do think 
that institutional asset has to be exercised very carefully. You have to 
gradually build up, because Nike's not a fan of the AFL-CIO--but at least 
they know who we were and they're ready to take our calls, where they 
wouldn't take USAS's calls. 
As a union organization, Nike knew that the Solidarity Center ultimately wanted to reach 
a deal--they did not think the Solidarity Center simply wanted to take them down, the 
way they saw USAS. Hermanson also had a great deal of experience in Mexico and 
understood the country’s labor laws; thus, he could credibly represent himself as an 
expert who would provide reliable information (Hermanson, interview, 2007). 
The Solidarity Center thus made a strategic decision not to engage in explicit 
protest, but play the role of a broker, relaying communications between groups that 
would not directly talk to each other. “What we could contribute to the struggle was to be 
a credible voice to Nike, to Kukdong, to the press, to the Mexican government, to the US 
government, but not to be seen as the campaigners. I mean, everybody knew that we were 
the AFL-CIO, and which side we’re on. It’s just that we're not going to be the ones 
demonstrating--there are other groups that can do that better than we can” (Hermanson, 
interview, 2007). 
 Over the summer of 2001, Nike began cutting significantly cutting its orders with 
Kukdong, publicly attributing this to a seasonal drop-off in demand. As a result, 
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management was forced to lay off large numbers of employees, reducing its workforce to 
350 (Ross 2006). This pressure convinced the factory-owners that they had to find some 
way to get rid of CROC and work with an independent union if they wanted to retain 
their business. The factory-owners finally struck a compromise with the labor Board and 
the CROC. Kukdong formally closed down and reopened as another company, 
Mexmode. It paid the CROC off--officially, compensating them for damages--while it 
negotiated with the workers. Workers in turn dissolved SITEKIM and created a new 
independent union, the Independent Union of Workers of Mexmode (Sindicato 
Independiente de Trabajadores de la Empresa Mexmode or SITEMEX), which the labor 
Board agreed to recognize (possibly, after they too received a pay-off from Mexmode’s 
owners). Even as the labor Board was deciding to certify the union, Mexmode and 
SITEMEX were busy negotiating a contract. They finally agreed upon one on September 
30, 2001, nine months after the initial strike (Hermanson 2009). 
 While tensions between management and workers certainly remained, things 
improved considerably. “The first contract at MexMode had a nominal 10% wage 
increase, in recognition of the losses the company had suffered during the nine-month 
struggle and as a show of good faith by the new union” (Hermanson 2009). It also 
contained language clearly protecting workers from abuse by supervisors. The contract 
lasted only six months, so it could be renegotiated in March 2002, when management 
hoped to have the factory back at full production again and able to provide the workers 
with better compensation (Hermanson 2009). Nike, however, initially refused to return its 
orders to the factory to the pre-strike levels. A group of Mexmode workers went on a tour 
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of the US, speaking at a number of colleges with which the brand had licensing 
agreements. As a result of renewed public pressure, Nike significantly boosted its 
business with Mexmode (Ross 2006). SITEMEX and Mexmode’s management signed a 
new contract on April 1, 2002, which gave the workers a 38% bonus--effectively a 
substantial raise that made them among the best paid workers in the region (Hermanson 
2009). Thus, USAS and the WRC--in alliance with a number of other groups, such as the 
Solidarity Center, the Korean House of International Solidarity, and a number of US-
based groups such as UNITE and USLEAP--were able to successfully support the 
workers in their struggle for justice. 
 
Other Major USAS Campaigns 
 The Kukdong campaign was not the only major solidarity campaign undertaken 
by USAS and its allies. Two other important ones, which I will only review here more 
briefly, were in support of workers at the BJ&B plant in the Dominican Republic and at 
the New Era Cap plant in Derby, New York. 
 The BJ&B campaign began before the establishment of the WRC, in 1997, just as 
USAS was coming together as a national organization. The BJ&B factory was owned by 
the Yupoong Company, based in South Korea. It produced baseball caps for a wide range 
of customers, including universities, professional sports teams and some of the major 
brand name companies, including Nike. As with most sweatshops, the vast majority--
95%--of the 2,000 workers were young women. And, as with most such factories, 
conditions were highly abusive--workers complained of verbal and physical abuse, sexual 
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harassment, undrinkable water, forced overtime, and poverty-level wages. In 1997, a 
Dominican Union, the National Federation of Free Trade Workers (Federacion Nacional 
de Trabajadores de Zonas or FENATRAZONAS), contacted UNITE for help. The US 
union, in its turn, published a report on the situation in 1998, specifically orienting it 
towards students, in order to pull the newly developing USAS into the struggle on the 
side of the workers--a sensible strategy, given that a significant portion of BJ&B’s 
production was for US colleges and universities. UNITE also organized a US tour for two 
workers from BJ&B--nineteen-year-old Kenia Rodriquez and twenty-year-old Roselio 
Reyes--which included a number of speaking events at colleges. Unfortunately, the 
Yupoong company was highly resistant to making any meaningful concessions and the 
struggle dragged on for years (Esbenshade 2004a; Ross 2006). 
After the WRC was founded, they investigated the situation in January 2002, as a 
renewed unionization effort began at BJ&B; Zepeda--the USAS member who had spent 
the duration of the Kukdong campaign in Puebla--also went to the Dominican Republic, 
to coordinate between the union there and USAS. BJ&B’s management engaged in 
retaliatory firings of the union’s leaders and publicly accused them of being terrorists. 
The WRC persuaded Nike (BJ&B’s largest customer) and the FLA to come on board and 
join it in pressuring the factory’s management. Even with this pressure, management still 
resisted negotiating with the union or even treating its workers decently. It was not until 
March 2003 that BJ&B signed an agreement with the BJ&B Company Workers’ Union 
(Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Empresa BJ&B S.A.) (Esbenshade 2004a; Ross 2006). 
 The New Era Cap campaign was a bit different from most other USAS solidarity 
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campaigns because its focus was on solidarity with workers at a factory in the US (in 
Derby, New York), rather than overseas (though New Era has contracted other work 
abroad). New Era produced baseball caps both for major league sports teams and a 
number of colleges and universities. The company started off as a small, family-owned 
business, with generally good relations between management and their employees. As the 
business grew and became more impersonal, these relations soured. By 2001, there were 
three major points of contention between the roughly 350 workers and management. The 
first was that working conditions did not meet proper ergonomic standards, leading to 
pervasive on the job injuries and work-related ailments such as carpal tunnel syndrome; 
often times, workers did not report these for fear of being fired. After the workers at the 
Derby plant voted to affiliate with the Communication Workers of America (CWA) in 
1997, management responded with persistent union-busting tactics. It also became clear 
during the course of the struggle that management simply had no respect for the workers, 
which was, in many ways, the straw that broke the camel’s back. Although 
representatives of the CWA tried to persuade the workers to take less confrontational 
actions (such as working to rule),11 in July 2001 they voted overwhelmingly to go on 
strike--a strike which lasted eleven months (Carty 2006; Worker Rights Consortium 
2001a, 2002) (Howald, Palmer; interviews, 2007). 
Even before the strike began, the CWA had begun contacting other groups in 
hopes of mobilizing a solidarity campaign behind the New Era workers. Through the 
local chapter of Jobs with Justice (a national organization focusing on building ties 
between the labor movement and progressive community organizations), the Derby 
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workers got in touch with USAS. After interviewing workers and documenting pervasive 
on the job injuries and union-busting, the students concluded that the New Era factory 
qualified as a sweatshop. They began a national campaign against New Era, urging their 
schools to suspend their contracts with the company until such time as the labor dispute 
was resolved. New Era workers spoke at college campuses across the country and at 
USAS’s annual national conference. After the workers filed a formal complaint in May 
2001, the WRC also undertook an investigation, with which New Era’s management 
initially refused to cooperate. The Consortium thus published an initial report in August 
2001, documenting the problems and management’s refusal to cooperate. As more and 
more schools began suspending their contracts, New Era’s management eventually came 
to the bargaining table and reached an agreement with the workers in March 2002, 
recognizing the CWA and correcting the ergonomic problems. Afterwards, the WRC 
followed up on its previous investigation and issued a new, final report, which reported 
that New Era’s management had fixed the bulk of the problems and was working in good 
faith on the others (Carty 2006; Worker Rights Consortium 2001a, 2002) (Howald, 
Palmer; interviews, 2007). David Palmer (interview, 2007), a national organizer with the 
CWA, who was deeply involved with the New Era campaign told me, “And, it is my 
belief--and I've told USAS people that were involved--if it was not for the student 
movement, I do not believe we would have been successful at New Era Cap. They did 
one heck of a job. The student movement was a key piece of CWA strategy.” 
Unfortunately, neither the Kukdong/ Mexmode nor BJ&B victories have proved 
lasting. This follows an all too common pattern in the anti-sweatshop movement. The 
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problem, as has been noted before, is that once conditions for workers improve, their 
employer’s cost of doing business goes up--and its patrons among the major brand name 
firms will look elsewhere for cheaper factories (Armbruster-Sandoval 2005). In the case 
of Mexmode, it has lost a good deal of business to China, where prices are generally 
cheaper to begin with--and independent unions illegal (Robert J.S. Ross, personal 
communication, 2010). In the case of BJ&B, shortly after the victory at that factory, 
Yupoong began shifting production to factories it owned in Vietnam, where independent 
unions are illegal, and to Bangladesh, which has export processing zones, another site 
where unions are banned. BJ&B’s major patrons, Nike and Adidas, began moving their 
orders to these new factory locations as well. In February 2007, Yupoong abruptly shut 
down BJ&B without providing the workers there the necessary legal notice time. 
Additionally, the company refused to negotiate with the union on terms of their legally 
required severance pay. Instead, it required workers to sign an agreement stating they 
would not press for more severance pay, in return for which Yupoong would provide 
with only what they were legally required to pay them under Dominican law. Nike 
meanwhile continually misrepresented the situation, insisting that Yupoong had come to 
a negotiated agreement with the union. It was only after more pressure was applied to 
Nike and Adidas that Yupoong finally agreed to negotiate with the workers and provide 
them decent compensation (Clean Clothes Campaign 2007; Nova 2007b, 2007c). The 
temporary nature of these victories was one of the major factors leading USAS, the WRC 
and others in the anti-sweatshop movement to reconsider their strategy and design the 
Designated Suppliers Program, which we will explore in chapter fifteen. 
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Having examined these individual campaigns, we can now turn to looking at the 
common elements that underlie these struggles. We will start by taking a closer look at 
how the structure of the global apparel industry shapes the political opportunity system of 
USAS and the anti-sweatshop movement--what kind of organizing space they have, 
where they have points of leverage, etc.--before moving on to look at the common 
strategic model behind these campaigns. 
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Chapter 13: Commodity Chains and Political Opportunity Systems 
 
 
The Global Political Opportunity System 
 While every solidarity campaign is different, there are common threads that run 
through all of them. Each campaign is waged in a similar set of social arenas, trying to 
use similar points of leverage--in other words, the political opportunity system within 
which the movements fights these battles is more or less the same across campaigns, with 
differences primarily due to the nature of the companies involved and their relationships 
to each other. The movement also has developed a standard strategic model for such 
solidarity campaigns--though, as with their strategic model for waging campus-based 
campaigns, they will adapt it to suit the circumstances of the individual campaign. 
 When we examined campus campaigns, the political opportunity system was 
relatively simple, in that we were looking at one social arena--the college campus. At its 
most complex level, as with the battle for the WRC, the struggle was fought in parallel on 
multiple campuses, with students coordinating their actions across campuses, while also 
fighting a secondary battle in the arena of the national mass media. Even in this case 
though, we can more or less understand what was happening by looking at how the 
campaign was waged on individual campuses. Solidarity campaigns in support of 
workers at factories producing college-licensed goods involve a much more complex 
POS, one that is fought in multiple social arenas--the actual factory where the workers 
labor; the brand name companies that do business with these factories; the schools with 
licensing agreements with these brands; and the national US mass media. Additionally, at 
times, the governments of the countries where the manufacturing takes place may get 
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involved, whether to repress the workers or (more rarely) to support their right to form a 
union. The battles here make use of three main points of leverage--the workers’ ability to 
disrupt production (for instance, through a strike) at the factory; the brands’ desire to 
maintain their good public image, which students can sully on their campuses and the US 
movement as a whole in the national mass media; and colleges’ and universities’ 
licensing agreements with the brands. The last two intersect with each other on the 
college campus, since licensing agreements are, in many ways, a highly specialized 
marketing strategy. The battles of this campaign are then fought at various locations on 
the commodity chain--the production process in the factory, the marketing process in the 
mass media, and one important site of consumption, college campuses. 
 We have already examined in depth in chapter two the nature of apparel 
commodity chains, describing the power differences between core and peripheral nodes--
that is, between the lead firms and the contractors. Here, we will look at how they form a 
chain of interlinked social arenas that form a single political opportunity system, within 
which the anti-sweatshop movement must maneuver. 
 
Social Arenas and Organizing Space 
As discussed in chapter two, many of the core firms in the apparel industry are 
sometimes referred to as the “brands”--they do not manufacture; instead, they market, an 
orientation that allows them to control the most profitable points of the production system 
and thus gives them the lion’s share of power. Thus, whatever brand-name corporations 
are involved in a particular struggle constitute the key decision-making arenas in the 
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struggle. USAS member Molly McGrath (interview, 2007) told me of the brands, 
“They've been able to just shut down a factory where a lot of people are organizing. 
Brands don't own the factories but brands have a tremendous influence over the factories 
that they can just take their orders out of them. There's nothing a factory really can do. A 
lot of times the business relationship is so important that a factory owner will just do 
whatever the brands tell them to do.” As discussed in chapter two, however, the brands 
rarely actually tell their contractors to keep workers’ wages down and implement 
sweatshop conditions. Instead, they tell them to keep manufacturing costs as low as 
possible--a condition that almost inevitably leads to sweatshop conditions, but allows the 
core firms to plead ignorance. But, just as the brands and the contractors are core and 
peripheral nodes in the production process, they are also core and peripheral decision-
making arenas in the political opportunity system. Because the brands hold so much 
power, the decisions they make have important consequences for those located in other 
decision-making arenas. The contractors, in their peripheral location, have relatively little 
influence on decisions made in other arenas. 
 The challenge for anti-sweatshop activists is that, regardless of their relationship 
to the commodity chain, whether as workers or consumers, they have no direct access to 
the core decision-making arenas constituted by corporations. These organizations are 
highly anti-democratic, closed systems that make little room for outside voices to be 
heard. Thus, activists must find ways to indirectly effect the decisions made by the 
brands’ boards of directors and major executives. Students, as we have explored, may, 
with the right strategy, be able to exercise a fair amount of power within colleges and 
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universities, which are a major site of marketing and consumption. US activists more 
generally may, with the proper strategy, be able to influence the framing of a particular 
company in the US mass media, which can negatively effect their all-important brand 
image. Given the centrality of both the national US mass media and college campuses to 
the brands’ advertising strategies--and thus their profitability--both these sites are 
semiperipheral arenas. Though the brands still make the key decisions, they cannot 
simply shrug off what happens here in the way they can with their contractors. They must 
take the mass media and colleges campuses as social arenas into account if they wish 
their marketing to succeed. While they can abandon one contractor in favor of another, 
they cannot abandon the national US mass media; nor can they give up the college 
market altogether and they are usually very reluctant to surrender any school to which 
they do have access through a licensing agreement. 
Jeff Hermanson (interview, 2007) of the Solidarity Center told me that press 
coverage of anti-sweatshop campaigns has 
been critical in the development of anti-sweatshop consciousness and, at 
certain times, critical in the development of certain campaigns--Kukdong 
is a good example. I think there are others examples--the BJ&B campaign 
in the Dominican Republic is an example where a mention in the press 
was important, mostly because of its impact on the companies that control 
the brands that you're trying to influence. They don't want to appear in the 
press, so when they do appear, they try to fix it. But it also creates a sense 
of our own power to the press--it helps the morale, it helps us see 
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ourselves, see our own power. 
Getting such press is not easy. Former USAS member Trina Tocco (interview, 2007), 
now with the ILRF, told me, “In order for us to even call up The New York Times, I feel 
like I have to have a fourteen-year-old chained to a sewing machine.” The problem, as 
discussed in chapter three, is that the sweatshop issue has become “old news” and 
therefore it takes an extraordinary hook to get a particular instance of sweatshop abuses 
to get coverage. The Kukdong campaign could get such coverage because it was the first 
investigation undertaken by the WRC, an organization whose very creation had been 
controversial. The Kukdong campaign was therefore novel and interesting--and Nike and 
Reebok, as companies very much invested in their brand image, were particularly 
sensitive to such coverage. 
 Workers have access to the factory as a decision-making arena, something not 
true of other groups, who can only influence what happens there indirectly. Like the 
college campus, the factory as a social arena is undemocratic; unlike the college campus, 
there is little tradition in most such factories of management listening to and having to 
take into account the opinions of workers, the way college officials must do with 
students, however reluctantly. Trying to exercise power in such conditions is, to say the 
least, not easy--and often involves risking one’s life. Workers trying to organize face a 
number of challenges--unlike students on college campuses, their ability to form 
autonomous organizations through which they can mobilize is highly restricted; if they do 
mobilize, they are likely to face repression, both from their employers and, more often 
than not, the state as well; and, even if they can successfully pressure their employers, 
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their employers may have relatively little power to change working conditions, given 
their peripheral location in the commodity chain. Hermanson (interview, 2007) summed 
up the position of the larger, multinational manufacturing companies (like the owners of 
Kukdong/ Mexmode) thus: 
The multinational production companies have an ability to close and 
move, but they're less mobile actually [than the brands]. They own the 
facilities, they don't just contract there. They too have a lot of capital 
relative to workers’ organizations. They have relationships with local 
governments especially, often corrupt relationships. The weakness of the 
production companies is that although they have a lot of capital, it's 
limited--it's not unlimited capital and therefore they need to make a profit 
just about every season in order to sustain their operations. Unlike the 
brands, which don't need to make a profit every season on any given 
factory or any given group of factories, multinational production 
companies need to make a profit on almost every one of their factories in 
order to survive in that location. They treat each factory as a separate 
profit center--if it's not making a profit, they close it down. They'll have 
big losses. They're very vulnerable to worker action because the 
conditions are so bad and so uniformly bad, which means that a single 
spark can start a prairie fire--it just doesn't take much to disrupt production 
in a Korean factory in Guatemala, Honduras, or Bangladesh. 
 Social arenas differ not only in their decision-making structures and the rules 
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which guide framing contests, but in the organizing space those within them have. 
Workers in third-world sweatshops typically have very little space to organize. While 
college administrators recognize the right of students to form their own autonomous 
groups, including ones that press for changes in policy at the college, most factory-
owners do not recognize the right of workers to form independent unions. The factory-
owner may well have signed onto a code of conduct requiring them to recognize such 
unions, but in practice, such measures are usually ignored or the company will try to 
substitute a “yellow” union--one controlled either by the company itself or (as with the 
CROC at Kukdong) by the government. While in the US, when the brands have engaged 
in counter-measures against the anti-sweatshop movement, they have primarily used 
framing strategies like corporate social responsibility programs, in most sweatshops, the 
first counter-measure employers will rely on is brute repression, often with the backing of 
the state. 
 USAS member Liana Dalton (interview, 2007) spoke about her experience 
working in the Philippines with workers facing government repression. 
The Philippines was really an intense experience for me, because I was 
sleeping on picket lines with people who were wanted by the military and 
who couldn't go home, just because of their involvement in organizing. It 
really struck me one time because I met with this guy who was organizing 
an auto parts factory. He was telling me about his organizing drive and he 
was telling me, Oh, I actually want to tell you about the log I've been 
keeping […] and he said he wanted me to be an added witness and I said, 
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Okay. He detailed things like, October 12th, 7-9pm, two armed gunmen 
on motorcycles outside my house. He said he was keeping this log and he 
had one copy in his house and one at the union, so when he was murdered 
by the military, we have some documentation that proves they were 
involved and we could actually attack the government more concretely for 
killing him. How do you respond to that? He's already creating evidence 
for his eventual murder investigation that hasn't happened. But he says 
he's still standing and we're still organizing and we're going to get this 
union won. 
 The overall effect of these various factors that close the organizing space open to 
workers can be devastating. While in some cases, workers are able to organize and 
persevere, more often than not, this is not the case. Dalton (interview, 2007) also told me 
of her experiences in Cambodia, where the labor movement was less well organized, due 
not only to repression, but also due to the fact that the unions have simply been in 
existence for much less time. 
In Cambodia, for example, you've got strikes that last for a few days or a 
week or a month--and then people get bought off, because their children 
are going to starve and the campaign strategy and organizing are not 
comprehensive enough to maintain very long-term struggles in many 
cases. They're going to take the money--you can't really blame them for 
taking the money, most people would take the money, in the absence of a 
clear plan to win. But this reality, compounded with the repression that 
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makes it an uphill battle for unions … I'm not saying they don't have a 
long-term vision, but it's very much a fight for survival and dealing with 
things as they come up on a daily basis. In Cambodia I would come to 
work in the morning at seven and I'd be like, What's the deal today? 
There'd be no plan for the work, because you wouldn't know what was 
going on--and all of a sudden there'd be a strike in this factory, okay, 
you’ve got to go there. You'd find out about it the day of or the day before. 
It's very much like that. It's really difficult, especially with the factories 
closing. 
 Organizing space can be limited in more subtle ways as well. In a study of worker 
organizing in Thai garment factories, Piya Pangsapa (2007) found that the way 
management organized work could make a significant difference. One factory she studied 
was organized in a paternalistic fashion--the bathrooms were clean, there was drinking 
water available, the owner allowed the women to take days off for medical reasons. This 
meant that the ways in which the women were being exploited were not clearly visible to 
them--they tended to see overtime work as a way of making more money, rather than to 
focus on the unfairness of needing to work overtime to make ends meet. Another factory 
Pangsapa looked at was more obviously exploitive--it was filthy, management had armed 
guards present, and the transportation to the women’s dorms left only after the overtime 
shift finished, making the coercion to work such hours obvious. Here, the workers 
organized and tried to resist management--at least for a time. Following the economic 
crisis of 1997, however, the managers of this second factory reorganized production 
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along a piecework system, under which the women were not paid by the hour, but by how 
much work they did. This system pitted the workers against each other, as each tried to 
produce more than the next and thus get paid more than the next. This innovation on 
management’s part was highly effective in ending worker organizing, since it undermined 
workers’ sense of solidarity with each other. Workers certainly still felt exploited, but 
they grew resigned, believing there was little they could do about it. 
 One of the main goals of the US anti-sweatshop movement is simply to find ways 
to increase the organizing space open to workers in these factories, so that their chances 
of creating an autonomous, independent union that can bargain effectively with their 
employers is increased. I heard this again and again from the activists I spoke with. For 
instance, USAS member Laura McSpedon (interview, 2007) told me, 
I think for me, the ultimate long-term goal was to create the room for 
workers to organize in this industry. Ultimately, what workers need to 
guarantee better working conditions and better pay and all of that is a 
union contract. And so for me, […] that was the long-term goal--to create 
a structure and to create systems that opened up that space, in a way that it 
was closed when we started. And so then, within that, creating the codes 
of conduct, creating a monitoring system, all of that was toward that end 
of workers having the power in their workplace to organize and have a 
voice--and these structures are just meant to facilitate and support that. 
Not that any code of conduct or any monitor was going to be able to create 
good working conditions--that we know is not true--but they could create 
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the possibility of workers organizing and being able to appeal to these 
structures that support that. 
 Long-time labor solidarity activist Stephen Coates (interview, 2007) not only 
concurred with this approach, but saw the work of USAS as having contributed 
significantly to it--though the problems still remain great. 
The weakness in the labor movement in these countries makes it very 
difficult to achieve the progress on the ground that we would like to see 
with respect to worker organizing. I think an important development of the 
anti-sweatshop movement over the last fifteen years has been the 
emergence of […] USAS. I think they've been extremely powerful in 
putting a lot of pressure on companies and helping create this space for 
improved conditions or at least to create a space where workers can 
organize for better conditions. Unions have been so weak, particularly in 
Central America; they have been historically squashed and there's still a 
lot of intimidation around that, so it's very, very difficult even with the 
space that the Northern activity has provided for the workers to form 
unions. 
 The US movement cannot directly effect the decisions made by the managers of 
sweatshops. They can, however, influence the decisions made by core corporations--and 
these corporations, in their turn, can significantly influence the decisions made by 
sweatshop employers. USAS member Jessica Rutter (interview, 2007) described the 
power dynamics at work this way: The brands 
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are the ones who are making a large profit and everything, and so […] 
they pretty much have the power to determine everything that happens 
below them in the supply chain. We have seen the power of brands being 
able to say one word and have something happen. There was a worker 
who had been fired for months for union organizing and the brand stepped 
in and said, Hey, you guys have to rehire this worker. It could happen the 
next day. And so this is something that we knew from experience and also 
just from analyzing what the supply chain looks like--it's very obvious that 
the brands themselves are the ones that have the most power. They have 
the power to determine price, they have the power to determine again 
working conditions. I mean, not necessarily that they were [explicitly] 
determining working conditions, but they were by paying certain 
conditions and by not taking certain steps to ensure certain things. 
Whenever a problem is brought to the brands, they say, Oh, we didn't 
know about this. Thank you so much for bringing it to our attention, and I 
have no doubt that they probably didn't know about that problem, but that 
doesn't mean they're not responsible for it, because in the end they [the 
contractors] are making products for brands, so they [the brands] are 
responsible. 
 It is worth noting that governments also play a significant role in this--in the eyes 
of the anti-sweatshop movement, mostly not for the better. In addition to aiding in the 
direct repression of workers, the legal structure governing the formation of unions has a 
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large effect on the organizing space open for workers. In the case of the workers at 
Kukdong, at least in theory, they had the right to form an independent union, even if the 
local government did its best to obstruct that process. In China or Vietnam, however, 
workers would not even have that much freedom, since unions not affiliated with the 
state and the Communist Party are illegal. Hermanson (interview, 2007) observed that, as 
a result, “government repression was not as powerful [in Kukdong] as it is in China. They 
put down the strike, but then they didn't station troops there.” In many countries, such as 
Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador, the very fact that there has been a long history of 
military governments using extreme levels of violence against the labor movement has 
left a legacy, even after the transition to formal democracy. The labor movements in these 
countries remain weak, workers are often fearful of the consequences of organizing, and, 
while conditions have improved, violence against progressive activists remains very 
much part of the political culture of those countries (Armbruster-Sandoval 2005). 
 The legal structure can have more subtle effects as well. USAS member Ken 
Abrams* (interview, 2007) observed that one of the difficulties in organizing in Central 
America is that the laws of those countries (as is also the case with the US) only permit 
union organizing by individual factory, not by industrial sector. 
And without industrial unions in a sector where factories are constantly 
shutting down and opening up … I mean, it's actually how the factories 
are written into the law, right? Ten years of tax-free benefits means you're 
going to shut down in one town and open up in another. So this constant 
shutting down and opening up makes factory-based union organizing 
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incredibly difficult, because what you need are institutions that aren't 
linked to the exact factory. I've seen this so many times--you have this 
great union executive committee, they have lists--an internally well-
organized union, fighting for something in their shop... and the factory 
closes and now those people are unemployed workers, right? And if they 
go to another factory, they're not part of an organization anymore. You 
have to start all over again. 
 Occasionally, the government of a country may intervene in a positive way. In 
chapter three, for instance, in discussing the case of the Bibong factory in the Dominican 
Republic, I noted the positive role played the reformist Secretary of Labor Rafael 
Albuquerque in enabling unionization in the export processing zones in his country. Such 
cases are the exception to the rule though. In the vast majority of cases, governments 
back business, if for no other reason than that they are desperate to attract investment and 
so want to create as business-friendly a climate as possible. 
 
Exercising Leverage 
 Having identified which arenas it is critical for activist groups to affect decisions 
in, the obvious questions becomes how those groups actually shape those decisions. If 
anti-sweatshop activists have no direct access to the very closed, anti-democratic arena 
constituted by a core corporation, how do they manage to get corporate leaders to make 
decisions that favor workers? Activists need to find ways to exercise leverage--that is, 
they must find structural points of vulnerability to which they can strategically apply 
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pressure to coerce authorities into changing the sorts of decisions they make. In the anti-
sweatshop movement, such leverage has come from both ends of the commodity chain. 
Workers have exercised leverage by going on strike, thereby disrupting the production 
process. Most US activists have attempted to use damage to core corporations’ brand 
image--their major asset--as a point of leverage. USAS, with the help of its allies, has 
found a more powerful point of leverage--they rely on the nexus of brands’ concern for 
their image and their desire to have licensing agreements with colleges and universities to 
pressure the lead apparel firms. Importantly, neither point of leverage alone is enough. If 
workers simply strike on their own, they are unlikely to succeed. Instead, the most 
common course is for them to be repressed and for the rest of the world to hear little or 
nothing of this. On the other hand, US activists can do little to help workers if those 
workers are not already organizing and fighting on their own. It is essential for both sets 
of activists to work together and struggle in the arenas they have access to if they hope to 
achieve anything. 
 The sort of leverage that workers can exercise is fairly straightforward--without 
them working, nothing actually gets produced. When they go on strike, they disrupt the 
production process. As we have already noted, however, this is far more threatening to 
the peripheral contractors than to the core companies who actually hold the power. Even 
the larger manufacturing companies with multiple factories make a limited amount of 
money and need to make sure each factory turns a profit. Smaller companies may consist 
of only one factory, meaning that in the case of the strike, the owner has no other source 
of profit. In some cases, companies will simply shut down, lay everyone off, and reopen 
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under another name--but this may mean moving to another location and losing the money 
they sunk into setting up the factory in the first place. The core companies, on the other 
hand, can simply walk away from the conflict, because they have invested none of their 
own resources in these factories and there are many more contractors looking to do 
business with them. Thus, the workers can, with some degree of effectiveness, put 
pressure on their immediate employer, the peripheral manufacturing company; they have 
no leverage, however, over the core companies that actually hold the real power. For this, 
they must rely on allies in the US and Europe. On the other hand, US and European anti-
sweatshop activists have no way of directly pressuring the contractors--they can only do 
so indirectly. And there is no way that the workers can be empowered if they are not 
fighting themselves. The goal, after all, is to get the contractors to bargain in good faith 
with an independent union representing their works--and, if the workers are not 
organized, there is no such union. 
 According to Dalton (interview, 2007), it was during her time working with 
USAS’s allies in Hong Kong and elsewhere in Asia that the importance of working 
organizing really became clear for her. “A code of conduct is just a piece of paper. And I 
really learned at the time how important it was for workers to be empowered and workers 
to be enforcing that code of conduct. No matter how good of an external monitor you had 
or how good a code you had, it didn't matter if the workers on the ground weren't 
fighting, especially in the context of China where there really is no public, independent 
organizing.” On the other hand, David Palmer (interview, 2007), a national staff person 
for the CWA, who worked with the local union during the New Era strike, told me that 
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the union itself did not have the power on its own to settle the strike with New Era Cap. 
“It was really going to be the pocketbook of New Era that was going to settle this thing. 
[…] As the colleges one at a time started coming on board with suspending their 
contracts with New Era, the pocketbook thing started to come into play.” If a relatively 
strong, well-funded union like the CWA, working in a social environment where labor 
activists do not normally need to fear for their lives, cannot win the fight against a 
company like New Era on its own, the difficulties a smaller, more poorly funded union in 
a place where violence against labor unions is the norm become even clearer. 
 The main vulnerability of the core corporations, which the US anti-sweatshop 
movement seeks to use as a pressure point, is their brand image. As discussed in chapter 
two, a brand is a form of non-material capital and the major asset of many of the best-
known apparel companies. Much of their time and resources is spent in trying to manage 
consumers, through means such as advertising and marketing, in order to ensure that they 
associate positive symbolism with the brand image (Arvidsson 2006; Klein 1999). When 
the anti-sweatshop movement succeeds in associating a brand with sweatshops and all the 
ills that go with them, they are doing damage to the company in question’s main asset, 
their main way of turning a profit. Thus, these companies find such actions extremely 
threatening. Despite the potential threat posed by anti-sweatshop groups, however, it is 
important to remember that the brands nonetheless maintain the upper hand in most 
cases. UNITE HERE staff person Eric Dirnbach (interview, 2007) described the 
situations this way: 
We want to take that [the brand image] and associate it with something not 
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positive, i.e. we want to associate it with something the company does not 
want people to know about, which are the tremendous sweatshop labor 
problems that are going on, which are at many levels really horrifying, if 
you can get consumers to recognize what's happening. The problem from 
an activist standpoint is making that connection. It's very difficult, very 
difficult to get regular consumers--not activists, but folks going about their 
business that are not necessarily consumed by this issue--to be aware of 
what's happening. And we don't have a billion dollars for advertising like 
the industry does, otherwise we could run commercial and have billboards. 
All we have are people handing leaflets and may be, hopefully getting a 
news article, putting stuff on the websites, putting out an e-mail. That's 
what activists have. It's disseminating information and it's people-to-
people contact. 
 Nonetheless, the brands feel threatened by such campaigns. Some activists I 
spoke with felt like they had done permanent damage to some brands’ image. Scott Nova 
of the WRC (interview, 2007) told me, 
As long as Nike is around, people will have it in the back of their minds 
that somehow Nike is related to sweatshops--and that has hurt their brand 
image, to some extent irretrievably. It's still a really powerful brand image, 
but it is somewhat less powerful because of the sweatshop issue. They can 
never completely overcome that, although it is extraordinarily difficult to 
quantify what it's cost them financially. They probably try to keep it 
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private, but there's no question it has cost them something significant and, 
more importantly, there's no question that they believe that it cost them 
something significant. 
Other activists were a little more skeptical of how much impact they had had. 
McSpedon (interview, 2007) said, 
I wouldn't guess we had any financial impact on these companies. I think 
their fear of us having financial impact was almost disproportionate to 
what would happen in reality. The amount they spent fighting it was an 
indication of how sensitive they were--the other companies didn't want to 
be Nike, right? Nike had been painted with the sweatshop brush--and 
Kathy Lee and Wal-Mart had been--and they didn't want that to happen to 
them. 
Even if the financial impact was minimal as McSpedon thinks, as she notes, the brands 
are still terrified of the potential damage to their image--so, whether real or not, the anti-
sweatshop movement has been able to turn harm to these companies’ brand image into a 
major point of leverage. 
 In some cases, they have been able to hit brands at sensitive moments in their 
marketing strategy. The New Era campaign, for instance, happened just as the New Era 
Cap company was trying to move from being a largely anonymous producer of baseball 
caps to one with a greater visibility and brand-name recognition. Jane Howald (interview, 
2007), the president of the CWA local to which the New Era workers in Derby belonged, 
recalled, 
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They didn't want a blemish on their mark--they didn't want people to know 
New Era is a bad place. The way they designed the New Era flag, in our 
advertisements we used it against them. They said, We designed the New 
Era flag to represent the hard working American workers, and we said, So 
why are you treating us with disrespect? Don't label yourself a true 
patriotic company when you're sending all your work overseas and don't 
say it represents the workers when you won't even pay us a fair wage. We 
used their own words against them during a lot of the strike. 
 It should also be emphasized that there are many apparel companies who do not 
focus their marketing strategy on branding. Some of them are companies that are 
unknown to most people, such Cintas, the world’s largest uniform company; others are 
well known, such as Hanes, but their marketing strategy is based on being inexpensive, 
rather than having a particular image. Such companies represent much more a challenge 
to the anti-sweatshop movement. Abrams* (interview, 2007) said, 
If it's a brand, it has a public reputation that it cares about; if its strategy is 
selling its stuff on the basis of their image--useful, sexy, etc.--then it's 
vulnerable. If its main strategy is selling stuff cheap, then the consumer, 
typically, doesn't care whether it's Fruit of the Loom or Hanes, because 
they're just buying a white t-shirt or some underwear and they're not as 
vulnerable for obvious reasons. So, it's much harder. The main thing I'm 
focusing on these days is a case in the Dominican Republic. Hanes owns a 
factory with dismal conditions and treatment of workers and it's been 
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really hard to get Hanes to respond. They just don't care that much. It's not 
part of their business strategy to appeal to a real sexy image so it's harder 
to threaten that image. 
 Even in the best of circumstances, a campaign to damage a brand’s image is an 
uphill battle. As Dirnbach noted, activists are handing out leaflets and working to get the 
occasional news story in an attempt to counter billion-dollar advertising budgets. What 
was important about USAS for the anti-sweatshop movement is not simply that they 
mobilized a grassroots base in a way that the movement hadn’t been able to do before, 
but that they were able to exercise leverage in a way that the movement had not been able 
to before. In chapter four, we discussed the ways in which licensing agreements are 
critical to many brands’ marketing strategies. In part, it is this very deep investment in 
cultivating the college market that gives USAS much of the power that it has. In part, it is 
the fact that USAS does not have to rely on the diffuse actions of individual consumers, 
but can instead exercise use the power of an institutional consumer, which gives them far 
more concentrated power than a campaign focusing solely on individual consumers ever 
could. Rutter (interview, 2007) said, 
In terms of actually affecting Nike as a company, there's not really so 
much that you can do [as an individual]. But if you bring in the university 
as a consumer, as an institutional buyer … […] We could very much more 
easily influence our universities than the brands themselves, so the 
campaigns are structured in ways that we're kind of going up against the 
brands, but we're more going against our universities to demand that the 
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brands do certain things, which is just a much more effective strategy. 
 While this strategy is in part based on an ideology of worker empowerment, it is 
also rooted in USAS’s belief in achieving concrete results and a very hard-nosed 
assessment of where they actually can exercise power in such a way as to accomplish 
something. USAS member Zack Knorr (interview, 2007) said, 
For the four or five years that we're students, the place that we have the 
most power is our universities. And so we should use that power as 
strategically as possibly to move universities. That's why the initial focus 
was on university licensing--because that's the most direct power that 
universities have over these companies is that we actually own the 
trademark and we have the power to take it away from you [the brands] 
whenever we want. And we have the power to dictate conditions to you if 
you want the ability to use it. There's not much more of a direct 
connection than that. Our analysis has always been that you use the power 
you have in the place where you're at--so that's why we've tried to figure 
out the ways where, knowing that we're going to be doing most of our 
work on campus, the universities have the most influence over companies. 
A number of USAS activists I interviewed spoke of this need to calculate where 
you actually had leverage to exert power and making that central to your strategy. USAS 
member Amanda Plumb (interview, 2007) told me, 
When you're talking about being strategic, it's not always about fighting 
for the most oppressed people--it comes from identifying where you have 
  321 
power to make change. […] It [USAS’s approach] is very strategic in that 
we have this power, there's this really clear target at the university level 
and that they has some power they can take--and then the fact that it's 
going on all around the country can really make big waves much quickly 
than individuals deciding not to buy Nike shoes. In that way, I think it was 
definitely a strategic campaign and probably the most strategic campaign 
for students to take on. Now I don't know if that same strategy would 
make sense for churches to take on--they don't license to companies. It 
doesn't make sense for workers to put pressure on schools--it only makes 
sense for students or faculty to do that. 
 In the right circumstances, such campaigns can have a profound impact. Palmer 
(interview, 2007) could very much see the results of USAS’s solidarity campaign 
unfolding as the CWA tried to bargain with New Era. 
As the campaign went on, I believe the final total was ten or thirteen major 
universities that do business with the New Era--and this is through the 
WRC as well--actually suspended contracts with New Era because they 
would not negotiate in good faith with their employees. I remember the 
night that we settled the contract. Their biggest collegiate customer was 
Ohio State. And through the work of the student movement, I got a phone 
call from the students at Ohio State at 10:00 at night one night--and they 
let me know that I had the ability to go back to the employer that night at 
the bargaining table and tell them that if we didn't get the deal done 
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tonight, Ohio State was the next college to go off-line. It was really a nice 
moment for me--you don't get many of those types of moments when you 
do this work. We got the deal done that night. 
 USAS members and their allies are also very much aware of the limits of this 
form of leverage though--it only has a real impact on corporations to whom having 
licensing agreements with colleges and universities are important. Speaking of the 
Kukdong campaign, Knorr (interview, 2007) told me, 
Because Nike cares a lot about the university market, that pressure was 
actually enough to get them to go and make sure that the workers got 
rehired and make sure that the union got recognized. Now if it had been a 
Nike factory that didn't produce for universities, Nike wouldn't care that 
much if the universities told them that they had to do this. Or if it had been 
some other brand, you know, Gap, that has no connection to universities. 
In theory, we could get our universities to tell Gap that they have to do 
something, but it doesn't really matter that much to Gap because it doesn't 
mean anything to them if the universities tell them this. But Nike, in this 
factory, because of this relationship, universities telling them that they had 
to do this or else mattered to them enough that they did something that 
they didn't want to do. 
McSpedon (interview, 2007) expressed the hope that USAS’s campaigns might 
have a wider impact, despite the limited scope of their leverage. 
Our thought was, it's not a majority of the garment industry, it's not even a 
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terribly huge percentage--but if we could at least create the space for 
workers to organize and improve conditions in the factories that made 
collegiate apparel, that that would spill over into other factories--because 
these companies have factories beyond the ones that just make collegiate 
apparel, but also because they're often clustered together in free trade 
zones. So if there's a way that us creating the space in this section of the 
industry can impact a larger piece of the industry ... It was just biting off 
that piece where we had a more significant amount of leverage over than 
we did as individual consumers against these other brand names. 
 
The Political Opportunity System and Social Location 
 As I quoted Plumb saying above, only students can exert the sort of leverage over 
their schools that allows them to translate it into leverage over brand-name corporations--
workers or churches cannot do this. This highlights an important point that runs as a 
subtext to what I have discussed above, but I here wish to address more explicitly--the 
fact that the political opportunity system always exists relative to the social location of a 
particular social actor, whether individual or collective. The workers in a contractor’s 
factory face different constraints and have different points of leverage open to them than 
do students organizing on a college campus. Most social movement theorists who have 
favored the concept of political opportunity structure, however, have not emphasized this 
point or explored it in depth. 
 Activists are well aware of the differences in leverage and degrees of repression 
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that differences in social location brings though. Dirnbach (interview, 2007), for instance, 
spoke of the differences he observed from his time as a student activist and working with 
the union UNITE HERE: 
The university environment--it's a different environment than the 
workplace. In the university environment there's a lot less fear among the 
activists than in the workplace--you can take over a building, you can do 
things like that and may be at most you'll get suspended, or probably not 
even that. You're probably not going to get kicked out of the university, 
which is just really not going to happen--maybe you'll be arrested, maybe 
not. Workers in a workplace, it's tremendously difficult for them to 
organize--there's a lot of fear and harassment. People are desperately 
afraid of loosing their jobs and so you might be a little bit more timid 
about what you're going to do. That said, eventually you might be able to 
get workers to go on strike--that's very difficult to do usually. Even things 
like getting a bunch of workers to sign a petition, signing union cards, 
wearing a union pin or a t-shirt or doing a march on the boss to confront 
them--very difficult, very difficult to do. It's probably easier to get ten 
student activists at the University of Michigan to do something like that 
than it is to get ten workers to do it, just because the environment is safer. 
Also, you know, there is such a thing as middle-class, white privilege--it's 
just safer for students like that--and most of them are middle-class, white 
students--I was one myself--there's just less ramifications. You're not 
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going to get fired, arrested or beaten the way you will if you're a worker of 
color in a factory. It's the unfortunate truth. 
 Just as it makes sense when looking at nodes in the production process or 
interlocking social arenas to distinguish between core, semiperipheral and peripheral 
nodes, William I. Robinson (2003) suggests it makes sense to distinguish between core, 
semiperipheral and peripheral populations of people.12 Sweatshop workers and students 
are incorporated into the apparel commodity chain at very different locations; while the 
workers are a peripheral population, the students are, depending on which school they are 
attending, a semiperipheral or core population. The workers are at the bottom of this 
social structure, interacting with their employers, contractors who themselves have 
relatively little power in the larger picture. The workers are, in many ways, a disposable 
population. The core firms certainly need workers, but there are an abundance of them 
and it is no loss to the brands if one set of workers is fired and another hired. Students, on 
the other hand, are consumers--and a particularly valued set of consumers at that, at 
which a great deal of marketing is targeted. In the eyes of the brands, they are anything 
but a disposable population--they are one to whom the brands not only want access, but 
whose loyalty the brands what to secure. The profits of those lead corporations who have 
invested heavily in their brand image depend on their relationship with students as 
consumers and these corporations do not want to give that relationship up. Given this, the 
brands worry far more about the attitudes and actions of students than they do workers, 
giving students openings that workers do not have--in particular, the ability to exert some 
leverage over the decisions the brands make. 
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 The status of students vs. workers as core and peripheral populations reflects their 
relationship not only to apparel commodity chains, but within the larger global capitalist 
world-system as well. The workers in sweatshops are near the bottom of the global social 
hierarchy--perhaps only indigenous peoples and other subsistence producers are below 
them. Students at US colleges and universities, on the other hand, can expect, at the very 
least, to go on to become white-collar workers, if not managers or other professionals 
(depending on the status of their school). In addition to these class differences, as 
Dirnbach notes, race and gender factor in as well. Sweatshop workers are 
overwhelmingly women and people of color. While USAS’s base is diverse (and varies 
somewhat from school to school), white, middle-class students are clearly central to it. 
All of these factors affect other aspects of the political opportunity system, such as the 
level of repression they may have to face. The lower a group falls in the global social 
hierarchy, the more likely the authorities are to take the gloves off when dealing with 
them, relying on violent repression as the main counter-measure to movement activity. 
Thus, workers like those at Kukdong have to worry about attacks by the police; or even 
outright murder, as was the case with the Filipino union leader Dalton told me of. On the 
other side, as described in chapter four, when the University of Wisconsin’s president had 
students engaged in a sit-in arrested by the riot police, he had to resign, his legitimacy 
destroyed by using excessive force--even though a sit-in, unlike a strike in many 
countries, is actually illegal. 
 There can also be more subtle ways in which social location can constrain 
activists. A number of activists mentioned the ways that, in the US, labor laws 
  327 
constrained unions, giving them less freedom take certain sorts of actions than students. 
Plumb (interview, 2007), who after graduating and leaving USAS, worked as an 
organizer with a number of unions, said, “USAS can afford to be more radical and take 
more risks because we're not playing by labor law. We don't have contracts that we have 
to hold up our end of. […] When you look at why we have labor laws, when you look at 
why unions have been sanctioned by the government, it's to create labor peace, not to 
give workers more rights.” She also noted more specifically that unions “can't call for 
certain boycotts, secondary boycotts. It's not illegal for students to boycott--it's not illegal 
for us, but it's illegal for unions to do some things.” Because of these differences, many 
unions “wanted students out there--I think that's one of the reasons that unions really like 
Jobs with Justice,” which brings together unions and progressive community groups, 
including students. 
 What not only Jobs with Justice, but the entire network that constitutes the anti-
sweatshop movement does is try to find ways to draw on the different forms of power 
groups in different social locations can exercise and strategically combine these to 
accomplish more than any one group in a particular social location could on their own. 
The ability of workers to disrupt the production process is absolutely essential and no 
other group can accomplish that. But the ability of US consumers--and especially 
students--to wreak havoc with brands’ images is also essential and is not something 
workers (especially those outside the US, as the vast majority of them are) can do. 
Additionally, USAS and other US-based groups try to find ways to use their relative 
privilege to protect workers. The international attention they bring to any one strike can 
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reduce the amount of repression against workers, at least in that particular case. (Sadly, 
they have not been able to reduce the overall level of repression--workers whose strikes 
do not get this international attention continue to face brutal violence.) By reducing the 
level of repression and exerting leverage over the brand name corporations, USAS and 
other US groups are also able to expand the organizing space workers have open to them. 
Thus, US groups can act in ways that facilitate workers’ efforts to empower themselves 
through creating independent unions. 
 Thus, for the anti-sweatshop movement to succeed it is necessary for the 
movement to involve alliances between activists at different social locations relative to 
the apparel commodity chain. Part of this is that differences in social location bring 
access to different points of leverage--workers at the point of production, students and 
other US activists at the point of consumption and brand-image creation. Another 
important part of this is the differences in the degrees of repression activists in different 
social locations face and, consequently, the amount the amount of organizing space open 
to them. Students and other US activists have, for the most part, more freedom to 
organize around anti-sweatshop issues without fear of dire consequences. They, in turn, 
try to find ways to extend this privilege so that is serves to shield not only themselves, but 
the workers with whom they have allied. By highlighting workers’ struggles, it makes it 
more difficult for the brands and contractors to use the most violent means of repression. 
Thus, student-workers alliances offer the potential for increasing the organizing space 
open to workers--which, in turn, allows them greater potential to exercise leverage. None 
of this is to say that a US-based campaign automatically translates into workers’ rights 
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being respected. Sweatshop workers still face large amounts of repression and an uphill 
battle over difficult social terrain. US-based campaigns can, however, begin to even the 
odds slightly in workers’ favor. In the next chapter, we will look at how these campaigns 
are organized and conducted. 
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 Having examined the power structures within which the anti-sweatshop 
movement must operate, we now turn to the ways in which they actually maneuver--their 
strategic model for solidarity campaigns and the ways in which they make decisions 
about how to implement and modify this model in specific cases. While the political 
opportunity system may present possible points of leverage, these exist only potentially 
until activists find ways to activate them--that is, until activists take actions that the 
targeted companies find actively threatening in some way. The anti-sweatshop 
movement’s strategic model for solidarity campaigns helps them to identify such points 
of leverage and the means by which they may activate them to put pressure on the firms, 
both core and peripheral, involved in any particular case of worker rights violations. The 
strategic model that underlies anti-sweatshop campaigns draws on several older strategic 
models, some of which we examined in chapter three--labor struggles against a particular 
employer, anti-corporate campaigns, and international solidarity campaigns. (Although 
there are some solidarity campaigns that are domestically oriented, as with New Era, the 
vast majority are international in scope. Thus, in many ways, the underlying strategic 
model for these campaigns is international in orientation, though it can easily be adapted 
for domestically focused campaigns like New Era.) 
Over time, the ability of activists to apply this strategic model has grown more 
sophisticated, as they have discovered new tools that they can use in their campaigns. Jeff 
Hermanson (interview, 2007) of the Solidarity Center, for instance, told me, “I think that 
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there's been a constant learning curve. I think the Philips Van Heusen campaign 
[discussed in chapter two], for example, was the first time we involved Human Rights 
Watch, a human rights kind of organization. That was when I began to see the importance 
of the NGO community as opposed to the labor movement itself.” USAS has been 
responsible for one of the key innovations in such campaigns--the ability to use college 
codes of conduct to pressure companies, brands and contractors alike, to respect workers’ 
rights. Unfortunately, there are many campaigns where USAS’s ability to exert leverage 
via universities does not come into play, because the factories involved produce little or 
no apparel for WRC-member schools. In those instances where college codes do come 
into play, however, they often make a critical difference, giving the movement power 
over their foes that they would not otherwise have, changing the terrain of struggle just 
enough that the movement can often gain the advantage--though not without a great deal 
of organizing and campaigning. 
An integral part of the strategic model for such campaigns is the way in which the 
international networks are organized. The initiative for any real solidarity campaign must 
come from the workers on whose behalf it is being waged--otherwise it is not truly a 
solidarity campaign. And the workers’ efforts at their own workplace must play a central 
role in the struggle; as discussed in the previous chapter, they are the ones with the most 
direct leverage over their employers. While the workers’ allies both in their own 
countries and abroad play an essential role in the struggle, there is in many ways no 
campaign without the workers themselves. Based on this insight, the US-based activists 
involved in a struggle attempt to put the workers on whose behalf they are campaigning 
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at the center of the network, letting their strategic decisions be shaped by the workers’ 
priorities, rather than those of some other group, such as the Solidarity Center or USAS. 
This, in turn, is rooted in the anti-sweatshop movement’s ideology, with the emphasis it 
places on solidarity (see chapter six). I will argue in this chapter that this approach not 
only makes sense in terms of the ethics of the movement, but has been a strategically 
important decision as well, contributing to the movement’s successes in its international 
campaigns. As Francesca Polletta (2005) reminds us (see chapters one and six), it is a 
mistake to draw distinctions between the instrumental and ideological. 
The significance of solidarity to the movement’s success can be seen by looking 
at a striking counter-example, provided by the work of Ethel C. Brooks (2005, 2007) on a 
1992-94 campaign targeting Bangladesh (discussed briefly in chapter three). Conducted 
by the AFL-CIO, US Senator Thomas Harkin, and the Child Labor Coalition, it was 
ostensibly intended to abolish child labor in the garment industry in Bangladesh. It was, 
however, actually met with by protests from Bangladeshi children’s rights and labor 
activists. On one level, it was successful in that new programs to discourage child labor 
were put in place in Bangladesh; Brooks argues, however, that in many ways it was a 
failure because it did nothing to address the root causes of such exploitation--and 
sweatshop conditions remain pervasive in Bangladesh. And while children who once 
worked in factories now go to school, the only job prospects they have open upon 
graduation is employment in these same sweatshops. The underlying problem with the 
campaign, Brooks says, was that the US groups involved had no ties with Bangladeshi 
labor and children’s rights groups and did not consult them in formulating their plan. 
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Their attitudes towards Bangladeshis were at best patronizing. Some Bangladeshi groups 
charged that the campaign was never meant to benefit them at all, but a protectionist ploy 
disguised in progressive language. 
The Bangladesh campaign is not strictly comparable to the sort of campaigns 
which USAS has been involved with--the Kukdong campaign, for instance, aimed to help 
workers in one factory, while the Bangladesh campaign sought to alter policy in an entire 
nation. The differences are nonetheless striking. Even though the Bangladesh campaign 
succeeded in changing policy nation-wide, it was arguably less successful in improving 
workers’ lives than the Kukdong campaign, despite the latter’s much smaller scope. The 
Kukdong campaign clearly improved the lives of the workers involved (at least for a 
certain amount of time), while the Bangladesh campaign seems to have failed to do so. 
The most salient difference seems to have been the lack of involvement of local activists 
in the Bangladesh campaign. This meant that US activists involved in this campaign had 
little understanding of the realities on the ground in that country--and therefore what 
might actually be effective (Brooks 2005, 2007). This is in contrast to the Kukdong 
campaign, where US activists had close ties to local activists and therefore better 
information on local conditions and a better sense of what workers’ actual priorities were. 
According to Brooks (2005, 2007), the US activists tended to see Bangladeshi 
workers not as active agents--as USAS does--but as passive victims. Given this 
ideological perspective, they did not see any reason to build local ties with Bangladeshi 
activist groups. Not having connections with local Bangladeshi groups, they were 
ignorant of the conditions that lead Bangladeshi parents to put their children to work in 
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factories. This was not because the parents did not value their children (as was sometimes 
implied in the US campaign), but because they were desperately poor and needed the 
additional income. Additionally, it did not occur to the US activists to consider the impact 
banning Bangladeshi imports would have on the workers of that country. The garment 
industry is the second major source of revenue in the Bangladeshi economy after 
remittances and the ban could potentially have devastated families dependent on work in 
the industry for their livelihood. This is one of the prime reasons that Bangladeshi 
activists opposed the campaign and denounced it as protectionist. In the rest of this 
chapter, we will explore some of the ways in which the approach of USAS and their 
allies contrasts with the patronizing tendencies of the activists who targeted Bangladesh 
and how this has contributed to the former’s relative degree of success. 
 
The Strategic Model for International Solidarity Campaigns 
The Boomerang Effect 
In addition to the principle of solidarity, one of the central elements of the 
strategic model for international solidarity campaigns is what Margaret E. Keck and 
Kathryn Sikkink (1998) call the boomerang effect. This dynamic is central to a number of 
movements that are international in scope, including the human rights, environmental and 
women’s movements. The boomerang effect comes into play when local activist groups, 
generally in the third world, find that the political opportunity system is closed to them, 
but potentially open to international actors, particularly those in the first world. These 
international allies have the power to bring pressure to bear where domestic activists 
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can’t, potentially tipping the balance of power in favor of the movement. In the case of 
the anti-sweatshop movement, workers find that they cannot effectively pressure their 
employers, because these contractors actually have very little power. It is their patrons--
major apparel firms like Nike and the Gap--who hold the real power in these relationships 
and whose policies force contractors to cut costs in any way possible, including violating 
workers’ rights. To exercise power over their employers, workers need the help of first-
world activists who may be able to exercise leverage over companies such as Nike. The 
boomerang metaphor refers to the fact that the transnational networks’ strategy involves 
going out of the country where opportunities are closed, striking another target that is 
vulnerable, and then relying on that target to turn around and put pressure on the original 
one; the means of pressure is elliptical instead of straight-forward. In the case of the anti-
sweatshop movement, since workers cannot effectively pressure their employers--the 
contractors--alone, they rely on US activists to put pressure on the employers’ main 
patrons--the major apparel firms. The goal is for these firms to turn around and put 
pressure on the original target, the contractor, to deal fairly with the workers. Rather than 
simply directly targeting the contractors, they are targeted in a round-about way. 
Other scholars have built on and critiqued this basic model, arguing that Keck and 
Sikkink (1998) rely too heavily on the example of the human rights movement, not taking 
into account the ways in which different issues may shape the nature of transnational 
campaigns. Julie Stewart (2004) has pointed out that in many campaigns, it is not simply 
that local activists choose to go transnational because of a closed domestic system, but 
that transnational actors were involved from the start. This is certainly the case for the 
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anti-sweatshop movement, where transnational apparel firms are, in fact, the most 
powerful players. In looking at how the boomerang effect applies specifically to anti-
sweatshop campaigns, Ralph Armbruster-Sandoval (2005) has cautioned that, while the 
aid of transnational actors is certainly important, Keck and Sikkink tended to downplay 
the importance of the agency of local actors. Keck and Sikkink tend to depict local actors 
as being able to do little more than contact international allies for support. Armbruster-
Sandoval, on the other hand, emphasizes that the activism of local groups is as important 
as that of their international allies and neither alone can succeed. If workers do not go on 
strike, they cannot hope to win against their employers, even if that alone is not enough. 
What all of these theorists have in common, however, is that they emphasize the 
importance of transnational activist networks, including members from both the Global 
South and North, in challenging inequalities in power on the ground in the South. They 
do not, however, attend to precisely how these networks are organized, how decisions are 
made in them, how groups from the first and third worlds relate to each--and the impact 
such things have on the strategy of the campaigns and therefore their success or failure. 
Keck and Sikkink (1998), for instance, make a few broad statements that transnational 
networks that are strong and dense, containing many nodes, with the different actors who 
trust each other, are the ones most likely to succeed. They do not, however, elaborate 
much beyond these basic points. In this chapter, we will explore in depth the issues 
involved in the organization of successful transnational campaigns seeking to take 
advantage of the boomerang effect. 
The activists I spoke with were well aware of how the role the boomerang effect 
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plays in solidarity campaigns, even if they do not use the term itself. UNITE HERE staff 
person Eric Dirnbach (interview, 2007), for instance, told me, 
Why do workers in developing countries need us? They can organize 
unions on their own. Do they need us? Well, I think they do need us. We 
need to work together. We can't do this alone--they need to be organizing. 
They can't do it alone--they need us to put pressure on the companies in 
the US that have the power in this industry. That is the benefit that we 
bring to the table here. We're in the US, the largest media market, the 
largest apparel market in the world, and the headquarters of almost all the 
major apparel companies. There's some power to doing activism here in 
the US, right? […] So that's what we bring to the table here. 
In some sense, the boomerang effect is at work even in a domestic campaign like New 
Era. The New Era workers could not succeed against the company alone and therefore 
had to enlist outside supporters, both in their local community and nationally as well. 
This basic division of labor between sweatshop workers and their US allies is rooted in 
how their social locations give them access to different points of leverage in the political 
opportunity system. Only workers can apply leverage directly to their employers by 
disrupting production; but only their allies from the Global North can hope to exert 
leverage over the core companies that hold the real power--and can compel the contractor 
to change their labor practices in the face of the high economic disincentives they have 
for doing so. 
For workers to successfully organize on the local level, it is not simply enough to 
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build an effective, cohesive, democratic union--though that is of vital importance 
(Robertson and Plaiyoowong 2004). The most successful organizing drives also involve 
forming alliances with other local groups rooted in the community, who can rally in 
support of the workers, helping them sustain a difficult struggle over the long run. For 
instance, in the Kukdong campaign, “well before they went on strike, the workers had 
developed solidarity links with a local women workers’ support centre and with students 
and faculty at the local university. And early in the strike the workers gained considerable 
local solidarity from the community around the plant and from nearby communities 
where most of the workers lived” (Wells 2009). Such community-based labor activism is 
what Kim Moody (1997) refers to as social movement unionism. Unions that take such an 
approach are interested not only in advancing the interests of their members, but in larger 
issues of social justice that affect everyone.13 From forming alliances with other groups in 
the community, it is a natural next step to reach out to national and international groups 
that have a similar interest in social justice issues. Indeed, it is often other groups in the 
community that provide unions with their first connections to the international groups 
that are also central to the success of a campaign (Wells 2009). 
 
The Role of Transnational Bridge-Workers 
Unfortunately, it’s likely that in all too many cases, such international alliances 
never coalesce. For them to happen, the unions involved need to be embedded in social 
networks that actually have such international ties--which is not always true. Philip 
Robertson, Jr. and Somsak Plaiyoowong (2004), two long-time labor activists based in 
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Thailand, argue that additionally it is essential that some person or organization in the 
network be able to take on the role of what they call a mid-fielder and other scholars have 
referred to either as a broker (McAdam et al. 2001) or a bridge-worker (Ryan 2005). This 
bridge-worker must be both bilingual and bicultural, able to act as a bridge between local 
activists and their international allies. Without a bilingual bridge-worker, it can be 
difficult to maintain communication. Important records documenting labor abuses will go 
un-translated and not get to Northern activists. Even if a document here or there is 
translated, without a bridge-worker, it is impossible to sustain long-term relationships 
between local activists and Northern ones--and without this, it is impossible to strategize 
in such a way as to ensure that the workers’ help to shape the agenda, and for Northern 
activists to get regular information on conditions on the ground, information which can 
greatly increase their credibility in campaigns. The density of bridge-workers varies from 
region to region--while there are many potential bridge-workers who speak both English 
and Spanish or Chinese, those who are fluent in both English and languages such as Thai 
are much less common--making it more difficult for Thai workers to contact international 
allies. 
 US-based anti-sweatshop activists are well aware of the necessity of having 
bridge-workers to facilitate coordination between local workers and their US allies. This 
is basic to their strategic models for running international solidarity campaigns. For 
instance, one of the first things USAS did when the strike at Kukdong began was to 
dispatch one of their members, Evelyn Zepeda, to Atlixco to act as a liaison between the 
workers and the student activists. Even before that, Jeff Hermanson of the Solidarity 
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Center had been acting as a bridge-worker, helping USAS conduct a tour of Mexico and 
make contact with workers producing apparel for WRC member schools. Representatives 
of the Solidarity Center have played this crucial role in many, though by no means all, of 
the campaigns in which USAS took part. When I asked her about building ties with local 
activist groups, USAS member Molly McGrath (interview, 2007) said, 
The Solidarity Center plays a unique role with that. Almost all of the 
partners that USAS has are Solidarity Center members. There are a few 
cases, like the Philippines, where USAS is affiliated with a group that the 
Solidarity Center, because it's been around so long, has an ideological 
difference with. It's very important because USAS really won't have a 
campaign if they don't have a direct link with workers. 
In addition to its close relationship with the Solidarity Center, USAS has set up its own 
program of international internships to help build its own set of bridge-workers. (We will 
look more at this program later in the chapter.) Even in domestically oriented campaigns, 
such as New Era, while a bridge-worker may not be necessary per se, it is important that 
communication between workers and their allies remain good, for the same reasons 
bridge-workers are important in international campaigns--to involve workers in setting 
the agenda and getting information about labor rights violations out. 
 
Framing Battles and Disruptive Tactics 
 As noted, one of the things bridge-workers do is provide information about the 
local struggle to US and European allies. In particular, they help get out the word about 
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what specific abuses are occurring in any particular sweatshop where workers are trying 
to organize. Such transmission of information is central to the boomerang effect, because 
US-based activists then use it to wage a framing battle against the core companies 
involved in this particular case (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Without relations of solidarity, 
US-based activists would not have access to this information and their campaigns would 
be much weaker. Given that many apparel companies’ principal weakness is their image, 
fighting framing battles is absolutely central to the strategic model underlying solidarity 
campaigns. One important tool that activists have in their framing battles is issuing 
reports based on research. In many ways, this is one of the most important things the 
WRC does--documenting the specific violations of workers’ rights in any one case. More 
than that, the WRC uses the implicit threat of a report containing negative information to 
get companies to make concessions, in return for positive coverage when the report is 
published. WRC staff person Jeremy Blasi (interview, 2007) explained, 
We try to not just publish things for the sake of publishing them. 
Transparency is a goal and we're the only [monitoring] organization that 
has a public disclosure database, with all the factories are listed. There's 
some value in being public as much as possible. But at the same time you 
want to use it as a tool, the threat of publishing your report is a way to get 
a company to do something good. And you make every report a positive 
report because you used threat of pubic disclosure to get them to take 
some action. By the time you're ready to publish, you can report that 
they've done all these positive things. So if you look at most of our 
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reports, a substantial number are actually positively toned. They're the 
final product along the process. In other cases, the case might be totally 
intractable. The company's not responding, so there would be value there 
to get it out as soon as possible. 
Such was the case with the preliminary reports the WRC published in the case of both 
Kukdong and New Era--reports that then served a valuable role in the larger struggle over 
the framing of the issue. 
 The WRC is not, however, the only anti-sweatshop organization that does 
research and publishes reports. It is also an important part of what groups such UNITE 
HERE and the ILRF do. Like the WRC, they will send representatives overseas to 
investigate conditions in factories and publish reports on the results. They are less 
concerned with using their reports as a direct means to pressure companies to change 
their behavior in the way the WRC does and more concerned to use them to mobilize 
their grassroots base to pressure the companies in question. Talking about this in relation 
to the on-going campaign against Wal-Mart, Dirnbach (interview, 2007) said, 
You take that research, that basic information and you covert that into 
public-friendly material. You put together fliers, you might put together a 
press release, you'll send versions of that to the media. You want to get the 
word out there to consumers and the media to raise consciousness about 
the sweatshop problem. You'll go to the store and you'll leaflet. You'll do 
it again and again. And companies are annoyed by that. I don't believe that 
it ever turns away enough customers for it to matter to them, but we want 
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to create the perception that that is a possibility. And it's just annoying to 
them that their image is being tarnished by this kind of information and 
people are in front of their stores in a real in-your-face manner. We want 
to organize demonstrations at a store or at a shareholders' meeting, to get 
some media attention, so that whenever Wal-Mart is mentioned, there is, 
somewhere in the article, allegations about sweatshop practices, etc. 
 Another central tool in framing battles is bringing the workers involved in a 
particular struggle on tour to the US to speak for themselves on the conditions they face. 
Keck and Sikkink (1998) argue that direct personal testimony plays a powerful role in 
framing struggles, humanizing the debate, while providing a legitimacy to the work of 
Northern groups that reports simply cannot. With reports, it is always possible for the 
movement’s opponents to claim that the movement, however well intentioned, is out of 
touch with the workers on the ground. When the workers themselves are speaking, this 
charge is much more difficult to make. Even more that reports, without relations of 
solidarity, the US anti-sweatshop movement could not bring workers over to tour the US 
and share their testimony. The workers in the New Era struggle found such speaking 
tours to be a powerful tool for them. Jane Howald (interview, 2007), president of the New 
Era CWA local, said, 
When we were in the middle of the strike, I always said it was like Horton 
Hears a Who [a children’s book by Dr. Seuss]--I wanted people to know 
who we were, where we were and what we were going through. Without 
USAS reaching out to universities across the United States, people in 
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Louisiana or California wouldn't have known who we were or that we 
make baseball caps for their team in Anaheim or Minnesota. USAS gave 
us the ability to take members on the strike line and go to their campuses 
and speak about the troubles we were going through. They invited us to 
their campuses so we sent members, off the strike line, to Louisiana, we 
sent them to California, we sent them to Ohio--just workers, not officers, 
not somebody that was educated and could speak. I remember one guy we 
sent to Louisiana said, I’ve never spoken in public in my life. Yet he cared 
about what was going on so when the students invited him he took our 
message to Louisiana. That's what USAS helped us do, helped us reach 
across the United States, to different universities and the students took us 
to their friends and their families. 
 According to USAS members, such worker tours were a powerful framing tool in 
their various campaigns. Speaking not only of the BJ&B campaign, but the USAS’s 
initial efforts to get their schools to implement codes of conduct, USAS member Laura 
McSpedon (interview, 2007) told me, 
A big turning point for us on campus was a delegation of workers from the 
Dominican Republic who came in about April of 1998--Roselio Reyes and 
Kenia Rodriquez, two workers from a factory where they made baseball 
caps for schools, including Georgetown, came and spoke on a couple 
different campuses on a tour sponsored by UNITE. That really for us 
totally changed the dynamic of the campaign. You know, we'd been 
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saying for four or five months that these sweatshops existed, that they 
made Georgetown apparel, but to have two workers say, Yeah I've seen 
your logo before, I've sewed it on to a bunch of caps, made a huge 
difference. We had a huge event in the middle of campus with three or 
four hundred people who came and heard them speak. It was the first time 
the administration actually agreed to sit down and meet with us--and with 
the workers. 
 According to activist Caroline Stoppard* (interview, 2007), when I asked her 
about the difference between the WRC’s reports and worker tours, 
I think people have a different reaction to workers speaking about their 
personal experiences than to reading it in a report. If someone talks about 
the experience of getting screamed at by their supervisor because they 
wanted to leave work at the end of the day that's very compelling--but 
when the WRC puts it in a report, […] it's dry, it's coming from a US 
organization. [Some people will think,] Who are these people? Why are 
they making these claims about certain things? […] I think the same 
person who would criticize something in a report, once they're face-to-face 
with the worker, would probably not say the same thing because it 
wouldn't be appropriate. And then also because they are more compelled 
in that kind of situation to understand why the conditions are bad. 
When I asked her about whether the audience--an administrator reading a report versus a 
student at a public talk by a worker--made any difference, Stoppard replied, “It might. 
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Most of the people who hear workers who come on tour are not university administrators, 
they’re activists. But even when we bring workers to speak with administrators, they 
generally have a pretty strong reaction.” 
 When such framing tactics are successful, they can have a number of important 
effects. First, they are often quite directly threatening to core apparel companies, 
especially those like Nike and Reebok have invested a great deal in cultivating a certain 
brand image. Second, they help movement leaders mobilize their grassroots base to take 
other actions to pressure companies. Some of these can seem fairly moderate, but can still 
be mildly disruptive for companies. Tocco (interview, 2007) told me, 
I've done letter drop-offs to retail stores. That causes a problem, because 
rarely does the company tell their retail stores what's going on, so it can 
cause a bit of confusion. So we give people sample letters that they can 
drop off. I've done it to Wal-Mart, I've done it to Bridgestone-Firestone. 
The letter will just state, Here are the demands, here's the problem, make 
sure you call your district manager and let them know we dropped off this 
letter. Then the corporations need to go back down through the chains and 
hand out information about why the letter is wrong. So it's more about 
causing them more work internally. 
 In the case of USAS, at schools which have joined the WRC, success in these 
frame battles puts college officials in a position where they feel compelled to do 
something to deal with their licensees who are violating their school’s code of conduct. 
Often, they need to do little more than to speak with the companies, with the implicit 
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threat of a suspension or cancellation of the licensing agreement hanging in the 
background. In cases where the US anti-sweatshop movement can mobilize such 
pressure, this often proves to be one of their most effective weapons. While at this stage 
in the game, USAS may be able to get their school administrators to take such action 
mainly through skillful framing and moderate levels of mobilization--petitions, public 
rallies, etc.--this ability is founded on past on-campus struggles that involved substantial 
levels of disruption through means such as sit-ins. 
 Thus we see in solidarity campaigns something similar to what we saw in 
campus-based campaigns--they rely on both disruption and changing the prevailing 
discourse for their success, not one or the other. Indeed, in many ways, changing the 
public discourse around a particular brand is in and of itself a disruptive action, since 
associating negative imagery--like the abuses that occur in sweatshops--with a brand is an 
attack on that company’s most important asset, their non-material capital. As for USAS 
and their ability to use the threat of the loss of college licensing agreements as leverage, 
this is, as already noted, built on a long history of disruptive activism tied together with 
reframing the issue of sweatshops on college campuses. And the threat of the loss of the 
licensing agreement is itself the threat of disruption--it would involve a loss of revenue 
coupled with the loss of an important captive audience for marketing, which the brands 
fear will be even more damaging to their profitability over the long run. Other groups 
generally seek to combine a particular framing of sweatshop abuses and disruptive 
actions as well, even if the actions they can take--such as the letter drop-offs discussed by 
Tocco--are less disruptive that what USAS can muster. This is not because these groups 
  348 
do not want to rely on disruption, they just have less means of creating disruption for the 
companies involved. 
 
The Organization of Solidarity 
Activist Niches and the Division of Labor 
Beyond the primary division of labor between activists in core and peripheral 
countries and the bridge-workers that link the two, there are finer ones, based on the 
capabilities of the groups involved. In her study of gay rights activist groups in Chicago, 
Sandra Levitsky (2007) refers to this division of labor as involving activist niches. She 
found that, while some groups might be moderately critical of other groups’ approaches--
groups focusing on direct action vs. those focusing on litigation and lobbying, for 
instance--all were well aware that other groups played a valuable role in the movement. 
They ultimately saw the varying specializations of the groups as complementary, not 
contradictory. I found similar attitudes in the anti-sweatshop movement, with two 
principle differences--the people I interviewed rarely criticized the approach of other 
groups14 and at least some groups had the capacity to vary which niche they took on from 
campaign to campaign. 
As one example of such niches, because of its social location, USAS is also able 
to mobilize a grassroots base that other groups do not have access to and can exert 
pressure on points of leverage that other groups cannot. On the other hand, a number of 
other groups, such as the WRC, UNITE HERE, and the ILRF are able to do research on 
their target companies that USAS simply doesn’t have the resources or staff to take on. 
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The Solidarity Center, meanwhile, has a network of international contacts that few other 
groups do, which is what allows it to take on the role of bridge-worker so often. The 
importance of having a division of labor is part of the movement’s strategic model, but it 
is also one of those elements of the model that varies considerably from campaign to 
campaign. Which roles different groups take on depends on a number of factors, 
including what specific SMOs are involved and what they can do in relation to the 
particular companies that are the target of any campaign. In a case involving factories 
that produce goods for WRC-affiliated schools, USAS is likely to play a central role. In 
others, USAS’s role is likely to be much more peripheral, simply because they have no 
particular leverage in such cases and USAS prefers to concentrate on the cases where it 
can make the most difference. 
To give a more specific example, in many campaigns the International Labor 
Rights Fund (ILRF) is willing and able to negotiate directly with the company targeted. 
In their campaign focusing on Wal-Mart, however, they were unable to do so. They were 
entangled in a lawsuit with the company, which consequently refused to speak with them. 
The ILRF thus relied on the Maquila Solidarity Network (MSN) to negotiate with Wal-
Mart for them, while the ILRF focused on more confrontational tactics. Meanwhile the 
MSN was in a position to remind Wal-Mart that if they do not negotiate with them, then 
the company would have to deal with the more aggressive actions of the ILRF. When I 
asked her if this arrangement caused any tension between the ILRF and MSN, Trina 
Tocco (interview, 2007), a former USAS member now working for the ILRF, said, “No, 
we actually we’re happy to play the different roles. The only tension I had was that it was 
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so aggravating to me because ILRF has the dedicated Wal-Mart campaign and it's just 
frustrating that Wal-Mart will not communicate with us because then I have to find 
groups, like MSN, that will commit to so much work on the various campaigns.” 
We can see in this example another important role in many struggles--that of 
negotiator. While direct negotiations with the companies involved in sweatshop abuses is 
ultimately necessary to resolve the problem, not every group has open lines of 
communication. In particular, the workers rarely have access to their employers to 
negotiate with them--and almost never have direct access to the core firms that are the 
patrons of their employers. Part of what is involved in the boomerang effect is looking for 
ways to open up channels of communication. This is done partly through coercion of the 
companies involved, but some Northern groups may have lines of communication 
available to them from the start that workers simply do not have. In the Kukdong 
campaign, for instance, we noted that Nike flatly refused to talk to USAS, seeing them as 
outside meddlers intent on destroying the company. Nike was, however, willing to 
negotiate with the Solidarity Center. As a result, Hermanson (interview, 2007) said, the 
Solidarity Center was careful to refrain from directly involving itself in the sort of 
confrontational actions USAS was doing so that they could maintain their open lines of 
communication. The Solidarity Center’s ability to speak with Nike, Reebok and 
Kukdong’s management ultimately proved critical in getting the Korean company to sit 
down and engage in good faith collective bargaining with their workers and come to an 
agreement that improved working conditions considerably--the ultimate goal of the whole 
campaign. 
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Decision-Making in Solidarity Campaigns 
Not every international campaign that seeks to make use of the boomerang effect 
is necessarily a solidarity campaign though. We discussed one case above--the campaign 
conducted by US groups to abolish child labor in Bangladesh documented by Brooks 
(2005, 2007)--that was clearly not a solidarity campaign, since the Bangladeshi workers 
whom it was supposed to benefit were not involved in formulating it and, in fact, opposed 
it. In ensuring that a campaign is genuinely a solidarity campaign, it is thus important to 
seek not only to empower the workers involved at their workplaces, but to include them 
in the decision-making processes of the campaign from the beginning. Indeed, such 
involvement in the decision-making process is as important an aspect of empowerment as 
exercising power and voice in the workplace. How well this process of decision-making 
works depends on the network of relationships that connect the groups involved in any 
campaign.  
 In international solidarity campaigns, a global network is involved in planning the 
strategy. Hermanson (interview, 2007), in speaking of the Solidarity Center’s 
international allies, told me, 
In Taiwan we linked up with a group called Focus on Globalization, which 
was just a marvelous group. They were academics, they did research, they 
held demonstrations, they went to the stock market and a meeting of Nien 
Hsing [a manufacturing company targeted by the anti-sweatshop 
movement]; they went to the meeting of Tainan [another such company] 
when we had that campaign. It was a very great organization, added a 
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tremendous amount. And I must say this--that these organizations don't 
just provide us with an understanding of what's going on in their country, 
they also participate in the development of a global strategy. They're 
students of the global production system just as much as we are in the US-
-I think it's a real misconception to think that the strategy is developed in 
the US and then you link up with organizations in other countries to carry 
it out. Quite often, the reverse is the case. 
International solidarity campaigns are not, then, US-centric affairs, but genuinely 
international in their organization, conception and execution. 
 A particularly important element of these international networks is the workers 
themselves. Ideally, they would be in a leadership position in determining the direction of 
the campaign. In practice, the picture is more complicated. While the workers can make 
clear what their priorities and goals are and other groups can seek to organize around 
them, the workers in any particular sweatshop have only limited expertise about the 
global terrain in which the movement must maneuver; and they know even less about 
conditions on the ground in the US, where the core companies are located and can be 
most effectively pressured. Thus, there is an inherent tension in the organization of such 
campaigns. How successfully these two elements are balanced probably varies somewhat 
from campaign to campaign, though all the solidarity activists I spoke with seemed 
sincerely committed to trying to make sure that they were ultimately accountable in some 
fashion to the workers on whose behalf they were campaigning. At least in the New Era 
campaign, they seem to have been relatively successful. Howald (interview, 2007), the 
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president of the local representing the New Era workers, in speaking of her experiences 
with USAS and other allies, said, “They were very open to our suggestions on our 
activities; they worked hand-in-hand with our members. If our members didn't feel 
comfortable doing something, they was never any pressure on our members […]. If 
USAS said we're going to protest this and somebody said they didn't like that, they would 
back off.” While Howald and the other leaders of the local union needed to rely on 
outside expertise even to help them to understand how to run their strike locally, she 
never felt as though these more experienced allies were imposing anything on the local 
union. 
 On the other hand, according to Tocco (interview, 2007): “You're often working 
with unions that don't have experience or even understand the potential that could exist in 
using students as a tactic or just as part of a broader campaign. They don't read the 
articles, they don't know when sit-ins happen, there's just a lack of cultural understanding 
of what that means.” The workers, because of their circumstances, have no way of 
knowing what it is possible to achieve on the ground in the US. This brings us back to an 
issue we discussed in the chapter on the WRC’s network of allies--the importance of 
local expertise, both in the countries of the sweatshop workers and in the US, where 
many of their allies are. The workers have a good sense of the local terrain--the plant they 
work in and the surrounding community. While they may have some sense of the local 
political terrain, it is likely that they will have to work with allies in their own country to 
help them maneuver in that terrain. Many of these allies will be the same organizations--
or at least the same sort of organizations--that the WRC works with. They are all part of 
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one international network, the anti-sweatshop movement. In terms of planning strategy in 
the US, groups based in the Global South--whether the workers themselves or their 
domestic allies--simply cannot have the detailed understanding of the political 
opportunity system in the US. As Tocco notes, they are not going to fully understand the 
role of brands in youth culture and college campuses and why this gives a group like 
USAS leverage over the brand-name companies. Therefore US groups must, of necessity, 
plan much of the US-based strategy themselves, working with the workers in any 
particular campaign to help them understand how precisely a particular strategy might 
affect them and discussing the ways in which it might be beneficial or harmful. 
 If communication is good, however, the workers should at least have a sense of 
what sort of impact any actions in the US are likely to have. From here, they can make 
informed decisions about whether or not a particular line of action makes sense, given 
where they are. Long-time labor activist Stephen Coates (interview, 2007) told me, for 
example, “We had a couple of conflicts with partner organizations that wanted to call for 
a boycott. We said, Well, that's not what the workers want. You may think that that's 
effective, but it's sort of a knee-jerk response, that's not going to work here. I think most 
people come around to that view.” Here, we can see the importance of Coates as a bridge-
worker, communicating the needs and goals of the workers to US allies who do not have 
as much direct contact with them. Contrast this with the Bangladesh campaign, where the 
US activists engaged in plans that ran directly counter to what Bangladeshi activists 
wanted. 
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(Workers’ concerns around boycotts are generally that they could end up putting 
them out of work permanently. This is not what they want. Rather, they are looking for 
ways to pressure the brands that will not result in a loss of orders for their factory, if it 
can helped. USAS, for instance, prefers to rely on the threat of suspension of apparel 
firms’ licensees; an actual suspension is a last resort and they never seek a permanent 
severing of ties with a particular company. The goal is to ensure that workers can 
continue producing college-licensed goods, only under better conditions--not to end their 
relationship with colleges. This involves walking a fine line in terms of pressuring 
companies, but, according to Howald (interview, 2007), USAS was sensitive to this 
problem: 
The students were pushing for contracts to be eliminated with New Era--
but they also understood that if it happened, it could impact us and our 
return to work. So they put more pressure on universities to reach out to 
New Era and say, Look, solve the differences with the union that represent 
the members, recognize that it's there, work on the health and safety issues 
that the union has brought to light and see what we can do about getting 
this into a working relationship. USAS was highly, highly effective in 
doing that. 
Like CWA national organizer David Palmer (quoted in chapter twelve), she noted that 
having Ohio State University threaten to suspend their contract was, for New Era, the 
final pressure point that got the company to come to an agreement with the CWA.) 
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 In planning strategy, the international network involved in any particular 
campaign relies on a process of consensus decision-making that, perforce, relies very 
heavily on telecommunications--e-mail and, more recently, the internet phone service 
Skype. “There would be long e-mail chains with a lot of CC's in which strategies would 
be discussed and debated and developed; and assignments suggested and accepted or 
rejected. And out of that give and take, the strategy would emerge and actions would be 
taken” (Hermanson, interview, 2007). As discussed in chapter eight, while 
telecommunications has been an invaluable tool in facilitating helping activists 
coordinate globally, it only works if key people within the network have met face-to-face 
and already established relationships of trust (Fox and Brown 1998; Keck and Sikkink 
1998; Olesen 2005). This is another reason that bridge-workers such as Evelyn Zepeda 
and Jeff Hermanson are so essential--they are among the key people in helping forge 
these relationships of trust, with their bilingual, bicultural position, keeping in direct 
touch with the workers in any particular campaign (even living with them in Zepeda’s 
case), while having close ties to US-based activists groups, such as UNITE HERE and 
USAS. 
 Simply because there are ties of trust does not mean that reaching consensus is 
easy. Indeed, it is the difficulty of forging consensus (particularly through a medium like 
e-mail, as opposed to the face-to-face meetings where the decision-making method 
originally developed) that makes such trust so important. Hermanson (interview, 2007) 
told me the story of one campaign where they faced particularly thorny decision. It 
involved a strike by workers at a factory in El Salvador, owned by Tainan Enterprises, a 
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Taiwanese manufacturer that also had plants in Cambodia, China and Indonesia and that 
did work for lead apparel firms such as Ann Taylor and the Gap. The question that came 
up was, 
is it ethical to put pressure on the Gap to stop dealing with Tainan 
everywhere? Or only tell them not to deal with them in El Salvador until 
the problem is resolved? And there are always different views on that 
question. There's no hard and fast rule you can apply here. It depends on 
the situation and what's going to be successful. If you're successful, your 
pressure results not in their actually leaving Tainan, but it results in their 
forcing Tainan to fix the problem--which is what happened in the El 
Salvador case. But if you don't have enough pressure to make a credible 
threat, you might end up hurting factories that have very little to do with 
the basic dispute. So those kinds of things just were argued out, argued 
out, and argued out. I think in the Tainan case, we went for months before 
the view that we had to be more extreme or radical and demand a total 
boycott of Tainan by the brands--it took months before that view 
prevailed. 
When I asked what lead to them finally settling on this consensus, Hermanson said, 
“Well, I think the situation of the workers got more and more dire and people became 
more and more convinced that half-measures weren't going to get the job done. […] And 
we came to that conclusion reluctantly, but in the end it did turn the trick and brought 
Tainan to the table and we negotiated an agreement.” 
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 There are also cases where the network simply can’t come to a consensus. 
Because it is a network of groups working together voluntarily, those groups that oppose 
the direction the majority wants to take can simply opt out of a particular campaign. They 
still, however, remain part of the anti-sweatshop movement and can participate in other 
campaigns with the same groups. In the case of the Designated Suppliers Program (which 
we look at more closely in the next chapter), the Clean Clothes Campaign--one of the 
most important European anti-sweatshop groups--came out in opposition to it. They 
thought the program was too ambitious and too harsh on the apparel industry (a 
perspective that is probably due to the fact that unions and their allies tend to have a less 
adversarial relationship with corporations in Europe than in the US). According to USAS 
member Jessica Rutter (interview, 2007), 
There were a lot of phone calls with them and meetings, to talk through 
what the program was. […] Unfortunately, we weren't able to ever 
convince them, even though a lot of their allies were also supporting the 
program, that this was something that could happen, that it was doable. 
[….] And so, of course, we kept a relationship going and we would work 
together on very specific factory cases, but in terms of the larger 
campaign, they didn't want to endorse something like that. 
 Based on his experiences, Hermanson (interview, 2007) sees this flexibility and 
the ability of groups to opt out of certain campaigns or programs largely as a strength, 
in the sense that it creates an atmosphere of creativity, where people aren't 
afraid to disagree or to put out different ideas. I think at this point in the 
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development of the movement, that's absolutely essential because 
nobody's got the answers--if we all had the answers, that would be simple. 
But I think it could be a weakness if we're not able to bring to bear a 
critical mass because people don't agree--but that hasn't been the case. We 
haven't been able to bring together a critical mass in a lot of cases, but it's 
not because of disagreements over strategy; it's because the organizations 
don't exist--we're still building them. 
Such flexibility in relations between groups is only possible if there is a certain degree of 
trust between them; this in turn is only possible when the various organizations within the 
movement have long-term relationships with each other. In the next section, we will look 
at the ways that USAS in particular has cultivated such relationships with various groups 
in the Global South through their internship program. 
 
USAS’s Internship Program 
 USAS’s internship program started because a number of people among its early 
leadership realized that it was essential for them to have some personal connections with 
those workers on whose behalf they were campaigning if they were to be a genuine 
solidarity organization. As with the WRC’s relationship to its partners, I am not in a 
position to evaluate how well their internship program has succeeded in creating 
relationships of genuine solidarity; it was, however, clear to me that the people I 
interviewed were all quite serious about wanting to create such relationships and saw 
them as of central importance to USAS’s work. The relations that are formed through 
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internships have an additional role beyond fostering solidarity and facilitating 
transnational strategic decision-making--they also boost USAS’s credibility, allowing 
USAS members to counter the claims of some of their critics, who argue that the student 
activists can’t really know what workers want or what will benefit them. 
 The impetus for USAS’s internship program, officially known as the College 
Apparel Research Initiative (CARI), came from among the first generation of USAS 
activists, who, for a number of reasons, wanted their organization to have closer ties with 
the groups in the Global South, with whom they aspired to work is solidarity. USAS 
member Jess Champagne (interview, 2007) told me, 
People are always looking at USAS like, You're not really workers, what 
you're doing is actually hurting them, you don't actually know what they 
want. I never thought that was true, but I did feel like I really wanted to 
know to more about what was happening in producing countries, so I was 
planning to use the study abroad program for the second semester for my 
junior year and then helped a little bit with the College Apparel Research 
Initiative. 
USAS member Nick Reville (interview, 2007), who also helped start CARI up, told me, 
One of the challenges in that context [student organizing] is you're 
basically first-world, at fancy schools, mostly white activists, trying to be 
in solidarity with workers in the third world that are getting screwed over. 
You have a lot of challenges around who speaks for who, what's the best 
way to be supportive--there's a lot of challenges there and there's a lot of 
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people just sort of saying, Here's what I think about what this should be. 
And so that was sort of the impetus [for CARI]--how do we make this a 
little bit more real, to have a conversation with people who are actually 
down there, and [better] understand what we're talking about? 
Underlying the creation of the internship program, in other words, was an intuitive sense 
that it is difficult to act in solidarity with others if you--or at least some members of your 
organization--do not have a personal connection with them. 
 As noted in previous chapters, while some USAS members did have their own 
personal connections with activist groups in the Global South, USAS’s initial ties with 
these groups was for the most part through their allies. It was such allies--including the 
National Labor Committee, USLEAP, and UNITE--that helped USAS get in touch with 
third-world NGOs and unions and set up the initial set of internships (Champagne, 
interview, 2007). The Solidarity Center is also central to CARI, with student interns often 
working with that arm of the AFL-CIO, as well as local groups (United Students Against 
Sweatshops 2005, 2009b). Additionally, not only the Solidarity Center, but some US 
unions, such as UNITE HERE and SEIU, have supplied funding for the internship 
program (United Students Against Sweatshops 2005). In chapter six, we discussed a 
number of the types of organizations that the WRC is connected to. Since they are 
embedded in the same social networks and they both relied heavily on the Solidarity 
Center to help them form their initial relationships, USAS works with a similar variety of 
groups. 
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 According to USAS member Liana Dalton (interview, 2007), CARI is crucial to 
maintaining USAS’s relationships with its partners abroad, although the staff members 
also play a central role. 
As far as maintaining those relationships, a lot of it does fall on staff 
because of the student turn-over. It's just capacity and access to phones 
and stuff. I think the other main venue is through our summer international 
intern program […]. The interns are the ones that actually build the trust 
and relationships with their host organizations over the course of the two 
months that they're with them and then they serve as the liaison 
throughout the year. We conceptualize our international intern program as 
not a two-month program but a year-long internship. 
While in the field, the interns serve their host organizations in a number of ways. Upon, 
their return to the US, in addition to maintaining their role as a liaison, they try to convey 
what they learned in their internship to other members of USAS, both in the leadership 
and in the grassroots base. 
 As the program had evolved by the early 2000s, students who wanted to 
participate in the internship applied during the school year. USAS reviewed their 
applications, looking for evidence of past activism, if not with USAS, then with some 
other groups involved with labor rights activism; the ability to speak a second language 
(although this was not absolutely necessary); and a commitment to continue working with 
USAS upon their return. Before going abroad, they would also go through an orientation 
lasting a few days (United Students Against Sweatshops 2009b). The number of interns 
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varied form year to year--in 2005, for instance, it included sixteen students assigned to 
thirteen countries (United Students Against Sweatshops 2005), while in other years, there 
were any where from eight or twelve interns.15 
 In designing the internship, the first generation of USAS activists were clear on 
what they wanted to avoid. Eric Brakken (interview, 2007) noted that “A lot of times 
groups in other parts of the world feel kind of used by US groups […]--they have to take 
a week out to come and tote a bunch of Americans around, show them all the horrors. 
The Americans go back and they do speaking tours and videos on the internet--and stuff 
doesn't really change in the country where they went to.” Instead, the people I spoke with 
consistently emphasized the importance of building long-term relationships, making 
themselves practically useful to the groups they worked with, and allowing those groups 
to set the goals. Indeed, they saw the internships as one of the main means of building the 
relationships necessary for “seeking guidance in the concrete demands from our partners 
as much as possible” (Dalton, interview, 2007). According to USAS staff member Zack 
Knorr (interview, 2007), 
We are a student organization of students primarily in the US, also in 
Canada, but our demands and what we do really needs to be driven by 
workers on the ground because we're primarily just trying to use the 
leverage of our universities to support the organizing that they're doing. If 
we're not connected to them then we're not doing that. And we also have a 
small staff, like three people. So the best way that we can do that is having 
students go out and really spending time with them and then hopefully 
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bringing that back and keeping those relationships going so that we can 
really get direction and be driven by the organizations we're working with. 
In accord with USAS’s ideology then, the internship is first and foremost about building 
relationships of solidarity and finding ways to empower workers not only in their 
workplaces, but in the transnational movement against sweatshops. 
 The people I spoke with in USAS, based on their own experience, believed that 
they were doing a good job of this. Dalton (interview, 2007) told me, 
USAS has a really good reputation around the world. Some of the other 
interns in Latin America were saying people look at them and say, Oh 
look, it's this kid, and then all of a sudden they introduce themselves as 
being from USAS and they're like, USAS, great. I think the same thing is 
true in Asia. Everyone has a lot of respect for USAS. It's amazing to me, 
actually--we're just a bunch of students, we don't have a lot of money or 
resources, but people do respect us. 
This trust is not, of course, automatic. When Dalton did her internship, it was a new 
partner organization, based in Hong Kong, whose trust she had to earn. 
I came in as sort of the first person that really had ever interacted with 
USAS and the WRC. It was first about building trust because the situation 
is so sensitive in China, organizing is so sensitive. There's a super strong 
security culture in a lot of ways and they're not just going to trust some 
random white American. It was really intense at first because I felt like I 
really wasn't wanted and I didn't fit in. But then really quickly I started 
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gaining their trust. I really felt a part of things and almost identified more 
with them than I ever had with any organization or anything I had been a 
part of in the United States. 
This, of course, is a self-assessment by a USAS member. Their partner organizations may 
have a different evaluation of the relationship, but, given that the these groups continue to 
work with USAS, the relationships would seem to be positive in at least some ways for 
them. 
 While in their internships abroad, part of what students do is lend organizations 
their English skills and their computer and other technical abilities, helping the host 
organizations around the office and facilitating their ability to communicate abroad--
acting as bridge-workers in others words. Having students present from the US may also 
be a help in and of itself, in terms both of boosting the morale of local activists and 
providing a set of eyes and ears that can convey word of labor and human rights 
violations to the outside world in a way that people from the Global South can’t 
(McGrath, interview, 2007). USAS member also do research on working conditions and 
the lives of sweatshop workers, knowledge they bring back to the US with them to use in 
USAS reports (a point to which we will return below). 
 Beyond this work of an immediately practical nature, the internships allow the 
participants--both students and host organizations--to exchange ideas and learn from each 
other. Knorr (interview, 2007) said, 
People get to learn a lot about what's going on in different places, they get 
to bring back different organizing models, different organizing strategies, 
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and then we try to work with them and encourage them to take those and 
talk about their experience at other campuses, or to actually bring them 
into the organization so that we can learn from the organizations that we're 
working with and hopefully they can learn from us too. 
Dalton (interview, 2007) emphasized that her internship had a large impact on the ways 
she thought about codes of conduct and what they could and couldn’t accomplish. This, 
in turn, significantly influenced the suggestions she made in the conversations involved 
in crafting the Designated Suppliers Program, a process which she was central to. Here 
we see a concrete way that USAS’s efforts to build ties with groups in the Global South 
had a major impact on their concrete strategy. (We will return to this in the next chapter.) 
It is not solely USAS that learns from its host organizations. USAS member Agatha 
Schmaedick (interview, 2007) told me of her work in Asia, “Frankly, so many of the 
unions in Asia, at least the ones that I worked with, are new, so it's probably more the 
other way around. I was trying to bring to them information from the unions in the United 
States or other countries--ideas, organizing models or success stories. There has only 
been freedom of association for about ten years, so they're very new.” 
 When the interns return to the US, they are expected to take on a number of 
responsibilities in addition to acting as liaisons with their host organization. In particular, 
they are expected to contribute to USAS’s popular education efforts, both among USAS’s 
grassroots base and the wider student population. Dalton (interview, 2007), while 
admitting that USAS could do a better job of this, identified a number of means by which 
the interns do this. “The main way that the interns do that is through being active as 
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organizers on their own campuses and in USAS nationally, being leaders in the 
organization, interacting with students. […] By being active in the organization upon 
their return, their perspective gets incorporated in how we make decisions.” She also 
pointed to, 
the report-backs at the [annual] conference; and then there's the written 
report that they write. If there's any case work, they're supposed to bottom-
line the communications around that, update students on specific cases. 
And the other thing they're supposed to do this year is to organize 
trainings for different campuses in their region as a way of outreaching to 
different students and sharing their experience. 
 In 2005, they also produced a detailed and attractively laid out report on the conditions 
in nine of the thirteen countries where they worked. The report included a basic overview 
of the structure of the international apparel industry, the state of workers’ right to 
organize in the selected countries, a comparison between the cost of living and the 
average apparel workers’ income, testimony from individual workers, and an overview of 
USAS’s strategy for supporting sweatshop workers in their struggles (United Students 
Against Sweatshops 2005). 
 
Conclusion 
 The strategic model for international solidarity campaigns is in many ways 
organized around the boomerang effect. It is what brings sweatshop workers and their 
local allies into a relationship with activists in the US and other foreign countries--the 
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fact that their local political opportunity system is largely closed and the consequent need 
to work with groups abroad who had access to openings in the POS that the workers and 
their local allies do not have. Specifically, US groups can exert pressure on critical points 
of leverage than the workers and other third-world groups cannot. This does not mean 
that the workers and their allies do nothing locally. Instead, the strategic model rests on 
both the workers pressuring the contractors through strikes and other elements in labor’s 
repertoire of tactics, while their US allies attempt to pressure the core firms employing 
the contractors more directly, by attacking their brand image. Different groups take on 
different roles, depending on their own skills, connections and resources and the 
particular companies involved in the struggle. This allows for a good deal of flexibility in 
how the strategic model is deployed from campaign to campaign. 
 The end goal of all these activities is to open more organizing space for the 
workers involved and give them more leverage over their employers--to change the 
political opportunity system within which workers must operate. In particular, the goal is 
to create room for worker empowerment through the organization of an independent 
union. This is what part of what makes the campaigns solidarity campaigns--the focus is 
ultimately on the workers, their goals, and their empowerment. 
 This focus on solidarity is integral to the success of anti-sweatshop campaigns. 
With these relationships in place, different groups can negotiate their roles in the various 
campaigns, what specific actions they will take, all the time keeping in touch with the 
workers to ensure that they are actually meeting the workers’ needs. Failure to do so 
would probably result in the sort of efforts that Brooks (2005, 2007) documented--
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campaigns that are, at best, misguided and do little to help those that they are nominally 
meant to. This means that US activists have to make sure that workers are incorporated 
into the strategic decision-making process in a way that lets them define the goals of the 
campaign. For this to work, there need to be relationships of trust between the 
participants in the transnational network. Usually, a few key people play the role of 
bridge-workers, using their bilingual, bicultural status to act as a bridge between workers 
and their domestic allies on the one hand and international groups on the other. These 
relationships must be actively maintained--this, for instance, is the main goal of USAS’s 
internship program. In the next chapter, we will examine the creation of the Designated 
Suppliers Program, which emerged specifically from feedback from groups in the Global 
South, included unions that had been at the center of some of the successful solidarity 
campaigns, about the limits of what they were actually achieving and the need to try a 
new strategy. 
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 The international solidarity campaigns we looked at in the last chapter scored a 
fair number of successes, in that many of them resulted in workers being able to form 
independent unions in their factories. The Designated Suppliers Program (DSP) was born 
out of anti-sweatshop activists’ frustration with the limits of such victories though. All 
too often, as happened at the Kukdong/ Mexmode and BJ&B factories (see chapter 
twelve), a year or two after they had helped workers successfully unionize, members of 
the wider movement would receive reports that the factory was closing down and the 
workers would soon be out of work--and the union, consequently, would be no more. As 
the factory-owners reached agreements with their newly unionized employees and 
improved working conditions, the factory-owners’ cost of business went up--to do the 
same work that they had done before there was a union, they would need to charge the 
lead apparel firms more. The reaction of the lead apparel firms--often the same ones who, 
under pressure from the movement, had pressed the contractor to recognize the union and 
cut a deal with it--would then decide that this increase in cost was unacceptable and take 
their business to another contractor. Soon the factory-owner in question would not have 
enough customers to continue running their business and would have little choice but to 
shut down. The core apparel companies might be willing to press their contractors to 
improve working conditions so their factories were no longer sweatshops--but the core 
companies were not willing to pay what it takes to run a factory in a sweat-free manner. 
Here, we come back to the structural roots of the problem of sweatshops in the basic 
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organization of the international apparel industry. It is this nut that the DSP is meant to 
crack, at least for college-licensed apparel. 
 Like the campaigns for codes of conduct for college and university licensees and 
for the WRC, the DSP is a significant strategic innovation--the development of an 
important new strategic model--on the part of the anti-sweatshop movement. It is rooted 
in the same dialectic of action and reflection (Ryan and Jeffreys forthcoming; Ryan et al. 
forthcoming), experience and ideology as underlay the creation of the WRC. Its origins 
are slightly different though, showing the diversity of conditions under which movements 
may choose to innovate. The codes of conduct were born of an attempt by UNITE to 
simply come up with as many new tools as possible in their anti-corporate campaigns--
but the codes proved to not only to be a very powerful tool, but something that took on a 
life of its own, becoming a distinct strategic model within the anti-sweatshop movement. 
The WRC was the result of a protracted conflict over the codes of conduct--the apparel 
industry responded to the codes by creating their own, in-house codes and the FLA to 
monitor them, arguing that this was sufficient to solve the problem of sweatshops. The 
anti-sweatshop movement responded by creating the WRC as a counter to the FLA and as 
a model of a genuinely independent monitoring organization. Unlike the WRC, the DSP 
was not a response to specific actions that the apparel industry had taken. Unlike the 
codes of conduct, it was not one of a number of experiments that the movement was 
trying out. Instead, the anti-sweatshop activists were frustrated with the limits of what 
they were achieving under what was, all things considered, a relatively successful 
strategic model. They then went through an extensive process, involving widespread 
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consultations, in which they deliberately designed the DSP. When it was complete, they 
publicly unveiled it in 2005 and then began to organize a campaign in support of it 
(which, as of this writing in February 2010, is still on-going). 
 What the Designated Suppliers Program is meant to do is “to compel the brands to 
reward the factories that respect the rights of workers” (Nova, interview, 2007), instead 
of punishing them by taking their business elsewhere. Beyond that, it is meant to alter the 
relations of power between the core companies, their contractors and workers in such a 
way that the workers have more bargaining power in the commodity chain that they 
presently do. The means to this end is to require companies with college licensing 
agreements to do business with factories that the WRC has conducted a thorough 
investigation of and approved of as generally respecting workers’ rights, including that to 
a living wage and the right to form an independent union. This does not necessarily mean 
that they have to choose from a WRC-approved list--the licensees can nominate their 
own choice of contractors and the WRC is willing to work with them (within reason) to 
bring them up to speed, so that they meet the requirements of the DSP. As always, the 
workers can file a complaint with the WRC--and if the WRC finds that the contractor is 
not respecting workers’ rights, the contractor risks losing their contract and the licensee 
their license. In other words, the workers have some ability to decertify the factory at 
which they work--which would give them some potential leverage over the companies 
involved that they do not have now. Thus, if the DSP were successful in meeting its 
goals, there would be a shift, so that power relations in transnational commodity chains 
would not be quite so unbalanced, at least within the limited realm of college apparel. 
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Ideologically speaking, the development of the DSP involved a re-affirmation on the part 
of USAS and its allies of the importance of worker empowerment, as well as a renewed 
emphasis on the structural nature of the problem of sweatshops--and therefore the need 
for a structural solution. 
 
Origins of the Designated Suppliers Program 
 The DSP was, in a number of ways, the product of the transnational network that 
constituted the anti-sweatshop movement and conducted the solidarity campaigns. As 
already noted, activists in the network were frustrated with the limits of the successes of 
the campaigns they conducted. Additionally, although the DSP was primarily crafted by 
US activists, they were specifically responding to complaints by their third-world 
partners about the limits of what they were achieving; and the US activists extensively 
consulted with their third-world allies in crafting the DSP, trying to ensure that the new 
program--while viable in the US--would meet the needs of activists in the Global South. 
The international solidarity campaigns we discussed in the last chapter thus formed the 
foundation for the DSP, in that the DSP would not have taken form if it were not for the 
networks built in such campaigns. 
 The international solidarity campaigns were also essential in that, if USAS and its 
allies had not been able to see the limits of their current strategic model, they would not 
have been motivated to begin developing a new strategic model that would try to address 
its weaknesses. USAS member Jessica Rutter (interview, 2007) explained how they 
began to see the shortcomings of what they were achieving: 
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So basically what was happening with a lot of the great successes that we 
had was the factories were starting to close because as workers organized-
-were able to successfully organize and have a union and increase wages, 
to improve their working conditions--prices were going up and so the 
brands were actually starting to divert their orders into other factories. 
[They would] say, Oh, unfortunately, for business reasons, we can't source 
from these factories. And we said, You're obviously cutting and running or 
trying to avoid these places, because now that their standards are better, 
it's a little more expensive than places where the standards aren't better. 
With a lot of the really important relationships that had been built with 
workers at certain factories, those workers were saying, We really need to 
keep our factory, that's the most important thing right now. 
According to Rutter, this request required a rethinking of USAS’s strategy, since it “was 
really different than anything USAS had ever done before, because USAS generally 
didn't work to keep business in certain places, that's just not what we did--we supported 
workers organizing.” 
This was not simply a matter of helping workers keep their jobs, but also of 
keeping unions alive. As discussed in chapter thirteen, because many countries do not 
legally allow for industrial unions, workers must do the slow work of organizing plant by 
plant--and if the factory closes down, the union no longer legally exists, all their work has 
come to naught, and they must start over again. While workers, especially union leaders, 
may still have organizing skills and ties to allied organizations who can help them, both 
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domestically and internationally, they are likely, in the search for work, to scatter to a 
number of new factories. This means that they then have to begin rebuilding the social 
networks within the factory that are necessary for a successful, democratic union from 
scratch--no easy task. 
There were subtler problems as well. Winning campaigns in the first place is a 
time-consuming task. Eric Dirnbach (interview, 2007) of UNITE HERE told me, “The 
scope of the problem is so tremendous that I'm loosing patience--you just can't have a 
two-year campaign to help workers at one factory organize a union.” A two-year 
campaign entails a tremendous investment of resources on the part of anti-sweatshop 
groups--and, in the mean time, that limits the amount of resources they have to help 
workers elsewhere. The monitoring following a successful campaign has also proved to 
be time consuming. Nancy Steffan (interview, 2007) of the WRC noted that the 
Consortium found it had to remain continuously involved in many factories, long after an 
apparent victory. “We would go and write up a report--and then to get the situation fixed 
takes months. And we're still involved in most of the factory investigations we've done 
just to make sure things are kept up. If they're not kept up, then we should probably get 
involved again.” This in turn limited the number of new cases that they could practically 
take on--and thus their wider impact. As a result, according to WRC executive director 
Scott Nova in an 2006 interview with InsideHigherEd.com, of the 2-3,000 factories 
around the world producing college apparel, only eight met the WRC’s standards fully 
(Jaschik 2006). 
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Another problem Steffan (interview, 2007) raised is that they had made no 
progress towards securing workers a living wage. 
The gains, while they were significant--getting unions recognized, getting 
harassment of workers to stop--they could have gained a lot more in one 
area where there hadn't been any progress[--]wages. You probably 
assumed that at this point the people are getting high wages--but the 
unions in the industry, the few that exist that are actually bargaining, are 
generally not bargaining over wages because the factories don't have the 
money to pay higher wages because they're under so much price pressure 
from their buyers. 
The problem is again the structure of the industry, where the core firms seek the 
contractors who can keep costs as low as possible while still maintaining a certain 
quality. As a result, “the actual improvements have a ceiling on them, and then the 
improvements are actually being eroded over time because there's no reward for 
improving conditions in the factories” (Steffan, interview, 2007). 
Additionally, the closure of unionized factories has wider repercussions. Rutter 
(interview, 2007) said, this pattern of closures “also sends a message to other workers 
that if you have a union at your factory and you improve conditions at your factory, then 
your factory will close--which is a really dangerous message to send to workers. It's 
another kind of intimidation tactic.” 
 Groups such as USAS and the WRC in the US thus were getting feedback from 
their allies, particularly the workers they had worked so hard to help improve their lives, 
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that made them question the long-term viability of their strategic model. In particular, 
some anti-sweatshop activists came to believe that the use of codes of conduct and 
independent monitoring as a strategic model, while valuable, was more limited in its 
impact than they had initially hoped it would be. This is, in part, because the major 
apparel companies have managed to partially co-opt the model, both through their 
internal corporate social responsibility departments and through the FLA. Brent Wood* 
(interview, 2007) was concerned that, 
There’s been some change at least on the part of a lot of groups--a move in 
a direction where that tool of public embarrassment has been made 
secondary to an effort to use the existing codes of conduct and monitoring 
systems the brands have developed as a separate tool to promote change--
in other words, a belief that through the codes of conduct and monitoring 
that the brands have opened up so that activists can walk through, that they 
[the brands] can be held accountable to their own self-proclaimed 
standards, that their own monitoring systems can be used to promote 
change. And that is true to a degree. The problem is the degree to which 
it's true is a lot more limited than people recognize. 
Again, the reasons for these limits are the structure of the apparel industry. In particular, 
there is the inevitable conflict of interest involved when corporations monitor themselves 
and their clients, which we discussed in depth in chapter nine. Wood believes that the 
model based on codes and monitoring “was worth pursuing, because at an earlier time 
there was more reason to be hopeful. There was less of understanding of the way that the 
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supply chain is structured would thwart efforts to use codes towards positive ends. But 
it's now clear that the level of progress that can be achieved is very limited.” That is, at 
least without altering the structure of the commodity chains--which the DSP aims to do. 
 In addition to the long-standing problems with the apparel industry’s structural 
reliance on outsourcing, a significant change in the political economy of the industry took 
place in 2004--the end of the Multifiber Arrangement (MFA), which had governed global 
apparel exports since 1961. As discussed in chapter two, the MFA gave developing 
countries quotas for how much in the way of textiles and apparel they could export to the 
US and Western Europe in any give year. The result of this was that apparel companies 
were compelled to contract out production to a wide range of countries, including some, 
such as Cambodia, that had relatively strong labor protections. According to Rutter 
(interview, 2007), “With the elimination of quotas, there was this fear that garment 
production would be able to just move based on wages, and these kind of efficiency 
standards have no respect whatsoever to workers’ rights or standards. In fact, it would 
increase the race to the bottom. […] There's this fear that now that the quotas don't exist, 
there's no incentive [to produce in places like Cambodia] and so there's this hysteria--
what are we going to do about the MFA?” 
 These developments caused anti-sweatshop activists, in both the Global North and 
South, to realize that they need to re-evaluate their strategy and find a new direction. 
Fortunately, their experience and their analysis of the apparel industry gave them a good 
sense of what they needed to look at to move forward. Steffan (interview, 2007) told me 
that after they realized that “the system just wasn't getting us as much as we thought we 
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could, that it wasn't sustainable over time,” they “decided we had to look not only at the 
labor conditions but also the purchasing practices of the brands--the way they do 
business, the way their suppliers act, the prices they pay, the relationship they have with 
them, the way they organize their production to ensure that they're actually in a position 
to determine working conditions in a factory.” It was the focus on these factors that 
eventually lead to the formulation of the DSP. 
 
Strategic Innovation and the Crafting of the DSP 
Organization and Decision-Making 
 Knowing that you need to strategically innovate and actually innovating are two 
different things. The process by which anti-sweatshop activists innovated was a time-
consuming one, involving widespread discussions and consultations, not only within the 
movement, but with outside experts. People came up with a number of proposals, which 
were discussed and debated until they settled on something broadly like the DSP. They 
then had to hone that model so that it could stand up in the conflict with both the apparel 
industry and reluctant school administrators that activists knew was sure to ensue. As 
with the creation of the WRC, this process of widespread consultation and consensus-
oriented decision-making fostered both creativity--resourcefulness--and a deeper 
commitment to the resulting program on the part of the activists involved (Ganz 2000; 
Polletta 2002). 
 According to USAS member Liana Dalton (interview, 2007), even before the 
wider anti-sweatshop movement began convening the conversation that would produce 
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the DSP, USAS was already on its own trying to figure out what the next steps it should 
take would be. It had taken up a wage disclosure campaign, which, retrospectively, she 
thought was a poor idea. “But we really didn't know what we were doing at the time in 
terms of demands. We thought it would be useful--but I think people were kind of 
floundering around not knowing what to do with the concrete things like demands.” Like 
other anti-sweatshop activists, they had identified the lack of a living wage in the apparel 
industry as a major problem. They hoped that, by requiring companies to disclose the 
wages that workers were paid, in manner similar to the way in which companies were 
required to disclose factory locations, they could push the industry to increase wages. 
“The rationale behind the wage disclosure was that it was a lead-in to a living wage 
campaign, which was something that USAS was running both locally and internationally. 
I think the wage disclosure was seen as a way to build towards something bigger.” 
Additionally, 
I think the people who were really behind the campaign were still thinking 
that we had to keep galvanizing the student movement. We needed to have 
concrete winnable demands on campus. We needed something to keep this 
movement going with energy. Whatever we are fighting for, the important 
thing is that students are organizing, students are fighting and we're 
obviously going to still be doing the factory cases--this is going to be 
useful information. That was the rationale behind the campaign. 
Eventually, however, “we started realizing that any sort of living wage campaign that we 
were going to do was not going to be really ideal and it was going to be more top-down 
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that we wanted. Really what we needed to focus on was unions directly. We should stop 
beating around the bush and stop pretending to go around it through these other 
mechanisms. We should focus on unions and support unions.” 
 Although Dalton was herself dismissive of the wage disclosure campaign looking 
back, it probably served a valuable purpose in clarifying the thinking of USAS activists. 
It is no simple matter to come up with strategic innovations of the scale that the 
movement was realizing it needed. This requires coming up with a number of different 
ideas and possibly testing them out. It should be remembered that using college licensing 
agreements as a strategy was simply one experiment among many UNITE was trying out 
at the time of its origin--an experiment that proved successful far beyond what anyone 
expected. The wage disclosure campaign, if nothing else, helped USAS activists see more 
clearly what they did not want to do--a top-down campaign, where reforms would be 
imposed from the US. This in turn helped them refocus on their core, ideological goals--
empowering workers by strengthening the power of independent labor unions. As Dalton 
noted, it was also a way of keeping USAS active by giving them a new issue around 
which they could organize. This in itself is important, since activist organizations who 
don’t have campaigns to mobilize people around tend to fade away into obscurity. Given 
the high turnover in student populations, a student activist group could succumb to this 
unfortunate fate fairly rapidly. 
 In many respects, the process of creating the DSP was similar to creating the 
WRC--there was widespread consultation among a number of groups, with those 
involved working out their differences by means of consensus. Initially, these took place 
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through conference calls and e-mail lists, with people sending draft proposals back and 
forth and editing them (Dalton, Rutter, Stoppard*, Wood, interviews, 2007). Rutter 
(interview, 2007) summed up the decision-making process this way: 
We really tried to talk to everyone that we could think of. We talked to US 
unions, we talked to NGOs--it was a lot of consultation, it was a period of 
just trying to figure out what could be done, policies that could be helpful, 
that could address some of these new problems. And so we actually had a 
retreat in January of 2005, where we tried to bring together a bunch of 
folks. So we brought together students from USAS, we brought together 
the US unions, we brought together some of the international allies and 
had this larger summit. It wasn't large--it was like a smaller retreat 
actually, but maybe fifty people. 
In addition, the Solidarity Center and a number of allied academics were involved in the 
decision-making process (Stoppard, interview, 2007). After the conference, they 
continued to work on the proposal developed there--the Designated Suppliers Program--
and unveiled it at the start of the next school year, September 2005 (Dalton, interview, 
2007). 
If anything, the network of groups involved was broader than in the creation of 
the WRC, since--thanks to the networks USAS and WRC had built up over the course of 
their international solidarity campaigns--groups from the Global South were better 
integrated. On the other hand, this was clearly an initiative lead by USAS and the WRC. 
Though they consulted their allies in unions and NGOs, these groups were not as 
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centrally involved as they had been in the creation of the WRC (Dalton, Rutter, Stoppard, 
Wood, interviews, 2007). USAS and the WRC has matured sufficiently as organizations 
that they were more in a position to take a leadership role in this process of deliberate 
innovation. 
Ruttter (interview, 2007) described the decision-making process as follows: 
We tried to consult as many people as possible. And then we also tried to 
talk to some people who had some expertise about what they thought 
about the details--so have focused conversations with those folks. A lot of 
times that meant having arguments. I would say some of the bigger 
decisions were made on conference calls or at the retreat itself. Some of 
the smaller decisions on some of the detailed stuff was worked out more 
informally and then would be proposed on paper to people for approval, 
that kind of thing. 
Wood (interview, 2007) said most of the debate was about the fine details of the program. 
His recollection is that, on the whole, the process was not a terribly contentious one 
because “the concepts are very straightforward--they're dictated by the economic reality. 
[…] I think we knew where we were from the outset because we had developed a very 
sophisticated understanding of the industry and how it operates and what it would take 
for a factory to be able to respect the rights of workers and succeed economically.” 
Rutter (interview, 2007) believed that the consensus process produced a better 
product for two reasons. On the one hand, it made everyone feel like they had a stake in 
the program. 
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Something we really tried to prioritize was making sure that everyone felt 
a part of the process and that everyone felt good with the output. And 
obviously you can't always have everyone be totally 100% happy with the 
outcome, but making sure that people felt like that their opinion was being 
respected in the process and being considered and that once the final 
product was done that everyone was at least like, Yeah, this is pretty cool-
-if not, I agree with every single part of it, at least, This is good. So that 
was really, really important because the whole campaign hinged on 
making sure that all of our allies everywhere were going to support this in 
a real way. 
On the other hand, Rutter also felt like it produced a stronger program at the end of the 
process, 
because we had to deal with a lot of different ideas and a lot of them got 
incorporated in some ways; and in other ways they were definitely used to 
create stronger arguments for what we had, so I think in every way that it 
was good that there was a lot of debate. And it was actually a really fun 
process in a lot of ways, being able to talk to so many people and hear 
different people's ideas and then think about ways that the program could 
incorporate or arguments for why the program shouldn't incorporate 
certain things. 
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This corroborates Marshall Ganz’s (2000) and Francesca Polletta’s (2002) arguments 
about the benefits of deliberative decision-making processes, which we examined in 
earlier chapters. 
 Beyond the use of consensus itself, there were quite deliberate efforts to make 
sure the decision-making process was inclusive. Rutter (interview, 2007) recalled, “I was 
one of the national organizers for USAS, I was pretty involved in a lot of the 
conversations that were happening with allies, but also trying to support the student in-
put part of that and making sure that students were part of it every step of the way in 
terms of how it was shaping and how we were going to create a campaign around it, so 
calling students at a bunch of different campuses and having conference calls and also 
helping with the internship program.” 
There was also a concentrated effort to include USAS and the WRC’s allies from 
the Global South, drawing on both the partnerships USAS had formed through its 
internship program and the relationships that the WRC’s field staff had developed. As I 
have noted in the previous chapter, in such situations, there is always the challenge that 
Southern groups don’t and really can’t fully understand the situation on the ground in the 
US--what is strategically feasible and what isn’t. They can make clear what their goals 
and priorities are and then US activists must try to find a way to create a viable program 
that honors those goals and priorities--something that necessarily entails some trust 
between the US and Southern groups. Dalton (interview, 2007) explained to me how this 
worked in relation to the DSP: 
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I think the core demands come from the unions and the partners in the 
South. I think that everyone pretty much agrees on what the fundamental 
issues that need to be addressed are--price pressures, labor flexibilization 
as a means of union repression. […] The necessity of student organizing 
has forced us to create this entity--and rather than being this concept of 
unionized factories and higher prices, it's become the DSP as an entity, as 
a program. It's become more about intricate little details and, to be honest, 
most unions don't give a shit about what does this paragraph of this forty-
page report say. A lot of them don't have a good enough conception of the 
organizing reality of students and administrators relations--they don't 
understand why some of these decisions are being made. Therefore it's 
really difficult to continue that consultation process of keeping them 
having ownership and decision-making power on exactly what the DSP 
looks like in terms of the policy document. What's going to be important is 
for us to keep the policy flexible enough so that they can still shape it once 
it exists, once we've won it. 
This shows what a careful balancing act is necessary in maintaining transnational 
relationships that genuinely embody the principles of solidarity. There are clearly limits 
to what consultations with unions representing sweatshop workers can accomplish in 
terms of designing a strategy. The US groups have to be able to act autonomously, using 
their knowledge of the situation on the ground in the US--what rules govern the different 
social arenas and what points of leverage US groups might have. What this means is that, 
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in many ways, the DSP is more a project of USAS and the WRC than the groups it is 
meant to help. Their hope is that it will, however, give their allies in the South more room 
to maneuver--more organizing space and new points of leverage. And, as Dalton noted, 
they have tried to design it be flexible so that, on the ground in the Global South, the 
unions there can adapt it to local conditions, using their local expertise, to turn it into a 
useful tool for whatever campaigns they are undertaking. This will allow these groups to 
retain their autonomy as well--indeed, one of the things USAS hopes to accomplish with 
the DSP is to strengthen that autonomy. 
As noted, in the period running up to the January 2005 conference, the activists 
involved developed a number of proposals. Some of the ones that my interviewees 
described to me only bore a distant resemblance to the final product--the DSP. This is in 
contrast to the creation of the WRC, where from the beginning the people involved knew 
pretty clearly what they were trying to create--an independent monitoring organization, 
that would serve as a contrast to the industry-controlled FLA. In this case, they new what 
they wanted to accomplish, but were uncertain about what sort of program might help 
them achieve these goals. Nova (interview, 2007) said that their starting point was that 
“we knew we had to do something to create a situation where a factory that treated 
workers more respectfully could actually survive and indeed thrive in the industry and 
that something would require the brands to change the way that their supply chains 
operated. The initial concept was simply to compel the brands to reward the factories that 
respect the rights of workers.” 
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One simple proposal was to require the brands to make ten-year commitments to 
the factories that they contracted with, since this would at least stabilize the relationships 
between the two and keep the brands from cutting and running if workers succeeded in 
improving conditions. It was quickly recognized that the core apparel firms would never 
agree to such a long-term commitment and that they would need to develop an alternative 
proposal involving a shorter commitment period (Rutter, Stoppard, Wood, interviews, 
2007). Dalton (interview, 2007) came up with a proposal of her own, based on her 
involvement with Just Garments, a Salvadoran apparel manufacturing co-op founded by 
workers who had been fired when they tried organizing a factory producing for Land’s 
End. “I was pretty emotionally attached to the case. […] I wrote a proposal about Just 
Garments, which was kind of a stupid proposal, fair tradey almost.” Despite this, she felt 
there was a core idea in it that was important--“I felt that we should have a third model 
and it should be how to support good factories. […] The idea behind it was that we 
needed some sort of mechanism, once we have good union factories, to support them.” 
This basic notion of developing mechanisms to support good factories would, in the 
conversations that ensued from these proposals, become a central goal of the DSP. As 
with USAS’s wage disclosure campaign, while many of the initial proposals may have 
been problematic, they served to clarify the anti-sweatshop activists’ thinking, both about 
what precisely they wanted to accomplish and what might actually be possible, given the 
political opportunity system they were embedded within. 
Eventually, they settled on a basic concept of what they wanted. Steffan 
(interview, 2007) described it this way: 
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We knew what the basic idea was: there was going to be a set of factories 
that were going to operate differently, that the current way the industry 
operated was just not conducive to respecting worker rights in countries. 
We needed--hence the term--designated suppliers. We needed to create a 
new world out there of factories, not geographically in a different place, 
but a new set of factories that would operate under different conditions, 
would have a very different kind of relationship with their buyer, and 
would therefore be in a position to meet high labor standards. 
More exactly, they wanted to require that those brands producing college-licensed goods 
would have to commit to doing business with factories that met particular standards. One 
of the most crucial of these was independent worker organization--the workers at the 
factories would have to clearly be at liberty to unionize (or, as an alternative, the factories 
could be worker co-ops). Moving from this basic concept to a viable program that they 
could ask colleges and universities to sign onto required a good deal of additional work. 
As part of the process, the activists involved did research to determine what 
would be practical and what conditions were needed to guarantee workers’ rights. WRC 
staff person Nancy Steffan (interview, 2007) said, for instance, that 
We did this study on the retail price impact of living wage requirement so 
the we could show that we know how pricing works in the industry, we 
know much wages are going to have to go up, and we know what the 
effect might be for scenarios where the wages are raised--this is how it's 
affected. We did this very detailed living wage example that showed how 
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to do it--a market basket for each day for a variety of countries so that 
people can't say, Oh, you can't calculate a living wage--it's impossible. 
Here's the chart: they need rice, they need beans, they need milk, and they 
need to send their kids to school and buy pencils--straightforward and it 
can't be argued against. 
They also worked with a consultant to the apparel industry--a man who had 
worked with a number of the major firms, but was not tied to any of them, and was, in 
fact sympathetic to the anti-sweatshop movement. Finally, they met with the factory-
owners, interviewing them in order to work out the technical details of what standards the 
program would need to have in order for the contractors to live up to the standards of the 
program and remain profitable. Steffan (interview, 2007) noted that the factory-owners 
were happy to talk to representatives of the WRC about this. “Factories generally think 
it's a good idea to talk to people from the US who come to visit them. […] We [the 
WRC] represent universities. They're up for a friendly chat. It's often quite different if we 
say we need to come and talk to you about the fact that you're beating workers up at the 
factory, but we wanted to talk to them about their business, what kind of orders they 
receive, things they're used to talking to people about.” 
In addition to doing research to help them determine what would be a practically 
feasible program, the activists needed to design the DSP in such a way that it would be 
politically feasible--that is, to take account of any criticisms their foes might level against 
it and try to address those as much as possible in the basic design of the program. 
Caroline Stoppard* (interview, 2007) gave this example: “Clearly, we knew before the 
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campaign started the idea of prescribing a list of factories from which Nike had to source, 
factories that we happened to like, was just not going to go over well with anybody. We 
can't credibly make the case to universities that we know who are better apparel sources 
than Nike. We never tried to make that case, but a campaign that implies that we think 
that is probably going to have less traction than a real basic approach.” This is the same 
cautious approach of trying to take counter as many of their opponents’ potential counter-
framing arguments that we saw the WRC taking when they write their reports on labor 
rights violations at particular factories. Careful strategists not only seek to counter their 
opponents’ current actions, but to anticipate their responses to the strategist’s own moves 
and take pre-emptive measures to counter any such responses. 
At the end of the process, when the details of the Designated Suppliers Program 
had been more or less hammered out, many anti-sweatshop activists were very excited 
about its potential--an excitement mixed with some skepticism that the movement could 
actually pull something like this off. Rutter (interview, 2007) recalled, “A lot of the 
international groups were like, Wow! This is pretty amazing. If you guys could do this, 
go do it! But it seems really unrealistic--how are we going to get the brands to do this, 
how are we going to get the universities to agree? This is really great. But just also people 
being like, Wow! This is craziness." Dalton (interview, 2007) had similar memories. “We 
were all excited because finally we had something, after we had been floundering around-
-especially workers in Just Garments, they were so excited about this. The BJ&B workers 
were also excited--but they also felt that it's like pie in the sky, like we wish but we don't 
actually believe you can win this.” Dalton noted that some of this excitement was 
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probably as much due to all the time and energy that they had invested in crafting the 
DSP as because of its potential. 
I definitely have a lot more criticisms now than I did back in the day--I 
thought this was going to be this great thing. And I think it's also a reality 
of organizing--you just get so excited about it and I think you're willing to 
be critical, but you're just thinking it's more than it is because you're 
thinking this is so rhetorically beautiful. You're so excited that you're 
focusing on all the positive elements. And over time you start to encounter 
difficulties and then all of a sudden you start to focus on are the negative 
things and the problems. 
Despite the more critical eye she now takes to the DSP though, Dalton still supports the 
program as the best next step forward for the movement. 
 
Shifts in Ideology 
The process of designing the DSP not only produced a significant strategic 
innovation, but also a subtle but important shift in the movement’s ideology. As was the 
case with the creation of the WRC, the process of deliberately crafting a new program to 
counter actions by the apparel industry encouraged those involved to both analyze the 
social environment in which they operated more closely and examine their own values 
more deeply. One result of this was a re-emphasis on and reinforcement of the 
movement’s belief in the importance of worker empowerment through independent 
unions. Dirnbach (interview, 2007) had these thoughts on how the movement’s 
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experience with the limits of their international solidarity campaigns shaped their 
ideology: 
I think that people always knew that worker organizing was important--
I'm just seeing it explicitly acknowledged that worker organizing is crucial 
now. I think just seeing the industry response to the anti-sweatshop 
movement, which has again been anti-union and anti-worker in that sense, 
but pro-code of conduct and pro-monitoring, just seeing how that's failed, 
seeing that implemented on a wide scale, and report after report of 
factories in every country of tremendous sweatshop problems as the norm. 
No change. So I think folks know now … I think we've always known it, 
but we certainly now know that we've got to do things differently, and 
workers have to be organized. We simply have to increase the power of 
workers in this industry, compared to the brands. 
Dalton (interview, 2007) echoed these thoughts, noting that worker empowerment and 
freedom of association had always been important to USAS, but that in the process of 
creating the DSP, “it was much more clearly articulated.” 
The second important shift in the movement’s ideology happened in their social 
analysis. As with the core value of worker empowerment, this involved putting greater 
emphasis on something that they had known was important--but in this case, they had not 
really accounted for in their strategy. Specifically, they really began to examine the role 
that the core apparel firms’ practice of outsourcing had on the global structure of the 
industry. According to Stoppard (interview, 2007), 
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We certainly had known that it was an issue before. It wasn't like it just 
suddenly hit us that purchasing practices were something to look at... […] 
But it wasn't that central to our thinking. We thought we could do this 
without seriously addressing purchasing practices. We thought that the 
brands would be forced to address their purchasing practices, even if we 
didn't impose that on them, because they would recognize that the only 
way to have their codes of conduct enforced was if they [increased their 
payments to contractors] ... but that was the last thing they actually wanted 
to change. So that didn't happen. We were running into a brick wall. It's 
probably something that people thought, if they had thought about it early 
on, is that if there's a living wage requirement, the brands would just have 
to pay more. But it didn't happen. 
The anti-sweatshop movement thus did not make profound changes in their social 
analysis--instead there was a subtle shift in emphasis, with renewed emphasis being 
placed on something they had long known but not focused on. This subtle shift in 
analysis, however, resulted in a major shift in strategy--a move away from simply asking 
the apparel firms--both the core marketing and retail firms and the peripheral 
manufacturing firms--to uphold certain standards in their dealings with workers to trying 
to change the nature of the relationship between the core and peripheral firms. On one 
level, both the codes of conduct and the Designated Suppliers Program are similar in that 
they ask the companies that constitute the apparel industry to change some of their 
business practices. On another level though, the DSP strikes deeper than the codes of 
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conduct, targeting practices that are central to the reproduction of unequal power 
relations in commodity chains in a way that codes of conduct do not. In other words, 
through the DSP, anti-sweatshop activists hope to begin addressing the structural roots of 
sweatshops, the system of social relations that encourages the gross exploitation of 
workers. They seek to foster a shift in the balance of power, away from the core firms 
towards, not the peripheral contractors, but towards the workers themselves, creating 
conditions where the brands have to contend with strong, independent unions 
representing workers. 
 
The Designated Suppliers Program 
Workings of the Program 
 In order to see how they hope to do this, we need to examine the proposed 
Designated Suppliers Program itself in more depth. For reasons we will discuss later in 
the chapter, USAS and the WRC have not been in a position where they can actually 
begin implementing the Program; therefore, much of this discussion is hypothetical--what 
the plan of action is once they are in a position to initiate the Program. 
 The official summary of the Program runs thus: 
Under the Designated Suppliers Program, university licensees are required 
to source most university logo apparel from supplier factories that have 
been determined by universities, through independent verification [by the 
WRC], to be in compliance with their obligation to respect the rights of 
their employees--including the right to organize and bargain collectively 
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and the right to be paid a living wage. In order to make it possible for 
factories to achieve and maintain compliance, licensees are required to 
meet several obligations to their suppliers. Licensees are required to pay a 
price to suppliers commensurate with the actual cost of producing under 
applicable labor standards, including payment of a living wage; they are 
required to maintain long-term relationships with suppliers; and they are 
required to ensure that each supplier factory participating in the program 
receives sufficient orders so that the majority of the factory’s production is 
for the collegiate market. Licensees may bring any factory they choose 
into the program, provided the factory can demonstrate compliance with 
the program’s labor standards (Designated Suppliers Program Working 
Group 2006a). 
Let us unpack this description in some detail. 
 The basic requirements of the Program are designed to force the core apparel 
companies to meet the standards of the codes of conduct, not just in the short term, when 
a campaign finds them at fault, but over the long term, whether or not the movement has 
directly mobilized a campaign around a particular factory or not. This does not mean that 
anti-sweatshop activists see the DSP as a substitute for mobilizing in campaigns. Rather, 
it is meant to sustain the gains made in campaigns over the long run, without activists 
needing to fear that the factory where they helped workers build an independent union 
last year is going to shut down this year. This can perhaps be most clearly seen in the fact 
that five factories--including Kukdong/ Mexmode and BJ&B16--were grandfathered into 
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the DSP; licensees who want to use these factories for production will not need to go 
through the usual approval process--they are already considered approved, as a result of 
the WRC’s extensive past work and positive relationship with them (Designated 
Suppliers Program Working Group 2006a). 
 Those involved in designing the DSP identified three major changes the core 
apparel firms need to make in their policies in order for their contractors to be able to 
meet the requirements of the codes of conduct and still remain profitable. The first is that 
the core firms must pay their contractors a price commensurate with what it is necessary 
for the contractor to be able to afford to pay their employees a living wage, maintain the 
factory at suitable health and safety standards, etc. This means that the core firms must 
pay their contractors somewhat more than they traditionally have, instead of pressing for 
the lowest possible prices. Second, the core firms must make a long-term commitment to 
their contractors--specifically, at least three years--so that the contractors can have 
confidence that they will continue to get orders if they go to all the trouble of meeting the 
code of conduct requirements; the requirement represents a promise of job security for 
both the factory-owners and the workers. (There is, however, an escape clause if the core 
firm finds that the contractor is either failing to meet the standards of the DSP or not 
producing quality products.) Third, the core firms must provide the contractor with 
enough business that over 50% of their production is done for the college market--thus 
guaranteeing them a stream of revenue high enough that they can ensure all their 
workers, not just those working on college apparel, benefit from the agreement 
(Designated Suppliers Program Working Group 2006a). Stoppard (interview, 2007) noted 
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that this set-up not only benefits workers, but “the DSP is actually great for factories who 
want to do this. The one problem could be is that they're not going to understand that the 
brands are serious about it and so they're going to be likely to not want to make the labor 
rights improvements even though the brands say they're going to give them the long-term 
contract. They get screwed by the brands all the time.” 
 The distinctiveness of the DSP can be seen by comparing these requirements with 
those of the Fair Labor Association. The FLA requires changes on the part of contractors 
in their practices, but not on the part of the lead firms (except that they should do 
business with contractors who meet the FLA’s standards). While under the FLA’s new 
“commitment-oriented” 3.0 approach (discussed in chapter nine), it does offer help to 
contractors so that they can meet the required standards, it does not require its member 
companies to pay their contractors so that they can afford to make these changes. The 
DSP places the burden of reform, both policy-wise and financially, on those social actors 
who hold the most power and control the most resources--the core apparel companies. 
Even under their new “commitment-oriented” approach, the FLA continues to place this 
burden on the contractors, who have very little power and few resources to make such 
changes. The FLA’s approach thus avoids those root causes of sweatshops that USAS 
and its allies hope the DSP will address. 
 The DSP also builds upon the traditional code of conduct in two ways. First, it 
strengthens considerably workers’ right to freedom of association--that is, their ability to 
form a union. Under the DSP, factory-owners not only have to refrain from union-busting 
activities, but make it clear to workers that, if they desire, they are welcome to form a 
  399 
union (Designated Suppliers Program Working Group 2006a). Steffan (interview, 2007) 
said this was to deal with the fact that “workers in the apparel industry know that there 
will be consequences for joining a union. So they [factory-owners] have to take a lot of 
pro-active steps to develop a climate in the factory under which workers could, if they 
wanted to, join a union.” If managers have undertaken union-busting campaigns in the 
past, they need to take steps to make it clear to workers that they have turned over a new 
leaf (Designated Suppliers Program Working Group 2006a). Originally, the DSP was 
designed so that participating factories were required to be unionized (or worker co-ops). 
This requirement was later revised to meet the concern that it might unfairly exclude 
factories where management was willing to allow workers to unionize, but the workers 
chose, for whatever reason, not to (Designated Suppliers Program Working Group 
2006c). Second, the DSP requires participating factories to pay their workers a living 
wage (Designated Suppliers Program Working Group 2006a). As we discussed in earlier 
chapters, this was a major omission from previous codes of conduct, one that anti-
sweatshop activists saw as a major flaw in the older system, even before it became clear 
that their other gains were not sustainable over time. They took the opportunity of 
creating the DSP to remedy this problem. (As discussed in chapter nine, the FLA, by 
contrast, does not require a living wage and has a poor record when it comes to the right 
to unionize.) 
 The DSP represents changes of sufficient scope that USAS and the WRC have 
allowed for a gradual implementation process once it begins. There will be a six-month 
grace period, while the college licensees select which contractors they want to work with 
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and then bring them up to speed, so that they can meet the standards of the DSP. The 
WRC will then perform inspections of the selected factories. Should they fail, they get a 
second grace period, while the Consortium helps them improve conditions in the factory 
until they meet the appropriate criteria. If they fail a second inspection after this, they 
must wait at least a year until they can apply again to be a DSP-approved factory. In the 
meantime, the licensee will have to find another factory to work with. In the first year 
after the DSP starts, licensees will have to do 25% of their business with DSP-approved 
factories. That amount will increase by 25% per year to a maximum of 75% in the third 
year. This gradual phase-in is in recognition of the fact that there are a limited number of 
factories that will currently be able to meet the standards of the DSP--it is meant to give 
the core apparel firms the necessary time to work with their contractors to improve 
conditions, while still meeting their current obligations to their customers (Designated 
Suppliers Program Working Group 2006a). Thus, although the goal of the DSP is clearly 
to get the lead apparel firms to change their business practices, it is not meant to be 
unnecessarily punitive. Rather, it takes into account that the DSP involves a significant 
shift in the way apparel companies--both the core retail/ marketing firms and the 
peripheral manufacturers--do business and that such changes do take some time to 
implement. On the other hand, they will hopefully not be able to drag their heels and 
stretch the phase-in time out indefinitely. 
 As another part of the implementation process, the WRC will work with local 
experts in the countries where factories are seeking approval to determine what 
constitutes a living wage for that area. They will conduct a baseline study to “construct a 
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culturally appropriate market basket of goods and services, for each country or region, 
sufficient to support a family of average size, and then determine the price for each of 
these goods and services in local markets” (Designated Suppliers Program Working 
Group 2006a). The WRC reserves the right to conduct further living wage studies in the 
future, should workers file a complaint that their current wages to do not actually meet 
that standard (Designated Suppliers Program Working Group 2006a). 
 All monitoring, inspection and verification of Program compliance remains the 
exclusive province of the Worker Rights Consortium, with its autonomy from the apparel 
industry. Rutter (interview, 2007) noted that, 
One of the demands also of the DSP became that the WRC would enforce 
this policy, because there's a pretty huge divide between the WRC and 
Fair Labor Association […]--some universities prefer it because it's much 
more conservative, it has companies on its board. It's an organization that 
USAS absolutely despises and doesn't trust. So we knew universities 
would try and say, Well, may be we can get the FLA involved and may be 
they can do this and blah, blah, blah. We definitely didn't want that to 
happen. 
In addition to the initial inspection, when a factory seeks approval to join the Designated 
Suppliers Program, the WRC also retains the right to carry out inspections at any time, in 
response to worker complaints, as it has in the past for all factories producing apparel for 
member colleges. The WRC also remains committed to transparency--those college 
licensees who fail to meet the DSP’s standards and who do nothing to remedy the 
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situation will find that the Consortium will continue issuing reports calling attention to 
this fact (Designated Suppliers Program Working Group 2006a). They will thus remain 
vulnerable to being targeted for solidarity campaigns by USAS and its allies. 
 If there is a dispute, it is resolved through a two-step process. In the first stage, the 
WRC carries out inspections and issues its own ruling. If any of the parties is unhappy 
with the decision, they may appeal the decision to an arbitration board. The parties 
involved--schools, the licensees, the contractor, the workers’ union, NGOs--jointly select 
the members of the board, but the board must consist of independent labor experts, 
without ties to either industry, apparel labor unions, or any group involved in the dispute 
(Designated Suppliers Program Working Group 2006a). In this regard, the arbitration 
boards’ structure mirrors the embedded autonomy of the Worker Rights Consortium that 
we discussed in chapter eleven--the arbitrators are people who are embedded in the anti-
sweatshop movement, but, because they are not tied to a particular union, retain their 
autonomy. The arbitration board will review the evidence and hear testimony from WRC 
representatives, then make a decision based on this, choosing whether to uphold the 
Consortium’s original findings or concluding that they were mistaken. The contractor and 
the licensee in the dispute pay for the arbitration board, with the licensee, as the wealthier 
party, paying the bulk of the fees. Additionally, the WRC has the right to initiate 
arbitration hearings if they have reason to believe that a contractor is not being paid 
sufficiently to meet the standards of the DSP, but is too intimidated to initiate a complaint 
themselves (Designated Suppliers Program Working Group 2006a). Originally, the WRC 
was to have the final say in such disputes. The arbitration boards were added so that 
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companies would not feel that they were entering into an agreement completely 
controlled by the Consortium (Designated Suppliers Program Working Group 2006c). 
The make-up of the board, while allowing for a second opinion, also ensures that 
concerns about workers’ rights will remain front and center within the entire process. 
 
The DSP and Structural Change in the Apparel Industry 
 While the immediate goals of the DSP are to benefit the workers in approved 
factories, USAS and its allies have broader hopes for the Program. Specifically, they 
hope that it will be the starting pointing for bringing about structural changes in the 
apparel industry, an alteration in the ways outsourcing is done so that it does not involve 
a race to the bottom in which workers are inevitably mercilessly exploited as the burden 
of cutting costs is shifted onto their backs. They also hope that these changes will alter 
the political opportunity system for workers, creating more organizing space throughout 
the apparel industry. Ultimately, what they hope to accomplish is a shift in power within 
the apparel commodity chain, so that workers are on a more even footing with the 
companies. USAS member Marion Traub-Werner (interview, 2007) said, 
The thing about the DSP that I like is that it's a very structural approach, 
right? We actually need to change the structure of the industry. […] To 
force the brands to pay a better price to the factories and so that price can 
actually get passed on to workers--the reason that doesn't happen is 
because workers don't have bargaining power. That's also the structure of 
capital here--this is an unorganized workforce. So can you actually raise 
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their standard of living through this other method? I don't know if you can, 
but it's definitely worth the try. 
 Dalton (interview, 2007) expanded on this. 
[USAS staff person] Zack [Knorr] describes it pretty well when he talks 
about it in his dissertation--he talks about a non-reformist reform, because 
certainly the DSP isn't revolutionary, but the idea behind it is to empower 
different actors so they can continue struggling and make more 
revolutionary change. The original spirit behind the DSP is to support and 
build the capacity of independent unions around the world and to give 
them a lot more bargaining leverage than they have right now. […] Also to 
create an economic incentive for having a union. Right now all the 
economic incentives are to bust, bust, bust. [Under the DSP,] the 
economic incentives of having sustainable university orders is contingent 
upon having a legitimate representative union in the factory which is not 
going to be certified by you, but by the workers. 
She acknowledged that the DSP did involve somewhat of a strategic shift on the part of 
the anti-sweatshop movement. “People are like, Oh I thought you were against 
certification and all this stuff--those are some of the critiques of how do you certify this. 
And we say the idea is to promote genuine unionism and it's basically going to be up to 
the local organizations as to what is genuine union and what's not.” 
 According to Dalton (interview, 2007), not only would contractors now have an 
incentive to recognize unions, but, 
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unions could use it as a bargaining chip. A union could say if you allow us 
to organize your factory, you're going to have access to this university 
market; you're going to get sustained orders. […] So we sort of changed 
the power relations so that both the factory management and most 
importantly the workers would have more power to negotiate. The idea 
was to build capacity towards a tri-partite negotiation system where brands 
actually have to sit down and be accountable to workers. The other 
thoughts were the union was sort of the way that the factory management 
would have any bargaining leverage with the brands and that was a really 
unique power structure. In order for the factory management to complain 
that they weren't getting paid a high enough price, they would have to go 
through the union and it would be on the union terms. That would reverse 
the existing dynamic where as you go down the supply chain, it's a 
command [system]--you do this because we have power. This would 
hopefully revitalize the power of some of the unions given that factory-
level union power has been eroded with globalization. 
 It may seem that the potential structural changes would be actually fairly limited, 
given that the immediate impact of the DSP would be confined to collegiate apparel--
which, as discussed in chapter four, is only 1-2% of the total US apparel market. 
Originally, USAS and its allies hoped their codes of conduct would have an impact on the 
larger apparel industry because apparel production is widely dispersed. The DSP, if 
implemented, would instead concentrate this production. Anti-sweatshop activists still 
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hope to have a broader impact on the industry, just in a different way. The activists I 
spoke with repeatedly spoke of the DSP creating an example, one which could influence 
the rest of the industry. Wood (interview, 2007), for instance, said, 
The fact that there are out there a certain number of factories that respect 
workers rights--it proves that it's possible to do that and still make a profit. 
That will then become the basis for putting new pressure on the brands 
and over time persuading paid observers that the brands are full of shit and 
they can do better than they're doing, because here is this shining example 
that shows that you can. The best defense now of the status quo is to say 
that you may not be achieving that much but, hey, we're trying and no one 
else is doing any better, so this is the best that can be done. If you can 
show that this, by any means, is not the best that can be done and in fact 
it's being done effectively elsewhere, then all their claims on why it can't 
be done are hogwash. It's possible that could form the basis of an effective 
campaign to pressure the brands that their credibility is at stake. But that's 
a ways off. 
 Knorr (interview, 2007) also invoked the idea of the DSP setting an example for 
others, but his take on it was rather more specific, seeing it as an example for other 
activist groups. 
In many ways I think we see and hope that our role is to provide a model 
that then other people can use. […] Our real hope with the DSP is that we 
can show that with universities, this is a model that works. […] And our 
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hope is that we can create a model that can then be used by other 
organizations in different areas-- I think SweatFree Communities is a 
really good example. [SweatFree Communities is targeting city and state 
governments, seeking to create a code of conduct for the companies who 
supply their uniforms, in a manner similar to what USAS did with college 
apparel.] […] I mean what they're doing isn't exactly like the DSP, but in 
many cases it's similar. And I think the hope is that if we can show that 
this works and prove to everybody out there that this can be done, other 
organizations like SweatFree Communities can demand similar things 
[…]. I can't imagine all the different possible areas where people will have 
leverage, but if they can use that leverage in a similar way, that will 
hopefully lead to the broader industry change that we're hoping for. And 
we realize that we have a limited sphere of power, but hopefully that the 
model that we can create in that sphere can then effect larger change. 
Ideally. 
 Dalton (interview, 2007) even hoped that the DSP might lead those lead firms 
involved to put pressure on other major companies. “The brands that are paying the 
higher price [under the DSP] […], they have to pay subsidies to other brands if they're 
not willing to pay for the higher standards. So it's not like the workers get 200% wages 
for producing the university orders and than 100% wages for producing the other orders. 
All the workers in the factory get the same wage, a livable wage.” In order to avoid 
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subsidizing other brands, Dalton hopes that the college licensees will start pressing other 
members of the industry to raise their prices as well. 
 How much of an impact the DSP will have beyond the college market remains to 
be seen. It is clear, however, that, when they designed it, USAS and its allies had their 
eyes on creating structural changes in the industry. This, in turn, they hope will 
significantly change the political opportunity system for workers trying to unionize. As 
has long been the anti-sweatshop movement’s goal, they hope to create more organizing 
space for workers. Under the terms of the DSP, not only will contractors be forbidden to 
engage in union-busting activities, but both the lead and peripheral firms in the apparel 
industry must actually take steps to encourage unionization--not something that, in the 
course of normal business, capitalists generally do. The DSP is also meant to give 
workers leverage over not jut their immediate employers, but over the core firms that 
dominate the commodity chain within which the workers are embedded. For a core firm 
to be able to market goods in the valued college market, they will have to come to an 
agreement with both their contractors and the union at the contracted factory, paying the 
contractor sufficiently that the union feels its members’ basic needs are being met. While 
activists sought with the codes of conduct and independent monitoring of the current 
system to expand workers’ organizing space, this attempt to give them leverage over core 
firms is new. In the past, it was US and Western European groups allied with the workers 
who exercised leverage over the core firms. This attempt under the DSP to give workers 
themselves some degree of leverage is consistent with the movement’s ideology of 
hoping, over the long term, to make it so that workers and their unions can be largely 
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self-sufficient and not need to rely on more privileged allies. This is not to say that 
anyone thinks this will happen in the short-term solely as a result of the DSP--USAS and 
its allies plan to remain involved in workers’ struggles worldwide for the foreseeable 
future--but it does potentially represent a step towards that goal. 
 Again, the distinctiveness of this approach can be seen by contrasting it with the 
FLA. Under the Fair Labor Association, the most powerful actors remain the core apparel 
companies. As discussed in chapter nine, they are able to use both their formal voting 
power in the Association and the fact that they supply the majority of its funding to 
define the FLA’s code of conduct and basic strategy. The idea that power relations in the 
commodity chain might need to be changed is apparently not even something the FLA 
has ever considered--which should hardly surprise us given that those who hold the most 
power in apparel commodity chains also hold the most power in the Association. Those 
who hold such power rarely consider the possible injustice of this or give it up willingly. 
Indeed, as we noted in chapter nine, Richard M. Locke, Matthew Amengual, and Akshay 
Mangla (2009), in advocating something along the lines of the FLA’s new 3.0 approach, 
downplay the importance of unequal power relations in commodity chains and largely 
ignore the question of the disempowerment of workers. Again, the FLA tends to assume 
that the problems lie with the practices of the contractors, not with the core firms--
ignoring the ways in which the latter shape the policies of the former. This includes the 
brands’ demands that contractors’ costs be kept as low as possible, a requirement that 
almost inevitably results in sweatshops--whether or not the core firms explicitly intend 
that outcome or not. The DSP hopes to change this balance of power, so that workers are 
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in a better position to bargain through their unions not only with their immediate 
employers (the contractors), but with those who are now the ultimate power-holders, the 
brands. If the DSP succeeded in this, even to some degree, this would result in a major 
shift in power relations, at least within the collegiate apparel sector. Unfortunately, since 
the DSP has yet to be implemented, it is too early to say whether it will meet these goals 
of shifting more of the balance of power towards sweatshop workers. 
 
The Campaign for the DSP 
 The campaign to institute the DSP has been much harder than the campaigns on 
behalf of codes of conduct and the WRC. Indeed, as of this writing (March 2010), the 
DSP has still not been implemented, even though the campaign was launched in 2005. It 
took considerably less time for the previous two campaigns to reach the implementation 
phase. In part, this is because of legal barriers to implementing the DSP under the Bush 
administration than may now change under the Obama administration. In part, however, 
the problems seem to run deeper. There is both more opposition to the DSP from industry 
and schools--because it asks for much more fundamental changes--and the schools have 
become better at reacting to and containing student protests than they have in the past. 
This highlights the fact that in developing strategic innovations, coming up with a new 
plan of action is only half the challenge--actually implementing it successfully is another 
challenge in and of itself. In some cases, this may come from the difficulties in 
mobilizing support in the movement for such a change in direction. In the case of the 
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DSP, it is overcoming the considerable obstacles within the political opportunity system 
to its implementation. 
 Although people like Rutter had solicited input from the wider USAS 
membership base, the number of people who had been actively working on it was 
relatively small. The DSP was officially unveiled to USAS as a whole at their summer 
conference in Chicago in 2005, where the leadership worked to mobilize support around 
the new Program. According to Knorr (interview, 2007), “A big part of that conference 
was educating people about what the DSP was, coming up with a strategic plan for the 
next school year as to how we were going to organize around it, how we were going to 
win it, and providing people with materials, and really using that as a place to get people 
really excited and on the same page about working together on this really big, new 
campaign that a small number of people knew about before hand.” 
 USAS then launched the campaign in September 2005 by sending out a letter to 
colleges and universities, inviting them to join. The vast majority schools voiced a 
number of reservations, but over the course of that fall eight schools--Duke, Georgetown, 
Indiana and Santa Clara Universities, and the Universities of Connecticut, Maine--
Farmington, and Wisconsin--Madison, plus Smith College--signed onto the DSP. 
Together with representatives from USAS, they formed the Designed Suppliers Program 
Working Group in March 2006. Jim Wilkerson, a Duke administrator who had long been 
supportive of the anti-sweatshop movement, chaired the Working Group. They allowed 
observers from member schools of the WRC who had not committed to the DSP, as well 
as the FLA and its member schools and the National Association of College Stores. The 
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initial goal of the Working Group was to revise the DSP to meet many of the concerns 
raised by WRC-member schools. The resulting document was released in September 
2006 (it is this version of the DSP that I described above), along with a memo explaining 
the changes that had been made to the original DSP proposal and the rationales for those 
changes (Designated Suppliers Program Working Group 2006b; June 2006) (Wilkerson, 
interview, 2007). Some of the changes were in response to issues raised by schools, some 
by college licensees, and some by USAS itself (Designated Suppliers Program Working 
Group 2006c). 
 One obstacle to getting more schools to approve the DSP has been its ambiguous 
legal status. A number of companies opposed to the Program and schools closely aligned 
with them have argued that, if not formulated correctly, the DSP could violate anti-trust 
statues. Supporters of the DSP are confident that it can be implemented in such a way 
that it doesn’t violate anti-trust laws--it is simply a matter of finding the correct language. 
The DSP Working Group had submitted a business letter of review request to the US 
Attorney General’s office, asking for a ruling on its probable legal status (a standard 
practice). Under the Bush administration, however, the Department of Justice simply 
would not give them a reply, something anti-sweatshop activists took as a sign of the 
administration’s general hostility to the whole concept. Fearing that any eventual ruling 
would result in a rejection, they withdrew the request, waiting for a Democratic (and 
therefore presumably somewhat more friendly) White House to resubmit it (Nova 
2007a)--something they have gained with the election of Obama. Until such time as the 
Working Group receives a positive ruling from the Attorney General, many schools have 
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reason for refusing to commit to the DSP. In some cases, this is merely an excuse, a sign 
of general opposition to the whole plan; in others, it is the natural caution of college 
administrators, concerned with anything that might put their schools at risk. Even those 
schools which have made a commitment to the DSP have done so in principal--they have 
not committed the specific proposal released by the Working Group and will not until its 
legal status is clarified. 
 In many cases, it is not the unclear legal status of the DSP that is the main 
problem though. Instead, it is the deep-seated opposition of the apparel industry to the 
Program and the reluctance of many college administrators to do anything that would 
unsettle their business partners. According to Steffan (interview, 2007), one unfortunate 
side effect of the campaign for the DSP is that it has considerably strained the 
relationships that the WRC had painstakingly built up with apparel companies. “Maybe 
they thought before that all they had to do was cooperate at the factory level and we'd be 
happy and that was something they agreed to do--but now they realize that we're asking 
for something more.” The lead apparel firms, of course, oppose the DSP because it would 
require fundamental changes in the way they do business, robbing them of their 
flexibility and thus one of the major means to keep prices down. Additionally, USAS 
member Stoppard noted, 
I think that some universities aren’t happy with the DSP campaign 
because they would prefer that the WRC took a more accommodating 
approach with the industry. Instead, the WRC delivered the unpleasant 
news that the brands have failed to clean up their act and urged 
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universities to intervene much more aggressively in the industry’s supply 
chain practices, something to which the industry is, of course, extremely 
hostile. This strained the relationship between the WRC and some schools, 
not because administrators at those schools lack confidence in the WRC’s 
monitoring work, but because they see the WRC as rocking the boat in an 
unwelcome manner. 
 The apparel industry, of course, does not argue against the DSP on the ground that 
it would cut into their profits. Wilkerson (interview, 2007) told me, however, that the 
arguments that he is hearing against the DSP in the current framing contest are very 
familiar. 
A good number of [the companies] are just saying to universities, We will 
never sign on to this sort of program and if you insist that we do, then we 
will just get out of the collegiate business. It is almost identical to the sort 
of statements we heard from companies back in the late '90s, you know, 
around 2000, when universities first developed codes of conduct […] 
Companies at that time just mounted an enormous anti-code of conduct 
campaign, saying to universities, We're not going to do it--if you try to 
make us do this, we're going to be gone, the sponsorship agreements you 
have with us are going to be gone. Some threatened legal action. It's 
almost identical to the sorts of things that we are hearing today from 
companies about the DSP. Unfortunately, some universities yield to that 
sort of pressure. 
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 The Fair Labor Association has also waded into the battle, questioning the DSP’s 
potential effectiveness. Auret van Heerden, then head of the FLA, argued that, “You 
can’t audit a factory into compliance,” and said that the DSP wouldn’t work because it 
ran counter to the market organization of the economy (Jaschik 2006). Gregg Nebel, the 
director of social and environmental affairs for Adidas and a board member of the FLA, 
objected to the living wage requirement as well, repeating the long-standing argument 
that it is impossible to properly measure what would constitute a living wage. He instead 
touted the FLA’s new 3.0 system (discussed in chapter nine), which involves working 
cooperatively with management to bring factories up to standards (Gaus 2006). This is 
consistent with the apparel industry’s long-standing framing strategy--to claim that they 
have both a real commitment to ending the problem of sweatshops and, unlike student 
activists or the WRC, the expertise to do so, as a result of their insider position. 
Stoppard (interview, 2007) noted that critiquing the living wage requirements was 
the most common counter-framing among representatives of industry. 
It's much more convenient to bring up the fact that they can't calculate 
living wage, because it wouldn't look very good for them to be arguing 
that they don't want to pay enough to enforce the code of conduct. And 
they also like to deny that there's pressure or blame it on the factories--if 
they were more efficient, if they were operated in a better way, they could 
take the prices we pay them and use them to respect worker rights. [This is 
the argument underlying the FLA’s commitment-oriented 3.0 approach.] 
But the factories are of course very efficient[--]there's so much intense 
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competition between factories that it's hard to imagine that there's an 
efficiency gain out there that hasn't already been realized. 
 Despite the fact that representatives of the apparel industry have focused in their 
counter-framing on the supposed difficulties of calculating a living wage, Stoppard 
(interview, 2007) said that she was “actually surprised by the lack of attacks on the 
WRC’s living wage studies. I figured somebody would try to go after it and say, Well, 
they don't need this rice here or this five percent discretionary income is too much, but no 
one has attacked them.” She attributes this to the fact that, before launching the campaign 
for the DSP, they had not only carefully considered the frames for their arguments, but 
had done the research they needed to back them up. The WRC both performed studies in 
El Salvador and Indonesia to verify the viability of their approach to calculating a living 
wage (Gaus 2006) and “they did this study on the retail price impact of living wage 
requirement so the they could show that they know how pricing works in the industry, 
they know much wages are going to have to go up and they know what the effect might 
be for scenarios where the wages are raised” (Stoppard, interview, 2007). USAS and the 
WRC also have relied on people, 
who are experts in the industry and can speak to the feasibility of what 
we're trying to do. We worked with this guy an apparel industry 
consultant. […] He works with companies throughout, the whole 
organization has companies that have problems with their apparel factories 
but he doesn't work for any of these companies--he doesn't have a personal 
financial stake. And he is supporting what we're doing and from that 
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perspective it makes sense, so we brought him to a couple of meetings at 
the university to talk through how this is actually feasible. Things like 
that: have people who can counter arguments we're going to get from the 
other side, and being prepared (Stoppard, interview, 2007). 
 While the staff of the WRC can defend the DSP as a program, it is not their place 
to actively pressure their member schools to adopt the Program--the staff of the WRC 
work for the schools and are their representatives. Thus, as we noted in chapter eleven, 
the WRC does not use protest tactics against their member schools. United Students 
Against Sweatshops, however, has no such allegiance to school officials and it is they 
who mobilize and use militant tactics to press schools to adopt the DSP. The basic 
structure of their campaign is a familiar one--it is based on the strategic model for 
campus campaigns that we discussed in chapter four. Thus, when USAS launched the 
DSP campaign in September 2005, they organized protests on at least forty campuses 
(Appelbaum and Dreier 2005). To their frustration, however, the members of USAS are 
finding it harder to win using the same set of tactics as they have in the past. 
 Knorr (interview, 2007) speculated that part of the problem was that the DSP 
asked for a substantially greater commitment than has been involved with the codes of 
conduct and the WRC--and thus generated greater resistance. He was also concerned, 
however, that college and university administrators had learned how to adapt to USAS’s 
repertoire of tactics. “Administrations have changed their tactics on sit-ins--the last two 
years, pretty much all the sit-ins we’ve done, people have been arrested that day. 
Administrations are no longer allowing students to stay.” Knorr was uncertain why 
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school officials were changing how they reacted to sit-ins, but offered the following 
speculations: 
Given that there is a different climate now than there was maybe in 1999 
and 2000, I think they may just not really necessarily fear arresting people. 
I think they think the general public won’t actually have that much of a 
problem with arresting students for occupying a building--unless the group 
has done a lot of work to build up community support, I think other than 
getting some press, I don’t know that they [administrators] get that much 
negative publicity in the community and I think we need to do more work 
to make sure that they do. […] I think they’re also getting used to our 
tactics. I think in 1999 and 2000, this was something unheard of. Now, 
you know, last year we had something like four sit-ins, the year before we 
had something like three--these are not like things that are coming out of 
nowhere anymore and I think they may have worked out a different kind 
of response to them. 
As a consequence of the administrator’s adaptation to USAS’s tactics, Znorr 
(interview, 2007) felt USAS had become less effective in winning victories. 
The sit-ins this last year, most of them didn't result in campaign victories. I 
mean, they mobilized a lot of people, they got a lot of press, especially the 
Michigan sit-in, which got picked up by the AP--it was in like fifty or 
sixty papers, it was in really big ones. The USC sit-in got some really big 
articles in the LA Times, but the administration refused to cave. At Purdue, 
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they did a twenty-six day hunger strike, got like eighty some articles 
throughout the mid-west--and they [the administrators] said, Too bad, 
we're not going to do it. 
This adaptation of administrators to USAS’s tactics in consistent with Doug 
McAdam’s (1983) findings in his study of the interactions between the civil rights 
movement and the authorities during the 1950s, 60s, and 70s. According to McAdam, in 
response to each new set of tactics that the civil rights movement developed, the 
authorities would soon develop their own set of tactics that would defuse their power. For 
instance, in response to the bus boycotts, the Southern authorities began harassing car 
pool drivers, arresting them for minor infractions; they also arrested the organizers of the 
buys boycotts for organizing a transport system without a license; and, when the Supreme 
Court finally ordered the buses desegregated, the local authorities directed bus drivers to 
seat passengers based on “maximum safety,” creating an excuse to perpetuate 
segregation. In response, the civil rights movement had to develop further tactical 
innovations--as the bus boycotts began to lose their effectiveness, for instance, movement 
leaders shifted to supporting the sit-ins initiated by a group of college students. 
When I spoke with Knorr (interview, 2007), he was considering what possible 
tactical innovations USAS could make, given the circumstances they faced. 
As our universities start more and more to operate like businesses, I think 
it makes sense to target them as such, so I'm looking at where money is 
coming into the university, looking at strategically targeting donors who 
may be willing to either pull donations or at least communicate to the 
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university that they will be thinking about pulling their donations if they 
didn't do the right thing. I think that's one avenue. I think more community 
support, so that there's more outrage when a university arrests students. I 
think that maybe getting more faculty to communicate that they won't 
tolerate the arrest of students, and actually maybe doing something with 
that. 
It is important to note that what Knorr is considering is a set of tactical 
innovations, not strategic ones. He is not contemplating dramatic changes to the basic 
strategic model by which USAS wages its campus-based campaigns. Instead, he is 
looking for new ways to effectively pressure administrators within this framework. 
Indeed, there have long been variations in the tactics USAS chapters have used from 
campus to campus. As discussed in chapter seven, some chapters relied more on 
disruption through sit-ins, others relied more on shaming, delegitimating tactics such as 
hunger strikes. In doing so, they operated within a common strategic model, of seeking to 
undermine administrators’ legitimacy in their campus communities and pressure them to 
make concessions to students. Knorr is contemplating the possibility that they may need 
to introduce a new mix of tactics into this basic strategic model, to respond to the 
adaptations administrators have made. Whether such tactical innovations will prove 
successful remains to be seen. 
The hope among USAS’s strategists is that once the Obama administration 
confirms the legality of some variant of the DSP and they reach a critical mass of schools 
who are committed to the Program, they will be able to begin implementing it. Dalton 
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(interview, 2007) told me that once schools had adopted the DSP, USAS members “also 
argue that their job is to lobby other administrators to join on as students are organizing 
on campuses. They have done that to some extent. Our assistant chancellor [at the 
University of Wisconsin--Madison] was integral in encouraging other university 
administrators to join on--but obviously student pressure is the only way to really win 
this.” The question is, how many schools constitute the necessary critical mass? When I 
spoke with him, Knorr (interview, 2007) was hopeful that the number was relatively 
manageable. “We have thirty-six universities signed on [as of July 2007], a number of 
large universities. We definitely need some more power before we force the brands to do 
it [the DSP]. […] I feel that we probably need one or two more of the major University of 
Michigan-style universities sign on. But, you know, the WRC was founded with about 
forty members.” Still, he admitted that this might not be the case. “It's not entirely clear 
how many [schools are needed] because this hasn't necessarily been done before. I mean 
we have enough to make this a legitimate program and to make it clear that it has a lot of 
university support. We may not have enough to say [to the brands] you have to do this 
and have the threat be enough for them to do it.” As of March 2010, the number of 
schools signed on had only risen to forty-six (Worker Rights Consortium 2007a) and the 
DSP has yet to be implemented. It remains to be seen if USAS can actually reach a 
critical mass of schools to initiate the Program. 
Meanwhile USAS’s third-world allies are left in a difficult position. Dalton 
(interview, 2007) told me, 
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It's difficult for a lot of the unions to think about having a campaign that's 
going to run for five years before we can actually implement it. In 
Cambodia, for example, you've got strikes that last for a few days or a 
week or a month and people get bought off because their children are 
going to starve so they're going to take the money. […] The DSP's too 
little, too late. That's the reality and there's nothing we can do about that. 
It's difficult because the workers say, We really like the DSP--but in three 
years our factory's going to be gone. 
 
Conclusion 
 What we see with the DSP is the need for constant innovation on the part of the 
anti-sweatshop movement--and how even such innovation is no guarantee of success. We 
also see quite distinctly the ways in which the dialectic between ideology and experience, 
action and reflection (Ryan and Jeffreys forthcoming; Ryan et al. forthcoming) play out. 
In the two other episodes of innovation we looked at closely--the creation of the codes of 
conduct and the WRC--the movement’s ideology played a central role, providing both 
guiding values and a social analysis that activists used to reflect on their experience and 
come up with new plans of action. With the DSP, we see something a little different. 
Here, not only does reflecting upon their experience in light of their ideology lead them 
to alter their plan of action, but their experience leads them to modify their ideology as 
well, albeit in subtle ways. Their values--a commitment to worker empowerment--remain 
the same, but they have somewhat modified their social analysis. As my interviewees 
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said, they always knew that the structure of the apparel industry was the root of the 
problem, but their experiences--the frustration of seeing their hard-won victories melt 
away--lead them to put renewed emphasis on this aspect of their analysis. 
This in turn lead to some changes in their norms of action. Supporting workers in 
their attempts to unionize and acting in solidarity remain central to anti-sweatshop 
activists, but the Designated Suppliers Program in some ways represents a new departure. 
Traditionally, USAS and its allies emphasized the importance of winning concrete 
victories. This remains important to anti-sweatshop activists, but they have found that 
these victories all too often are ephemeral. Thus, they searched for new norms of action 
by which they could preserve these victories. As a result, they came up with the DSP--
which includes a form of certification, a practice of which they were previously wary, as 
we saw in chapter nine. The certification is not an end in itself, as it is with the forms of 
certification USAS has criticized in the past. That is, the certification process is not meant 
to be a guarantee of good working conditions in and of itself. Rather, the certification 
system is part of a larger plan to force the apparel industry to restructure itself--at least 
within the realm of college-licensed apparel; it is a tool that the movement hopes to use to 
bring about long-term structural changes, so that such programs are not needed in the 
future. Thus, their new norms are as much about seeking ways to directly bring about 
structural change, as they are about certification. Were the DSP to fail, it seems likely 
that USAS and its allies would instead look for other ways to press for structural change, 
rather than necessarily fixating on a better certification system. It also remains to be seen 
how much tension there will be between the movement’s continuing commitment to 
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winning concrete victories in the short term and their new focus on bringing about 
structural change in the long term. 
 For the DSP to have a chance to succeed or fail though--and the movement to 
learn any necessary lessons from this course of events--first it must be implemented. This 
is proving a challenge, for multiple reasons. First, the apparel industry and their allies 
among college administrators are resisting it more than any of USAS’s previous 
proposals, perhaps because it demands more deep-reaching changes on their part. Second, 
USAS needs to find ways to tactically innovate to succeed in their campus campaigns. 
This highlights two important facts. One is that, no matter how creative a movement is, 
they must deal with the realities of the political opportunity system in which they operate. 
In many ways, the DSP is intended to do just that--it targets those aspects of the system 
that present the greatest obstacles to workers in seeking to unionize and empower 
themselves. The problem is that this same POS may prevent them from implementing the 
Program, since the apparel industry may well have enough power to obstruct any attempt 
to implement the DSP. While it remains to be seen what will happen with the DSP, other 
movements have certainly run up against insurmountable obstacles in their social 
environment, often after a series of successes. The civil rights movement, for instance, 
won significant victories in abolishing the Jim Crow system, but was unable to 
successfully bring about the reforms needed to address the problem of widespread 
poverty in the black community as well. 
Second, strategic innovation may need to be accompanied by tactical innovation. 
Innovation, in other words, must operate on two levels--and sometimes they are only 
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loosely coupled. In the case of the DSP, USAS and its allies came up with an innovative 
new strategy at the global level--but find that their strategy at the campus level, where 
they need to win their victories if they wish to implement this new global strategy, is 
falling short. It doesn’t appear that their campus strategy needs a fundamental retooling, 
in terms of the basic model of building up campus support and using gradually escalating 
actions to bring pressure to bear on administrators. It is a model that has stood the test of 
many decades of activism, one that USAS inherited from older student movements. 
Rather, the challenge will be to find new ways to bring pressure to bear upon 
administrators--that is new tactics--that they have not yet adapted to; this may involve 
more work to build up popular support among a wider community of people--certainly, 
Knorr’s suggestion of working with donors to pressure schools would require this. Such 
innovation is a constant struggle and it is possible that the time may come when a 
movement runs out of viable tactical innovations. McAdam (1983) argues that this is, in 
part, what happened to the civil rights movement, as they ceased being able to come up 
with new nonviolent strategies--leaving riots as the main form of new protest, a tactic that 
only further isolated the movement. 
It may well be that USAS eventually succeeds in implementing the Designated 
Suppliers Program. If it does so, that will certainly not be the end of the story. Even if it 
is relatively successful, it will not change the entire apparel industry in and of itself--
something which activists are well aware of. As discussed above, they see much of its 
potential in the possibility of setting an example, showing that it is possible to do 
business differently, in ways where companies can remain profitable (if somewhat less 
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flexible) without resorting to the most extreme forms of exploitation. To build on any 
such successes, the anti-sweatshop movement will need to continue to strategically 
innovate--something which it has proved successful at so far. 
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Chapter 16: Conclusion 
 
 
Social Movement Theory 
 Over the course of this dissertation, I have sought to unravel the process by which 
the US anti-sweatshop movement, and particularly United Students Against Sweatshops 
and the Worker Rights Consortium, have developed their strategy, while positioning this 
process in the wider political opportunity system with which the movement must deal. In 
doing so, I have drawn on both the political process and cultural constructionist schools 
of thought in social movement studies. While both provide valuable insights, neither is 
able to stand on its own--nor does either theory adequately explain the process by which 
movements strategize. As an alternative, I have presented models of strategic 
development and the political opportunity system that draw on the strengths of both 
schools, synthesizing them together, while adding new elements to fill in the gaps. 
 
Social Movement Strategy 
 The principle problem with most previous attempts to analyze strategy is that they 
did not distinguish adequately between individual tactics and overall strategy, instead 
focusing on the former in isolation from each other. A tactic, as I defined it in chapter 
one, is a discrete action that a group can take that is modular (that is, standardized and 
repeatable)--something such as a rally, a sit-in, street theater, or strike. Together these 
tactics can form a strategy. Strategy also includes such discrete decisions as the choice of 
organizational model, who to form coalitions with, and how to frame both issues and 
events in discursive arenas. Simply because an organization makes such choices though 
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does not mean they have a strategy--they may make such choices more or less in isolation 
from each other, not thinking deeply about how they fit together. A strategy exists when 
these discrete choices are woven into a larger plan of action, in such a way that they build 
off each other. There is, of course, a continuum here. It is unlikely that any organization 
is totally oblivious to the ways these choices interact with each other. Still, some groups 
give much more thought to how these choices fit together so that they come together to 
form a more or less coherent strategy. 
 Looking at the overall strategy of movements--and not just the individual 
elements of strategy--can deepen our understanding of why movement actors make the 
choices they do and why they succeed or fail. The anti-sweatshop movement seems to be 
particularly adept when it comes to crafting strategy and, so far, to be relatively 
successful in winning incremental victories. It is entirely possible that other movements 
cling more dogmatically to strategies that have become outmoded and are less able to 
adapt as their social environment changes or they encounter unexpected obstacles. Such 
movements that cannot learn from their experiences are likely to be less successful (cf. 
Koopmans 2005). 
Nor do all movements necessarily think strategically. A number of interviewees I 
spoke with said that--before connecting with the larger anti-sweatshop movement--they 
had very little idea what they were doing in terms of strategy. While they might be adept 
at organizing a colorful piece of guerilla theater on campus, they did not know how to 
link it up with other actions into a larger, overall strategy for effectively pressuring the 
school administration to adopt certain policies. According to their own testimony, they 
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were taking an approach that was basically tactical, not strategic. As a result, they were 
not terribly successful. A strategic approach differs from a tactical approach in that the 
tactical one merely considers individual tactics or frames in isolation, without linking 
them in any coherent way; while a strategic approach finds ways to interlink the 
individual movement practices into a larger, coherent whole, with the purpose of 
exercising power against those responsible for social injustices. Doing guerilla theater 
alone is merely tactical; doing guerilla theater in combination with other actions, as part 
of a larger, thought-out campaign is strategic. 
In general, the anti-sweatshop movement does not operate in the haphazard 
fashion of those who only consider tactics, either on the campus or the global level. They 
carefully choose which practices they will engage in--which groups they will ally with, 
which frames they employ, which tactics they will use--and interlink them in a specific 
way to achieve their goals. Without understanding how this process works, we cannot 
fully understand the success of the anti-sweatshop movement. The study of strategy as a 
process by which movements attempt to make sense of and then alter their social 
environment is thus central to understanding the dynamics of social movements. 
One important point of disagreement between political process theorists and 
cultural constructionists has been how a movement’s choice of tactics translates into 
success--that is, changes in policy on the part of their foes. As noted in the introduction, 
political process theorists have argued that it is actions that disrupt the smooth flow of 
social life that produce results, by interfering with elite’s ability to carry out business as 
usual, thus threatening their profits or power (Flacks 1988; Gamson 1990; McAdam 
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1983; Piven and Cloward 1977; Tarrow 1998). James Jasper (1997) of the cultural 
constructionist camp, on the other hand, argues that movements win their gains by 
altering the public discourse, forcing new issues onto the public agenda--issues which 
policy-makers must then deal with. What I have found is that, at least in the case of the 
anti-sweatshop movement, both schools of thought are right--it is not an either-or matter. 
Whether on campus or on the global stage, the anti-sweatshop movement has needed to 
change the public debate through skillful framing in order to get their issues onto the 
agenda and increase their own legitimacy, while damaging that of their opponents. When 
they have established such legitimacy, then they are in more of a position to successfully 
use disruptive actions to further their goals. Without such legitimacy, a campus 
administration, for instance, can easily arrest students engaging in a sit-in; with it, the 
campus administration has a much bigger problem on their hands and potentially faces a 
backlash if they handle the sit-in poorly. 
I would go so far as to suggest that disruption and discursive change are, in fact, 
two sides of the same coin in many cases. When we look at how movements have 
successfully changed public discourse by putting new issues on the public agenda, as 
stressed by Jasper (1997), most often it is because they have sufficiently disrupted the 
normal workings of major social institutions that the news media and authorities must 
pay attention to them, even if that attention is disapproving. The civil rights movement 
forced itself to the center of the public agenda in the 1960s through such disruptive 
actions as the bus boycotts, sit-ins and freedom rides. In the US at least, the news media 
and authorities did not even begin to acknowledge that serious critiques of neoliberal 
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globalization existed until the 1999 protests in Seattle shut down the opening meetings of 
the World Trade Organization--and a string of other such high profile protests followed. 
USAS contributed to a larger change in the political discourse in the US around the issue 
of sweatshops through the high profile sit-ins its members conducted on many college 
campuses, demanding codes of conduct--which forced apparel companies to respond with 
a counter-framing of corporate social responsibility. 
On the other hand, what constitutes the sort of disruptive action stressed by 
political process theorists is, to some extent, socially constructed. In his examination of 
the changing tactics of the civil rights movement, Doug McAdam (1983) notes that one 
of the ways actions such as sit-ins and freedom rides worked was by creating a “crisis 
definition of the situation” among all parties in the conflict--the civil rights movement, 
their segregationist foes, and the Kennedy and Johnson administrations (reluctant allies of 
the movement)--as well as in by-stander publics, who, for instance refused to go 
shopping in areas where sit-ins were happening, because they feared the unpredictable 
nature of the situation. Some of this can be seen in USAS’s actions as well--in larger 
schools, events such as sit-ins did not necessarily disrupt the smooth functioning of the 
administration per se, so much as cause a crisis of legitimacy for school officials; actions 
such as hunger strikes could have a similar affect. In some cases, causing a target to lose 
some of its legitimacy can be disruptive in and of itself--to the brands who are so 
dependent on their image, a loss in legitimacy means a potential loss in sales and 
therefore profits, a crisis for any company. 
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As noted in the introduction, cultural constructionist theorist Francesca Polletta 
(2005) has argued that it is a mistake to make a distinction between instrumental and 
value-rational or ideological approaches to strategy, even if one’s take is that movements 
seek to balance both. Instead, she argues that the process of determining what is 
instrumentally effective is a culture-laden process, involving a socially constructed 
interpretation of the world. My findings confirm this--ideology is central to the process of 
strategizing, not only in defining what a group’s values are and therefore what ends they 
want to achieve, but in helping them understand the social systems they are embedded in 
and what norms of action might alter those systems for the better. Without an ideology to 
help them make sense of the world around them, I find it doubtful that a movement could 
formulate a coherent strategy. 
Here we return to the dialectic of action and reflection (Ryan and Jeffreys 
forthcoming; Ryan et al. forthcoming), experience and ideology that underlies the process 
of strategic development and innovation in the anti-sweatshop movement. For a 
movement’s strategy to evolve, the movement must both practically experiment by taking 
action, then take the time to reflect on those experiences and their outcome through the 
lens of their ideology. We can see this process at work in the creation of both the Worker 
Rights Consortium and the Designated Suppliers Program. In each case, members of the 
anti-sweatshop movement took the time to collectively deliberate about their past 
experiences, particularly the obstacles they were running up against, whether the FLA or 
the short-term nature of their victories. In doing so, they used their value of worker 
empowerment and their analysis of the structural nature of the sweatshop problem--their 
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ideology in short--to understand what was wrong with the current situation and what new 
directions might make the most sense strategically. At the same time, a more subtle 
process happened in both instances, where the experiences and their reflection on them 
helped them deepen their ideology, more clearly seeing the imperative to empower 
workers and (in the case of the DSP) putting the problem of the structure of the apparel 
industry front and center in their thought about strategy. Thus, ideology shapes a 
movement’s actions, but reflection on such experiences can also shape a movement’s 
ideology. 
I would also stress that it is important to distinguish ideology from another 
cultural process, framing, not eliding the two as many political process theorists have. 
Doing so overextends the concept of framing, thereby robbing it of much of its analytical 
power. Framing is best understood in terms of the choices movements make as they vie 
with their foes in discursive arenas, trying to represent the issues and events they care 
about in ways that a wider audience can relate to. The distinction is important because, if 
a movement framed things strictly in terms of their own ideology, they would probably 
only communicate effectively with a much narrower range of people. The process of 
framing involves finding ways to modulate their message to reach a wider audience who 
may not understand or agree with their ideology. Both ideology and framing relate to 
strategy, but in different ways--a movement’s ideology helps them define their strategy, 
while framing is a strategic choice. 
The emphasis political process theorists put on the role of organizations in a 
movement’s success is correct, but they tend to define organizations rather narrowly as 
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mobilizing structures. Certainly, the role organizations play in mobilizing the 
movement’s membership is essential. But movement organizations are also--and equally 
importantly--decision-making structures. As Marshall Ganz (2000, 2009) has shown, the 
way an organization is structured to make decisions can result in critical differences in 
the quality of the resulting strategy, with deliberative, participatory structures producing 
far more innovation than top-down structures operating by fiat. But not all SMOs make 
their decisions through the sort of participatory, deliberative process that the anti-
sweatshop movement does. Many individual labor unions, for instance, still make their 
decisions internally through much more top-down methods--which in Ganz’s analysis 
results in decisions that are less well thought out, more likely to rely on old strategic 
models than new ones adapted to changing social conditions. Movement organization is 
also essential in creating a system of institutional memory, though which knowledge of 
the movement’s ideology, strategic models, and individual strategic practices--tactics, 
frames, etc.--can be passed on. Without such institutional memory, each new generation 
of activists would be forced to reinvent their strategy from scratch, greatly slowing the 
rate of progress by which movements can bring about change. Student movements are 
potentially particularly vulnerable to this, given that a generation on a college campus is 
only four years long. Thus, social movement organizations play an important role not 
simply in mobilizing members once a strategy has been formulated, but in formulating 
that strategy as well. 
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Political Opportunity Systems 
 Using the US anti-sweatshop movement as a case study, I have tried to give the 
concept of POS more specificity, while also redefining it as a political opportunity 
system, instead of a political opportunity structure--a system that includes social 
structures, but also cultural factors and non-movement social actors. To summarize, the 
POS is made up of multiple, interlocking social arenas, both discursive and decision-
making ones, which may be hierarchically arranged, or only more loosely coupled. While 
it is useful to analytically distinguish between discursive and decision-making arenas--
and most arenas are principally discursive or decision-making--all arenas have both 
discursive and decision-making elements. In the mass media, the social actors fighting 
frame battles must deal with the decisions made by journalists and editors in terms of 
what to cover and how; they may even lobby the decision-makers to cover certain stories 
in certain ways. In decision-making arenas, social actors must make their case, framing 
their arguments in ways that will persuade others--even if they are also bringing other 
pressures to bear, such as the threat of a strike or sit-in. In waging campus campaigns, 
USAS had much more success if it first met with the administration to frame their 
demands in a more conventional way, presenting their arguments in a dialogue with 
school officials; then going to establish their frame as the normative one on campus 
through getting positive coverage in the campus newspaper; and only then exerting 
leverage through sit-ins to force administrators to agree to codes of conduct, joining the 
WRC and/or the DSP, etc. 
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Such arenas, whether principally discursive or decision-making, can vary in many 
ways, affecting the degree to which they are open or closed to activists; formal 
democracy is one of these factors, but only one. Non-democratic arenas can also provide 
openings, especially where there are some norms of consultation, as with the ways in 
which college administrators are expected to give some audience to student concerns--
and as opposed to the way sweatshop owners generally regard the concerns of their 
workers. The general level of repression is another key factor. These various elements 
create different degrees of organizing space, room in which activists can build ties with 
each other independent of authorities and then mobilize to press for their demands. When 
trying to get access and affect the discourse and/or decisions in an arena, activists have to 
find ways of taking advantage of their standing and any potential leverage they have. 
Standing is normative, a type of status, connected with legitimacy--how much of a right 
to speak a social actor has, something that may vary with the issue at hand. Leverage, on 
the other hand, is structural, in the sense that it refers to activists’ ability to bring 
institutional pressure to bear, usually through disrupting the routine workings of the 
institution--which means their cooperation or at least quiescence is usually required for 
the smooth grinding of the institutional gears. 
While I have developed these concepts in the context of a movement with a focus 
primarily on economic and educational structures, I would argue that they are also useful 
for understanding movements that focus on challenging nation-states. If the mass media 
is the master discursive arena in contemporary society, as Myra Marx Ferree and her 
colleagues (2002) argue, the arena that has the greatest impact on public discourse in 
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other arenas; the nation-state remains the master decision-making arena, even in the age 
of neoliberalism. States have not only created the neoliberal laws and policies that have 
facilitated the rise of economic globalization and given corporations more free reign to 
exploit vulnerable populations; states also continue to carry out the task of repressing 
those populations when they rebel. Neoliberalism, for all its adherents’ talk of a minimal 
state, could not exist without the violence of the police and military (Harvey 2005). States 
are not simple organizations, but themselves consist of multiple interlocking decision-
making arenas. The US state, for instance, has multiple levels--local, state, federal--and 
branches--legislative, executive, judicial--all of which are venues in which movements 
can seek to influence decision-making (Tarrow 1998). Additionally, in the age of 
neoliberal globalization, it is not only the policies of nation-states that matter, but also of 
multilateral organizations that bring together multiple states; bodies such as the G-8, 
IMF, World Bank and WTO all play a critical role in creating the global architecture of 
neoliberalism (Robinson 2003). 
It is also worth highlighting the role that local media has played as important 
discursive arenas in the anti-sweatshop movement. When we think about social 
movements fighting frame battles with their foes, we most commonly think of this in 
connection with the national mass media. Certainly, this has been important in the case of 
the anti-sweatshop movement--scandals like Kathie Lee Gifford’s line of clothing being 
made by child workers brought the issue of sweatshops to national attention, galvanizing 
the movement; and much of the conflict around the creation of the FLA and WRC was 
fought out as frame battles in the national news media. At the same time though, USAS 
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has always made extensive use of student newspapers and other on-campus discursive 
arenas such as teach-ins to fight its frame battles. Indeed, when the arbiters of the 
national news media decided that sweatshops were old news and coverage declined, 
USAS could continue to draw attention to the issue through college-based media. 
Certainly, this is a smaller audience, but it kept the movement from being silenced 
altogether in the larger public discourse. And the frame battles fought in these localized 
discursive arenas have ultimate proved critical in the anti-sweatshop movement’s ability 
to have a global impact, by giving the movement the legitimacy to win their demands on 
campus and then use those successes as means to exert leverage over transnational 
apparel firms such as Nike and Reebok. (Local media coverage has also been important 
for SweatFree Communities, which we will look at below.) 
We may therefore conceive of the political opportunity system as whole as 
composed of interlocking decision-making and discursive arenas--nation-states, 
multilateral organizations, corporations, the national mass media, local media, etc.--
within which movements must contest ideas and decisions. Depending on the structure 
and norms of these arenas, different movement actors may have different degrees of 
access; and different arenas, in their turn, have differing degrees of power in the larger 
social system. Movements may not have meaningful access to the core arenas of society, 
in which case they will need to find ways to exercise indirect influence, forcing decisions 
through in semiperipheral arenas that in turn create pressure on core decision-makers. To 
exert such pressure, activists need to find ways to exert leverage. In some cases, 
movements may have some institutional leverage, most often through being able to use 
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the vote in formally democratic states to pressure elites. (For an example of this, see the 
discussion of SweatFree Communities below.) More often, they will have to exercise 
leverage through various forms of disruption--strikes, boycotts, civil disobedience, etc.--
creating such social disorder that elites are forced to react (Flacks 1988; Gamson 1990; 
McAdam 1983; Piven and Cloward 1977; Tarrow 1998). That reaction may take the form 
of repression, of counter-framing and counter-mobilization--or, when movements are 
successful, of some measure of concessions. The challenge for movements is to achieve 
enough legitimacy through their battles in discursive arenas and to find tactics to exercise 
sufficient leverage, that they can affect the choices made in core decision-making arenas, 
whether corporations or states, in a way that elites feel compelled to make such 
concessions, instead of defusing the movement through counter-framing and counter-
mobilization (as the apparel industry attempted to do with the Fair Labor Association) or 
crushing it through repression (as sweatshop owners continue to regularly do). 
 
Unanswered Questions 
 It is, of course, not a given that simply because the US anti-sweatshop movement 
develops its strategy in a particular way that other movements do so. This bears further 
exploration. One question in particular worth considering is the fact that the majority of 
people I interviewed were conscience constituents--they were involved in the anti-
sweatshop movement because of their ideology, not because they had any immediate 
material outcome in its stake. Groups that have specific, material grievances--people such 
as sweatshop workers for instance--may strategize somewhat differently. I would argue, 
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however, that how people understand their material interests are, at least in part, socially 
constructed--that is, defined through their ideology. Nonetheless, such material 
grievances do exist independently of ideology. No matter how sweatshop workers choose 
to interpret the causes and meaning of the conditions under which they work, these 
conditions are brutal, barely allowing a worker to scrape by and perhaps support her 
family--or they may not in fact be enough to get by, leading to early deaths from 
malnutrition or illness. Such material grievances doubtless interact with ideology in some 
complex way in shaping the strategy of activists in such a position. It would be worth 
exploring in future research how such interactions play out. 
 Another question worth examining is how the process of strategizing plays out in 
movements where there is less agreement on ideology and/or strategic models than in the 
anti-sweatshop movement. In conducting my interviews, I was actually surprised by the 
levels of agreement I found on these issues among activists in different positions. I 
actively probed for ideological or strategic disagreements between the student and labor 
wings of the movement, for instance, but found none of significance. The only thing that 
came up was some USAS members’ critique of unions overly hierarchical organization 
and the resulting limits in their internal democracy. While this is an important issue--and 
doubtless shapes the fortunes of the labor movement as such--it does not seem to have a 
significant impact on the anti-sweatshop movement itself, since union leaders are usually 
willing to deliberate as equals with other sectors of the anti-sweatshop movement, 
including student activists. Other movements, however, have surely had much deeper 
divides around ideology and strategy. One thinks of the civil rights movement, with the 
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conflicts between the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and the Student 
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee over whether the organization of the movement 
should center around charismatic ministers or be broadly egalitarian and participatory; or 
the disagreements between advocates of nonviolence and groups like the Black Panther 
Party who believed in the importance of armed self-defense. One can also look at the 
contemporary global justice movement, where there are sometimes contentious debates 
around whether the best path towards social transformation is through the capture and 
transformation of state power or through carving out democratic spaces autonomous from 
the state. Or the debates within the environmental movement about whether cap-and-
trade is an acceptable first step towards addressing global warming or a policy that will 
simply make the problem even worse by commodifying the very air. 
 This brings up a related issue--the relationship between ideology and/or strategic 
models on the one hand and the collective identity of a movement on the other. Verta 
Taylor and Nancy E. Whittier (1999) note that part of the process of building a collective 
identity involves drawing boundaries, whereby some people are symbolically excluded 
from a particular group. Jasper (1997) has noted that within movements, various groups 
may distinguish themselves from others in the same movement based on the sorts of 
tactics they favor--lobbying versus direct action for instance. In the anti-sweatshop 
movement, we see its members drawing boundaries to distinguish themselves from the 
fair trade movement based on ideology, particularly around the core value of worker 
empowerment. In many ways, there seems to be clear-cut relationship in the anti-
sweatshop movement between ideology, strategic models and collective identity. In other 
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movements, where there is less consensus around issues of ideology and strategy, the 
relationship between these three factors is likely to be a good deal more complicated. Just 
how these relationships play out is worthy of further study. 
 Another area that bears closer examination is the exact relationship between 
ideology and framing. I have argued that it is important to distinguish the two, but this 
does not mean that there is a not a relationship between them. In deciding on how to 
frame their message, activists must decide how closely they want to hew to their ideology 
and how much they want to use frames that may be more familiar to their audience--and 
therefore more likely to win people over. For a movement whose ideas fall in or near the 
mainstream, this may not be much of a dilemma. The farther a movement’s ideology is 
from the mainstream, the more troublesome this decision will be--and, since an ideology 
includes a movement’s core values, it is not necessarily a simple strategic decision to 
frame an issue in ways that depart too much from that ideology, no matter how much this 
may help build support for an issue. The anti-sweatshop movement’s ideology of worker 
empowerment, while not necessarily inherently radical, does lie well outside of 
mainstream discourse, which tends to see sweatshop workers as passive victims, not 
agents trying to improve their lives. One thing I have not been able to look closely at in 
this study is the degree to which USAS’s commitment to worker empowerment in 
practice translated into their framing of the issue of sweatshops to a larger audience. And, 
even if USAS did emphasize worker empowerment in their framing, that is far from a 
guarantee that journalists, whether for student newspapers or the national news media, 
will pick up on that frame; they may well simply go with the familiar frame of passive 
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victims. When dealing with the tension between ideology and successful framing, 
different movements have doubtless struck different balances and have made varying 
choices at different points in time and in different social arenas. Examining how 
movements make these decisions though is worth more in-depth study. 
 This study also opens up the question of how social actors other than social 
movements strategize. The transnational apparel corporations who are the movement’s 
main foes certainly acted in a strategic manner, responding to the actions of anti-
sweatshop activists with actions of their own meant to defuse the power of the activists. 
These range from the brute repression of sweatshop workers using hired guards and the 
police to sophisticated framing campaigns involving the creation of corporate-controlled 
monitoring bodies like the FLA. In Getting Your Way, James Jasper (2006) assumes that 
all social actors--individual and collective; social movements, businesses, militaries and 
governments--all strategize in basically the same way. My research suggests otherwise. 
While I have not analyzed in depth the ways in which apparel corporations formulated 
their strategy, what I have analyzed leads me to suspect that they strategize in different 
ways, given the profoundly different nature of corporations form social movements--they 
command different sorts of resources, are differently positioned within the social 
structure, have different amounts of legitimacy, and have different sorts of goals. 
For instance, Nike’s primary goal is to maximize its profits and secondarily--as a 
means to this first goal--to maintain a certain brand image. They also seek to maintain the 
status quo of the social system--though we cannot assume that this is a conscious goal, as 
opposed to a taken-for-granted, assumed goal which is implicit in all they do without ever 
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being spelled out. Nike may have loyal consumers, but it is doubtful that they could 
mobilize them in the way that a movement does its members; instead, Nike relies on the 
vast sums of money it controls to influence policy-makers in other social arenas and to 
push its frames in the mass media. In doing so, Nike has standing and leverage that a 
movement can never hope to achieve simply because of the fact that Nike is a major 
corporation. Additionally, Nike’s leverage comes from institutionalized sources--its 
ability to command vast amounts of resources, workers around the world, and substantial 
political influence. Unlike USAS, Nike does not have to disrupt the workings of business 
as usual to exercise leverage; indeed, as long as business as usual is operating, Nike may 
in fact need to do very little to actively exert leverage, because other social actors (such 
as its contractors) often react to the implicit threat that such leverage could be exercised 
without a word ever being said. While the way Nike and other corporations strategize 
may well bear some resemblance to how social movements strategize--and there may 
indeed be commonalities in the way all social actors strategize--it seems unlikely that 
corporate, government, or military actors strategize in exactly the same way as social 
movements. This bears further exploration. 
 
The Future of the Anti-Sweatshop Movement 
 This dissertation is by no means a complete overview of the anti-sweatshop 
movement. Instead, it focused on two US groups--United Students Against Sweatshops 
and the Worker Rights Consortium--that have been among the most dynamic in the 
movement. Their influence can be seen in the formation of a group called SweatFree 
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Communities, which has sought to adapt the strategic model developed by USAS in the 
arena of higher education to a new social arena, that of local (city and state) governments. 
Like colleges and universities, city and state governments are institutional consumers 
whose business is valued by many companies. Additionally, they are spending tax money 
on the items they purchase, which makes it possible for activists to frame their demands 
in terms of public accountability--that the companies who benefit from tax-payers’ 
dollars should uphold the standards set by tax-payers. This makes city and state 
governments a logical choice in terms of replicating and adapting USAS’s strategy of 
focusing on using the leverage of institutional consumers (Claessen, Foxvog; interviews, 
2007). 
There are, of course, important differences between the social arenas of colleges 
and local government, which are reflecting in differences in strategies and goals. The 
bulk of what city and state governments purchase is, in fact, electronics and food, not 
apparel. SweatFree Communities has nonetheless chosen to initially focus on the uniform 
companies with which local government do business, since the movement as a whole is 
more familiar with the workings of the apparel industry; when they have successfully 
created a model for local governments to demand accountability for working conditions 
in the apparel industry, SweatFree Communities hopes to extend its model to other 
industries that do business the local governments. Even the sort of apparel companies 
SweatFree Communities is targeting are different though--uniform companies such as 
Cintas that have a relatively low brand profile compared to companies such as Nike and 
Reebok. This means that some of USAS’s tactics, particularly those that focus on 
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damaging a company’s brand image, are less effective--though not wholly ineffective, 
since these companies still worry to some extent about their legitimacy. Additionally, 
SweatFree Communities activists have a form of institutionalized leverage USAS has 
never had--the threat of voting uncooperative officials out of office. As a result, they have 
relied less on the sort of confrontational tactics USAS finds necessary and instead relied 
heavily on coalition-building with constituencies, such as labor and religious groups, who 
are critical to elected officials’ own coalitions that keep them in office. Thus, the 
differences in social arena mean that, at the local level, there are important differences in 
strategy (Claessen, Foxvog; interviews, 2007). 
At the global level, on the other hand, SweatFree Communities’ strategy is very 
similar to that of USAS. SweatFree Communities is looking to set up a monitoring body 
that will be able to bring together local governments that have passed sweat-free 
purchasing laws to harness their collective power to effectively and independently 
monitor working conditions of their business partners in the same way that the WRC has 
done for schools. In doing so, SweatFree Communities has sought not to simply replicate 
the WRC, but to incorporate many of the lessons it has learned, including building 
something like the Designated Suppliers Program into the workings of the State and 
Local Government Sweat Free Consortium (SLGSWC). At the same time, they have had 
to adapt the model to address the needs of local governments. As a matter of basic policy, 
government officials--even the highly supportive ones whom SweatFree Communities 
has worked closely with--have insisted that public officials must constitute a majority of 
the board, with activist members in a minority position. This is striking different than the 
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WRC, where USAS and independent labor rights experts each control one-third of the 
board, with college administrators only controlling the remaining third. Additionally, the 
SLGSWC will not be able to conduct monitoring operations itself--it must allow different 
monitoring organizations to bid for the job, as is done with all government contracts. The 
concern activists have is that it ultimately contracts with a reliable, truly independent 
monitor with real expertise in labor rights--not an organization like the Fair Labor 
Association, with its close corporate ties. Much of SweatFree Communities’ work has 
thus focused on ways to ensure that the Consortium will meet the needs of allied public 
officials but remain true to the purposes of the activists who originally envisioned it 
(Claessen, Foxvog; interviews, 2007). 
Despite the anti-sweatshop movement’s strategic creativity, its future remains 
unclear. USAS and the WRC have, so far, been frustrated in their goal of seeing the DSP 
implemented. This may change if the Obama administration’s Justice Department 
certifies the Program’s legality, which will certainly increase its legitimacy in the eyes of 
college administrators. On the other hand, the movement will still have to overcome 
strong opposition from the apparel industry--opposition that may be more fierce than that 
towards the WRC because of the more profound changes the DSP would require of the 
apparel industry. This should remind us of something important--a social movement can 
do everything correctly, strategically speaking, and still fail, because the larger political 
opportunity system simply does not provide enough opportunities. Even in the best of 
circumstances, social movements face an uphill battle against more powerful foes--if they 
didn’t, they would not need to resort to the disruptive tactics movements must so often 
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fall back on. In circumstances that are highly unfavorable, there may be little a movement 
can do beyond popular education work to lay the groundwork for potential mobilizations 
in the future when the POS becomes more open. 
On the other hand, the DSP may not be essential to the anti-sweatshop 
movement’s success. Or, if it is implemented and does ultimately contribute to policy 
reforms--not just on the part of companies, but on governments and multilateral agencies, 
as is the movement’s ultimate goal--the effects of the DSP may not be straightforward. 
While one of the goals of the DSP is to show that it is possible for companies to follow 
an alternative production model while remaining profitable, even if implemented and 
creating pressure for greater change, the DSP model may well not be the model 
implemented on a grand scale. For better or worse, social movements rarely achieve 
exactly what they set out to achieve; they rarely see the passage of the reforms that they 
campaigned for. This is because, even when policy-makers are forced to respond to 
movements and make concessions to them in the form of substantial social reforms, it is 
still the policy-makers crafting the reforms, not the movements--and even sympathetic 
policy-makers have their own agendas. 
 Additionally, any impact the anti-sweatshop movement is likely to have will 
certainly not happen in isolation. The outsourcing of production--the main structural 
cause of sweatshops--is embedded in a host of other practices, many of them likewise 
geared towards maximizing profits by any means necessary, which together constitute the 
system of neoliberal globalization. It seems unlikely that the injustices around sweatshops 
will be righted in the long-term without significant changes in the global economy as a 
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whole, not just in outsourcing practices. Anti-sweatshop activists are certainly aware of 
this--the anti-sweatshop movement is one of the constituent movements of the larger 
global justice movement, with members of USAS attending protests against the meetings 
of the WTO, IMF, World Bank and other such summits of world leaders meant to 
perpetuate and deepen the neoliberal restructuring of the global economy. Thus, activism 
around issues of sweatshops is occurring in the context of widespread, global--and in 
some cases, highly militant--activism around a broad range of issues, the common 
denominator of which is opposition to the larger neoliberal agenda. It is likely all these 
various elements of transnational global justice activism that together will force policy-
makers to enact the dramatic reforms necessary, not only around production practices, but 
a whole host of issues--plus the wider context of deepening economic and environmental 
crises that, at some point, will convince all but the most dogmatic elites that serious 
change is necessary. If the global justice movement is very lucky, the sort of transitions 
in power that we have seen in countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela may 
become more common. But, even if such transitions deepen democracy significantly, 
power structures will not be completely horizontal and egalitarian and there will be, for 
better or worse, a class of policy-makers trying to craft and implement reforms. Thus, 
while in the short run, anti-sweatshop activists may win important victories concretely 
improving the lives of specific workers at specific factories, in the long run, it may 
simply be the agitation created by the movement--and the pressure this puts on the 
powerful--that produces change, rather than any specific victory. 
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This is not to belittle the work of the anti-sweatshop movement--quite the 
opposite. The more successful the movement is in dragging specific concessions out of 
elites--the executives of companies such as Nike, Reebok, Champion, Cintas, etc.--the 
more they raise the costs of the current economic model. If they succeed in implementing 
the DSP, this will only raise the costs of the current model more--and point to the 
possibility of alternative models, even if it is not a model based on the DSP that is 
specifically implemented. The anti-sweatshop movement’s strategic creativity and its 
ability to win concrete victories will thus be critical in any major change of the global 
economy, even if the ultimate form of that transformation is not quite what anti-
sweatshop and other global justice activists had in mind. 
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1 For an exception, see Piven and Cloward (1977); for a rebuttal of their position, see 
Gamson and Schmeidler (1984). 
2 It should be noted that, according to the Human Rights Watch report, managers claimed 
that they hired the armed guards because of telephoned death threats they received 
(Human Rights Watch 1997). 
3 Strictly speaking, Robinson (2003) and Ross and Trachte (1990) would not consider 
themselves world-systems theorists, despite their usage of ideas from that school, due to 
debates over the proper definition of capitalism that lie beyond the scope of this work. 
4 For statistics on the rise in media coverage of sweatshops, see Ross (2004). 
5 Ross was one of the founders of Students for a Democratic Society in 1960; he is now a 
professor at Clark University and an advisor to USAS at the national level, putting him in 
a position to witness the changes in how campus administrators have dealt with student 
activists over several decades. 
6 This discussion of USAS’s demographics is based on the observations of experienced 
USAS members. Since the different observers I spoke with more or less concurred, these 
impressions should be given some credibility. To my knowledge, however, they are not 
based on scientific surveys and should not be taken in that light. 
7 It should be noted that the FLA is only one of three major monitoring organizations 
affiliated with the apparel industry. The other two are Social Accountability International 
(SAI) and Worldwide Responsible Apparel Production (WRAP); of the three, the FLA is 
generally considered the most credible within movement circles. This is because, while 
the FLA includes some NGOs and has had to make some concessions to their concerns, 
the SAI and WRAP have only corporate members, leaving their standards far lower than 
the FLA’s. Ultimately, however, all three suffer from the fundamental flaw of an innate 
conflict of interest (Esbenshade 2004b; Rodríguez-Garavito 2005).Since the SAI and 
WRAP are not involved with the chain of events I am tracing in this dissertation, I do not 
discuss them here. For a detailed review of their operations, see Esbenshade (2004b) and 
O’Rourke (2003). 
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8 See his website, http://rlocke.scripts.mit.edu/ (accessed January 19, 2010), where it 
says, “His work has also had an impact on Nike’s business practices, helping the 
company to integrate reporting and auditing labor conditions with its quality 
improvement efforts.” Nike also gave him access to the company’s own data on the 
outcomes of its internal CSR program (See Locke et al. 2007). 
9 Given that the harsh competitive pressures of the global market more or less force 
companies to focus on maximizing profits before all else if they want to survive, such 
steps would probably nned to involve something like creating a system of enforceable 
international labor law. 
10 Such as Social Accountability International (SAI) and Worldwide Responsible Apparel 
Production (WRAP). For more information on these organizations, see Esbenshade 
(2004b) and O’Rourke (2003). 
11 “Working to rule” is a tactic frequently used by unions when they do not feel a full-out 
strike is appropriate. It involves workers following management’s rules for production 
precisely, not deviating at all. This inevitably slows down production considerably, since 
the rules do not reflect the flexibility needed to make sure the process goes smoothly or 
the fact that workers frequently perform tasks not in their formal job descriptions. 
12 Robinson (2003) actually raises this issue in speaking not of commodity chains, but of 
the relations of core, semiperipheral and peripheral states in the capitalist world-system. 
Given the rising inequalities within as well as between states, Robinson argues that it is a 
mistake to simply consider all of the population subject to a particular state, whether core 
or peripheral, to be core or peripheral in turn. Within any state, there are both core 
populations who exercise great power both locally and globally, and peripheral 
populations, who are increasingly marginalized. 
13 Social movement unionism has been important not only for labor struggles in Global 
South, but for the on-going revival of labor activism in the US (Fantasia and Voss 2004). 
Indeed, USAS has its roots in efforts by the AFL-CIO’s national leadership to form ties 
with non-labor groups, since many of USAS’s early leaders first connected with the labor 
movement though Union Summer, a summer internship program geared towards building 
ties between students and labor, as discussed in chapter five. 
14 Those groups that they did criticize, such as fair trade-oriented groups, they tended to 
see as part of a distinct movement and not part of the anti-sweatshop movement. 
Although this could be interpreted to mean that anti-sweatshop activists are, in fact, more 
narrow-minded that the Chicago gay rights activists, the anti-sweatshop activists and fair 
trade activists do seem to form distinct social networks and can therefore legitimately be 
considered separate movements, ideological differences aside. 
15 On USAS’s website, there are two nearly identical pages urging students to apply for 
the internship program. One 
(http://www.studentsagainstsweatshops.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view
&id=195&Itemid=2) says that twelve students will be sent that year, another 
(http://www.studentsagainstsweatshops.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view
&id=219&Itemid=2) eight to ten students. Unfortunately, neither page (both accessed 
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August 23, 2009) has any date attached to it, beyond the 2009 copyright found on all 
USAS pages. 
16 As noted in chapter twelve, BJ&B, unfortunately, closed down in 2007, as Yupoong--
the company which owned the factory--looked to escape from their obligations to the 
workers’ union. Under a program known as the Bookstore Initiative, however, the WRC 
arranged in 2009 for Knight Apparel--one of the major college apparel producers--to 
reopen the factory where BJ&B was housed, giving hiring preference to former workers 
there. Knight Apparel has also committed to ensuring that workers are paid a living wage 
and to collectively bargain with an independent union representing the workers, with the 
WRC acting as a monitor to ensure these conditions are met (Nova 2009) 
